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Abstract
This thesis is developed in the framework of symbolic analysis of cryptographic
protocols. The contributions of this thesis can be split into three mains parts:
1. We analyse the three classes of cryptographic protocols using respectively col-
lision vulnerable hash functions, key substitution vulnerable digital signature
schemes, and cryptographic primitives represented by convergent equational the-
ories having the finite variant property.
• We conjecture that the verification problem of the first class of protocols can
be reduced to the verification problem of the class of cryptographic protocols
using an associative symbol of concatenation, and we show the decidability
of the verification problem for the last class.
• We show the decidability of the verification problem for the second two
classes of protocols.
2. We show the decidability of the ground entailment problem for a new fragment
of first order logic, and we show the application of this result on the verification
problem of cryptographic protocols.
3. We analyse the electronic-voting protocols, and we give a formal definition for
the voter-verifiability property. We also show that some well-known electronic
voting protocols satisfy this property.
Keywords: Security protocols, electronic-voting protocols, decision proce-
dures, algebraic primitives, constraint systems, first order clauses, resolution,
saturation, applied pi calculus.
This thesis is presented and defended at Toulouse on the 9th of Decem-
ber 2009, was performed under the supervision of Yannick Chevalier and
Philippe Balbiani. The author obtained the degree of Docteur en Informatique
de l’Universite´ de Toulouse.
vRe´sume´
Chapitre 1: Introduction
Dans notre socie´te´, l’utilisation des applications e´lectroniques comme la com-
munication e´lectronique, le vote e´lectronique, le commerce e´lectronique, etc est
progressive. Afin de garantir la se´curite´ qui est l’un des aspects importants,
de telles applications utilisent des protocoles cryptographiques. Ces derniers
sont des petits programmes exe´cute´s en paralle`le par plusieurs agents distants,
et communicants entre eux a` travers un re´seau. Dans les protocoles cryp-
tographiques, les messages, ou une partie des messages, sont produits a` l’aide
des primitives cryptographiques (sche´mas de chiffrement, sche´mas de signa-
ture, fonctions de hachage, etc). La cryptographie est utilise´e depuis des milliers
d’anne´es pour se´curiser les communications militaires et diplomatiques. Par
exemple, le ce´le`bre empereur romain Jules Ce´sar utilisait le chiffrement pour
communiquer en toute se´curite´ avec ses troupes.
Malheureusement, l’utilisation des primitives cryptographiques dans un
protocole n’est pas suffisante pour assurer sa se´curite´ et plusieurs attaques
ont e´te´ de´couvertes sur plusieurs protocoles deja e´tablis [78]. L’exemple le
plus frappant est l’attaque (appelee´e man-in-the-middle attack) de´couverte par G.
Lowe [144] sur le protocole de Needham-Schroeder 17 ans apre`s la publication
du protocole. Cette situation aboutit a`, et montre l’importance de l’e´laboration
des outils et des proce´dures de de´cision pour la ve´rification formelle et automa-
tique des protocoles cryptographiques.
Protocoles cryptographiques
Communication via un e´change de messages
Un protocole de communication, ou tout simplement un protocole, peut eˆtre de´crit
par des e´changes des messages entre de nombreux participants. Ces e´changes
sont ge´ne´ralement de´crits par un sce´nario, c’est-a`-dire une se´quence des re`gles
chacune indiquant l’expe´diteur, le re´cepteur, et le message e´change´. Le sce´nario
de´crit une exe´cution normal (dite aussi une exe´cution correcte) du protocole, c’est
a` dire la fac¸on dans laquelle le protocole devrait eˆtre exe´cuter en l’absence de
l’intrus. Un exemple simple de protocole de communication est pre´sente´ dans
la figure 1.1.
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Figure 1 Exemple de protocole{
A⇒ B : “Salut, je suis A.”
B ⇒ A : “Salut, je suis B. Enchante´ de faire ta connaissance.”
Ce protocole de´crit la premie`re rencontre entre deux personnes. Dans ce pro-
tocole, nous avons deux roˆles “ A” (abre´viation de “ Alice”) et “ B” (abre´viation
de “ Bob”).
Dans le sce´nario, les roˆles repre´sentent des participants abstraits. Dans le pro-
tocole de´crit dans la figure 1.1, nous avons deux roˆles “ A” (le roˆle initiateur) et
“ B” (le roˆle re´pondeur).
Nous appelons une exe´cution du protocole tout ensemble cohe´rent, par rap-
port a` la description de ce protocole, d’e´changes des messages entre ses partic-
ipants. Dans l’exe´cution d’un protocole, les roˆles sont instancie´s par des partic-
ipants concre`ts, e´galement appele´s agents. Lorsqu’un agent A instancie un roˆle
R, on dit que “ l’agent A joue le roˆle R”. On remarque que le roˆle peut eˆtre
joue´ par plusieurs agents et tout agent peut jouer plusieurs roˆles ou le meˆme
roˆle a` plusieurs reprises. Nous appelons une session d’un protocole un ensem-
ble d’e´changes des messages entre les participants du protocole, qui satisfait les
conditions suivantes:
1. cohe´rent par rapport a` la description de ce protocole,
2. peut eˆtre re´pe´te´,
3. et chaque roˆle est instancie´ une seule fois.
On remarque qu’il est important de prendre en conside´ration plusieurs in-
stances du meˆme protocole, et donc on parle d’une exe´cution d’une seule ses-
sion du protocole, et de plusieurs sessions du protocole.
Example 1 L’ensemble suivant des e´changes des messages{
(1).1 Alice(A)→ Bob(B) : “Bonjour, je suis Alice.”
(1).2 Bob(B)→ Alice(A) : “Salut, je m’appelle Bob. Enchante´ de faire ta connaissance.”
repre´sente une exe´cution d’une session du protocole de´crit dans l’exemple 1.1.
Dans cette exe´cution, nous avons deux participants concrets, “Alice” jouant le roˆle
“A” et “Bob” jouant le roˆle “B”.
Example 2 L’ensemble suivant des e´changes de messages
(1).1 Alice(A)→ Bob(B) : “Bonjour, je suis Alice.”
(2).1 Bob(A)→Marlie(B) : “Bonjour, je suis Bob.”
(1).2 Bob(B)→ Alice(A) : “Salut, je suis Bob. Enchante´ de faire ta connaissance.”
(2).2 Marlie(B)→ Bob(A) : “Salut, je suis Marlie. Enchante´ de faire ta connaissance.”
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repre´sente une exe´cution de deux sessions du protocole de´crit dans l’exemple 1.1. Dans
cette exe´cution, nous avons trois participants concrets, “Alice”, “Bob” et “Marlie” :
“Alice” (jouant le roˆle “A”) instancie une session (1) avec “Bob” (jouant le roˆle “B”),
puis, “Bob” (jouant le roˆle “A”) instancie une autre session (2) avec “Marlie” (jouant
le roˆle “B”).
Participants
Un protocole cryptographique est un protocole de communication visant a` garan-
tir plusieurs proprie´te´s de se´curite´, telles que l’e´change des informations secre`tes
(proprie´te´ de secret), l’authentification de la personne avec laquelle on communique,
l’anonymat, etc. Nous avons deux cate´gories des participants concre`ts d’un pro-
tocole : “les participants honneˆtes” et “les participants malhonneˆtes”.
Participant honneˆte
Un participant honneˆte est un participant concre`t du protocole. Il envoie et rec¸oit
des messages en suivant le mode`le de´fini par le roˆle qu’il joue.
Participant malhonneˆte
Les protocoles cryptographiques sont exe´cute´s dans un environnement non
se´curise´. Cet environnement est repre´sente´ par un participant spe´cial du pro-
tocole : le participant malhonneˆte, e´galement appele´ l’intrus, l’adversaire, ou
l’attaquant. L’intrus a un controˆle complet sur le moyen de communication (le
re´seau), il e´coute la communication et a la possibilite´ de re´cupe´rer tous les mes-
sages circulant dans le re´seau, il peut intercepter, bloquer et/ou rediriger tous
les messages envoye´s par les agents honneˆtes. Il peut cacher son identite´ et
prendre part dans le protocole sous l’identite´ d’un participant honneˆte. Il peut
aussi de´duire de nouveaux messages a` partir de ses connaissances en utilisant
quelques re`gles spe´cifiques. Cet intrus s’appelle l’intrus de Dolev-Yao et ceci
en se re´fe´renciant a` D. Dolev et A. Yao qui etaient les premiers a` introduire ce
mode`le d’intrus.
L’intrus est appele´ :
• e´couteur quand il est seulement capable d’e´couter le re´seau.
• passif quand il est seulement capable d’e´couter le re´seau et d’utiliser des
re`gles spe´cifiques pour calculer de nouveaux messages.
• actif quand il peut en outre envoyer des messages aux participants
honneˆtes.
Si nous avons plus d’un intrus, nous supposons que tous les intrus coope`rent
ensemble.
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Proprie´te´s de se´curite´
Les protocoles cryptographiques sont des protocoles de communication visant a`
assurer certains objectifs de se´curite´ appele´s proprie´te´s de se´curite´. Nous donnons
ci-dessous certaines de ces proprie´te´s.
Secret
La proprie´te´ de secret est e´galement appele´e proprie´te´ de confidentialite´ ou
proprie´te´ de vie prive´e. Nous distinguons trois niveaux principaux de la pro-
prie´te´ de secret :
• Le secret simple signifie que les “donne´es secre`tes” ne devraient eˆtre
connu que par certains agents, et en particulier ne devraient pas eˆtre
connus par l’intrus, on dit que le secret de la donne´e “sec” est conserve´
si l’intrus n’est pas capable de la de´duire.
• Le secret fort signifie que l’intrus ne doit pas eˆtre en mesure de savoir
quoi que ce soit au sujet des donne´es secre`tes.
• Le secret de transfe`rt signifie que certaines donne´es secre`tes doivent
eˆtre tenues secre`tes a` l’intrus, meˆme apre`s avoir re´ve´le´ d’autres
donne´es secre`tes.
Dans ce document, et par souci de simplicite´, nous de´signerons par la
“proprie´te´ de secret” le “secret simple”.
Authentification
La proprie´te´ d’authentification est e´troitement lie´e a` la proprie´te´
d’identification. Cette proprie´te´ est applique´e a` la fois sur les entite´s et les
informations. Deux agents communicant ensemble devraient s’identifier
mutuellement. D’une fac¸on similaire, les informations livre´es sur un
canal doivent eˆtre authentifie´ comme l’origine des donne´es, le contenu des
donne´es, etc. La proprie´te´ d’authentification est divise´e en deux classes :
l’authentification de l’entite´ et l’authentification de l’origine des donne´es. On re-
marque que l’authentification de l’origine des donne´es implique la proprie´te´
d’inte´grite´ des donne´es, qui porte sur la modification non autorise´e des
donne´es.
Non-re´pudiation
cette proprie´te´ empeˆche une entite´ de nier ses engagements ou ses actions
ante´rieurs.
On remarque que d’autres proprie´te´s de se´curite´ telles que l’anonymat, le certi-
ficat, la re´vocation, etc peuvent eˆtre de´rive´s des proprie´te´s de secret, authentifica-
tion, inte´grite´ des donne´es et de la non-re´pudiation. On remarque e´galement que
des types spe´cifiques des protocoles cryptographiques tels que “les protocoles
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de vote e´lectronique” requie`rent encore d’autres proprie´te´s de se´curite´ telles
que “la re´sistancea` la coercition, l’absence d’un recu, la ve´rification des votes,
etc”. Ces proprie´te´s sont discute´s plus en de´tail dans le Chapitre 7. Une liste
comple`te des proprie´te´s de se´curite´ se trouve dans [179].
Primitives cryptographiques
Les protocoles cryptographiques sont des protocoles de communication qui
utilisent des primitives cryptographiques pour construire les messages. Nous
donnons ci-dessous certaines de ces primitives cryptographiques, et pour cha-
cune d’entre elles certaines de ses proprie´te´s alge´briques.
Concate´nation
La concate´nation, note´e “·”, est couramment utilise´e dans les protocoles cryp-
tographiques pour la construction des messages. L’algorithme de concate´nation
“·” est repre´sente´ par une fonction qui prend un couple de messages comme ar-
guments d’entre´e et ge´ne`re leur concate´nation, par exemple la concate´nation de
“a” et “b”est “a·b”.
Nous donnons ci-dessous les proprie´te´s alge´briques de la concate´nation:
Associativite : (x · y) · z = x · (y · z)
Unaire : x ·  =  · x = x
Ou exclusif
Le ou exclusif, note´ “⊕” ou “XOR”, est couramment utilise´ dans les proto-
coles cryptographiques pour la construction des messages, il a les proprie´te´s
alge´briques suivantes :
Associativite : (x⊕ y)⊕ z = x⊕ (y ⊕ z)
Commutativite : x⊕ y = y ⊕ x
Unaire : x⊕  = x
Nilpotence : x⊕ x = 
Le couplage
Le couplage, note´ “〈−,−〉”, est couramment utilise´ dans les protocoles cryp-
tographiques pour construire des messages, il a les proprie´te´s alge´briques suiv-
antes :
1ere projection : pi1(〈x, y〉) = x
2eme projection : pi2(〈x, y〉) = y
xou` pi1 et pi2 denotent les fonctions de projection. La diffe´rence principale entre le
couplage et la concate´nation est que le premier n’est pas un ope´rateur associatif,
i.e. 〈x〈y, z〉〉 6= 〈〈x, y〉, z〉.
Sche´mas de chiffrement
Nous avons deux types de sche´mas de chiffrement : les sche´mas de chiffrement a`
clefs publiques (appele´s aussi sche´mas de chiffrement asyme´triques) et les sche´mas de
chiffrement a` clefs secre`tes (appele´s aussi sche´mas de chiffrement syme´triques).
Sche´mas de chiffrement a` clefs publiques
Les sche´mas de chiffrement a` clefs publiques, appele´s aussi sche´mas de chiffrement
asyme´triques, ont e´te´ introduits initialement par W. Diffie et M. Hellman [101] et
R. Merkle [154].
Un “syste`me de chiffrement a` clefs publiques” est de´fini par trois algo-
rithmes : l’algorithme de chiffrement “encp”, l’algorithme de de´chiffrement “decp”,
et l’algorithme de ge´ne´ration de clefs “G”. L’algorithme de ge´ne´ration de clefs
prend comme arguments d’entre´e le nom d’un agent A et un nombre ge´ne´re´
ale´atoirement et retourne une paire de clefs publique et secre`te, note´es respec-
tivement par Pk(A) et Sk(A), qui correspond a` l’agent A. Ce nombre ale´atoire
permet a` tout agent d’avoir une paire de clefs diffe´rente pour chaque ses-
sion tout en utilisant le meˆme algorithme de ge´ne´ration de clefs. L’algorithme
de chiffrement prend comme arguments d’entre´e un message clair, et la clef
publique d’un agent, et retourne le chiffrement de ce message clair avec la
clef publique donne´e. L’algorithme de de´chiffrement prend comme arguments
d’entre´e un texte chiffre´ et la clef prive´e d’un agent, et retourne le de´chiffrement
de ce texte chiffre´ avec la clef prive´e donne´e a` condition que le texte chiffre´ a e´te´
obtenu en utilisant la clef publique correspondante a` la clef prive´e donne´e.
Example 3 L’un des sche´mas de chiffrement a` clefs publiques les plus courants est le
sche´ma de chiffrement construit par R. Rivest, A. Shamir et L. Adleman [174] et note´
par “chiffrement RSA a` clefs publiques”.
Un sche´ma parfait de chiffrement a` clefs publiques est repre´sente´ par l’e´quation
suivante :
decp(encp(x, Pk(y)), Sk(y)) = x
Sche´mas de chiffrement a` clefs syme´triques
Un sche´ma de chiffrement a` clefs syme´triques est similaire a un sche´ma de chiffrement
a` clefs asyme´triques avec la diffe´rence que la meˆme clef est utilise´e pour chiffrer
et de´chiffrer les messages. Cela signifie que, dans ces sche´mas de chiffrement,
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l’algorithme de ge´ne´ration de clefs retourne une seule clef au lieu d’une paire
de clefs. En outre, dans ces sche´mas, l’algorithme de chiffrement est note´ encs,
et l’algorithme de de´chiffrement decs.
Un sche´ma parfait de chiffrement a` clefs syme´triques est repre´sente´ par l’e´quation
suivante :
decs(encs(x, y), y) = x
Proprie´te´s alge´briques
Un sche´ma de chiffrement a` clefs (asyme´triques ou syme´triques) peut utiliser
certains ope´rateurs tels que la concate´nation “·”, ou XOR “⊕”, ou la multi-
plication “∗”, ou le couplage “〈−,−〉”. Tels sche´mas ont certaines proprie´te´s
alge´briques et qui sont les suivantes:
Commutativite´. La proprie´te´ commutative est repre´sente´e par l’e´quation suiv-
ante enc(enc(x, y), z) = enc(enc(x, z), y). L’un des sche´mas de chiffrement
commutatifs les plus importants est le sche´ma de chiffrement RSA a` clefs
publiques avec des modules communs [69].
Homomorphisme. La proprie´te´ homomorphique est repre´sente´e par l’e´quation
suivante enc(x, y) ∗ enc(z, y) = enc(x ∗ z, y), et cela signifie que l’on peut
obtenir du chiffrement des messages m1 et m2 le chiffrement du nouveau
message m1 ∗m2 sans connaıˆtre la clef de chiffrement. Le sche´ma de chiffre-
ment RSA a` clefs publiques posse`de cette proprie´te´ [112].
Pre´fixe. La proprie´te´ de pre´fixe signifie que l’on peut obtenir a` partir d’un
message chiffre´ le chiffrement d’un de ses pre´fixes, et elle est formellement
repre´sente´e comme le suivant : a` partir d’un message enc(< x, y >, z) on
peut obtenir le message enc(x, z).
Sche´mas de signature
La premie`re apparition des sche´mas de signature est dans le papier se´minal de
W. Diffie et M. E. Hellman [101]. L’objectif le plus important des sche´mas de
signature est de de´montrer l’authenticite´ d’un message ou d’un document : une
signature nume´rique valide donne une raison de croire que le message a e´te´ cre´e
par un expe´diteur connu, et qu’il n’a pas e´te´ modifie´ pendant la transmission.
Ces sche´mas sont de´crits par trois algorithmes : l’algorithme de ge´ne´ration des
signatures “sig”, l’algorithme de ve´rification “ver”, et l’algorithme de ge´ne´ration de
clefs “G”. L’algorithme de ge´ne´ration de clefs prend comme arguments d’entre´e
le nom d’un agentA et un nombre ge´ne´re´ ale´atoirement et retourne une paire de
clefs publique et secre`te, note´es respectivement par Pk(A) et Sk(A), qui corre-
spond a` l’ agentA. Ce nombre ale´atoire permet a` tout agent d’avoir une paire de
clefs diffe´rentes pour chaque session, et ceci en utilisant le meme algorithme de
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ge´ne´ration de clef. L’algorithme de ge´ne´ration des signatures prend comme ar-
guments d’entre´e un message et la clef prive´e d’un agent, et renvoie la signature
du message donne´ faite par l’agent donne´. Il existe deux types d’algorithmes
de ve´rification :
• L’algorithme de ve´rification du premier type prend en entre´e un message,
une signature, et une clef publique d’un agent, et retourne “succes” si la
signature donne´e correspond a` la signature faite par l’agent donne´ sur le
le message donne´.
• Un algorithme de ve´rification du deuxie`me type prend comme arguments
d’entre´e une signature et la clef publique d’un agent. Il reconstruit le mes-
sage qui a e´te´ signe´ et ceci a` partir de la signature donne´e en entre´e et
renvoie ce message a` condition que la signature donne´e est ge´ne´re´e par
l’agent donne´.
Lorsque l’algorithme de ve´rification est du premier type, nous appelons le
sche´ma de signature “un sche´ma de signature avec appendice” et lorsque
l’algorithme de ve´rification est du deuxie`me type, nous appelons le sche´ma de
signature “un sche´ma de signature avec re´cupe´ration de messages”.
Un sche´ma de signature parfait avec appendice est repre´sente´ par l’e´quation
suivante :
ver(x, sig(x, Sk(y)), Pk(y)) = 1
Et, un sche´ma de signature parfait avec re´cupe´ration de messages est
repre´sente´ par l’e´quation suivante :
ver(sig(x, Sk(y)), Pk(y)) = x
Sche´mas de signature aveugle
Les sche´mas de signature aveugle, initialement introduits par D. Chaum [61], est
un type des sche´mas de signature ou` les messages sont cache´s (de´guise´s) avant
qu’ils ne soient signe´s. La signature aveugle qui en re´sulte peut eˆtre publique-
ment ve´rifie´e par rapport au message original, non cache´, dans la manie`re d’une
signature re´gulie`re. Les sche´mas de signature aveugle sont ge´ne´ralement em-
ploye´s dans les protocoles lie´s a` la vie prive´e ou` le signataire et l’auteur du
message sont de diffe´rents agents; comme exemples de ces protocoles, il y a les
syste`mes de vote e´lectronique [115] et les syste`mes de tre´sorerie nume´rique.
Les sche´mas de signature aveugle sont de´crits par les algorithmes suivants :
• l’algorithme de ge´ne´ration des signatures “sig”, l’algorithme de ve´rification
“ver”, et l’algorithme de ge´ne´ration de clefs “G”, qui sont de´finis comme pour
les sche´mas de signature traditionnels donne´s dans la section pre´ce´dente.
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• L’algorithme d’aveuglement “Bl” et l’ algorithme de de´saveuglement “Ubl”
sont de´finis comme suivant :
L’algorithme d’aveuglement prend comme arguments d’entre´e un mes-
sage “m” et une valeur “r” se´lectionne´e ale´atoirement, et retourne
l’aveuglement de “m” par rapport a` “r”.
L’algorithme de de´saveuglement prend comme arguments d’entre´e un mes-
sage aveugle´ “b” et une valeur “r” se´lectionne´e ale´atoirement, et re-
tourne le message original (non aveulge´) a` condition que “b” a e´te´
construit en utilisant “r”.
Les sche´mas de signature aveugle ont les proprie´te´s alge´briques suivantes:
ver(sig(x, Sk(y)), Pk(y)) = x, (or, ver(x, sig(x, Sk(y)), Pk(y)) = 1)
Ubl(Bl(x, y), y) = x
Ubl(sig(Bl(x, y), Sk(z)), y) = sig(x, Sk(z))
Les fonctions de hachage
Une fonction de hachage cryptographique est une proce´dure de´terministe qui
prend en entre´e un bloc arbitraire de donne´es et renvoie une chaıˆne de taille
fixe. La sortie d’une fonction de hachage est appele´e le hachage, ou la valeur
de hachage du message d’entre´e. Les fonctions de hachage cryptographiques
ont de nombreuses applications dans le domaine de la se´curite´ de l’information,
notamment dans les sche´mas de signature, les codes d’authentification de mes-
sage (MAC), et d’autres formes d’authentification.
Les fonctions de hachage peuvent avoir les proprie´te´s suivantes :
proprie´te´ de pre´-image
e´tant donne´ une valeur de hachage n, on peut calculer une donne´e m tel
que la valeur de hachage de m est e´gal a` n.
proprie´te´ de second pre´-image
e´tant donne´ une donne´e m, on peut calculer une autre donne´e m′ 6= m tel
que m et m′ ont la meˆme valeur de hachage.
proprie´te´ de collision
on peut calculer deux donne´es distinctes m,m′ tels qu’ils ont la meˆme
valeur de hachage.
Ces proprie´te´s sont de´crites plus en de´tail dans le Chapitre 3. Une fonction de
hachage parfaite n’a aucune de ces proprie´te´s.
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Exemple: Le protocole de Needham-Schroeder
Description du protocole. Le protocole de Needham-Schroeder a` clefs syme´triques
est l’un des protocoles cryptographiques les plus connus. Il a e´te´ conc¸u par
R. M. Needham et M. D. Schroeder en 1978 [163], et il forme la base pour le
protocole Kerberos.
Ce protocole est de´crit comme le suivant :
PNS :

1. A⇒ S : 〈A, 〈B,NA〉〉
2. S ⇒ A : encs(〈NA, B,KAB, encs(〈KAB, A〉, KBS)〉, KAS)
3. A⇒ B : encs(〈KAB, A〉, KBS)
4. B ⇒ A : encs(NB, KAB)
5. A⇒ B : encs(NB − 1, KAB)
NA (respectivement NB) repre´sente la nonce fraıˆchement cre´e´ par A
(respectivement B), KAS (respectivement KBS) repre´sente la clef secre`te
partage´e entre A (respectivement B) et le serveur de confiance S et KAB la clef de
session partage´e entre A et B.
Ce protocole vise a` e´tablir une clef de session entre les participants, et ceci pour
prote´ger d’autres communications.
Analyse du protocole. Lorsque ce protocole a e´te´ conc¸u, R. M. Needham et M.
D. Schroeder ont suppose´ que les clefs prive´es ne sont jamais compromises
[163]. Sous cette hypothe`se, le protocole est se´curise´ [99]. D. Denning et G.
Sacco [99] ont montre´ l’inse´curite´ du protocole lorsque les clefs prive´es sont
compromises. En fait, supposons que (i) un agent a a initialise´ une session avec
un agent b, (ii) l’intrus I a obtenu une copie de la clef Kab et (iii) I a intercepte´
tous les messages entre a et b. I peut plus tard tromper b en utilisant la clef Kab
comme suivant : I commence par envoyer le message encs(〈Kab, a〉, Kbs) a` b
I ⇒ b : encs(〈Kab, a〉, Kbs)
En supposant que a a initialise´ une nouvelle conversation, b re´pond a
b⇒ I(a) : encs(n′b, Kab)
I intercepte le message, le de´chiffre, et construit le message que a est sence´e
construire :
I(a)⇒ b : encs(n′b − 1, Kab)
Par la suite, I peut envoyer de faux messages a` b qui semblent parvenir de a.
Cette attaque, appele´e attaque de rejeu, est l’attaque la plus ce´le`bre sur le
Needham-Schroeder a` clefs syme´triques.
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Analyse des protocoles cryptographiques
Pre´sentation
Les protocoles cryptographiques sont des programmes conc¸us pour assurer
la se´curite´ des communications e´lectroniques entre les participants utilisant
un re´seau non-se´curise´. Ils utilisent des primitives cryptographiques telles
que les sche´mas de chiffrement, les sche´mas de signature, les fonctions de
hachage, et d’autres pour construire les messages e´change´s. Ces primi-
tives cryptographiques sont base´es sur des notions mathe´matiques telles que
l’exponentiation modulaire et les courbes elliptiques et sur des proble`mes
algorithmiquement durs comme la factorisation en de nombres premiers,
l’extraction du logarithme modulaire, et d’autres.
Malheureusement, l’existence des primitives cryptographiques n’est pas
suffisante pour assurer la se´curite´ et plusieurs attaques ont e´te´ trouve´s sur des
protocoles e´tablis [78, 2]. L’exemple le plus pertinent est l’attaque sur le proto-
cole de Needham-Schroeder a` clefs publiques [163] trouve´e par G. Lowe [144]
en utilisant l’outil de model-checking. Il a fallu 17 ans depuis que le protocole
a e´te´ publie´ pour trouver l’attaque, l’ attaque de man-in-the-middle. Cette sit-
uation montre que la conception d’un protocole cryptographique est de´licate,
et qu’il est facile que le protocole soit non-se´curise´. Ainsi, on a besoin de la
ve´rification formelle. Dans la litte´rature, on trouve deux mondes distincts pour
la ve´rification des protocoles cryptographiques : le monde calculatoire et le monde
symbolique. Maintenant, on va voire brie`vement ces deux approches :
Le monde “calculatoire”
Dans les mode`les calculatoires, aussi appele´s probabilistes, ou cryptographiques, ou
des mode`les concrets, les messages sont des chaıˆnes de bits, et l’intrus est une
machine de Turing probabiliste arbitraire polynoˆmiale. Ces mode`les sont plus
proches de la re´alite´ que les mode´les symboliques, et donc les re´sultats obtenus
dans ces mode`les donnent des garanties de se´curite´ plus renforce´es, mais les
preuves de validation sont essentiellement manuelles [38, 142, 49]. Re´cemment,
I. Tsahhirov et P. Laud [194] ont de´veloppe´ un outil automatique pour la
ve´rification des protocoles cryptographiques dans les mode`les calculatoires, et
B. Blanchet [48] a mis au point un autre outil automatique “cryptoVerif” qui est
plus de´veloppe´ que l’outil dans [194]. De nombreux re´sultats ont e´te´ obtenus
dans les mode`les calculatoires [13, 33, 26, 56, 203, 155]. Par exemple, dans [26],
M. Backes et B. Pfitzmann ont prouve´ que le protocole de Needham-Schroeder-
Lowe est se´curise´ en pre´sence des attaques cryptographiques re´e`lles, et actives,
y compris les exe´cutions concurrentes du protocole. Pourtant, une autre preuve
de se´curite´ pour le protocole de Needham-Schroeder-Lowe a e´te´ donne´ dans
[203], ou` B. Warinschi a prouve´ que le protocole est se´curise´ s’il est imple-
xvi
mente´ en utilisant un sche´ma de chiffrement qui satisfait l’indistinguabilite´ sous
l’attaque de chosen-ciphertext. Dans [155], D. Micciancio et B. Warinschi ont
montre´ que, dans le cas du chiffrement asyme´trique, l’hypothe`se de chiffrement
parfait est une abstraction correcte pour les sche´mas de chiffrement satisfaisants
la proprie´te´ IND-CCA2.
Dans [13], M. Abadi et Ph. Rogaway ont montre´ que si deux messages
sont formellement indistinguables alors ils sont computationellement indistin-
guables, et ceci est dans le cas ou` le chiffrement syme´trique est le seul sche´ma
de chiffrement utilise´, en plus de certaines restrictions techniques. Ce re´sultat
a e´te´ e´tendu par M. Baudet, V. Cortier et S. Kremer [33] pour prendre en con-
side´ration des primitives cryptographiques repre´sente´es par une large classe
de the´ories e´quationnelles notamment le ou exclusif, et plus tard par E. Bres-
son, Y. Lakhnech, L. Mazare´ et B. Warinschi [56] qui ont pris en conside´ration
l’exponentiation modulaire.
Le monde “symbolique”
Les premiers mode`les symboliques pour la ve´rification des protocoles cryp-
tographiques sont attribue´s a` R. Needham et M. Schroeder [163], et a` D. Dolev
et A. Yao [107]. Ces mode`les repre´sentent une abstraction du monde re´el, et per-
mettent donc un raisonnement plus simple et une analyse automatique des pro-
tocoles de se´curite´. Dans le monde symbolique, les primitives cryptographiques
sont repre´sente´es par des symboles de fonction, les messages par des e´le´ments
dans une signature (une signature est un ensemble de symboles de fonction
repre´sentants les primitives cryptographiques), et l’intrus par un ensemble de
re`gles de de´duction. De telles approches adoptent le soi-disant mode`le d’intrus
de Dolev-Yao [107] repre´sente´ comme suivant :
L’intrus a un controˆle complet sur le moyen de communication
(re´seau), Il e´coute la communication et a la possibilite´ de re´cupe´rer
tous les messages transitant sur le re´seau, Il peut intercepter, bloquer
et/ou rediriger tous les messages envoye´s par les agents honneˆtes. Il
peut aussi cacher son identite´ et prendre part dans le protocole sous
l’identite´ d’un agent honneˆte. Sa maıˆtrise du re´seau est mode´lise´e
en supposant que tous les messages envoye´s par les agents honneˆtes
sont envoye´s directement a` l’intrus et que tous les messages rec¸us
par les agents honneˆtes sont toujours envoye´es par l’intrus. Outre
le controˆle du re´seau, l’intrus a certaines re`gles spe´cifiques pour
de´duire de nouveaux messages.
Dans ce document, nous suivons l’approche symbolique, afin d’analyser
les protocoles cryptographiques.
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Figure 2 Le proble`me de se´curite´ des protocoles cryptographiques
Entre´e : un protocole P, et une proprie´te´ de se´curite´ P.
Sortie : SE´CURISE´ si et seulement si P satisfait P.
L’analyse symbolique des protocoles cryptographiques
Les protocoles cryptographiques sont difficiles a` ve´rifier pour plusieurs raisons
: la complexite´ sans bornes des messages e´change´s, le nombre illimite´ des nou-
veaux messages construits, le nombre illimite´ de participants, et le nombre il-
limite´ de sessions.
“Le proble`me de se´curite´” des protocoles cryptographiques donne´ dans la
figure 1.2 est inde´cidable en ge´ne´ral, [111]. Dans [110], les auteurs ont montre´
que le proble`me demeure inde´cidable, meˆme si les constructeurs de donne´es,
la profondeur du message, la largeur du message, le nombre de roˆles dis-
tincts, la longueur du roˆle, et la profondeur des chiffrements sont limite´s par
des constantes. Une autre restriction correspond a` la de´limitation du nombre
de valeurs fraıˆches (nonces) utilise´es pendant l’attaque. Cependant plusieurs
proble`mes inde´cidables comme le PCP peuvent eˆtre encode´ dans ce cas [89].
Afin de de´cider le proble`me de se´curite´ des protocoles cryptographiques,
nous avons besoin d’ajouter encore plus de restrictions. Nous de´crivons ci-
dessous quelques me´thodes utilise´es pour analyser symboliquement les proto-
coles cryptographiques, puis nous donnons quelques uns des re´sultats de (non)
de´cidabilite´ obtenus dans la lite´rature.
Recherche des attaques logiques. Une premie`re tentative a e´te´ de rechercher des
attaques logiques dans le cas de nombre borne´ de sessions. Dans [192], les au-
teurs ont montre´ que, dans cette me´thode, il suffit de conside´rer un seul intrus.
Les premiers outils e´taient fonde´s sur le model-checking. Ces outils repre´sentent
les protocoles comme des machines a` e´tats finis et les proprie´te´s de se´curite´
comme des formules dans la logique temporelle. Des exemples de tels outils
sont FDR [108], Murφ [160], ou Brutus [79] Les outils ont mene´ a` la de´couverte
de plusieurs attaques inte´ressantes en supposant un nombre borne´ de sessions
et des messages de taille limite´e. L’attaque la plus ce´le`bre de´couverte grce a`
ces outils est l’attaque sur le protocole de Needham-Schroeder a` clefs publiques
[145].
A. Huima [122] a e´te´ le premier a` sugge´rer que la de´limitation de la taille
des messages n’est pas ne´cessaire, et a` analyser les protocoles cryptographiques
dans ce cas. Il a propose´ l’utilisation de contraintes symboliques. L’utilisation
de contraintes symboliques pour analyser les protocoles cryptographiques a e´te´
e´tudie´e plus tard dans [15, 156, 53], puis dans [68, 95, 73, 70, 69, 54] qui ont con-
side´re´ les protocoles cryptographiques avec des primitives alge´briques comme
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l’exponentiation modulaire, ou exclusif, etc. La re´solution des contraintes est
devenue le mode`le standard pour analyser les protocoles cryptographiques
dans le cas de nombre borne´ de sessions.
Dans cette approche, d’autres travaux ont e´te´ effectue´s afin de saisir d’autres
proprie´te´s de se´curite´ telles que la re´sistance aux attaques de dictionnaire [96],
les proprie´te´s base´es sur l’e´quivalence [109], et les proprie´te´s lie´es aux contract-
signing protocols [135].
Recherche de preuves. L’inconve´nient de cette approche est que, en supposant
un nombre borne´ de sessions, elle ne prouve pas la correction du protocole.
Nous montrons ici une autre approche, la “recherche des preuves”, qui ne sup-
pose pas un nombre borne´ de sessions. Un de ses inconve´nients est qu’elle peut
introduire de fausses attaques, c’est-a`-dire qu’elle peut rejeter des protocoles
qui n’ ont pas des attaques logiques. Nous donnons ci-dessous quelques-unes
des me´thodes e´labore´es dans cette approche :
• Les me´thodes qui utilisent les de´monstrateurs telles que l’approche induc-
tive de L. Paulson [168], qui utilise Isabelle pour prouver des proprie´te´s de
se´curite´, et l’approche de Bolignano [52].
• Les me´thodes fonde´es sur l’alge`bre des processus tels que les pi-calcul, le
spi-calcul et le pi-calcul applique´ [12, 11].
• Les me´thodes fonde´es sur des logiques comme la logique BAN [57] due a`
M. Burrows et M. Abadi et R. M. Needham.
• L’analyseur de protocole NRL [151] qui est connu d’eˆtre le premier outil
qui n’impose aucune restriction.
• Les me´thodes qui utilisent des automates d’arbres [161, 118, 85].
• Les me´thodes fonde´es sur les clauses de Horn [46, 180, 84, 205].
Plusieurs outils automatiques ont e´te´ de´veloppe´s afin de ve´rifier symbolique-
ment les protocoles cryptographiques, tels que “ ProVerif” [46, 50], “ AVISS”
[17], ou “ AVISPA” [19]. Les me´thodes symboliques ont e´te´ utilise´es pour anal-
yser une large classe de protocoles cryptographiques, tels que les protocoles
d’e´change de clefs et d’authentification, les protocoles de vote e´le´ctronique
[136, 97], les protocoles de contract-signing [128], les protocoles re´cursifs [138],
les services web [41, 72], et d’autres.
Re´sultats de de´cidabilite´ et inde´cidabilite´
Le proble`me de se´curite´ des protocoles cryptographiques, donne´ dans la Figure
1.2 est inde´cidable en ge´ne´ral, [111], mais sous certaines restrictions plusieurs
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re´sultats de de´cidabilite´ ont e´te´ obtenus. Ces re´sultats peuvent eˆtre divise´s en
deux classes : les re´sultats de de´cidabilite´ avec l’hypothe`se de cryptographie par-
faite, et les re´sultats de de´cidabilite´ sans l’hypothe`se de cryptographie parfaite. Un
sche´ma de chiffrement est dit parfait lorsqu’aucune information (meˆme pas par-
tielle) a propos du texte clair peut eˆtre obtenue a` partir d’un texte chiffre´ sans
connaıˆtre la clef de de´chiffrement (secre`te). Cette hypothe`se a e´te´ introduite par
R. Needham et M. Schroeder [163], D. Dolev et A. Yao [107] dans leurs travaux
respectifs. Lorsque l’hypothe`se de chiffrement parfait est ge´ne´ralise´e aux autres
primitives cryptographiques, on parle alors de l’hypothe`se de cryptographie par-
faite.
Alors que l’hypothe`se de cryptographie parfaite n’est pas re´aliste, (en fait,
l’intrus peut utiliser les proprie´te´s alge´briques des primitives cryptographiques,
quand il attaque le protocole), plusieurs attaques importantes ont e´te´
de´couvertes. Un exemple de telles attaques serait l’attaque de´couverte par G.
Lowe sur le protocole de Needham-Schroeder a` clefs publiques [145]. En outre,
plusieurs re´sultats ont e´te´ obtenus, nous montrons ci-dessous quelques-uns.
Nombre non borne´ de sessions. En supposant un nombre non borne´ de sessions,
le proble`me est inde´cidable [14, 81, 110, 111], et reste inde´cidable, meˆme si
nous supposons qu’aucune nonce (donne´e ale´atoirement cre´e) est ge´ne´re´e
[81, 111], ou` nous bornons la taille des messages [14, 110]. Ce proble`me de-
vient DEXPTIME comple`t si on suppose qu’aucune nonce est ge´ne´re´e et si
on limite la taille des messages [71, 110]. Dans [106], les auteurs ont montre´
que la se´curite´ des protocoles de ping-pong est de´cidable en PTIME.
Nombre borne´ de sessions. En supposant un nombre borne´ de sessions, M.
Rusinowitch et M. Turuani [178] ont montre´ que le proble`me est co-NP-
complet.
Plus tard, l’hypothe`se de chiffrement parfait a e´te´ assouplie, et plusieurs proprie´te´s
alge´briques des primitives cryptographiques ont e´te´ conside´re´es dans l’analyse
des protocoles cryptographiques. Plusieurs re´sultats ont e´te´ obtenus, nous
montrons ci-dessous quelques-uns. Le proble`me est co-NP-complet pour les
protocoles de ping-pong avec la the´orie e´quationnelle commutative [69, 195]. Le
proble`me reste de´cidable pour un nombre borne´ de sessions avec le ou exclusif
[87]. Il reste aussi de´cidable pour les groupes abe´liens [188].
De nombreuses recherches ont e´te´ centre´es sur les classes ge´ne´rales de pro-
prie´te´s alge´briques et plusieurs re´sultats ont e´te´ obtenus dans ce domaine. Par
exemple, M. Baudet [32] a prouve´ la de´cidabilite´ du proble`me de se´curite´ pour
la classe des protocoles cryptographiques utilisant des primitives repre´sente´es
par des the´ories equationalles sous-termes convergentes. S. Delaune et F.
Jacquemard [95] ont prouve´ la de´cidabilite´ du proble`me de se´curite´ pour la
classe des protocoles cryptographiques utilisant des primitives repre´sente´es
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par des the´ories e´quationnelles convergentes et public-collapsing, etc. D’autres
re´sultats peuvent eˆtre trouve´s dans [90].
Dans cette the`se, nous relchons l’hypothe`se de la cryptographie par-
faite en tenant compte de certaines proprie´te´s alge´briques des primitives
cryptographiques que nous formulons par des e´quations. Nous suivons
l’approche symbolique pour analyser les protocoles de se´curite´, et en par-
ticulier, l’approche base´e sur la re´solution des syste`mes de contraintes. A`
cette fin, nous formulons la capacite´ de l’intrus par des re`gles de de´duction,
et la tche de ve´rification des protocoles par un proble`me d’accessibilite´. Ce
dernier est le proble`me de de´terminer si un certain nombre (fini) de pro-
grammes paralle`les, qui mode´lisent le protocole et la spe´cification, peut at-
teindre un e´tat errone´, tout en interagissant avec l’environnement. Nous four-
nissons des proce´dures de de´cision pour le proble`me d’accessibilite´ en pre´sence
de plusieurs ope´rateurs alge´briques. Ensuite, nous donnons un re´sultat de
de´cidabilite´ pour le proble`me de deduction clos pour un nouveau fragment de
la logique du premier ordre, et nous montrons son application sur le problee`me
de ve´rification des protocoles cryptographiques. Finalement, nous analysons
une classe particulie`re des protocoles cryptographiques, les protocoles de vote
e´le´ctronique pour lesquels nous analysons la proprie´te´ de ve´rifiabilite´ de votes.
Chapitre 2 : Les syste`mes de contraintes pour analyser les
protocoles cryptographiques
La se´curite´ des protocoles cryptographiques est e´value´e en fonction de
l’environnement dans lequel le protocole est exe´cute´. Dolev et Yao [107] ont
de´crit l’environnement par les de´ductions que l’intrus attaquant le protocole
est en mesure d’effectuer. Ils ont estime´ que l’intrus a un controˆle complet sur
le moyen de communication (re´seau), il e´coute la communication et il a la possi-
bilite´ de re´cupe´rer tous les messages transitant sur le re´seau. Il peut intercepter,
bloquer et/ou rediriger tous les messages envoye´s par les agents honneˆtes. Il
peut aussi cacher son identite´ et prendre part dans le protocole sous l’identite´
d’un agent honneˆte. Sa maıˆtrise du re´seau est mode´lise´e en supposant que
tous les messages envoye´s par des agents honneˆtes sont envoye´s directement
a` l’intrus et que tous les messages rec¸us par les agents honneˆtes sont toujours
envoye´s par l’intrus. Outre le controˆle du re´seau, l’intrus a certaines re`gles
spe´cifiques pour de´duire de nouveaux messages [73, 72, 156].
De nombreuses proce´dures ont e´te´ propose´es pour de´cider le proble`me de
se´curite´ des protocoles cryptographiques dans le mode`le de Dolev-Yao par rap-
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port a` un nombre borne´ de sessions [16, 53, 178]. Parmi les diffe´rentes ap-
proches, il y a les approches symboliques [156, 75, 29, 87] dans lesquels, tel
que mentionne´ dans l’introduction de ce document, nous travaillons. Dans ces
approches, les primitives cryptographiques sont repre´sente´es par des symboles
de fonction, les messages sont repre´sente´s par des termes dans une signature
(une signature est un ensemble de symboles de fonction repre´sentants les prim-
itives cryptographiques), et les capacite´s de l’intrus sont repre´sente´s par des
re`gles de de´duction sur des ensembles de messages repre´sentant ses connaissances. Les
re`gles de de´duction de l’intrus permettent de de´duire de nouveaux messages
a` partir d’un ensemble fini de messages repre´sentants ses connaissances. Les
primitives cryptographiques peuvent avoir des proprie´te´s alge´briques, comme
l’associativite´ pour la concate´nation “·”. Ces proprie´te´s sont repre´sente´es par
des the´ories equationnelles.
Parmi les diffe´rentes approches symboliques, dans ce chapitre, nous nous
concentrons sur l’approche symbolique qui utilise la re´solution des syste`mes
de contraintes. Cette approche re´duit le proble`me de l’inse´curite´ des protocoles
cryptographiques avec nombre borne´ de sessions au proble`me de satisfiabilite´
pour les syste`mes de contraintes [205, 156, 73, 178]. Dans [29], les auteurs ont
prouve´ que cette re´duction est assez efficace et ont pu de´couvrir de nouvelles
attaques sur plusieurs protocoles.
Dans ce chapitre, nous pre´sentons les notions et les de´finitions de base
que nous utilisons dans la majeure partie de cette the`se. Nous de´finissons
les syste`mes de contraintes, et le proble`me d’accessibilite´. Ces notions ont e´te´ ini-
tialement introduites par J. Millen et V. Shmatikov [156], mais telles qu’elles
sont de´finies, elles ne sont pas ade´quates pour les the´ories e´quationnelles non-
vides. Nous suivons effectivement les de´finitions introduites par Y. Cheva-
lier et M. Rusinowitch [73] qui ont ge´ne´ralise´ les de´finitions initiales de [156]
afin de capturer des the´ories equationalles non-vides. Nous montrons la fac¸on
dont les protocoles sont mode´lise´s dans un langage de spe´cification de haut
niveau, et nous montrons comment re´duire le proble`me de l’inse´curite´ des pro-
tocoles cryptographiques au proble`me de satisfiabilite´ des syste`mes de con-
traintes. Plusieurs travaux suivent cette approche [156, 87, 73, 72]. Dans les trois
prochains chapitres, nous assouplissons l’hypothe`se de cryptographie parfaite en
prenant en compte quelques proprie´te´s alge´briques des primitives cryptographiques,
et, suivant l’approche symbolique pre´sente´e dans ce chapitre, nous analysons
les protocoles cryptographiques en pre´sence de certains ope´rateurs alge´briques.
Chapitre 3 : Analyse des protocoles en pre´sence des fonctions
de hachage vulne´rables a` la collision
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Dans le chapitre 3, nous conside´rons la classe des protocoles cryp-
tographiques qui utilisent comme primitives cryptographiques les fonctions de
hachage vulne´rables a` la collision.
Les fonctions de hachage jouent un roˆle capital dans la cryptographie moderne.
Ils prennent comme argument un message de longueur arbitraire et retourne
un message de longueur fixe appele´ code de hachage, re´sultat de hachage, valeur de
hachage, ou simplement hachage.
Formellement, nous de´finissons une fonction de hachage comme suivant :
soit D et R respectivement un ensemble de messages de longueur arbitraire et
un ensemble de messages de longueur fixe. Une fonction de hachage h est une
fonction h : D → R, ayant au minimum les deux proprie´te´s suivantes :
Compression
h prend en entre´e un message x de longueur finie arbitraire, et retourne
un message h(x) de longueur fixe.
facilite´ de calcul
e´tant donne´ het une entre´e x, h(x) est facile a` calculer.
Pour toute fonction de hachage h : D → R, il est facile de voir que ‖D‖ >
‖R‖.
Les fonctions de hachage ont de nombreuses applications dans la se´curite´
informatique. Une utilisation typique d’une fonction de hachage serait la suiv-
ante : Alice donne un proble`me de mathe´matiques difficile a` Bob, et pre´tend
qu’elle l’a re´solu. Bob voudrait essayer lui-meˆme de le re´soudre, mais encore il
voudrait eˆtre sr que Alice ne le trompe pas. Par conse´quent, Alice e´crit sa solu-
tion, ajoute une nonce ale´atoire, et calcule le hashage et donne a` Bob la valeur de
hachage (tout en gardant secret la solution et la nonce). De cette fac¸on, lorsque
Bob arrive lui-meme a` trouver la solution quelques jours plus tard, Alice peut lui
prouver qu’elle avait la solution avant, et ceci en re´ve´lant la nonce a` Bob. Ceci
est un exemple d’un simple commitment scheme.
Les fonctions de hachage sont e´galement utilise´es dans les sche´mas de sig-
nature.
En plus des deux proprie´te´s de base donne´es ulte´rieurement pour les fonc-
tions de hachage, elles peuvent avoir l’ une ou plusieurs des proprie´te´s suiv-
antes :
Preimage re´sistance
e´tant donne´ un hachage y ∈ R, si l’entre´e correspondante n’est pas connue,
il est mathe´matiquement impossible de trouver une entre´e x ∈ D tel que
h(x) = y. Cette notion est lie´e a` celle de fonction a` sens unique.
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Seconde-preimage re´sistance
e´tant donne´ une entre´e x ∈ D, il est mathe´matiquement impossible de
trouver une autre entre´e x′ ∈ D tel que x′ 6= x et h(x′) = h(x).
Collision re´sistance
il est mathe´matiquement impossible de trouver deux entre´es distinctes
x, x′ ∈ D tels que h(x′) = h(x). Cette proprie´te´ est parfois appele´e forte
re´sistance a` la collision.
On dit qu’une fonction de hachage est respectivement vulne´rable aux attaques preim-
age, seconde-preimage, et collision si elle n’ est pas re´sistante respectivement au
preimage, au seconde-preimage et a` la collision. On dit aussi qu’ une fonction de
hachage est, respectivement, preimage re´sistante, seconde-preimage re´sistante, et colli-
sion resistante s’il s’agit d’une fonction de hachage qui satisfait respectivement
les proprie´te´s suivantes : preimage re´sistance, seconde-preimage re´sistance et
collision re´sistance.
Dans [153], les auteurs ont montre´ les relations suivantes entre les proprie´te´s
des fonctions de hachage donne´es pre´ce´dement :
• la collision re´sistance implique la seconde-preimage re´sistance;
• la collision re´sistance ne garantit pas la preimage re´sistance;
• preimage re´sistance ne garantit pas seconde-preimage re´sistance.
La proprie´te´ que nous e´tudions dans ce chapitre est la vulne´rabilite´ a` la
collision. Cette vulne´rabilite´ signifie que l’on peut construire deux messages
diffe´rents ayant la meˆme valeur de hachage. On remarque qu’il y a seulement
quelques anne´es, il e´tait impossible de calculer les collisions sur les fonctions de
hachage, et ainsi ils e´taient conside´re´s par les cryptographes comme re´sistants
a` la collision. La collision n’a e´te´ conside´re´e comme une attaque possible sur
les fonctions de hachage qu’a` partir des anne`es 90 quand des attaques de colli-
sion ont e´te´ prouve´es et de´montre´es par plusieurs chercheurs [98, 103, 199, 201].
Comme exemples de fonctions de hachage vulne´rables a` la collision, nous citons
les fonctions de hachage “MD5” et “SHA-0”.
Dans ce chapitre, nous repre´sentons symboliquement comment l’intrus peut
calculer les collisions sur les fonctions de hachage. Nous re´duisons alors le
proble`me de l’inse´curite´ de notre classe de protocoles cryptographiques au
proble`me de satisfiabilite´ ordonne´ pour l’intrus utilisant la proprie´te´ de la
vulne´rabilite´ a` la collision des fonctions de hachage lorsque il attaque une
exe´cution d’un protocole. Le proble`me de satisfiabilite´ ordonne´ est une vari-
ante du proble`me de satisfiabilite´ pre´sente´ dans le chapitre 2. Il a e´te´ intro-
duit par Y. Chevalier et al. [72]. En suivant en gros les re´sultats obtenus dans
[74], nous conjecturons que le proble`me de satisfiabilite´ ordonne´ pour l’intrus
exploitant la proprie´te´ de vulne´rabilite´ a` la collision des fonctions de hachage
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peut eˆtre re´duit au proble`me de satisfiabilite´ ordonne´ pour l’intrus exploitant
les mots, de´finis avec un symbole associatif de la concate´nation. Nous mon-
trons la de´cidabilite´ du proble`me pre´ce´dent, ce qui est inte´ressant en lui-meˆme
car a` notre connaissance, il est le premier re´sultat de de´cidabilite´ qui dispose
d’un syste`me d’intrus pour lequel l’unification est infinitaire. En outre, il per-
met de conside´rer une concate´nation associative des messages au lieu de leur
couplage.
Afin de mode´liser les fonctions de hachage vulne´rables a` la collision, nous
avons introduit de nouveaux symboles de fonctions pour de´signer la capacite´ a`
cre´er des messages avec la meˆme valeur de hachage. Cette introduction de nou-
veaux symboles est due a` la skole´misation de la the´orie e´quationnelle de´crivant
l’existence des collisions. Nous croyons que cette construction peut eˆtre e´tendue
afin de mode´liser des proprie´te´s plus complexes et base´es sur la notion de jeu
apparaissants lorsque nous traitons des mode´les symboliques et plus concrets
des primitives cryptographiques. Il est bien connu que les fonctions de hachage
sont largement utilise´es dans les schm´as de signature qui est le sujet du chapitre
suivant.
Chapitre 4 : Analyse des protocoles utilisant des sche´mas de
signature vulne´rables
La notion des sche´mas de signature est apparue dans le papier se´minal de W. Diffie
et M. E. Hellman [101].
La signature d’un message est un nombre de´pendant d’ un certain secret connu
uniquement par le signataire, et, du contenu du message en cours de signature.
Les signatures doivent eˆtre ve´rifiables pour que nous puissions s’ assurer de
l’ identite´ de l’ agent qui a signe´ un document. A` cette fin, chaque agent A
posse`de une paire de clefs : une clef publique, pkA et une clef secre`te, skA. L’agent
A se sert de sa clef secre`te skA pour signer des messages, et la clef publique
pkA est utilise´e par les autres agents afin de ve´rifier les signatures ge´ne´re´es par
A. La clef secre`te d’un agent est appele´e clef de signature, et sa clef publique est
appele´e clef de ve´rification.
Formellement, nous de´finissons un algorithme de ge´ne´ration de clefs, note´G, un
algorithme qui prend comme arguments d’entre´e le nom d’un agent et un nom-
bre ge´ne´re´ ale´atoirement et retourne une paire de clefs, la clef secre`te et la clef
publique de l’agen donne´. Nous ds´ignons par Sk(A) (respectivement Pk(A)) la
clef secre`te (respectivement la clef publique) de l’ agent A. Nous de´finissons un
algorithme de ge´ne´ration de signature, note´ sig, un algorithme qui prend comme
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arguments d’entre´e la clef de signature (clef secre`te) d’ un agent, sk, et un mes-
sage, m, et ge´ne`re un message, sig(m, sk), qui repre´sente la signature de m en
utilisant la cle´ secre`te sk. Nous de´finissons un algorithme de ve´rification, note´ ver,
un algorithme qui teste si un message s est une signature valide d’un message
m par rapport a` une clef publique pk .
Un sche´ma de signature est de´fini par trois algorithmes : l’ algorithme de
ge´ne´ration de signature “sig′′, l’ algorithme de ve´rification “ver′′, et l’ algorithme de
ge´ne´ration de clefs “G′′.
Il existe deux grandes cate´gories de sche´mas de signature, qui peuvent eˆtre
brie`vement re´sume´s comme suit :
• Les sche´mas de signature avec appendice exigent que le message qui a e´te´
signe´ (aussi appele´ le message d’origine) soit un des arguments d’entre´e de
l’algorithme de ve´rification. Comme exemples de sche´mas de signature
avec appendice, nous avons les sche´mas de signature DSA [3], ElGamal
[116], et Schnorr [185].
• Les sche´mas de signature avec re´cupe´ration de messages ne ne´cessitent pas que
le message original soit un des arguments d’entre´e pour l’algorithme de
ve´rification. Dans ce cas, le message d’origine est re´cupe´re´ a` partir de
la signature elle-meˆme. Comme exemples de sche´mas de signature four-
nissant des signatures avec re´cupe´ration des messages, nous avons les
sche´mas de signature RSA [174], Rabin [171], et Nyberg-Rueppel [18].
Les signatures nume´riques ont de nombreuses applications dans la se´curite´
informatique, y compris l’authentification, l’inte´grite´ des donne´es et la non-
re´pudiation. Dans [117], les auteurs ont montre´ les diffe´rents attaques sur les
sche´mas de signature nume´rique. En outre, Les auteurs ont de´fini la notion
de se´curite´ des sche´mas de signature : un sche´ma de signature nume´rique est
conside´re´ comme sr s’ il est existentiel inforgeable contre une attaque avec des
messages adaptatifs et choisis. Malheureusement, Si cette notion de se´curite´ est
suffisante dans le cadre d’ un unique utilisateur, elle ne l’est pas dans le cadre
multi-utilisateurs [152].
Dans ce chapitre, nous analysons la se´curite´ des sche´mas de signature dans le
cadre multi-utilisateur, et pour cette fin, nous conside´rons deux proprie´te´s des
sche´mas de signature : la proprie´te´ de vulne´rabilite´ constructive exclusive ownership
et la proprie´te´ de vulne´rabilite´ destructive exclusive ownership.
La proprie´te´ de vulne´rabilite´ constructive exclusive ownership peut eˆtre de´crite de
manie`re informelle comme suit :
soit S un sche´ma de signature, S posse`de la proprie´te´ de vulne´rabilite´ constructive
exclusive ownership si, e´tant donne´ la clef publique de l’ agent A, et la signature
sa faite par A sur un message m, l’intrus est capable de construire avec une
probabilite´ non ne´gligeable une nouvelle paire de clefs (SkI , PkI) tels que sa
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est aussi la signature de m faite par l’ intrus par rapport a` la nouvelle pair de
clefs.
Cette proprie´te´ a d’abord e´te´ introduite par S. Blake-Wilson et A. Menezes
[45], et a e´te´ e´galement discute´e dans [152], et dans [170]. Comme exemples de
sche´mas de signature ayant cette proprie´te´, nous avons : RSA [174], DSA [3],
ECDSA [5], et ElGamal [116].
La proprie´te´ de vulne´rabilite´ destructive exclusive ownership peut eˆtre de´crite de
manie`re informelle comme suit :
soit S un sche´ma de signature, S posse`de la proprie´te´ de vulne´rabilite´ destructive
exclusive ownership si, e´tant donne´ la clef publique de l’ agent A, et la signature
sa faite par A sur un message m, l’intrus est capable de construire avec une
probabilite´ non ne´gligeable une nouvelle paire de clefs (SkI , PkI), et un
nouveau message m′ tels que sa est la signature de m′ faite par l’ intrus par
rapport a` la nouvelle pair de clefs.
Comme exemples de sche´mas de signature ayant cette proprie´te´, nous citons
RSA [174] et DSS [6].
Dans ce chapitre, nous de´finissons le mode`le symbolique de ces deux pro-
prie´te´s, et nous montrons la de´cidabilite´ du proble`me de l’inse´curite´ pour
les deux classes de protocoles cryptographiques ou` les sche´mas de signature
utilise´e ont respectivement ces deux proprie´te´s. Ce re´sultat de de´cidabilite´
est obtenu en re´duisant le proble`me de l’inse´curite´ au proble`me d’accessibilite´
pour nos syste`mes d’intrus, et en donnat un algorithme de de´cidabilite´ pour
ce dernier proble`me. Cet algorithme peut se re´sumer comme suit : on com-
mence par saturer nos deux systee`mes d’ intrus IDSKS et IDEO (DSKS et DEO
repre´sentent respectivement nos deux proprie´te´s). Cette saturation termine, et
permet d’obtenir deux nouveaux syste`mes de de´duction d’ intrus : I”DSKS et
I”DEO. Ensuite, nous simplifions les IDSKS- et IDEO-syste`mes de contraintes,
et ceci par deux e´tapes, afin d’obtenir des syste`mes de contraintes en forme
re´solue. Cette simplification est correcte, comple`te, et se termine. Malheureuse-
ment, cette proce´dure est spe´cifique a` notre cas de protocoles cryptographiques.
Dans [95], S. Delaune et F. Jacquemard a montre´ que le proble`me d’accessibilite´
pour un syste`me d’intrus arbitraire est de´cidable en temps polynomial non-
de´terministe a` condition que la the´orie e´quationnelle est ge´ne´re´e par un syste`me
de re´e´criture convergent public-collapsing. Nous remarquons que les deux
the´ories e´quationnelles hDSKS et hDEO sont ge´ne´re´es par des syste`mes de
re´e´criture convergents public-collapsing, et par conse´quent, le re´sultat de [95]
peut eˆtre applique´ sur nos classes de protocoles cryptographiques. Nous remar-
quons e´galement que, dans [31], M. Baudet a obtenu un re´sultat de de´cidabilite´
pour le proble`me d’accessibilite´ pour la classe des the´ories e´quiationelles sous-
terms convergentes. Comme les deux the´ories e´quationnelles hDSKS et hDEO
sont des the´ories e´quationnelles sous-terms convergentes, nous pouvons aussi
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appliquer le re´sultat de [31] a` nos classes de protocoles cryptographiques. Nous
remarquons que la me´thode utilise´e dans ce chapitre est diffe´rente de celles
utilise´es dans [95, 31]. Leurs me´thodes ne peuvent pas eˆtre ge´ne´ralise´es a`
d’autres classes de syste`mes de de´duction ne pouvant pas eˆtre conside´re´s par
[95, 31].
Chapitre 5 : Re´sulats de de´cidabilite´ pour les syste`mes de
de´duction sature´s
Dans le chapitre 5, nous ge´ne´ralisons les re´sultats de de´cidabilite´ obtenus
au chapitre 4 et nous conside´rons alors la classe des protocoles cryp-
tographiques ou` les primitives cryptographiques sont repre´sente´es par des
the´ories e´quationnelles convergentes ayant la proprie´te´ de variante finie. Cette
proprie´te´ a e´te´ symboliquement introduite dans [86], et elle nous permet de
calculer toutes les formes normales possibles de n’importe quel terme t. Cette
proprie´te´ peut etre e´nonce´e plus formellement par le suivant :
SoitH une the´orie e´quationelle ge´ne´re´e par un syste`me de re´e´criture
convergentR. H posse`de la proprie´te´ de variante finie si et seulement si pour
tout terme t, il existe un ensemble fini de substitutions Σ(t) tel que pour n’
importe quelle substitution σ, il existe une substitution θ ∈ Σ(t), et une
substitution τ verifiant le suivant : (σ)↓ = θτ and (tσ)↓ = (tθ)↓τ
La proprie´te´ de variante finie est revendique´e comme une proprie´te´ essentielle
pour les re´sultats de de´cidabilite´ pour le proble`me de ve´rification des protocoles
cryptographiques en pre´sence des proprie´te´s alge´briques [80], et de nombreuses
the´ories e´quationnelles posse`dent cette proprie´te´, par exemple, la the´orie de
Dolev-Yao avec des de´structeurs explicites.
Une premie`re contribution de ce chapitre est la de´cidabilite´ du proble`me d’
accessibilite´ clos pour notre classe de syste`mes de de´duction.
En suivant la description donne´e dans le chapitre 2, nous utilisons la pro-
prie´te´ de variante finie afin de re´duire le proble`me d’accessibilite´ modulo une
the´orie e´quationelle au proble`me d’accessibilite´ modulo la the´orie vide. En-
suite, nous calculons partiellement la fermeture transitive des de´ductions pos-
sibles. Nous prouvons ensuite que la terminaison de ce calcul implique la
de´cidabilite´ du proble`me d’accessibilite´ clos. Nous conjecturons que la con-
struction revient a` prouver que le syste`me de de´duction est F -local, et la F -
localite´ est de´finie dans [40]. Nous donnons ensuite un nouveau crite`re qui
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nous permet de re´duire le proble`me d’accessibilite´ ge´ne´rale au proble`me d’
accessibilite´ clos. Ce crite`re est base´ sur le comptage du nombre de vari-
ables dans un proble`me d’accessibilite´ avant et apre`s qu’ une de´duction ne
soit devine´e, et est une ge´ne´ralisation du crite`re employe´ pour le cas spe´cifique
des mode`les d’intrus DSKS et DEO. L’intuition derrie`re ce crite`re est qu’une
re`gle de de´duction doit fournir plus de relations entres les messages existants
qu’en introduire de nouveaux. Nous donnons un exemple montrant qu’un tel
crite`re supple´mentaire est ne´cessaire, dans le sens ou` il existe des syste`mes de
de´duction sur lesquels l’algorithme de saturation termine, mais pour lesquels le
proble`me d’accessibilite´ ge´ne´ral est inde´cidable. Une troisie`me contribution de
ce chapitre est le re´sultat de de´cidabilite´ du proble`me d’ accessibilite´ clos pour
la the´orie des signatures aveugles, cette the´ories est de´ja introduite dans [136].
Ce re´sulat est obtenu en utilisant la de´finition initiale des sous-termes introduite
dans [10, 31]. Un autre re´sultat de de´cidabilite´ du proble`me d’ accessibilite´ clos
pour la the´orie des signatures aveugles a e´te´ obtenu dans [9], ce dernier re´sultat
a e´te´ obtenu en utilisant une de´finition e´largie de la notion de sous-terme. Dans
[91], un autre re´sultat de de´cidabilite´ a e´te´ obtenu pour la classe des proto-
coles cryptographiques avec des sche´mas de signature aveugle. Ce re´sultat a
e´te´ obtenu en utilisant une technique diffe´rente de celle suivie dans ce chapitre :
dans [91], les auteurs ont montre´ la de´cidabilite´ d’un fragment de la logique du
premier ordre et ont utilise´ ce re´sultat pour obtenir la de´cidabilite´ pour la classe
des protocoles cryptographiques utilisant les sche´mas de signature aveugle. En
outre, nous donnons un re´sultat de de´cidabilite´ sur le proble`mes d’ accessibilite´
ge´ne´rale pour une classe de the´ories e´quationnelle sous-termes convergentes,
tandis qu’un re´sultat plus ge´ne´ral a e´te´ donne´ dans [31] pour la meˆme the´orie,
la preuve donne´e dans ce chapitre pour notre cas spe´cial est beaucoup plus
courte.
Dans [80], H. Comon-Lundh a propose´ une strate´gie en deux e´tapes pour
re´soudre les proble`mes d’accessibilite´ ge´ne´rale : tout d’ abord, montrer la
de´cidabilite´ des proble`mes d’ accessibilite´ clos et ensuite, re´duire les proble`mes
d’accessibilite´ ge´ne´rale au proble`mes d’accessibilite´ clos, par exemple en four-
nissant une borne sur la taille d’une solution minimale d’un proble`me. Nos
re´sultats suivent le meme raisonnement : pour les syste`mes de de´ductions
contracting, le proble`me d’ accessibilite´ ge´ne´rale peut eˆtre re´duit au proble`me
d’accessibilite´ clos. Nous conjecturons que ceci nous permet de fournir une
borne sur la taille des solutions minimales. Ainsi, ce chapitre ajoute un nou-
veau crite`re a` celui de´ja` connu pour de´cider les proble`mes d’ accessibilite´.
Chapitre 6 : Re´sultats de de´cidabilite´ pour le proble`me de
deduction clos dans la logique du premier ordre
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Les syste`mes de de´duction qui repre´sentent les capacite´s de de´duction de
l’intrus peuvent eˆtre conside´re´e comme des ensembles de clauses de Horn avec
un pre´dicat unaire. Dans ce chapitre, nous e´tudions le proble`me de de´duction
clos dans la logique du premier ordre, et plus pre´cise´ment le proble`me de
de´duction clos pour un ensemble de clauses de premier ordre. Il est connu que
pour les clauses et les clauses de Horn, le proble`me de satisfiabilite´ ainsi que
le proble`me de de´duction clos sont inde´cidables. Pourtant, certains re´sultats
de de´cidabilite´ ont e´te´ obtenus pour plusieurs fragments de la logique du pre-
mier ordre [150, 28, 84, 180, 205]. Dans ce chapitre, nous introduisons un nou-
veau fragment de la logique du premier ordre et nous prouvons la de´cidabilite´
du proble`me de de´duction clos. Pour obtenir ce re´sultat, nous ge´ne´ralisons la
proce´dure de saturation utilise´e dans le chapitre 5 afin d’e´tudier le proble`me de
deduction clos pour notre ensemble de clauses de premier ordre. Ce re´sultat
de de´cidabilite´ se base sur l’utilisation de la re´solution avec se´lection (largement
e´tudie´e dans la litte´rature [134, 133, 137, 146, 164]), ainsi que sur l’utilisation
d’un ordre sur les atomes compatible avec un ordre de simplification et complet sur
les termes. Nous remarquons que lorsque nous conside´rons un ordre arbitraire
compltet sur les termes, le proble`me de decution clos pour les clauses sature´es
n’a pas ne´cessairement de´cidable. Nous montrons aussi comment utiliser ces
re´sultats afin de de´cider le proble`me de l’inse´curite´ pour les protocoles cryp-
tographiques dans le cas de nombre borne´ de sessions.
Alors que dans ce chapitre l’application de clauses de Horn sur les proto-
coles de se´curite´ est limite´e a` la recherche d’attaques, l’analyse de protocoles
cryptographiques en utilisant les clauses de Horn peut encore aller plus loin : en
effet on peut utiliser les clauses de Horn pour prouver la correction de ces pro-
tocoles, et ceci, en incluant les clauses de´crivant le protocole dans le processus
de saturation.
Comme dit pre´ce´dement, plusieurs re´sultats de de´cidabilite´ ont e´te´ obtenus
pour le proble`me de deduction clos pour la logique de premier ordre, et certains
sont discute´s dans le chapitre. Parmi les re´sultats cite´s dans le chapitre, le plus
proche du noˆtre est celui de [28]. Dans [28], D. Basin et H. Ganzinger ont prouve´
la de´cidabilite´ du proble`me de de´duction clos pour un ensemble S des clauses
sous les hypothe`ses suivantes :
1. S est sature´ pour la re´solution ordonne´e et par rapport a` la redondance et
ceci pour un ordre complet bien-fonde´ sur les atomes;
2. chaque atome maximal dans chaque clause de S contient toutes les vari-
ables figurant dans les autres atomes dans la clause.
Dans ce chapitre, nous relchons la deuxie`me condition, et afin d’obtenir la
de´cidabilite´, nous utilisons un ordre plus restrictif que celui utilise´ dans [28].
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Dans le futur, nous envisagons d’imple´menter la proce´dure de de´cision par
rapport aux re´sultats de D. Basin et H. Ganzinger [28]. Nous remarquons que
pour les proble`mes de de´duction clos, il suffit de conside´rer des infe´rences
par re´solution avec se´lection dans lesquelles un des atomes est clos. Ainsi, nous
n’avons pas besoin de construire l’ensemble des atomes clos avant de re´soudre
le proble`me de de´duction. En outre, nous envisagons d’ e´tendre le re´sultat au
cas ou` les clauses sont conside´re´es modulo une the´orie e´quationnelle.
Chapitre 7 : Analyse des protocoles de vote-e´le´ctronique : la
prorpie´te´ de “voter verifiability”
Dans le chapitre 7, nous nous inte´ressons aux protocoles de “vote-
e´lectronique”. Le vote e´lectronique est un terme qui englobe plusieurs types de
vote, regrouppant a` la fois les moyens e´lectroniques d’ envoyer les votes et les
moyens e´lectroniques de compter les voix. Les syste`mes de vote e´lectronique
peuvent inclure les punch cards, les syste`mes de vote base´s sur la lecture optique,
et kiosques de vote spe´cialise´es, y compris self-contained Direct-recording electronic
(DRE) voting systems. Il peut aussi inclure la transmission des bulletins et des
votes par te´le´phone, sur des re´seaux informatiques prive´s, ou sur Internet. Le
vote e´lectronique peut offrir des avantages par rapport aux autres techniques
de vote. Il promet la possibilite´ d’une installation commode, efficace et sr pour
l’enregistrement et le comptage des voix. Il peut eˆtre utilise´ pour plusieurs types
d’e´lections, de petits comite´s jusqu’ a` l’ e´chelle des e´lections nationales. Le vote
e´lectronique est utilise´ depuis les anne´es 60. Toutefois, les machines de vote
e´lectronique utilise´es lors des re´centes e´lections ame´ricaines ont e´te´ attaque´es.
Des syste`mes de vote potentiellement beaucoup plus srs pourraient eˆtre im-
plemente´s, ces syste`mes sont base´s sur des protocoles cryptographiques qui
spe´cifient les messages envoye´s entre les e´lecteurs et les administrateurs. De
tels syste`mes sont appele´s les protocoles de vote e´lectronique. Comme tous les pro-
tocoles cryptographiques, les protocoles de vote e´lectronique sont e´crit comme
une suite de messages envoye´s entre les e´lecteurs et les administrateurs. De
tels protocoles ont e´te´ e´tudie´s depuis plusieurs de´cennies [97, 136, 62, 63, 65],
et diffe´rents types de protocoles de vote e´lectronique ont e´te´ propose´es dans la
litte´rature [61, 92, 62, 115, 141, 181]. Ces protocoles visent a` fournir des pro-
prie´te´s de se´curite´ qui vont au-dela` de celles qui peuvent eˆtre re´alise´s par les
syste`mes de vote a` base de papiers. Certaines de ces proprie´te´s sont donne´e
dans le suivant :
• E´quite´ : Il est impossible d’ obtenir de premiers re´sultats qui peuvent in-
fluencer les e´lecteurs restants.
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• Le secret de vote : La valeur de vote de n’ importe quel e´lecteur n’est re´ve´le´e
a` personne.
• L’absence de recu : un e´lecteur ne gagne aucune information qui peut eˆtre
utilise´e ulte´rieurement pour prouver a` une autre personne qu’il a vote´
d’une certaine manie`re.
• Re´sistance a` la coercion : un e´lecteur ne peut pas coope´rer avec une autre
personne afin de lui prouver qu’il a vote´ d’une certaine manie`re.
• Inalte´rabilite´ : personne ne peut changer le vote d’un e´lecteur.
• Bulletin de´clare´ : le re´sultat publie´ est une somme correcte des suffrages
exprime´s.
• Admissibilite´ : Les seuls qui peuvent voter sont les e´lecteurs le´gitimes, et
seulement une fois.
• Ve´rifiabilite´ individuelle : un e´lecteur peut ve´rifier que son vote a e´te´ inclus
dans l’inventaire.
• Ve´rifiabilite´ universelle : n’importe qui peut ve´rifier l’exactitude des
re´sultats publie´s.
• Ve´rifiabilite´ d’admissibilite´ : n’importe qui peut ve´rifier que chaque vote a
e´te´ cre´e´ par un e´lecteur le´gitime unique.
Dans ce chapitre, nous nous interessons a` la “proprie´te´ voter verifiability”, qui
contient les deux proprie´te´s : ve´rifiabilite´ individuelle et ve´rifiabilite´ universelle.
Nous de´finissons formellement ces deux proprie´te´s, et ceci en utilisant le pi cal-
cul applique´ (applied pi calculus) introduit dans [11] et qui est bien adapte´ pour
la mode´lisation des protocoles de se´curite´ et en particulier les protocoles de vote
e´lectronique [97, 25]. Nous appliquons notre de´finition a` certains protocoles de
vote e´lectronique bien connus tels que le protocole fait par Fujioka, Okamoto,
et Ohta [115] et Lee et al. [141], et montrons que les deux protocoles satisfassent
la proprie´te´ de ve´rifiabilite´ de vote selon notre de´finition.
Conclusion et perspectives
Dans notre socie´te´, l’utilisation des applications e´lectroniques telles que la com-
munication e´lectronique, le vote e´lectronique, le commerce e´lectronique, etc est
de plus en plus fre´quente. Parmi plusieurs exigences importantes, la se´curite´
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apparait comme un aspect crucial. Pour garantir la se´curite´, de telles appli-
cations utilisent des protocoles cryptographiques. Il est bien connu que la
conception des protocoles cryptographiques n’est pas suffisante, ils doivent
eˆtre formellement analyse´s afin de ve´rifier qu’ils garantissent les proprie´te´s de
se´curite´ souhaite´es. Bien que le proble`me de l’inse´curite´ des protocoles cryp-
tographiques a e´te´ de´montre´ inde´cidable dans le cas ge´ne´ral [111], plusieurs
restrictions ont conduit a` des re´sultats de de´cidabilite´ et ceci avec, et sans,
l’hypothe`se de cryptographie parfaite.
Dans cette the`se, nous avons assoupli l’hypothe`se de cryptographie parfaite
en prenant en compte plusieurs proprie´te´s alge´briques des primitives cryp-
tographiques. Nous avons analyse´ les protocoles cryptographiques en utilisant
l’approche symbolique, et en particulier en utilisant la me´thode base´e sur la
re´solution des syste`mes de contraintes. Nous avons fourni des proce´dures de
de´cision pour le proble`me de l’inse´curite´ des protocoles cryptographiques dans
le cadre de nombre borne´ de sessions.
Dans le chapitre 3, nous avons e´tudie´ les fonctions de hachage vulne´rables
a` la proprie´te´ de collision, et nous avons analyse´ la classe des protocoles cryp-
tographiques qui utilisent telles fonctions de hachage comme primitives cryp-
tographiques. Nous avons re´duit le proble`me de l’inse´curite´ de notre classe de
protocoles cryptographiques au proble`me de satisfiabilite´ ordonne´ pour l’intrus
exploitation la proprie´te´ de vulne´rabilite´ a` la collision des fonctions de hachage.
Nous avons fourni des arguments d’entre´e suffisants nous permettant de con-
jecturer que le proble`me de satisfiabilite´ ordonne´ pour l’intrus exploitant la pro-
prie´te´ de vulne´rabilite´ a` la collision pour les fonctions de hachage peut eˆtre
re´duit au proble`me de satisfiabilite´ ordonne´ pour l’intrus exploitant les mots.
Ensuite, nous avons prouve´ la de´cidabilite´ du proble`me pre´ce´dent. Une exten-
sion naturelle de ce travail serait de prouver la conjecture ci-dessus.
Dans le chapitre 4, nous avons conside´re´ les sche´mas de signature vulne´rable
a` la proprie´te´ destructrice exclusive ownership et a` la proprie´te´ constructive exclu-
sive ownership. Nous avons montre´ la de´cidabilite´ du proble`me de l’inse´curite´
pour ces deux classes de protocoles cryptographiques. Nous avons commence´
par re´duire le proble`me de l’inse´curite´ de nos deux classes de protocoles au
proble`me d’accessibilite´ pour nos syste`mes de de´duction de l’intrus respec-
tifs. Nous avons ensuite fourni une proce´dure de de´cision pour le proble`me
d’accessibilite´. Cette proce´dure est base´e sur la saturation des syste`mes de
de´duction de l’intrus.
Cette proce´dure de de´cision a ensuite e´te´ e´tendue dans le Chapitre 5 et
nous avons conside´re´ une classe plus ge´ne´rale des protocoles cryptographiques
: la classe des protocoles cryptographiques utilisants des primitives cryptographiques
repre´sente´es par des the´ories e´quationnelles convergentes ayant la proprie´te´ de variante
finie. Une simple ge´ne´ralisation de la proce´dure de de´cision donne´e dans le
chapitre 4 nous a permis de prouver la de´cidabilite´ du proble`me d’accessibilite´
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clos pour notre classe de syste`mes de de´duction. En fait, nous avons le´ge`rement
modifie´ l’algorithme de saturation introduit dans le Chapitre 4, et nous avons
montre´ que si la saturation du syste`me de de´duction de l’intrus termine alors le
proble`me d’accessibilite´ clos est de´cidable. Nous avons e´galement montre´ que
la terminaison de la saturation n’est pas suffisante pour prouver la de´cidabilite´
du proble`me d’accessibilite´ ge´ne´ral. Nous avons ensuite donne´ une condition
supple´mentaire sur les syste`mes de de´duction de l’intrus et nous avons monte´
que cette condition supple´mentaire est suffisante pour prouver la de´cidabilite´
du proble`me d’accessibilite´ ge´ne´ral. Nous avons ensuite utilise´ notre re´sultat
pour prouver la de´cidabilite´ du proble`me d’accessibilite´ clos pour la the´orie des
signatures aveugles. Un re´sultat similaire a e´te´ obtenu pour ces sche´mas de sig-
natures dans [9]. Nous avons e´galement donne´ une autre preuve de de´cidabilite´
pour le proble`me d’accessibilite´ ge´ne´ral pour les the´ories e´quationelles sous-
termes convergentes, une premie`re preuve est donne´e dans [31].
Nous notons que dans le Chapitre 5, nous avons conside´re´ seulement la
classe des theories e´quationelles convergentes avec la proprie´te´ de variante
finie. Nous pre´voyons d’e´tendre ces re´sultats afin de conside´rer la classe des
the´ories e´quationnelles commutatives-associatives convergentes ayant la pro-
prie´te´ de variante finie. Comme montre´ dans [86], de telles extentions peuvent
inclure plusieurs the´ories e´quationnelles comme la the´orie de ou exclusif ou la
the´orie des groupes abe´liens. Nous pre´voyons e´galement d’affaiblir la condition
syntaxique que nous supposons sur les syste`mes de de´duction afin de prouver
la de´cidabilite´ du proble`me d’accessibilite´ ge´ne´ral.
Dans le Chapitre 6, nous avons montre´ la de´cidabilite´ du proble`me de
de´duction clos pour une nouvelle classe de clauses. Ce re´sultat de de´cidabilite´ est
obtenu en ge´ne´ralisant la proce´dure de saturation donne´e dans le Chapitre 5, et il
est base´ sur l’utilisation de la re´solution avec se´lection et sur certaines conditions
syntaxiques sur les ordres sur les atomes et les termes. Nous avons e´galement
montre´ comment utiliser ces re´sultats afin de de´cider le proble`me d’inse´curite´
pour les protocoles cryptographiques dans le cas de nombre borne´ de sessions.
Dans les travaux a` venir, nous pre´voyons de :
1. imple´menter la proce´dure de de´cision : par rapport aux travaux de D.
Basin et H. Ganzinger [28], nous remarquons que pour le proble`me de
de´duction clos, il suffit de conside´rer des infe´rences par re´solution avec
se´lection dans lesquels un des atomes est clos. Ainsi, nous n’avons pas
besoin de construire l’ensemble des atomes clos avant de re´soudre un
proble`me de de´duction.
2. e´tendre ce re´sultat au cas ou` les clauses sont conside´re´es modulo
une the´orie e´quationnelle, i.e., nous raisonnons modulo une the´orie
e´quationelle sur les atomes et sur les termes.
3. e´tendre l’application sur les protocoles cryptographiques afin de prouver
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la correction des protocoles, et ceci en incluant les clauses de´crivant le pro-
tocole a` l’ensemble des clauses.
4. e´tendre l’application sur les protocoles cryptographiques en utilisant
l’hypothe`se de la cryptographie imparfait, et ceci en incluant les clauses
de´crivant les proprie´te´s alge´briques des primitives et les clauses qui
repre´sentent la relation de congruence a` l’ensemble des clauses.
Dans le Chapitre 7, nous avons e´tudie´ une classe particulie`re de protocoles
cryptographiques : les protocoles de vote e´lectronique. Nous avons e´tudie´ pour
ces protocoles la proprie´te´ de voter-verifiability, qui comprend les proprie´te´s de
individual et universal verifiability. Nous avons donne´ une de´finition formelle de
ces deux proprie´te´s en utilisant le pi calcul applique´, et nous avons utilie´ cette
de´finition pour montrer que le protocole de Fujioka et al. [115] et le protocole de
Lee et al. [141] satisfassent la proprie´te´ de voter-verifiability. Dans les travaux
futurs, nous pre´voyons de :
1. e´tendre le champ d’application sur un nombre plus large de protocoles
de vote e´lectronique tels que le protocole de Okamoto [165] et le protocole de
Sandler et al. [182].
2. e´tende les re´sultats de de´cidabilite´ obtenus pour les syste`mes de de´duction
sature´s afin de prouver la proprie´te´ de voter verifiability.
3. analyser les protocoles de vote e´le´ctronique en prenant en conside´ration
les proprie´te´s alge´briques des primitives cryptographiques.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In our society, the use of electronic applications such as e-
communication, e-voting, e-banking, e-commerce, etc is increasing.
Among several important requirements, security figures as one cru-
cial aspect. To guarantee security, such applications use crypto-
graphic protocols. These are small concurrent programs executed by
several distant agents through a network. Messages, or part of the
messages, are produced using cryptographic functions (encryption,
signature, hashing, etc). Cryptography has been used for thousands
of years to safeguard military and diplomatic communications. For
example, the famous Roman emperor Julius Caesar used encryption
to securely communicate with his troops.
Unfortunately, the usage of cryptographic primitives in a proto-
col is not sufficient to ensure its security and several attacks were
found on established protocols [78]. The most stating example is the
bug (a so-called man-in-the-middle attack) of the Needham-Schroeder
protocol found by G. Lowe [144] 17 years after the publication of the
protocol. This situation leads to, and shows the importance of, the
development of tools and decision procedures for the formal verifi-
cation of security protocols.
1.1 Cryptographic protocols
1.1.1 Communication via exchanges of messages
A communication protocol, or simply protocol can be described by exchanges of
messages between many participants. These exchanges are usually described
by a scenario, sequence of rules each one specifying the sender, the receiver, and
the exchanged message. The scenario describes a normal (also said correct) run of
the protocol, that is how the execution of the protocol should proceed in the
1
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Figure 1.1 Example of protocol{
A⇒ B : “Hello, I am A.”
B ⇒ A : “Hi, I am B. Nice to meet you.”
absence of the intruder. A simple example of protocol is given in Figure 1.1.
This protocol describes the first meeting between two people. In this proto-
col, we have two roles “A” (abbreviation of “Alice”) and “B” (abbreviation of
“Bob”).
In the scenario, the roles represent abstract participants. In the protocol de-
scribed in Figure 1.1, we have two roles “A” (the initiator role) and “B” (the
responder role).
We call an execution of the protocol any coherent, with respect to the descrip-
tion of that protocol, set of exchanges of messages between its participants. In
the execution of a protocol, the roles are instantiated by concrete participants, also
called agents. When an agent a instantiates a roleR, we say that “the agent a plays
the role R”. We remark that a role can be played by many agents and any agent
can play many roles or the same role many times. We call session of a protocol a
set of exchanges of messages between the participants of the protocol which is
(1) coherent with respect to the description of that protocol, (2) can be repeated,
and (3) where each role is instantiated only once.
We remark that it is important to take into consideration many instances
of the same protocol, and thus we talk about execution of one session of the
protocol, also called run of the protocol, and execution of many sessions of the
protocol.
Example 4 The following set of exchanges of messages{
(1).1 Alice(A)⇒ Bob(B) : “Hello, I am Alice.”
(1).2 Bob(B)⇒ Alice(A) : “Hi, I am Bob. Nice to meet you.”
represents an execution of one session of the protocol described in Example 1.1.
In this execution, we have two concrete participants, “Alice” playing the role “A”
and “Bob” playing the role “B”.
Example 5 The following set of exchanges of messages
(1).1 Alice(A)⇒ Bob(B) : “Hello, I am Alice.”
(2).1 Bob(A)⇒Marlie(B) : “Hello, I am Bob.”
(1).2 Bob(B)⇒ Alice(A) : “Hi, I am Bob. Nice to meet you.”
(2).2 Marlie(B)⇒ Bob(A) : “Hi, I am Marlie. Nice to meet you.”
represents an execution of two sessions of the protocol described in Example 1.1. In this
execution, we have three concrete participants, “Alice”, “Bob” and “Marlie”: “Alice”
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(playing the role “A”) instantiates a session (1) with “Bob” (playing the role “B”), and
then, “Bob” (playing the role “A”) instances another session (2) with “Marlie” (playing
the role “B”).
1.1.2 Participants
A cryptographic protocol is a communication protocol having several security
goals such as exchange secret information, authenticate the communication partner,
anonymity, etc.. We have two categories of the concrete participants of a proto-
col: “the honest participants” and “the dishonest participants”.
Honest participant
A honest participant is a concrete participant of the protocol. It sends and receives
messages in a pattern defined by the role it plays.
Dishonest participant
Cryptographic protocols are executed in a malicious (or unsafe) environment.
This environment is represented by a special participant of the protocol: the
dishonest participant, also called the intruder, the adversary, or the attacker. The
intruder has a complete control over the communication medium (network), he
listens to the communication and can obtain any message passing through the
network, he can intercept, block, and/or redirect all messages sent by honest
agents. He can masquerade his identity and take part in the protocol under the
identity of an honest participant. He also can deduce new messages using some
specific rules. This intruder is called Dolev-Yao intruder as it was first introduced
by D. Dolev and A. Yao in [107].
The intruder is called:
• eavesdropper when it is only able to listen to the network.
• passive when it is only able to listen to the network and to use specific rules
to compute new messages.
• active when it can furthermore send messages to honest participants.
If we have more than one intruder, we assume that all the intruders cooperate
together.
1.1.3 Security properties
Cryptographic protocols are communication protocols aiming at ensuring some
security objectives called security properties. We give below some of these prop-
erties.
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Secrecy
The secrecy property is also called confidentiality or privacy. We distinguish
three main levels of secrecy:
• Simple secrecy means that the “secret data” should be known only by
some agents, and in particular should not be known by the intruder;
we say that the secrecy of the data “sec” is preserved if the intruder is
not able to deduce it.
• Strong secrecy means that the intruder should not be able to know
anything about the secret data.
• Forward secrecy means that some secret data should be kept secret to
the intruder even after revealing some other secret data.
In this document, and for sake of simplicity, we denote by “secrecy” the
“simple secrecy”.
Authentication
The authentication property is closely related to the identification. This prop-
erty is applied to both entities and information. Two parties communicat-
ing together should identify each other. In a similar way, information de-
livered over a channel should be authenticated as to origin, data content,
etc. The authentication property is divided into two classes: entity authen-
tication and data origin authentication. We remark that data origin authen-
tication implies data integrity property which addresses the unauthorised
modification of data.
Non-repudiation
prevents an entity from denying previous commitments or actions.
We remark that other security properties such as anonymity, certification, revoca-
tion, etc. can be derived from the properties secrecy, authentication, data integrity
and non-repudiation. We also remark that specific kinds of cryptographic proto-
cols such as “electronic-voting protocols” require other security properties such
as “coercion-resistance, receipt-freeness, voter verifiability, etc”. These prop-
erties are discussed in more detail in Chapter 7. A complete list of security
properties can be found in [179].
1.2 Cryptographic primitives
Cryptographic protocols are communication protocols in which cryptographic
primitives are used to construct messages. We give below some of these cryp-
tographic primitives, and for each of them some of its algebraic properties.
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1.2.1 Concatenation
The concatenation, denoted by “·”, is commonly used in cryptographic proto-
cols to construct messages. The concatenation algorithm “·” is represented by a
function that takes a couple of messages as input and outputs their concatena-
tion, for example the concatenation of “a” and “b” is “a· b”.
We give below the algebraic properties of the concatenation:
Associativity : (x · y) · z = x · (y · z)
Unary : x ·  =  · x = x
1.2.2 Exclusive or
The exclusive or, denoted by “⊕” or “XOR”, is commonly used in cryptographic
protocols to construct messages, it has the following algebraic properties:
Associativity : (x⊕ y)⊕ z = x⊕ (y ⊕ z)
Commutativity : x⊕ y = y ⊕ x
Unary : x⊕  = x
Nilpotence : x⊕ x = 
1.2.3 Pairing
The pairing, denoted by “〈−,−〉”, is commonly used in cryptographic protocols
to construct messages, it has the following algebraic properties:
1st projection : pi1〈x, y〉 = x
2nd projection : pi2〈x, y〉 = y
where pi1 and pi2 denote the projection functions. The main difference be-
tween the pairing and the concatenation is that the pairing is not associative, i.e.
〈x, 〈y, z〉〉 6= 〈〈x, y〉, z〉.
1.2.4 Encryption schemes
We have two types of encryption schemes: the public (or asymmetric) encryption
schemes and the symmetric encryption schemes.
Public encryption schemes
The public encryption schemes, also called asymmetric encryption schemes, have
been initially introduced by W. Diffie and M. Hellman [101] and R. Merkle [154].
A “public encryption scheme” is defined by three algorithms: the encryption
algorithm “encp”, the decryption algorithm “decp”, and the key generation algorithm
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“G”. The key generation algorithm takes as input an agent name A and a ran-
dom generated number and returns a pair of public and secret keys, respec-
tively denoted by Pk(A) and Sk(A), corresponding to that agent. This random
number allows any agent to have a different pair of keys for each session while
using the same key generation algorithm. The encryption algorithm takes as in-
put a clear message, called plaintext, and an agent’s public key, and outputs the
encryption of that plaintext, called ciphertext, with respect to the given public
key. The decryption algorithm takes an input a ciphertext and an agent’s pri-
vate key, and outputs the decryption of that ciphertext with respect to the given
private key provided that the ciphertext has been obtained using the public key
correspondant to the given private key.
Example 6 One of the most common public encryption schemes is the encryption
scheme due to R. Rivest, A. Shamir and L. Adleman [174] and denoted by “RSA public
encryption scheme”.
A perfect public encryption scheme is represented by the following equation:
decp(encp(x, Pk(y)), Sk(y)) = x
Symmetric encryption schemes
A symmetric encryption scheme is similar to the asymmetric encryption scheme with
the condition that the same key is used to encrypt and decrypt messages. This
means that in these schemes, the key generation algorithm outputs one key in-
stead of a pair of keys. Furthermore, in these schemes, the encryption algorithm
is denoted by encs, and the decryption algorithm by decs.
A perfect symmetric encryption scheme is represented by the following equa-
tion:
decs(encs(x, y), y) = x
Algebraic properties
An (asymmetric or symmetric) encryption scheme may use some operators
such as the concatenation “·”, or XOR “⊕”, or multiplication “∗”, or pairing
“〈−,−〉”. Such schemes may have some of the following algebraic properties:
Commuting. The commuting property is represented by the following equation
enc(enc(x, y), z) = enc(enc(x, z), y). One of the most important commuting
encryption schemes is RSA public encryption scheme with common modulus
[69].
Homomorphism. The homomorphism property is represented by the following
equation enc(x, y) ∗ enc(z, y) = enc(x ∗ z, y), and it means that one can get
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from the encryption of the messages m1 and m2 the encryption of the new
message m1 ∗ m2 without knowing the encryption key. The RSA public
encryption scheme possesses this property [112].
Prefix property. The prefix property means that one can get from an encrypted
message the encryption of any of its prefixes, and it is formally repre-
sented as follows: from a message enc(< x, y >, z) one can get the message
enc(x, z).
1.2.5 Signature
Digital signature schemes first appeared in W. Diffie and M.E. Hellman’s seminal
paper [101]. Their most important goal is to demonstrate the authenticity of a
digital message or document: a valid digital signature gives a recipient reason
to believe that the message was created by a known sender, and that it was not
altered in transit.
Such schemes are described by three algorithms: the signature generation
“sig”, the verification “ver”, and the key generation “G” algorithms. The key
generation algorithm takes as input an agent name A and a random generated
number and returns a pair of public and secret keys, respectively denoted by
Pk(A) and Sk(A), corresponding to that agent. This random number allows any
agent to have a different pair of keys for each session, and that using the same
key generation functions. The signature generation algorithm inputs a message
and an agent’s private key, and outputs the signature of the given agent for the
given message. There are two types of verification algorithms:
• The verification algorithm of the first type takes as input a message, a sig-
nature, and an agent public key, and outputs “succeeds” if the given sig-
nature corresponds to the signature done by the given agent for the given
message.
• A verification algorithm of the second type takes as input a signature and
an agent’s public key, recovers the message that has been signed from the
signature and returns it provided that the given signature is done by the
given agent.
When the verification algorithm is of the first type, we call the signature scheme
“a signature scheme with appendix” and when the verification algorithm is of
the second type, we call the signature scheme “a signature scheme with message
recovery”.
A perfect signature scheme with appendix is represented by the following
equation
ver(x, sig(x, Sk(y)), Pk(y)) = 1
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And, a perfect signature scheme with message recovery is represented by
the following equation
ver(sig(x, Sk(y)), Pk(y)) = x
1.2.6 Blind signature
Blind signature schemes, initially introduced by D. Chaum [61], is a form of digital
signature schemes in which the content of a message is blinded (disguised) be-
fore it is signed. The resulting blind signature can be publicly verified against
the original, unblinded message in the manner of a regular digital signature.
Blind signatures are typically employed in privacy-related protocols where the
signer and message author are different parties; examples include electronic
voting systems [115] and digital cash schemes.
The blind signature schemes are described by the following algorithms:
• the signature generation “sig”, the verification “ver”, and the key generation
“G” algorithms which are defined as for the traditional digital signature
schemes given in Section 1.2.5.
• The blind “Bl”and unblind “Ubl” algorithms defined as follows:
Blind algorithm takes as input a message “m” and a random selected value
“r”, and returns the blinded value of “m” with respect to “r”.
Unblind algorithm takes as input a blinded message “b” and a random se-
lected value “r”, and outputs the original (unblinded) message pro-
vided that “b” has been constructed using “r” as random selected
value.
The blind signature schemes have the following algebraic properties:
ver(sig(x, Sk(y)), Pk(y)) = x, (or, ver(x, sig(x, Sk(y)), Pk(y)) = 1)
Ubl(Bl(x, y), y) = x
Ubl(sig(Bl(x, y), Sk(z)), y) = sig(x, Sk(z))
1.2.7 Hash function
A cryptographic hash function is a deterministic procedure that takes an ar-
bitrary block of data and returns a fixed-size bit string. Cryptographic hash
functions have many information security applications, notably in digital sig-
natures, message authentication codes (MACs), and other forms of authentica-
tion.
Hash functions may have some of the following properties:
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Preimage property
given a hash value n, one can compute a data m such that the hash value
of m is equal to n.
Second preimage property
given a data m, one can compute another data m′ 6= m such that m and m′
have the same hash value.
Collision property
one can compute two distinct datam,m′ such that they have the same hash
value.
These properties are described in more detail in Chapter 3. A perfect hash func-
tion does not have any of these properties.
1.3 Example: Needham-Schroeder protocol
Description of the protocol. The Needham-Schroeder symmetric key protocol is one
of the most known cryptographic protocols. It has been designed By R. M.
Needham and M. D. Schroeder in 1978 [163], and it forms the basis for the Ker-
beros protocol.
It is described as follows:
PNS :

1. A⇒ S : 〈A, 〈B,NA〉〉
2. S ⇒ A : encs(〈NA, B,KAB, encs(〈KAB, A〉, KBS)〉, KAS)
3. A⇒ B : encs(〈KAB, A〉, KBS)
4. B ⇒ A : encs(NB, KAB)
5. A⇒ B : encs(NB − 1, KAB)
NA (respectively NB) represents the nonce freshly created by A (respectively
B), KAS (respectively KBS) represents the secret key shared between A
(respectively B) and the trusted server, and KAB the session key shared between
A and B.
This protocol aims at establishing a session key between the participants, typi-
cally to protect further communication.
Analysis of the protocol. When this protocol has been designed, R. M. Need-
ham and M. D. Schroeder assumed that the private keys are never compro-
mised [163]. Under this assumption, the protocol is secure [99]. D. Denning
and G. Sacco [99] showed the insecurity of the protocol when private keys are
compromised. Actually, assume that (i) an agent a has initialised a session with
an agent b, (ii) the intruder I has obtained a copy of the key Kab, and (iii) I has
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intercepted all messages between a and b. I can then later trick b into using the
key Kab as follows: first I replays the message encs(〈Kab, a〉, Kbs) to b
I ⇒ b : encs(〈Kab, a〉, Kbs)
Assuming that a has initiated a new conversation, b replies to a
b⇒ I(a) : encs(n′b, Kab)
I intercepts the message, deciphers it, and impersonates a′s response:
I(a)⇒ b : encs(n′b − 1, Kab)
Thereafter, I can send false messages to b that appear to be from a.
This attack, called a replay attack is the most famous attack on the Needham-
Schroeder symmetric key protocol.
1.4 Analysis of cryptographic protocols
1.4.1 Overview
Cryptographic protocols are programs designed to ensure secure electronic
communications between participants using an insecure network. They use
cryptographic primitives such as encryption schemes, signature schemes, hash
functions, and others to construct exchanged messages. These cryptographic
primitives are based on mathematical notions such as modular exponentiation
and elliptic curves and on algorithmically hard problems such as factorisation
into prime numbers, extracting the modular logarithm, and others.
Unfortunately, the existence of cryptographic primitives is not sufficient to
ensure security and several attacks were found on established protocols [78, 2].
The most relevant example is the bug of the Needham-Schroeder public key
protocol [163] found by Lowe [144] using a model-checking tool. It took 17
years since the protocol was published to find the attack, a man-in-the-middle
one. This situation shows that the design of a cryptographic protocol is tricky,
and that it is easy to have it wrong. Thus, one needs formal verification. In
the literature, we find two distinct worlds for the verification of cryptographic
protocols: the computational world and the symbolic world. Let us now review
briefly these two approaches:
The “computational” world
In the computational models, also called probabilistic, or cryptographic, or concrete
models, messages are bit strings, and the intruder is an arbitrary probabilistic
polynomial-time Turing machine. These models are closer to the reality than
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the symbolic ones, and hence results obtained in these models yield stronger se-
curity guarantees, but the validation proofs are essentially manual [38, 142, 49].
Recently, I. Tsahhirov and P. Laud [194] have developed an automatic tool to
verify cryptographic protocols in the computational models, and B. Blanchet
[48] has developed another automatic tool “CryptoVerif” which is more devel-
oped than the tool in [194]. Many results have been obtained in the computa-
tional models [13, 33, 26, 56, 203, 155]. For instance, in [26], M. Backes and B.
Pfitzmann proved that the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol is secure under
real, and active cryptographic attacks including concurrent protocol runs. Still,
another computationally sound proof of security for the Needham-Schroeder-
Lowe protocol has been given in [203], where B. Warinschi has proved that the
protocol is secure if it is implemented with an encryption scheme that satis-
fies indistinguishability under chosen-ciphertext attack. In [155], D. Micciancio
and B. Warinschi showed that, in the case of assymetric encryption, the perfect
encryption hypothesis is a sound abstraction for encryption schemes satisfy-
ing the IND-CCA2 property. In [13], M. Abadi and Ph. Rogaway showed that
if two messages are formally indistinguishable then they are computationally
indistinguishable, and that in the case where the symmetric encryption is the
unique encryption scheme in addition of some technical restrictions. This result
has been extended by M. Baudet, V. Cortier and S. Kremer [33] to take into con-
sideration cryptographic primitives represented by a wide class of equational
theories including exclusive or, and by E. Bresson, Y. Lakhnech, L. Mazare´ and
B. Warinschi [56] who take into consideration the modular exponentiation.
The “symbolic” world
The first symbolic models for the verification of cryptographic protocols are at-
tributed to R. Needham and M. Schroeder [163], and to D. Dolev and A. Yao
[107]. These models represent an abstraction of the real world, and hence al-
low simpler reasoning and an automatic analysis of security protocols. In the
symbolic world, the cryptographic primitives are represented by function sym-
bols, messages by elements in a signature (a set of function symbols represent-
ing the cryptographic primitives), and the intruder by a set of deduction rules.
Such approaches adopt the so-called Dolev-Yao intruder model [107] represented
as follows:
The intruder has a complete control over the communication
medium (network), he listens to the communication and can obtain
any message passing through the network, he can intercept, block,
and/or redirect all messages sent by honest agents. He also can mas-
querade his identity and take part in the protocol under the identity
of an honest agent. His control of the network is modelled by as-
suming that all messages sent by honest agents are sent directly to
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Figure 1.2 Security problem of cryptographic protocols
Input: a protocol P, and a security property A.
Output: SECURE if and only if the P satisfies A.
the intruder and that all messages received by the honest agents are
always sent by the intruder. Besides the control of the network, the
intruder has some specific rules to deduce new messages.
In this document, we follow the symbolic approach in order to analyse
cryptographic protocols.
1.4.2 Symbolic analysis of cryptographic protocols
Cryptographic protocols are difficult to verify for several reasons: the un-
bounded complexity of the exchanged messages, the unbounded number of
the new generated data, the unbounded number of participants, and the un-
bounded number of sessions.
The “security problem” of cryptographic protocols which is stated in Fig-
ure 1.2 is undecidable in general [111]. In [110], the authors showed that the
problem remains undecidable even if data constructors, message depth, mes-
sage width, number of distinct roles, role length, and depth of encryption are
bounded by constants. Another restrictions consist in bounding the number
of fresh values (nonces) used during the attack. However several undecidable
problems like PCP may be encoded in that case [89]. In order to decide the se-
curity problem of cryptographic protocols, we need to add more restrictions.
We describe below a few methods used to symbolically analyse cryptographic
protocols, then we give some obtained (un)decidability results.
Search for logical attacks. A first attempt was to search for logical attacks in the
case of bounded number of sessions. In [192], the authors showed that, in this
method, it is sufficient to consider a unique intruder. The first tools were based
on model-checking. Such tools represent the protocols as finite-state machines
and security properties as formula in temporal logic. Examples of such tools
are FDR [108], Murφ [160], or Brutus [79]. They discovered several interest-
ing attacks assuming a bounded number of sessions and messages of bounded
size. The most famous attack discovered using these tools is the attack on the
Needham-Schroeder public key protocol [145].
A. Huima [122] was the first to suggest that bounding the size of messages is
not necessary, and to analyse cryptographic protocols in that case, proposed
the use of symbolic constraints. The use of symbolic constraints to analyse
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cryptographic protocols has been studied later by [15, 156, 53], and then by
[68, 95, 73, 70, 69, 54] who considered cryptographic protocols with algebraic
primitives such as modular exponentiation, exclusive or, etc. Constraint solv-
ing has become the standard model to analyse cryptographic protocols in the
case of bounded number of sessions.
In this approach, other works have been done in order to capture other secu-
rity properties such as the resistance to the dictionary attacks [96], equivalence-
based properties [109], and the properties related to contract-signing protocols
[135].
Search for proofs. The drawback of this approach is that, assuming a bounded
number of sessions, it does not prove the correctness of the protocol. We
show here another approach, the “search for proofs”, which does not assume
a bounded number of sessions. One of its inconvenient is that it may introduce
false attacks, that is it may reject protocols that do not have logical attacks. We
give below some of the methods elaborated in this approach:
• Methods that use theorem provers such as the inductive approach of L.
Paulson [168] which uses Isabelle to prove security properties, and the
approach of Bolignano [52].
• Methods based on process algebra such as pi-calculus, spi-calculus and
applied pi-calculus [12, 11].
• Methods based on logics such as BAN logic [57] which is due to M. Bur-
rows and M. Abadi and R. M. Needham.
• NRL protocol analyser [151] which is known to be the first tool that does
not impose any restriction.
• Methods that use tree automata [161, 118, 85].
• Methods based on Horn clauses [46, 180, 84, 205].
Several automatic tools have been developed to symbolically verify crypto-
graphic protocols such as “Proverif” [46, 50], “AVISS” [17], or “AVISPA” [19].
The symbolic methods have been used to analyse a wide class of cryptographic
protocols such as key exchange and authentication protocols, voting protocols
[136, 97], contract-signing protocols [128], recursive protocols [138], Web Ser-
vices [41, 72], and others.
(Un)Decidability results
The security problem of cryptographic protocols, stated in Figure 1.2 is unde-
cidable in general [111], but under some restrictions several decidability results
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have been obtained. These results can be divided into two classes: the decid-
ability results with (respectively without) the perfect cryptography hypothesis. An
encryption scheme is said to be perfect when no (not even partial) information
about the plaintext can be obtained from a ciphertext without knowing the de-
cryption (secret) key. This hypothesis has been introduced by R. Needham and
M. Schroeder [163], and D. Dolev and A. Yao [107] in their respective works.
When the perfect encryption hypothesis is generalised to the other cryptographic
primitives, we talk about the perfect cryptography hypothesis.
While perfect cryptography hypothesis is not realistic, (actually the intruder
may use the algebraic properties of cryptographic primitives when he is attack-
ing the protocol), several important attacks have been discovered. An example
of such attacks would be the attack discovered by G. Lowe on the Needham-
Schroeder public key [145]. Furthermore, several results have been obtained,
we show below some of them.
Unbounded number of sessions. Assuming an unbounded number of sessions,
the problem is undecidable [14, 81, 110, 111], and remains undecidable
even if we suppose that no nonces (fresh data) are generated [81, 111],
or we bound the size of messages [14, 110]. This problem becomes
DEXPTIME-complete if we suppose that no nonces are generated and
bound the size of messages [71, 110]. In [106], the authors showed that
the security of Ping-pong protocols is decidable in PTIME.
Bounded number of sessions. Assuming a bounded number of sessions, M. Rusi-
nowitch and M. Turuani [178] showed that the problem is co-NP-complete.
Later, The perfect encryption hypothesis has been relaxed, and several algebraic
properties of cryptographic primitives have been considered in the analysis of
cryptographic protocols. Several results have been obtained, we show below
some of them. The problem is co-NP-complete for the Ping-pong protocols with
commutative equational theory [69, 195]. The problem remains decidable for the
bounded number of sessions with exclusive Or [87]. It also remains decidable
for the abelian groups [188].
Many researches have been focused on general classes of algebraic prop-
erties, and several results have been obtained in that field. For example, M.
Baudet [32] has proved the decidability of the security problem for the class of
cryptographic protocols using primitives represented by subterm convergent
equational theories. S. Delaune and F. Jacquemard [95] have proved the decid-
ability of the security problem for the class of cryptographic protocols using
primitives represented by convergent public-collapsing equational theories, etc.
Other results can be found in [90].
1.5. CONTRIBUTIONS AND PLAN OF THIS THESIS 15
1.5 Contributions and plan of this thesis
In this thesis, we relax the perfect cryptography hypothesis by taking into ac-
count some algebraic properties of cryptographic primitives that we formulate
by equations. We follow the symbolic approach to analyse security protocols,
and in particular, the approach based on the resolution of constraint systems. To
this end, we formulate the capacity of the intruder by deduction rules, and the
verification task of the protocol by a reachability problem. The latter is the prob-
lem of determining if a certain (finite) parallel program which models the pro-
tocol and the specification can reach an erroneous state while interacting with
the environment. We provide decision procedures for the reachability problem
in presence of several algebraic operators.
In Chapter 2, we give the basic notions and definitions we use in the most
of this thesis. We define the constraint systems, and reachability problem. These
notions have been initially introduced by J. Millen and V. Shmatikov [156], but
as defined there, they are not adequate for the non empty equational theories.
We actually follow the definitions introduced by Y. Chevalier and M. Rusinow-
itch [73] who generalised the initial definitions of [156] in order to capture non
empty equational theories. We show how protocols are modeled in a high spec-
ification language, and we show how to reduce the insecurity problem of cryp-
tographic protocols to the satisfiability problem of constraint systems. Several
works follow this approach [156, 87, 73, 72].
1.5.1 Decidability results in presence of algebraic operators
Chapter 3: Analysis of protocols with collision vulnerable hash functions.
In Chapter 3, we consider the class of cryptographic protocols that use colli-
sion vulnerable hash functions. The collision vulnerability property for a hash
function means that one can construct two different messages having the same
hash value. We remark that only a few years ago, it was intractable to compute
collisions on hash functions, so they were considered to be collision resistant
by cryptographers, and collision was considered to be a possible attack on hash
functions only from the nineties when collision attacks have been proved and
showed by several ressearchers [98, 103, 199, 201]. Examples of collision vulner-
able hash functions are “MD5” and “SHA-0”.
In this chapter, we symbolically represent how the intruder may compute
collisions on hash functions. We then reduce the insecurity problem of our class
of cryptographic protocols to the ordered satisfiability problem for the intruder
using the collision vulnerability property of hash functions when attacking a
protocol execution. The ordered satisfiability problem is a variant of the satisfi-
ability problem presented in Chapter 2. It was initially introduced by Y. Cheva-
lier et al. [72]. Roughly following the results obtained in [74], we conjecture that
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the ordered satisfiability problem for the intruder exploiting the collision vul-
nerability property of hash functions can be reduced to the ordered satisfiability
problem for an intruder operating on words, that is with an associative symbol
of concatenation. We show the decidability of the last problem, which is inter-
esting in its own as it is the first decidability result that we are aware of for an
intruder system for which unification is infinitary. Furthermore, it permits one
to consider in other contexts an associative concatenation of messages instead
of their pairing.
Chapter 4: Analysis of protocols with vulnerable digital signature schemes.
In chapter 4, we study two classes of cryptographic protocols: the class of pro-
tocols using digital signature schemes vulnerable to constructive exclusive owner-
ship property, and the class of protocols using digital signature schemes vulnera-
ble to destructive exclusive ownership property. The constructive exclusive ownership
vulnerability property for a digital signature schemes permits the intruder, given
a public verification key and a signed message, to compute a new pair of signa-
ture and verification keys such that the message appears to be signed with the
new signature key; and the destructive exclusive ownership vulnerability property
for a digital signature schemes permits the intruder, given a public verification
key and a signed message, to compute a new pair of signature and verification
keys, and a new message, such that the given signature appears to be the sig-
nature of the new computed message with the new signature key. We show
the decidability of the insecurity problem for these two classes of cryptographic
protocols, and that by reducing the insecurity problem to the reachability prob-
lem for our intruder deduction systems.
Chapter 5: Decidability results for saturated deduction systems.
In chapter 5, we generalise the results obtained in Chapter 4. We consider the
class of cryptographic protocols where the cryptographic primitives are repre-
sented by equational theories generated by convergent rewrite systems having
the finite variant property. This property has been introduced in [86], and means
that one can compute all possible normal forms of the instances of a term t.
First, we show the decidability of the ground reachability problem for our
class of deduction systems. This decidability result is obtained by (1) reducing
the reachability problem modulo an equational theory to the reachability prob-
lem modulo the empty theory, (2) computing a transitive closure of the possible
deductions (using a saturation procedure), and (3) showing that the termination
of this computation implies the decidability of the ground reachability problem.
Next, we give a new criterion, based on counting the number of variables
in a reachability problem before and after a deduction is guessed, that permits
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us to reduce the general reachability problem to the ground reachability prob-
lem. This criterion is a generalisation of the one employed for the specific cases
in Chapter 4, and we give an example showing that such additional criterion
is needed, that is the decidability of the ground reachability problem without
this criterion does not imply the decidability of the general reachability prob-
lem. Another contribution of this chapter is a decidability result of the ground
reachability problem for the theory of blind signature [136], and a decidabil-
ity result of the general reachability problem for a class of subterm convergent
equational theories. Other decidability results have been obtained for the the-
ory of blind signature in [9, 91] but they are different from our. Similarly, a more
general decidability result for the subterm convergent theory was given in [31],
but our proofs are simpler and can be easily generalised to other classes.
1.5.2 Chapter 6: Decidability result for the ground entailment problem in
the first order logic
Deduction systems representing the intruder’s deductive capabilities can be
viewed as sets of Horn clauses with one unary predicate. We generalise in
Chapter 6 the saturation procedure employed in Chapter 5 in order to study
the ground entailment problem for a new set of first order clauses. It is well-
known that the satisfiability and the ground entailment problem are undecid-
able for both clauses and Horn clauses sets, but several decidability results have
been obtained for several fragments of first order logic [150, 28, 84, 180, 205].
In this chapter, we introduce a new fragment of first order logic and we
prove the decidability of its ground entailment problem. This decidability re-
sult relies on the use of the selected resolution (widely studied in the literature
[134, 133, 137, 146, 164]) and on the use of an atom ordering compatible with a
complete simplification term ordering. We remark that when the complete term
ordering is arbitrary, a saturated set of clauses does not necessarily have a de-
cidable ground entailment problem. We also show how to use this result in
order to decide the insecurity problem for cryptographic protocols in the case
of bounded number of sessions.
While in this chapter the application of Horn clauses on security protocols
is limited to the search of attacks, the analysis of cryptographic protocols using
Horn clauses may go beyond that: actually one can use Horn clauses to prove
the correctness of such protocols, and that by including the clauses describing
the protocol in the saturation process.
18 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
1.5.3 Chapter 7: Analysis of electronic voting protocols: “voter verifiability”
property
In Chapter 7, we study a specific class of cryptographic protocols: the
“electronic-voting” protocols for which we analyse the “voter verifiability prop-
erty”. The voter verifiability property includes the the individual verifiability and
universal verifiability properties. Intuitively, the individual verifiability property
mans that a voter can check whether her ballot was included in the tally, and
the universal verifiability property means that anybody can check the correctness
of the published outcome. We formally define these two properties, and that
using the applied pi calculus [11] which is well-suited for modelling security pro-
tocols and in particular electronic voting protocols [97, 25]. We apply our defini-
tion to some well-known e-voting protocols such as the protocol due to Fujioka,
Okamoto & Ohta [115] and Lee et al. [141], and show that both protocols are
voter verifiable according to our definition.
Chapter 2
Constraint systems to analyse
cryptographic protocols
The security of a cryptographic protocol is assessed with respect
to the environment in which the protocol is executed. Dolev and Yao
[107] have described the environment by the deductions an intruder
attacking a protocol is able to perform. They considered that the in-
truder has a complete control over the communication medium (net-
work), he listen to the communication and can obtain any message
passing through the network, he can intercept, block, and/or redi-
rect all messages sent by honest agents. He also can masquerade his
identity and take part in the protocol under the identity of an hon-
est agent. His control of the network is modelled by assuming that
all messages sent by honest agents are sent directly to the intruder
and that all messages received by the honest agents are always sent
by the intruder. Besides the control of the network, the intruder has
some specific rules to deduce new messages [73, 72, 156].
Many procedures have been proposed to decide security prob-
lems of cryptographic protocols in the Dolev-Yao model with respect
to a finite number of sessions [16, 53, 178]. Among the different ap-
proaches, there is the symbolic approaches [156, 75, 29, 87] on which,
as mentionned in the introduction of this document, we work. In
these approaches, cryptographic primitives are represented by func-
tion symbols, messages are represented by terms in a signature (a
set of function symbols representing the cryptographic primitives),
and intruder capacities are represented by deduction rules on sets of
messages representing his knowledge. These deduction rules allow
the intruder to derive new messages from a given (finite) set of mes-
sages representing his knowledge. Cryptographic primitives may
have algebraic properties, such as the associativity for the concate-
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nation primitive “·”, which are represented by an equational theory.
Among the different symbolic approaches, in this chapter we are
focused on the symbolic approach that uses the resolution of con-
straint systems and reduces the insecurity problem of cryptographic
protocols with bounded number of sessions to the satisfiability prob-
lem of constraint systems [205, 156, 73, 178]. In [29], the authors
proved that this reduction is quite effective and were able to discover
new attacks on several protocols.
Outline of the Chapter. We start by giving the basic technical defi-
nitions and notions used troughout this document in Section 2.1. In
Section 2.2, we present how protocols are modeled. In Section 2.3, we
show how the insecurity problem of cryptographic protocols can be
reduced to the satisfiability problem of constraint systems.
2.1 Preliminaries
This section introduces the basic notions used in this document.
Given a set of elements E, we denote by E∗ the set of all words over E in the
sense of formal language theory. For example, if E = {1, 2, 3}, elements of E∗
are of the form {, 1, 2, 3, 1.2, 1.2.2.3, . . .}where “.” denotes the concatenation and
 denotes the empty word. The cardinality of a set E is denoted by \E. By infinite
set, we mean a countably infinite set (i.e. the same cardinality as N).
2.1.1 Multisets
Let E be a set of elements. A multisetM over E can be formally defined as a
pair (E, f ) where f is a function fromE toN. The multisetM can also be written
as {(e1, f(e1)), (e2, f(e2)), . . .}, or as {e1, . . . , e1︸ ︷︷ ︸
f(e1)
, e2, . . . , e2︸ ︷︷ ︸
f(e2)
, . . .} where ei ∈ E. The
support of the multisetM, written Supp(M), is defined as follows
Supp(M) = {e such that f(e) > 0}
A multisetM is said to be finite if the cardinality of its support is finite. For sim-
plicity, we sometimes denote byM(e) the number of occurrences of the element
e in the multisetM.
2.1.2 Terms over a signature
Let X be an infinite set of variables, C be an infinite set of free constants ,
and F be a set of function symbols. We associate a special function arity to
2.1. PRELIMINARIES 21
the function symbols, arity : F → N. The arity of a function symbol indicates
the number of arguments that it expects. We call signature the tuple (F , arity),
and for simplicity, in this document, we denote by signature only the set F .
We define the set of terms T (F ,X ) over the signature F to be the smallest set
containing X , C , and such that if f is a function symbol in F with arity n ≥ 0,
and if t1, . . . , tn are terms in T (F ,X ), then f(t1, . . . , tn) is a term in T (F ,X ). We
define the set of ground terms T (F) over the signature F to be biggest subset of
the set of terms T (F ,X ) such that T (F) does not contain variables. We denote
the set of variables (respectively set of free constants) occurring in a term t by
V ar(t) (respectively Cons(t)). A term without variables, i.e. a term in T (F),
is called ground term. If T, T ′ are two sets of terms, and t, t′ are two terms, we
abbreviate T ∪ T ′ by T, T ′, T ∪ {t} by T, t, T \ {t} by T \ t, and {t, t′} by t, t′.
2.1.3 Positions and subterms
The subterms of a term t are denoted by the set of terms Sub(t) which is defined
recursively as follows. If t ∈ X ∪ C then Sub(t) = {t}, and if t = g(t1, . . . , tn)
then Sub(t) = {t} ∪ (⋃ni=1 Sub(ti)). The strict (or proper) subterms of a term t are
denoted by the set of terms SSub(t), and SSub(t) = Sub(t) \ t. We denote t[s] a
term t that admits s as subterm.
Example 7 Consider the term t = Sig(h(a), Sk(Bob)).
We have: Sub(t) = {t, h(a), Sk(Bob), a, Bob}, and SSub(t) =
{h(a), Sk(Bob), a, Bob}.
We call positions the elements of N∗. We say that a position p is smaller than a
position q, and we write p ≤ q, if p is a prefix of q, i.e. there exists a position p′
such that p.p′ = q. Given a term t, the set of positions of t, denoted by Pos(t), is
defined recursively as follows:
• if t is a variable or a constant then Pos(t) = {};
• if t = f(t1, . . . , tn) then Pos(t) = {} ∪ (
⋃
1≤i≤n{i.p such that p ∈ Pos(ti)}).
The position  is called the root position of the term t. The dag-size of a term t,
denoted by ‖t‖dag, is defined to be the number of distinct subterms of t.
The Top symbol of a term t, denoted by Top(t), is defined by Top : T (F ,X ) →
F ∪ X ∪ C, with
• Top(t) = t if t ∈ X ∪ C
• Top(t) = f if t = f(t1, . . . , tn)
The subterm of t at position p ∈ Pos(t), denoted by t|p, is defined recursively
as follows:
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• if t ∈ X ∪ C or p =  and t|p = t;
• if t = f(t1, . . . , tn) and p = i.p′ with 1 ≤ i ≤ n then t|p = ti|p′ .
Given a term t, and a position p ∈ Pos(t), we denote by t[p ← s] the term
obtained from t by replacing the subterm at position p by s.
2.1.4 Substitutions
A substitution σ is a partial function from variables X to terms T (F ,X ), such
that its domain is finite. We define the support of a substitution σ, written Supp(σ)
as follows: Supp(σ) = {x|σ(x) 6= x}, is a finite set. The substitution σ with
Supp(σ) = ∅ is called the empty substitution or the identity substitution. The sub-
stitution σ with Supp(σ) = {x1, . . . , xn} and σ(xi) = ti for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, can also
be written as σ = {x1 7→ t1, . . . , xn 7→ tn}. The range of σ, denoted by Ran(σ), is
defined by the set Ran(σ) = {σ(x) such that x ∈ Supp(σ)}. The substitution σ
with Supp(σ) = ∅ is called the identity substitution. We denote by V ar(σ) the set
V ar(Ran(σ)). A substitution σ is said to be ground if V ar(σ) = ∅, that is Ran(σ)
is a set of ground terms. A substitution σ instantiates a variable x if x ∈ Supp(σ),
and σ is said to be grounding x if x ∈ Supp(σ) and σ(x) is a ground term.
The application of a substitution σ to a term t is denoted σ(t) and is equal
to the term t where all variables x have been replaced by the term σ(x). More
formally, in order to apply a substitution σ to terms, we extend σ homomorphi-
cally on terms by the rule σ(f(t1, . . . , tn)) = f(σ(t1), . . . , σ(tn)). Let E be a set of
terms, E ⊆ T (F ,X ), we denote σ(E) = {σ(t) such that t ∈ E}.
From now on, we mean by xσ the application of σ to x, i.e. xσ = σ(x). In
similar way, if t (respectively E) is a term (respectively a set of terms), we will
write tσ (respectively Eσ) instead of σ(t) (respectively σ(E)).
A renaming ρ is an injective substitution such that Ran(ρ) ⊆ X .
The composition σθ of two substitutions σ and θ is defined as x(σθ) = (xσ)θ =
xσθ. A substitution θ is an extension of a substitution σ if Supp(σ) ⊆ Supp(θ), and
xσ = xθ for all x ∈ Supp(σ). A substitution σ is a restriction of a substitution θ if
θ is an extension of σ. A substitution σ is cyclic if there exists x1, . . . , xn, xn+1 ∈
Supp(σ) with n ≥ 1 such that xi+1 ∈ V ar(xiσ) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, with xn+1 =
x1. A substitution σ is idempotent if σ = σσ. We remark that a idempotent
substitutions are acyclic, and as we consider substitutions with finite domain,
the converse also holds. In this document, we will only consider idempotent
substitutions.
2.1.5 Equational theories and rewriting systems
Given a binary relation → over a set of terms S. The relations →+,→∗ are re-
spectively the transitive and reflexive-transitive closure of→. The relation→ is
said to be:
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• well-founded if there is no infinite chain t→ t1 → . . . for any term t ∈ S;
• monotone if s → t implies sσ → tσ for any substitution σ, and any terms
s, t;
• stable if s→ t implies u[s]→ u[t] for any terms s, t and u;
• a reduction if it is stable, monotone and well-founded.
An equation over the signature F is an unordered pair of terms {u, v}, denoted
u
·
= v or v ·= u, with u, v ∈ T (F ,X ). An equational presentation H over the
signature F is a set of equations u ·= v over F , such that for any u ·= v ∈ H,
Cons({u, v}) = ∅. Given an equational presentation H, we denote by ↔H the
smallest symmetric relation containingH, stable and monotone. Hence, for any
couple of terms s, t, we have s ↔H t if and only if there exists an equation
u
·
= v ∈ H, a substitution σ, a position p ∈ Pos(s) such that s|p = uσ, and
t = s[p← vσ].
The equational theory generated byH on T (F ,X ), denoted by =H, is the small-
est monotone congruence containing H. We remark that a congruence is stable
by definition. For any terms s, t, we say that s and t are equal modulo H if
s =H t. We often do not distinguish between an equational theory generated
by H and H itself. An equational theory H is said to be consistent if two free
constants are not equal moduloH.
A rewrite rule over the signature F is a pair of terms denoted l→ r such that
V ar(r) ⊆ V ar(l). A rewrite system R over the signature F is a set of rewrite
rules over F . The reduction relation→R induced from R is the smallest relation
containingR, stable and monotone.
For any couple of terms t, s, we have that s reduces to (or can be reduced to,
or rewrites to, or can be rewritten to) t, and we write s→Rt or simply s→ t ifR
is clear from the context, if and only if there exists a rewrite rule l → r ∈ R, a
substitution σ, a position p ∈ Pos(s) such that s|p = lσ, and t = s[p ← rσ]. We
call s→Rt a reduction step, and a sequence of reduction steps is called reduction
sequence. We write s→∗Rt if we have s→Rs1→R . . .→Rt. We write s ↔R t if we
have s→R t and t→R s, and we write s↔∗R t if we have s↔∗R s1 ↔∗R . . .↔∗R t.
A term t is said to be in R-normal form (or simply in normal form when R is
clear from the context) if and only if there is no term s such that t→Rs. A term s
is theR-normal form (or simply the normal form whenR is clear from the context)
of the term t if and only if t→∗Rs and s is in normal form. The normal form of a
term t is denoted t ↓R (or simply t ↓whenR is clear from the context).
A rewrite system R is said to be terminating if the reduction relation →R is
well-founded, that is any reduction sequence is finite. A rewrite system R is
said to be confluent if for any terms t, u, v such that t→∗Ru, t→∗Rv, there exists a
term w verifying u→∗Rw and v→∗Rw. If R is confluent, then when a term t has
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a normal form, this normal form is unique. A rewriting system is said to be
convergent if it is confluent and terminating. IfR is convergent, each term has a
normal form which is unique, and for any terms s, t we have s↔∗R t if and only
if s ↓= t ↓ [21].
A rewrite system R is said to be ground confluent if for any ground terms
t, u, v such that t→∗Ru, t→∗Rv, there exists a ground term w verifying u→∗Rw and
v→∗Rw. A rewrite systemR is said to be ground convergent if it is ground conflu-
ent and terminating. IfR is ground convergent, each ground term has a normal
form which is unique.
A substitution σ is said to be in normal form if for all x ∈ Supp(σ), the term
xσ is in normal form.
2.1.6 The completion procedures
Given an equational theory H, and a rewrite system R, we say that H is gen-
erated by R if R and H are equivalent, that is for any terms s and t, we have
s =H t if and only if s↔∗R t [21].
In this section, we present techniques to construct a convergent rewrite sys-
tem or a ground convergent rewrite system generating a given equational the-
ory. Given an equational theory H, many procedures aiming to construct a
convergent (or a ground convergent) rewrite system R equivalent to H have
been given in the literature, for example [131, 23, 120]. In this section, we make
use of the notions of two terms are ∅-unifiable and a most general ∅-unifier of two
terms. Let u, v be two terms, a ∅-unifier (or unifier in the ∅-theory) of u and v is
a substitution σ such that uσ = vσ. We say that u and v are unifiable in the
∅-theory (or syntactically unifiable, or ∅-unifiable) if they have a ∅-unifier. We say
that a substitution σ is more general modulo ∅ than a substitution σ′, and we write
σ . σ′, if there exists a substitution θ such that σ′ = σθ. Given two terms u
and v, it is well-known that if u and v are ∅-unifiable then there exists a unique
most general ∅-unifier θ, denoted by mgu(u, v), such that for every unifier σ of
u, v, there exists a substitution σ′ verifying σ = θσ′ [22]. The notions of ∅-unifier,
∅-unifiable, most general ∅-unifier are generalised to an arbitrary theory in Section
2.1.7.
Given a pair of rewrite rules l→ r and g → d, and an integer p ∈ Pos(l) such
that l|p 6∈ X , l|p and g are ∅-unifiable with σ is their most general ∅-unifier, the
pair 〈l[d]p)σ, rσ〉 is a critical pair of the rules l → r and g → d. The rules l → r
and g → d do not need to be different in order to compute their critical pairs,
furthermore, we assume that the rules l → r and g → d do not share variables,
and to this end, we rename their variables before computing their critical pairs.
Given a rewrite system R, we denote by CP (R) the set of all critical pairs
obtained from the rules ofR.
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Figure 2.1 Knuth-Bendix completion procedure
Input:
An equational theoryH and a reduction order > over T (F ,X ).
Output:
A finite convergent rewrite system R that is equivalent to H, if the procedure
terminates successfully;
or “fail”, if the procedure terminates unsuccessfully.
Initialisation:
If there exists an equation l ·= r ∈ H such that l 6= r, l ≯ r and r ≯ l then
terminates with output fail
otherwise, i = 0 andR0 =
{
l→ r such that l ·= r ∈ H and l > r
}
repeatRi+1 = Ri;
for all 〈l, r〉 ∈ CP (Ri) do
1. reduce l, r to someRi-normal form l ↓, r ↓;
2. if l ↓6= r ↓ and neither l ↓> r ↓ nor r ↓> l ↓, then terminate with output fail;
3. if l ↓> r ↓, thenRi+1 = Ri ∪ {l ↓→ r ↓};
4. if r ↓> l ↓, thenRi+1 = Ri ∪ {r ↓→ l ↓};
od
i=i+1;
untilRi = Ri−1;
outputRi;
Knuth-Bendix completion procedure
The Knuth-Bendix completion procedures [131] (also called basic completion proce-
dure), which is described in Figure 2.1, starts with an equational theory H and
tries to find a convergent rewrite system R that is equivalent to H. We assume
that the order > used in the procedure is a reduction order and it is given as an
input of the procedure. We recall that a reduction order > is any order which is
stable, well-founded, and monotone (see Section 2.1.5).
The Knuth-Bendix procedure removes automatically all trivial equations (re-
spectively trivial critical pairs) of the form l ·= l (respectively 〈l, l〉 or 〈l, r〉 with
l ↓= r ↓).
Thus, the basic completion procedure may show three different types of be-
haviour, depending on the particular inputH and >:
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1. It may terminate with failure because one of the H-equations can not be
ordered using >, or the normal forms of the terms in one of the critical
pairs are distinct and can not be ordered using >. In this case, one could
try to run the procedure again using another reduction order;
2. it may terminate successfully with outputRn;
3. it may run for ever since infinitely many new rules are generated.
Given an equational theory H and a reduction order >, in [21], the authors
showed that if the basic completion procedure applied on (H, >) terminates
successfully and outputsRn, thenRn is a finite convergent rewrite system gen-
erating H, and if the basic completion procedure applied on (H, >) does not
terminate, then R∞ = ∪i≥0Ri is an infinite convergent rewrite system generat-
ingH.
Bachmair completion procedure
The basic completion procedure described above usually generates a huge number
of rules, and all these rules must be taken into account when computing critical
pairs. This implies that both run time and space requirements for the comple-
tion process are often too high and unacceptable. In what follows, we present
an improved completion procedure that extends basic completion by simplifi-
cation rules. The goal of this procedure is to transform an initial pair (H, ∅),
where H is an equational theory, into a pair (∅,R) such that R is a convergent
rewrite system equivalent toH.
This procedure, introduced in [23], is described by the set of rules given in
Figure 2.2.
A completion procedure is a program that accepts as input an equational
theoryH and a reduction order >, and uses the rules of Figure 2.2 to generate a
(finite or infinite) sequence:
(H0,R0) ` (H1,R1) ` . . .
where H0 = H, R0 = ∅, and (H,R) ` (H′,R′) means that (H′,R′) is obtained
from (H,R) by applying a rule from Figure 2.2. This sequence is called a run of
the completion procedure on inputsH and >.
A run is said to be fair if
CP (∪i≥0 ∩j≥i Rj) ⊆ ∪i≥0Hi
Given a fair run, G. Huet [121] proved that if there is a step n in the run where
Hn = ∅ thenRn is convergent rewrite system equivalent toH.
When an equational theory H is generated by a convergent rewrite system
R, we have that s =H t if and only if s ↓= t ↓ [123, 120].
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Figure 2.2 Bachmair completion procedure
Deduce:
H,R
E∪{l ·=r},R if 〈l, r〉 ∈ CR(R)
Orient:
H∪{l ·=r},R
E,R∪{l→r} if l > r
Delete:
H∪{l ·=l},R
E,R
Simplify-Identity:
H∪{l ·=r},R
H∪{l′ ·=r},R if l→Rl
′
R-Simplify-Rule
H,R∪{l→r}
H,R∪{l→l′} if r→Rl′
L-Simplify-Rule
H,R∪{l→r}
H∪{l′ ·=r},R if l→Rl
′
Unfailing Knuth-Bendix procedure
The basic completion procedure described above will fail when an initial non trivial
equation is unorientable or when it generates an unorientable non trivial critical
pair or when it generates infinitely many new rules.
J. Hsiang and M. Rusinowitch [120] introduced an extension of the Knuth-
Bendix completion procedure, called the unfailing completion procedure or UKB-
procedure in short, which is a Knuth-Bendix type completion procedure that
does not fail. This procedure is described in Figure 2.3.
In [120], the authors make use of a complete simplification ordering >, i.e. >
is well-founded, monotone, stable, total over ground terms, and s[t] > t for any
terms s, t. They also make use of extended critical pairs defined as follow:
Definition 1 (extended critical pairs) Given two equations g ·= d and l ·= r, and an
integer p ∈ Pos(g) such that
1. g|p 6∈ X ,
2. g|p and l are unifiable with σ is their most general unifier,
3. rσ  lσ,
4. dσ  gσ.
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Figure 2.3 Unfailing Knuth-Bendix procedure
Input:
An equational theoryH and a complete simplification ordering > over T (F ,X ).
Initialisation:
For each equation l ·= r ∈ H, orient this equation into rule if possible
repeat
- Find an extended critical pair 〈l, r〉
- Reduce it using the existing equations as much as possible.
- If the resulting pair is not trivial, orient it into a rule if possible.
until no more new extended critical pair is generated.
Output:
the system constructed from the set of rules and equations obtained at the end of
the procedure.
then the pair 〈dσ, g[p ← r]σ〉 is an extended critical pair of the equations l ·= r and
g
·
= d. The equations l ·= r and g ·= d do not need to be different in order to compute
their extended critical pairs, furthermore, we assume that the equations l ·= r and g ·= d
do not share variables, and to this end, we rename their variables before computing their
extended critical pairs.
We remark that if the equations l ·= r and g ·= d are orientable, then (2) and
(3) become (2′) lσ > rσ and (3′) gσ > dσ, and the procedure to construct an
extended critical pair become equivalent to the procedure to construct a critical
pair.
Given a term s, s is said to be reducible by an equation l ·= r if there is a
position p ∈ Pos(s), and a substitution σ such that (i) s|p = lσ, and (ii) lσ > rσ.
In this case, we say that s is reducible to s[p← rσ] using the equation l ·= r.
Given an equational theory H and a complete simplification ordering >,
in [120], the authors showed that if the procedure terminates and the obtained
system does not contain unorientable equations then the obtained system is a
convergent rewrite system equivalent toH. They showed also that if the proce-
dure terminates and the obtained system contains unorientable equations then
the obtained system is a ground convergent rewrite system equivalent toH.
In the remainder of this chapter, we assume F to be a signature, H to
be an equational theory on T (F ,X ), and R to be a convergent rewrite
system generatingH.
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2.1.7 Unification
The unification is the process of solving the following problem: given an equa-
tional theory H, two terms s and t, find a substitution σ such that sσ =H tσ.
The syntactic unification or standard unification is a special case of the unification
whereH = ∅.
Definition 2 (Unification systems) Let H be an equational theory on T (F ,X ). A H-
unification system U is a finite set of pairs of terms in T (F ,X ) denoted by U = {u1 ?=H
v1, . . . , un
?
=H vn}. It is satisfied by a substitution σ, and we note σ |=H U , if for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , n} we have uiσ =H viσ. In this case we call σ aH-solution or aH-unifier
of U . We say that U isH-unifiable if it has aH-solution.
When H is generated by a convergent rewrite system R, the confluence of R
implies that if σ is a solution of a H-unification system, then (σ)↓ is also a so-
lution of the same unification system. Actually, if σ is a H-unifier of the terms
s, t then uσ =H vσ, which implies that (uσ)↓ = (uσ)↓. Since (uσ)↓ = (u(σ)↓)↓,
we deduce that if σ is a H-unifier of s, t then (σ)↓ is also a H-unifier of s, t. Ac-
cordingly we will consider only solutions in normal form of unification systems
when the equation theoryH is generated by a convergent rewrite system.
Definition 3 (H-Unifiability Problem) Given an equational theory H, the H-
unifiability problem is defined as follows:
Input: AH-unification system U .
Output: SAT if and only if there exists a substitution σ such that σ |=H U .
Definition 4 A substitution σ is more general modulo H than a substitution σ′, and
we write σ .H σ′, if there exists a substitution τ such that στ =H σ′. When H = ∅,
the relation .H is denoted ..
The relations .H and . are quasi-order relations [21].
Definition 5 (Complete set of unifiers) A complete set of H-unifiers of a H-
unification system U is a set Σ of H-solutions of U such that, for any H-solution τ
of U , there exists a substitution σ ∈ Σ such that σ .H τ .
Definition 6 (minimal complete set of unifiers) A minimal complete set of H-
unifiers of a H-unification system U is a complete set Σm of H-unifiers of U that
satisfies the condition
for all substitutions σ, σ′ ∈ Σm, σ .H σ′ implies σ = σ′.
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Definition 7 (most general unifiers) Let H be an equational theory, and let U be a H-
unification system. A substitution σ is a most generalH-unifier of U if and only if there
exists a minimal complete set Σm ofH-unifiers of U , such that σ ∈ Σm.
Definition 8 The equational theoryH is of unification type
Unitary if for every satisfiableH-unification system U , there exists a minimal complete
set ofH-unifiers with cardinality 1.
finitary if for every satisfiableH-unification system U , there exists a minimal complete
set ofH-unifiers with finite cardinality.
infinitary if for every satisfiable H-unification system U , there exists a minimal com-
plete set ofH-unifiers, and there exists anH-unification system for which this set
is infinite.
zero if there exists an H-unification system that does not have a minimal complete set
ofH-unifiers.
The equational theory ∅ is of type unitary, that is, whenH = ∅, given a satisfiable
set of equations U = {ui ?=∅ vi}i∈{1,...,n}, U has a unique most general unifier,
denoted by mgu(U) [21]. If H is finitary, then the set of all H-unifiers of a given
H-unification system can always be represented asH-instances of finitely many
unifiers. The commutativity is a finitary equational theory that is not unitary
[21]. A finite representation of all H-unifiers via H-instantiation is not always
possible for equational theories of type infinitary and zero. The associativity
theory is an example of infinitary equational theory [21], and the equational
theoryH =
{
x.(y.z)
·
= (x.y).z, x.x
·
= x
}
is of type zero [20, 184].
2.1.8 Finite variant property
We define in this section what means an equational theory H has the finite variant
property. The finite variant property has been intially introduced in [86].
Definition 9 (finite variant property) Let H be an equational theory generated by a
convergent rewrite system R. We say that H has the finite variant property if for
any term t, there is a finite set of substitutions Σ(t) such that for any substitution σ,
there exists a substitution θ ∈ Σ(t), and a substitution τ verifying (σ)↓ = θτ and
(tσ)↓ = (tθ)↓τ . The substitutions in Σ(t) are called variant substitutions of t. We say
thatR has the finite variant property ifH has that property.
It is easy to see that the variant substitutions of any term t are in normal form.
The finite variant property and its application for cryptographic protocols are
analysed in more details in Chapter 5.
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Figure 2.4 Unification algorithm based on the finite variant property
Input:
An arbitrary equational theory H having the finite variant property, and a H-
unification system U =
{
s1
?=H t1, . . . , sn
?=H tn
}
.
Step 1:
Compute the term M = g(s1, t1, . . . , sn, tn) where g is a new function symbol not
appearing in F playing the role of cartesian product.
Step 2:
Compute the set of variant substitutions Σ(M).
Output:
• “U is H-unifiable” if there is a substitution θ ∈ Σ(M) and a substitution τ
such that (sjθ)↓τ = (tjθ)↓τ for every j ∈ {1, . . . , n};
• “U is notH-unifiable” otherwise.
Finite variant property and unification
We introduce in this section a general H-unification procedure, where H is an
arbitrary equational theory having the finite variant property. This algorithm is
given in Figure 2.4.
It is easy to see that the finite variant property reduces the H-unifiability
problem to the syntactic unifiability problem. We show next the correctness
and completeness of this unification procedure.
Lemma 1 Let H be an equational theory having the finite variant property, and let s
and t be two terms. Let M = g(s, t) where g is a new function symbol playing the role
of cartesian product. If there exists a variant substitution θ of M and a substitution
τ such that (sθ)↓τ = (tθ)↓τ then s and t are H-unifiable and σ = θτ is one of their
possibleH-unifiers.
PROOF.
Let s, t be two terms such that (sθ)↓τ = (tθ)↓τ where θ is a variant sub-
stitution of g(s, t) and τ an arbitrary substitution. (sθ)↓τ = (tθ)↓τ implies
(sθ)↓τ =H (tθ)↓τ . Let σ = θτ , we have (sσ)↓ = (sθτ)↓ = ((sθ)↓τ)↓ and simi-
larly, (tσ)↓ = ((tθ)↓τ)↓. Since (sθ)↓τ =H (tθ)↓τ , we conclude that ((sθ)↓τ)↓ =
((tθ)↓τ)↓ and hence (sσ)↓ = (tσ)↓ which implies that σ is an H-unifier of s and
t. 
Lemma 2 Let H be an equational theory having the finite variant property, and let s
and t be two terms. Let M = g(s, t) where g is a new function symbol playing the
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role of cartesian product. If there exists a substitution σ such that sσ =H tσ then there
exists a variant substitution θ of M and a substitution τ such that (sθ)↓τ = (tθ)↓τ
and (σ)↓ = θτ .
PROOF.
Let s and t be two terms, and let σ be a H-unifier of s and t, that is
sσ =H tσ. Let M = g(s, t) where g represents the cartesian product, and
let Σ(M) be the finite set of variant substitutions of M . Definition 46 im-
plies that there exists a substitution θ ∈ Σ(M) and a substitution τ such
that (σ)↓ = θτ and (Mσ)↓ = (Mθ)↓τ . We have (g(s, t)σ)↓ = g((sσ)↓, (tσ)↓)
and (g(s, t)θ)↓τ = g((sθ)↓τ, (tθ)↓τ). Since g is a new free function symbol,
(g(s, t)σ)↓ = (g(s, t)θ)↓τ implies that (sσ)↓ = (sθ)↓τ and (tσ)↓ = (tθ)↓τ . Due
to the equality (sσ)↓ = (tσ)↓, we conclude the lemma.
The finite variant property implies that the set of variant substitutions for
any term t is finite. It is then easy to see that the algorithm given in Figure 2.4 is
a terminatingH-unification algorithm.
Definition 10 Let U =
{
s1
?
=H t1, . . . , sn
?
=H tn
}
be a H-unification system, and let
the term TU = g(s1, t1, . . . , sn, tn) where g is a new function symbol representing the
cartesian product. We define the set SolV ar(U) as follows:
SolV ar(U) =
{θ such that θ = (ατ)↓ where α is a variant substitution of TU and τ = mgu∅((Uα)↓}
Lemma 3 For any H-unification system U = (s1 ?=H t1, . . . , sn ?=H tn), SolV ar(U) is
a complete set ofH-unifiers of U .
PROOF.
Let U = (s1 ?=H t1, . . . , sn ?=H tn) be a H-unification system. We first prove
that any substitution in SolV ar(U) is a H-unifier of U . Let σ be a substitution
in SolV ar(U), this means that there exists a variant substitution of TU such that
σ = (θτ)↓ where τ = mgu∅((Uθ)↓). Lemma 1 implies that θτ |=H U , which
implies that (θτ)↓ |=H U , and hence σ |=H U .
Next, we show that SolV ar(U) is a complete set ofH-unifiers of U . Let σ′ be a
H-unifier of U , Lemma 2 implies that there exists a variant substitution θ of TU ,
such that (σ′)↓ = θα where α is a ∅-unifier (Uθ)↓. Since α |=∅ (Uθ)↓, there exists
a most general ∅-unifier τ of (Uθ)↓, a substitution τ ′ such that α = ττ1. We have
that (σ′)↓ = θα, then σ′ =H θα, and then σ′ =H θττ1 =H (θτ)↓τ1. By definition of
θ and τ , we have (θτ)↓ ∈ SolV ar(U) and hence we conclude the proof. 
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2.1.9 Narrowing
Narrowing is a process that can be used as a general H-unification procedure
whereH is an equational theory.
The idea of narrowing was first mentioned by J. R. Sagle [190] and D. Lank-
ford [140], and the first description of narrowing as a generalH-unification pro-
cedure is due to M. Fay [113].
Let H be an equational theory generated by the convergent rewrite system
R. If σ is a unifier of the equation s ?=H t, then sσ and tσ have a common R-
normal form, that is, there are chains of reduction steps starting from sσ and
tσ that lead to the same R-irreducible term. We recall that an R-irreducible
term is any term t such that there is no term t′ verifying t→Rt′. The main idea
underlying narrowing is to construct the unifier and the corresponding chains
of reductions simultaneously.
The narrowing relation induced by the rewrite systemR, denoted by R, is
defined as follows [21, 123]:
Definition 11 (Narrowing) Let s and t be two terms. We say that t is narrowed to s
and we write t Rs if and only if (1) there exists a renamed rule l → r of R such that
t and l → r have no variables in common, (2) a position p ∈ Pos(t) such that (2.1)
t|p /∈ X , and (2.2) the terms t|p, l are syntactically unifiable, let σ be their most general
∅-unifier, and (3) s = t[r]pσ.
We denote by R the narrowing relation induced by R, and we denote by narrowing
derivation any derivation of the form t0 Rt1 R . . . where t0 is an arbitrary term.
We define now the basic narrowing which, intially introduced in [123], is a re-
finement of the narrowing.
Definition 12 Let t be a term and let NV.Pos(t) be the set of non-variable positions
in t, NV.Pos(t) =
{
p ∈ Pos(t) such that t|p 6∈ X
}
. We define by induction what it
means for a narrowing derivation
t = t0 Rt1 R . . . Rti
to be based on P0 with P0 ⊆ NV.Pos(t), and we construct a set of positions Pi ∈
Pos(ti), 0 ≤ i ≤ n, as follows:
• the empty narrowing derivation is based on P0,
• if the narrowing derivation above is based on P0, then the derivation obtained from
it by adding one step ti Rti+1 is based on P0 if and only pi ∈ Pi, with pi is the
position in ti on which the rule li → ri ∈ R is applied to obtain ti+1 from ti, and
in this case we take
Pi+1 = (Pi \ {q ∈ Pi such that pi ≤ q}) ∪ {pi · q such that q ∈ NV.Pos(ri)}
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Definition 13 (Basic narrowing) A narrowing derivation started from a term t
t = t0 Rt1 R . . . Rtn
is said to be a basic narrowing derivation if and only if it is based on NV.Pos(t).
From now on, we denote by R the narrowing relation induced by R, and
by bR the basic narrowing relation induced byR.
J.M. Hullot [123] studied the correspondence between narrowing and rewrit-
ing, and obtained many results in that field. We present below some of these
results:
Theorem 1 (J.M. Hullot results) LetH be an equational theory on T (F ,X ) generated
by the convergent rewrite systemR.
1. Let t be an arbitrary term, and let σ be a substitution in normal form. Consider
any→R-derivation issuing from tσ:
tσ = t′0 →R t′1 →R . . .→R t′n,
there exists an associatedR-basic narrowing derivation issuing from t:
t = t0  bR t1  bR . . . bR tn,
and there exists a substitution µ in normal form such that tnµ = t′n, and σ =
θ0θ1 . . . θn−1µ with θi is the substitution used with the rule li → ri ∈ R in the
step ti  bR ti+1.
2. Let s and t be two terms, M be g(s, t) where g is a new function symbol (g 6∈ F).
Let Σ be the set of all substitutions σ such that σ ∈ Σ if and only if there exists a
R-basic narrowing derivation
M = g(s, t) = M0  bR M1 = g(s1, t1) bR . . . bR Mn = g(sn, tn),
such that sn and tn are unifiable modulo ∅ theory, θ is a substitution in normal
form, and σ = µθ where µ is the most general unifier of sn and tn. Then Σ is a
complete set ofH-unifiers of s and t.
3. If R is a convergent rewrite system such that for every rule l → r ∈ R, every
R-basic narrowing derivation starting from r terminates, then anyR-narrowing
derivation starting from any term terminates.
4. If the convergent rewrite systemR satisfies the hypothesis given in the above point
(point (3)) then the construction given in the second point (point (2)) leads to a
sound, complete and finiteH-unification algorithm.
2.1. PRELIMINARIES 35
Remark. It is easy to see that the first point (point (1)) of Theorem 1 implies
that: for any term t and for any substitution σ in normal form, there exists a
term t′ and a substitution σ′ in normal form such that t
∗
 bR t′ and t′σ′ = (tσ)↓.
Lemma 4 Let H be an equational theory generated by a convergent rewrite system R
such that the right hand side of every rule inR is notR-narrowable. Let t be a term and
D be aR-basic narrowing derivation starting from t. Then, the length of D in bounded
by ‖t‖dag.
PROOF.
Let t be a term and D be aR-basic narrowing derivation starting from t,
D : t = t0  bR t1  bR . . . bR tn
R is convergent and any basic narrowing derivation starting from the right
members of the rules of R terminates (in fact, all right members of the rules
of R are not R-basic narrowable), then every R-narrowing derivation starting
from any term terminates (Theorem 1), and hence D terminates. We prove next
that ‖D‖ ≤ ‖t‖dag. Let Qi be the number of distinct subterms of ti where we can
apply the basic narrowing. We note that if the basic narrowing can be applied
on a term s at a position p and if there exists another subterm of s at position
q such that t|p = t|q, we apply the basic narrowing at the positions p and q at
the same time. Since all right members of R rules are not narrowable, and by
definition of narrowing (Definition 11), we deduce that Qi+1 < Qi, and hence,
‖D‖ ≤ Q0. By definition, we have Q0 ≤ ‖t‖dag, which implies that ‖D‖ ≤ ‖t‖dag,
and hence the length of any R-basic narrowing derivation starting from any
term t is bounded by ‖t‖dag. 
Lemma 5 Let H be an equational theory generated by a convergent rewrite system R
such that the right hand side of every rule in R is not R-narrowable. For any term
t, and for any variant substitution θ of t, we can guess in NPtime another variant
substitution θ′ of t such that θ′ is more general moduloH than θ.
PROOF.
Let H be an equational theory generated by a convergent rewrite system
R such that the right hand side of every rule in R is not R-narrowable. This
implies that every R-narrowing derivation starting from any term terminates
1, and hence H has the finite variant property [86]. Let t be a term, the fi-
nite variant property implies that we can construct a finite set of variant sub-
stitutions Σ(t) = {σ1, . . . , σn} of t. We remark, by definition of finite variant
property (Definition 46), that substitutions in Σ(t) are in normal form. Let
σ ∈ Σ(t), and let the derivation tσ = t′0 →R t′1 →R . . . →R t′n such that t′n
is in normal form. Theorem 1 implies that there exists a R-basic narrowing
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derivation D : t = t0 Rt1 R . . . Rtn such that at each step ti Rti+1, the
rule li → ri ∈ R is used with the substitution θi; furthermore, there exists a
substitution µ in normal form such that σ = θ0θ1 . . . θn−1µ and t′n = tnµ. This
implies that (tσ)↓ = t′n = tnµ = (tθ1θ2 . . . θn)↓µ, and hence, θ1 . . . θn is a variant
substitution of t, and θ1 . . . θn .H σ. Assume that we always explore the right
R-basic narrowing derivation starting from t. By lemma 4, we have that any
R-basic narrowing derivation starting from t is bounded by ‖t‖dag, and hence,
we conclude the proof. 
2.1.10 Two intruder deduction systems
As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, we work in the so called sym-
bolic model. Cryptographic primitives can be seen as functions from messages
to messages and messages themelves are obtained by applying operations to
other messages. It is then natural to represent cryptographic primitives by func-
tion symbols F , and messages by terms in T (F ,X ). We specify how to apply
functions symbols in order to get messages by deduction rules.
Definition 14 (Deduction rule) Let F be a signature andH be an equational theory.
A deduction rule overF is a tuple of terms (l1, . . . , ln, r), denoted by l1 . . . , ln → r, with
l1, . . . , ln, r ∈ T (F ,X ). For the aim of simplicity, we denote the rule l1, . . . , ln → r by
l˜→ r where l˜ is the set of terms l1, . . . , ln.
For example, consider the function symbol enc representing the encryption
primitive, the deduction rule x, y → enc(x, y) specify the application of that
function symbol.
We consider an intruder who, in addition to follow the Dolev-Yao model [107],
uses the algebraic properties of cryptographic primitives in order to break se-
curity properties of cryptographic protocols. In the Dolev-Yao model [107], the
intruder is the network, he can intercept, block, and/or redirect all messages
sent by honest agents. He can also deduce new messages and take part in the
protocol as an honest agent or under the identity of an honest agent (if he can
masquerade the identity of that honest agent). In order to construct messages,
the intruder follows some specific rules that he applies on his knowledge. The
application of a rule on the intruder knowledge outputs a new term that will
be added to the intruder knowledge. We call intruder deduction system the set of
deduction rules representing the capacities of the intruder.
Before giving the two models of intruder deduction system, we give the in-
tuition behind these models.
Intuition We have two types of cryptographic primitives, the constructor prim-
itives and the destructor primitives. A primitive is said to be constructor if its ap-
plication on a set of terms outputs a new term, that is a term for which we need
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a dedicated function symbol to represent it. For example enc, representing the
encryption, is a constructor primitive. A primitive is said to be destructor if its
is not a constructor, that is if its application on a set of terms E outputs a term
which can be represented without a dedicated function symbol, for example,
the primitive dec, representing the decryption, is a destructor.
We have two ways to represent destructors, either they are explicit in the sig-
nature or they are implicit, and hence, we have two models for intruder deduc-
tion systems. Below, we present respectively the intruder deduction systems in
the case of explicit and implicit destructors.
Intruder deduction system with explicit destructors
Assume the signature F is a disjoint union of two sets of function symbols
Fpub and Fpri, F = Fpub ∪ Fpri. A function symbol is said to be public if it
can be performed by any parties, and private otherwise. As example, Fpub =
{enc, dec, Pk}, and Fpri = {Sk}, where enc, dec, Pk and Sk represents respec-
tively the encryption, decryption, public key generator function, and secret key
generator function.
The definitions we give below were introduced in [73].
Definition 15 (Intruder deduction rule with explicit destructors) An intruder deduc-
tion rule is a tuple of terms (x1, . . . , xn, f(x1, . . . , xn)), denoted by x1, . . . , xn →
f(x1, . . . , xn), where xi is a variable for every i, and f ∈ Fpub with arity n.
Definition 16 (Intruder deduction system with explicit destruc-
tors) An intruder deduction system I, also called an intruder sys-
tem, is a tuple I = 〈F , TI ,H〉 where F is a signature, TI =
{f(x1, . . . , xn) such that xi is variable for every i, and f ∈ Fpub with arity n }, and H
is an equational theory over T (F ,X ). To each f(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ TI , we associate a
deduction rule, also called an intruder deduction rule, x1, . . . , xn → f(x1, . . . , xn).
The set of rules LI is defined as the union of x1, . . . , xn → f(x1, . . . , xn) for all
f(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ TI .
Example 8 We assume F = {encs, decs}, and F = Fpub. The intruder deduction
system I is given by the tuple 〈F , TI ,H〉 where:
• TI = {encs(x, y), decs(x, y)},
• andH = {dec(enc(x, y), y) = x}.
We conclude that LI =
{
x, y → encs(x, y)
x, y → decs(x, y)
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Intruder deduction system with implicit destructors
The definitions we give below were introduced in [72].
Definition 17 (Intruder deduction rule with implicit destructors) An intruder deduc-
tion rule is a tuple of terms in T (F ,X ) (t1, . . . , tn, t), denoted by t1, . . . , tn → t.
Definition 18 (Intruder deduction system with implicit destructors) An intruder de-
duction system I, also called an intruder system, is a tuple I = 〈F ,LI ,H〉 where F
is a signature, LI is a set of deduction rules of the form t1, . . . , tn → t, and H is an
equational theory over T (F ,X ).
Example 9 Assume F = {encs}, and F = Fpub. The intruder deduction system
I = 〈F ,LI ,H〉 where:
• LI =
{
x, y → encs(x, y)
encs(x, y), y → x
• andH = ∅.
Intruder derivations
Given an intruder system I (with explicit or implicit destructors) such that LI
is the corresponding set of deduction rules, given two finite sets of terms E and
F , we have E →I F if and only if there is an intruder deduction rule l˜→ r ∈ LI
(where l˜ is a set of terms and r is a term), and a substitution σ, such that l˜σ =H l˜′,
rσ =H r′, l˜′ ⊆ E and F = E ∪ {r′}. We denote by→∗I the transitive closure of
→I . It is easy to see that for sets of terms E, E ′, F and F ′ such that E =H E ′ and
F =H F ′, we have E →I F if and only if E ′ →I F ′. We simply denote by→ the
relation→I when there is no ambiguity about I.
An I-derivation D of length n, n ≥ 0, is a sequence of the form E0 →I
E0, t1 →I · · · →I En with finite sets of terms E0, . . . , En, and terms t1, . . . , tn,
such that Ei = Ei−1 ∪ {ti} for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. The term tn is called
the goal of the derivation. Given a set of terms E, we define E¯I to be equal
to the set of terms that can be derived from E with respect to I, the set
E¯I = {t such that ∃F with E→I∗F, and t ∈ F}. If E and t are respectively a
set of terms in normal form and a term in normal form, it is easy to see that if
t ∈ E¯I then there exists a I-derivation starting from E of goal t, D : E →I
E, t1 →I E, t1, t2 →I . . . →I E, t1, . . . , tn, t, where t1, . . . , tn are in normal form,
that is in each step E, t1, . . . , ti →I E, t1, . . . , ti+1 where l˜→ r is the applied rule,
we have that (l˜σ) ↓⊆ E, t1, . . . , ti and ti+1 = (rσ) ↓. From now on, we consider
that in each derivation starting from E of goal t, E →I E, t1 →I E, t1, . . . , tn, t,
withE and t are respectively a set of terms in normal form and a term in normal
form, every term ti (1 ≤ i ≤ n) added in each step in the derivation is in normal
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form. If there is no ambiguity on the intruder deduction system I we write E¯
instead of E¯I .
Example 10 (The Dolev-Yao deduction system with implicit destructors) We present
here the Dolev-Yao deduction system with implicit destructors.
Let < −,− > (concatenation), encs (symmetric encryption), encp (public encryp-
tion) and −1 (the inverse key) be the cryptographic primitives. The rules L<−,−> are
defined as follows:
x, y →< x, y > (2.1)
< x, y >→ x (2.2)
< x, y >→ y (2.3)
The rules Lencs are defined as follows:
x, y → encs(x, y) (2.4)
encs(x, y), y → x (2.5)
The rules Lencp are defined as follows:
x, y → encp(x, y) (2.6)
encp(x, y), y−1 → x (2.7)
encp(x, y−1), y → x (2.8)
The Dolev-Yao deduction system with implicit destructors is given by
I iDY = 〈FDY , LDY , ∅〉
where
• FDY = {< −,− >, encs, encp,−1 },
• LDY = L<−,−> ∪ Lencs ∪ Lencp .
Example 11 (The Dolev-Yao deduction system with explicit destructors) We present
here the Dolev-Yao deduction system with explicit destructors.
Let < −,− > (concatenation), encs (symmetric encryption), decs (symmetric de-
cryption), encp (public encryption), decp (public decryption), and −1 (the inverse key)
be cryptographic primitives. The rules L<−,−> are defined as follows:
x, y →< x, y > (2.9)
x→ pi1(x) (2.10)
x→ pi2(x) (2.11)
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and the associated equational theory is defined by:
H<,−,−> :
{
pi1(< x, y >) = x
pi2(< x, y >) = y
The rules Lencs are defined as follows:
x, y → encs(x, y) (2.12)
x, y → decs(x, y) (2.13)
and the associated equational theory is defined by:
Hencs = {decs(encs(x, y), y) = x}
The rules Lencp are defined as follows:
x, y → encp(x, y) (2.14)
x, y → decp(x, y) (2.15)
and the associated equational theory is defined by:
Hdecp :
{
decp(encp(x, y), y−1) = x
decp(encp(x, y−1), y) = x
The Dolev-Yao deduction system with explicit destructors is given by
IeDY = 〈FDY , LDY ,HDY 〉
where
• FDY = {< −,− >, encs, decs, encp, decp},
• LDY = L<−,−> ∪ Lencs ∪ Lencp ,
• HDY = H<−,−> ∪Hencs ∪Hencp .
From now on, we consider only intruder deduction systems with explicit
destructors, and for simplicity, we will use the notation “intruder deduc-
tion systems” to mean “intruder deduction systems with explicit destruc-
tors”. This intruder deduction system will be denoted by I = 〈F , TI ,H〉
and LI denotes the set of deduction rules associated to I.
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2.1.11 Variant of the intruder deduction system
Let I be an intruder deduction system, I = 〈F , TI ,H〉 and let LI be the set of
intruder deduction rules associated to I. We recall that rules in LI are of the
form x1, . . . , xn → f(x1, . . . , xn) and f is a public function symbol in F with
arity n.
Definition 19 (Variant of the intruder deduction system) Let H be an equational the-
ory having the finite variant property, and let I = 〈F , TI ,H〉 be an intruder deduction
system. The variant intruder deduction system I ′ = 〈F ,L′I , ∅〉 of the intruder deduc-
tion system I is defined as follows:
L′I =
⋃
x1, . . . , xn → f(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ LI
θ variant substitution of f(x1, . . . , xn)
x1θ, . . . , xnθ → (f(x1, . . . , xn)θ)↓
where LI is the set of intruder deduction rules associated to I.
Lemma 6 Let < be an arbitrary complete simplification ordering over T (F ,X ), that
is < is well-founded, monotone, stable, total over ground terms T (F), and t < s[t] for
any terms s, t in T (F ,X ), and let t1, t2 ∈ T (F ,X ). If t1 ≤ t2 then:
1. V ar(t1) ⊆ V ar(t2)
2. t2 /∈ SSub(t1)
3. If t2 ∈ X then either t1 = t2 or t1 is the minimal ground term in T (F) for <.
PROOF.
1. Let t1 and t2 be two terms and t1 ≤ t2. If t1 = t2 then we have obviously
V ar(t1) = V ar(t2). Suppose t1 6= t2 this implies that t1 < t2 and let us prove
that V ar(t1) ⊆ V ar(t2). By contradiction, suppose that V ar(t1) 6⊆ V ar(t2)
and let x ∈ V ar(t1) \ V ar(t2). By definition of <, we have t1σ < t2σ for
all substitutions σ. Let σ be a substitution such that Supp(σ) = {x} and
σ(x) = t2. This implies that t2σ = t2 and t2 ∈ Sub(t1σ) and hence t2 ≤ t1σ
which contradicts t1 < t2.
2. If t2 ∈ SSub(t1) this implies that t1 6= t2 and t2 < t1 which contradicts
t1 ≤ t2.
3. Assume t2 = x. t1 ≤ t2 implies V ar(t1) ⊆ {x} and point (2) implies that
x /∈ SSub(t1). Hence, either t1 = x or t1 is a ground term in T (F). Let t1
be a no minimal ground term in T (F), and let s be a ground term in T (F)
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with s < t1. t1 < x implies t1 < xσ for all σ and then for σ = {x 7→ s}, we
have t1 < s which contradicts s < t1. We conclude that either t1 = t2 or
t1 is the minimal ground term in T (F) for < which exists due to the well-
foundness of < and which is unique due to the fact that < is total over
ground terms.

Lemma 7 Let I = 〈F , TI ,H〉 be an intruder deduction system, and let I ′ = 〈F ,L′, ∅〉
be the variant intruder deduction system of I. If t1, . . . , tn → t ∈ L′, then V ar(t) ⊆
V ar(t1, . . . , tn).
PROOF.
Let t1, . . . , tn → t ∈ L′, we have two cases:
1. If t1, . . . , tn → t ∈ L then, by definition of L, t1, . . . , tn → t = x1, . . . , xn →
f(x1, . . . , xn) where f is a public function symbol in F and hence, V ar(t) ⊆
V ar(t1, . . . , tn).
2. If t1, . . . , tn → t 6∈ L, then, by definition of L′, there exists a rule
x1, . . . , xn → f(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ L, a variant substitution θ of f(x1, . . . , xn)
such that ti = xiθ for every i, and (f(x1, . . . , xn)θ)↓ = t. We
have that V ar(f(x1, . . . , xn)θ) =
⋃n
i=1 V ar(xiθ), and (f(x1, . . . , xn)θ)↓ ≤
f(x1, . . . , xn)θ. Lemma 6 implies that V ar((f(x1, . . . , xn)θ)↓) ⊆
V ar(f(x1, . . . , xn)θ) and hence, V ar((f(x1, . . . , xn)θ)↓) ⊆
⋃n
i=1 V ar(xiθ)
which concludes the lemma.

We prove in what follows (Lemma 8) that when considering only deduc-
tions on ground terms in normal form and yielding ground terms in normal
form, it is sufficient to consider derivations modulo the empty theory.
Lemma 8 Let E and F be two sets of ground terms in normal form we have: E →I F
if and only if E →I′ F .
PROOF.
Let E and F be two sets of ground terms in normal form and assume there
is a rule x1, . . . , xn → f(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ L such that E →x1,...,xn→f(x1,...,xn) F .
By definition there exists a ground substitution σ in normal form such that
(x1, . . . , xn)σ ⊆ E and F = E ∪ {(f(x1, . . . , xn)σ)↓}. Due to the finite variant
property, there exists a variant substitution θ of f(x1, . . . , xn) and a ground nor-
mal substitution σ′ such that (f(x1, . . . , xn)σ)↓ = (f(x1, . . . , xn)θ)↓σ′ and σ = θσ′.
The rule x1θ, . . . xnθ → (f(x1, . . . , xn)θ)↓ was added to L′ by definition of I ′
(Definition 19). This implies that E →I′ F . To prove the converse, notice that if
(x1, . . . , xn)θ → (f(x1, . . . , xn)θ)↓ can be applied with the normal ground substi-
tution σ′ on E, then the rule x1, . . . , xn → f(x1, . . . , xn) can be applied with the
ground substitution σ = (θσ′)↓ on E. 
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2.1.12 Constraint systems
In [156], the authors introduced the notions of “deduction constraint” and “I-
constraint systems”. They defined a deduction constraint to be an expression of
the form E D t where E is a set of terms and t is a term, and they defined an
I-constraint system C as follows: C = (E1 D t1, . . . , En D tn) where Ei ⊆ Ei+1,
and V ar(Ei) ⊆ V ar({t1, . . . , ti−1}). They defined also a solution of C as follows:
a substitution σ is a solution of C if tiσ ∈ Eiσ for every i. This notion of I-
constraint system has been defined with the ∅ equational theory in mind.
Unfortunately, such definitions of I-constraint systems are not adequate in
presence of non empty equational theory. For instance, let us consider the
equational theory H = {f(x, x) = a} which is generated by the convergent
rewrite system R = {f(x, x)→ a}, and let us consider the I-constraint system
C = ({a, b}D f(x, y), {a, b, x}D b). This constraint system follows the definition
of constraint system given above, and the substitution σ = {x 7→ y} is a solu-
tion of C following the definition above. When we apply this substitution σ to C
then normalise, we obtain the following system C ′ = ({a, b}D a, {a, b, y}D b). It
is easy to see that C ′ does not satisfy the definition of constraint systems given
above.
In order to avoid such problem, in [73], the authors introduced another def-
inition of constraint systems. This definition, given below, is adequate with the
non empty equational theories, and it is the definition adapted in this docu-
ment.
Definition 20 (I-Constraint systems) Let I be an intruder deduction system. An I-
constraint system C is denoted (E1 ` v1, . . . , En ` vn,U) and is defined by a finite set
of expressions Ei ` vi, called deduction constraints, with:
• vi ∈ X for i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
• E1 ⊆ T (F), and Ei ⊆ T (F ,X ) for i ∈ {2, . . . , n},
• Ei ⊆ Ei+1 for i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1},
• V ar(Ei) ⊆ {v1, . . . , vi−1} for i ∈ {2, . . . , n},
• and aH-unification system U .
An I-Constraint system C is satisfied by a substitution σ, and we write σ |=I C, if for
all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} we have viσ ∈ EiσI and if σ |=H U . We call such a substitution a
solution of C.
It is easy to see that if a substitution σ is a solution of a constraint system C, the
substitution (σ)↓ is also a solution of C.
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Definition 21 (I-ground Constraint systems) Let I be an intruder sys-
tem. An I-ground constraint system C is denoted (E1 ` v1, . . . , En `
vn,
{
v1
?
=H t1, . . . , vn
?
=H tn
}
) and is defined by a finite set of expressions Ei ` vi, and
expressions vi
?
=H ti with:
• Ei ∪ {ti} ⊆ T (F), vi ∈ X for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and
• Ei ⊆ Ei+1 for i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}.
2.1.13 Modified I-constraint systems
We introduce now a modified I-constraint systems.
Definition 22 (modified I-Constraint systems) Let I be an intruder deduction sys-
tem. A modified I-constraint system C is denoted (E1 B t1, . . . , En B tn) and is
defined as follows:
• ti ∈ T (F ,X ) for i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
• E1 ⊆ T (F), and Ei ⊆ T (F ,X ) for i ∈ {2, . . . , n},
• Ei ⊆ Ei+1 for i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1},
• V ar(Ei) ⊆ V ar({t1, . . . , ti−1}) for i ∈ {2, . . . , n}.
A modified I-Constraint system C is satisfied by a substitution σ, and we write σ |=I C,
if for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} we have tiσ ∈ EiσI and Eiσ, tiσ are in normal form .
We remark that our definition of modified I-constraint system is different
than the definition of I-constraint system introduced in [156] and showed in
Section 2.1.12: while in [156] the authors considered each substitution σ with
tσ ∈ EσI is a solution of E D t, we consider the fact that tσ ∈ EσI is not
sufficient to have σ solution of E B t and we add the condition that Eσ and tσ
must be in normal form.
Let us consider again the example given in Section 2.1.12, that is C = ({a, b}D
f(x, y), {a, b, x}D b), and the equational theory is H = {f(x, x) = a}. Following
[156], the substitution σ = {x 7→ y} is a solution of C, and we showed how
its application is problematic. Definition 22 implies that σ is not a solution of
C = ({a, b}B f(x, y), {a, b, x}B b).
Definition 23 (modified I-ground constraint systems) Let I be an intruder deduction
system. A modified I-ground constraint system C is denoted (E1 B t1, . . . , En B tn),
with:
• Ei ∪ {ti} ⊆ T (F) for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and
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• Ei ⊆ Ei+1 for i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}.
In the rest of this document, we will make use of the modified I-ground
constraint systems (Definition 23) instead of the I-ground constraint system
(Definition 21), and for the aim of simplicity, we will abuse of the notation and
call modified I-ground constraint systems by I-ground constraint systems.
An I-ground constraint system C = (E1 B t1, . . . , En B tn) is satisfied, and we
write |=I C, if for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} we have ti ∈ EiI , and ti, Ei in normal form.
Definition 24 (solved form) A modified I-constraint system (E1B t1, . . . , EnB tn) is
said to be in solved form if for all i, we have ti ∈ X .
Lemma 9 Let C be a modified I-constraint system, C = (Cα, EB t, Cβ) such that Cα is
in solved form and t 6∈ X . Then, for all substitutions σ we have: σ |=I C if and only if
σ |=I (Cα, (E \ X )B t, Cβ) .
PROOF.
It suffices to prove that if x ∈ E∩X and σ is a substitution such that σ |=I C,
then we have σ |=I (Cα, (E \ {x}) B t, Cβ). Given x ∈ E, by definition 20, there
exists a set of terms E ′ ⊆ E such that E ′ B x ∈ Cα. Since σ |=I C we have
σ |=I E ′ B x, and by the fact that E ′ ⊆ E \ {x} we have σ |=I E \ {x}B x. Since
we also have σ |=I (EB t) then, σ |=I E \{x}B t. The reciprocal is obvious since
E \ X ⊆ E. 
Lemma 10 Let C = (Cα, E B x, Cβ) be a modified I-constraint system such that Cα is
in solved form and x /∈ V ar(Cβ) and let C ′ = (Cα, Cβ). We have:
1. If σ |= C then σ |= C ′.
2. If σ′ |= C ′ then we can extend σ′ to σ such that σ |= C.
PROOF.
1. Let C = (Cα, E B x, Cβ) and let σ be a closed substitution such that σ |= C.
Since x /∈ V ar(Cβ), C ′ is a constraint system. It is trivial that σ |= C ′.
2. Let σ′ be a closed substitution such that σ′ |= C ′. Since V ar(E) ⊆ V ar(Cα),
σ′ is defined on V ar(Cα, E, Cβ). We have two cases:
• If x /∈ V ar(Cα) then σ′(x) is not defined and x /∈ V ar(E). We then
extend σ′ to σ as follows:
σ(y) = σ′(y) for y ∈ Supp(σ′), σ(x) is a closed term in E.
Since x /∈ V ar(Cα, Cβ, E) and xσ ∈ Eσ, we deduce that σ |= C.
• If x ∈ V ar(Cα) then there exists Ex B x ∈ Cα. σ′ |= (Cα, Cβ) implies that
σ′ |= Ex B x, and since Ex ⊆ E, we have σ′ |= E B x and hence σ′ |= C.

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2.1.14 Reachability problems
Definition 25 (I-Reachability Problem) Given an intruder deduction system I,
the I-reachability problem is defined as follows:
Input: An I-constraint system C = (E1 ` v1, . . . , En ` vn,U)
. Output: SAT if and only if there exists a substitution σ such that σ |=I C.
Definition 26 (I-Ground Reachability Problem) Given an intruder deduction
system I, the I-ground reachability problem is defined as follows:
Input: An I-ground constraint system C = (E1 B t1, . . . , En B tn).
Output: SAT if and only if for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, ti ∈ EiI .
2.1.15 Variant of I-constraint systems
Definition 27 Let C = (E1 ` v1, . . . , En ` vn,U) be an I-constraint system, and let
C ′ be the I-constraint system constructed from C as follows:
C ′ = (E1 ` v1, . . . , En ` vn,U ′) where
U ′ = U ∪
{
x11
?
=H e11, . . . , x
1
m
?
=H e1m, . . . , x
n
1
?
=H en1 , . . . , x
n
p
?
=H enp
}
such that for all
i, j, xij is a fresh variable 6∈ X , and the set of terms
{
eij
}
j
represents the terms in Ei.
Since
⋃
i,j V ar(e
i
j) ⊆ {v1, . . . , vn} by definition of constraint systems (Definition
20), it is easy to see that any solution σ of U can be extended to a solution σ′ of
U ′ as follows:
• σ′(x) = xσ for all x ∈ V ar(C),
• σ′(x) = (tσ)↓ for every variable x ∈ V ar(C ′) \ V ar(C) such that x ?=H t ∈
U ′ \ U .
And, each solution σ′ of U ′ is a solution of U .
Definition 28 (variant of I-constraint system) Let C = (E1 ` v1, . . . , En ` vn,U) be
a I-constraint system, and let C ′ = (E1 ` v1, . . . , En ` vn,U ′) be a I-constraint
system constructed from C as given in Definition 27. Let σ be a substitution in
SolV ar(U ′). The constraint system ((E1σ)↓B(v1σ)↓, . . . , (Enσ)↓B(vnσ)↓) is a variant
I-constraint system associated to C.
Lemma 11 Let C be a I-constraint system and let C ′ be a variant I-constraint system
associated to C. C ′ is a modified I-constraint system.
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PROOF.
By hypothesis, we have C = (E1 ` v1, . . . , En ` vn,U), and C ′ =
((E1σ)↓ B (v1σ)↓, . . . , (Enσ)↓ B (vnσ)↓) with σ a substitution in normal form.
By definition of I-constraint systems, we have Ei ⊆ Ei+1, which implies
that Eiσ ⊆ Ei+1σ, and hence (Eiσ)↓ ⊆ (Ei+1σ)↓. Since E1 ⊆ T (F), then
E1 = E1σ = (E1σ)↓ and hence (E1σ)↓ ⊆ T (F). Now, we prove that
V ar((Eiσ)↓) ⊆ V ar({(v1σ)↓, . . . , (vi−1σ)↓}). We have that V ar((Eiσ)↓) ⊆
V ar(Eiσ). We have also that V ar(Ei) ⊆ {v1, . . . , vi−1} which implies that
V ar(Eiσ) ⊆ V ar({v1σ, . . . , vi−1σ}). By definition of C ′, we have that σ is
in normal form, and hence (viσ)↓ = viσ. This implies that V ar((Eiσ)↓) ⊆
V ar({(v1σ)↓, . . . , (vi−1σ)↓}), which concludes the proof. 
Lemma 12 Let H be a finitary equational theory, and let C = (E1 ` v1, . . . , En `
vn,U) be an I-constraint system, and let C ′ = (E1 ` v1, . . . , En ` vn,U ′) constructed
from C as in Definition 27. We have:
1. If there exists a substitution σ in normal form such that σ |=I C then there exists
a substitution θ ∈ SolV ar(U ′), and a substitution τ in normal form such that
τ |=I′ ((E1θ)↓ B (v1θ)↓, . . . , (Enθ)↓ B (vnθ)↓).
2. If there exists a substitution θ ∈ SolV ar(U ′), and a substitution τ in normal form
such that τ |=I′ ((E1θ)↓ B (v1θ)↓, . . . , (Enθ)↓ B (vnθ)↓), then there exists a
substitution σ in normal form such that σ |=I C.
PROOF.
Let C = (E1 ` v1, . . . , En ` vn,U) be an I-constraint system, and let C ′ =
(E1 ` v1, . . . , En ` vn,U ′) constructed from C as given in Definition 27.
1. Let σ be a substitution in normal form such that σ |=I C. σ can be ex-
tended, as given above, to σ′ such that σ′ |=I C ′, and hence, σ′ |=I Ei ` vi
for all i, and σ′ |=H U ′. This implies that there exists a variant substitu-
tion of TU ′ , a substitution τ in normal form such that for any term u ∈ C ′,
(uσ)↓ = (uθ)↓τ . This implies that τ |=∅ (U ′θ)↓, and hence, there exists a
most general ∅-unifier, µ of (U ′θ)↓, and a substitution τ ′ in normal form
such that τ = µτ ′. We have (Eiσ)↓ = (Eiθ)↓τ = (Eiθ)↓µτ ′ = (Eiθµ)↓τ ′ =
(Ei(θµ)↓)↓τ ′, and (viσ)↓ = (viθ)↓τ = (viθ)↓µτ ′ = (viθµ)↓τ ′ = (vi(θµ)↓)↓τ ′
for all i. We recall that (Eiσ)↓ →∗I (viσ)↓, then (Ei(θµ)↓)↓τ ′ →∗I (vi(θµ)↓)↓τ ′,
and by Lemma 8, we have (Ei(θµ)↓)↓τ ′ →∗I′ (vi(θµ)↓)↓τ ′ By definition of θ
and µ, we have (θµ)↓ ∈ SolV ar(U ′) which concludes the proof of (1).
2. Let θ ∈ SolV ar(U ′), and let τ be a substitution in normal form such that
(Eiθ)↓τ →∗I′ (viθ)↓τ for all i. Lemma 8 implies that (Eiθ)↓τ →∗I (viθ)↓τ
for all i. This implies that (Eiθτ)↓ →∗I (viθτ)↓ for all i, and hence,
(Ei(θτ)↓)↓ →∗I (vi(θτ)↓)↓ for all i. Let σ = (θτ)↓, we have (Eiσ)↓ →∗I (viσ)↓
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for all i. Since θ ∈ SolV ar(U ′), we deduce that θ |=H U ′, and hence θ |=H U .
This implies that θτ |=I U , then (θτ)↓ |=I U and thus σ |=I U , which
concludes the proof of (2).

2.2 Cryptographic protocols
In this section, we introduce how we model protocols.
2.2.1 Specification of protocols
A k-party protocol consists in k roles glued together with an association that
maps each step of a role that expects a message m to the step of another role
where the message m is produced. This association essentially defines how the
execution of the protocol should proceed in the absence of the intruder. We give
next the high level specification of a protocol.
Definition 29 (Protocol) The high level specification of a k-party protocol is given by
a scenario, sequence of rules of the form “R1 ⇒ R2 : m′′ with R1,R2 are two roles and
m ∈ T (F ,X ) is the exchanged message. This scenario describes how the execution of a
protocol should proceed in the absence of the intruder.
Example 12 The Needham-Schroeder symmetric key protocol [163] (presented in chap-
ter 1, at Section 1.3) is specified as follows:
PNS :

1. A⇒ S : 〈A, 〈B,NA〉〉
2. S ⇒ A : encs(〈NA, B,KAB, encs(〈KAB, A〉, KBS)〉, KAS)
3. A⇒ B : encs(〈KAB, A〉, KBS)
4. B ⇒ A : encs(NB, KAB)
5. A⇒ B : encs(NB − 1, KAB)
NA (respectively NB) represents the nonce freshly created by A (respectively B), KAS
(respectively KBS) represents the secret key shared between A (respectively B) and the
trusted server, and KAB the session key shared between A and B.
In this protocol, we have three roles, the trusted server (S), sender’s role (A) and
receiver’s role (B).
Definition 30 (Specification of role) A role R is given by a couple
({vi ⇒ Si; Ui}i∈I , KR) where:
• for every i, vi ∈ X , Si ∈ T (F ,X ), and Ui is an unification system,
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• KR is a set of terms in T (F ,X ) describing the knowledge of the roleR,
• {vi ⇒ Si;Ui}i∈I is the set of rules describing the behaviour of that role, that is the
set of actions that he should follow, and
• I is a totally ordered set of integers.
For simplicity, we assume I = {1, 2, . . .}. A rule vi ⇒ Si; Ui means: at step i,
the role will receive a message, stored in vi, and then send a message represented by
Si if the tests represented by Ui succeed. At each step i, the message Si is created by
the role from his initial knowledge, from the previously received messages stored in
v1, . . . , vi, and from fresh created values. A fresh value is represented by a variable
appearing in Si and not in {v1, . . . , vi}. The set of fresh values for the role R is the set⋃\I
i=1(V ar(Si) \ {v1, . . . , vi}). We denote by parameters of a role R the set constructed
from his initial knowledge KR, and his fresh values. We then remark that each variable
in Si is either in {v1, . . . , vi} or represents a parameter. The fact that I is totally ordered
means that the rules describing the role are sequential, and they are executed in a specific
order given by the protocol. A role represents an abstract participant in the protocol,
and thus in the description of a role, we do not specify which concrete participant plays
the role. We remark that a role can be played by many concrete participants and the
same concrete participant can play many roles or the same role many times. We observe
that a “receive” is always coupled with a “send”. This is because we suppose that if a
received message is as expected, the role will send his response.
Example 13 We consider the Needham-Schroeder symmetric key protocol described in
Example 12. In that protocol, we have three roles: the trusted server (S), sender’s role
(A) and receiver’s role (B). The role server (or S) is given by the tuple constructed as
follows:
• KS = {A,B, S,KAS, KBS, KAB},
• and the set of rules is:
S1 : v1 ⇒ encs(〈pi2(pi2(v1)), 〈pi1(pi2(v1)), 〈Kpi1(v1)pi1(pi2(v1)), encs(〈Kpi1(v1)pi1(pi2(v1)),
pi1(v1)〉, Kpi1(pi2(v1))S)〉〉〉, Kpi1(v1)S);
v1
?
= 〈X1, Y1, Z1〉
The role sender (or A) is given by a tuple constructed by the follow:
• KA = {B, S,A,NA, KAS},
• and the set of rules is:
A1 : ∅ ⇒ 〈A, 〈X2, NA〉〉; ∅
A2 : v2 ⇒ pi2(pi2(pi2(decs(v2, KAS)))); v2 ?= encs(〈NA, 〈X2, 〈Y2, Z2〉〉〉, KAS)
A3 : v3 ⇒ encs(decs(v3, pi1(pi2(pi2(decs(v2, KAS)))))− 1, pi1(pi2(pi2(decs(v2,
KAS))))); v3
?
= encs(X ′2, pi1(pi2(pi2(dec
s(v2, KAS)))))
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And the role receiver (or B) is given by a tuple constructed by the follow:
• KB = {B, S,A,NB, KBS},
• and the set of rules is:
B1 : v4 ⇒ encs(NB, pi1(decs(v4, KBS))); v4 ?= encs(〈X3, Y3〉, KBS)
B2 : v5 ⇒ ∅; v5 ?= encs(NB − 1, pi1(decs(v4, KBS)))
Before describing the execution of a protocol, we need to describe the execution
of a role. In the high level specification of a protocol, a role represents an abstract
participant in the protocol, while a concrete participant of the protocol, denoted an
agent (or instance of role), is as represented below:
Definition 31 (Instance of role) An instance of role R is obtained from the role R by
instantiating its parameters, that is its initial knowledge, KR, and its fresh values. If R
is a role, and σ is a substitution instantiating the parameters of R, Rσ is an instance of
that role.
Let an instance of role defined by ({vi ⇒ Si;Ui}i∈I , K), by definition of role (Def-
inition 30), and by definition of instance of role (Definition 31), it is easy to see
that V ar(Si) ⊆ {v1, . . . , vi} for i ∈ {1, . . . , \I}.
An agent, also called a concrete participant in the protocol, should play a role
in that protocol. To this end, he should instantiate that role. An agent could
instantiate many roles, or instantiate the same role many time.
Definition 32 (Instance of protocol) An instance of a protocol P is defined by a
union of instances of P roles and by a set of ground terms representing the initial
knowledge of the intruder I. We denote an instance of the protocol P as follows:
({vi ⇒ Si;Ui}i∈I , <I , KI) where
• KI is a set of ground terms in T (F) representing the initial knowledge of the
intruder,
• I is a set of integers partially ordered by <I , and
• for every i, vi ⇒ Si;Ui is a rule where vi ∈ X , Si is a term in T (F ,X ), and Ui is
an unification system.
The set of rules {vi ⇒ Si;Ui}i∈I is the union of rules specifying the different instances
of roles we are considering.
Since each instance of role instantiates role parameters, we remark that if v is a
variable in Si for an integer i, then there is another integer j such that j ≤I i and
v = vj , that is v represents a message previously received.
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Example 14 We consider again the Needham-Schroeder symmetric key protocol. We
consider three agents Alice, Bob, and s such that Alice instantiates once the sender
role (or role A), Bob instantiates once the receiver role (or role B), and s instantiates
once the server role (or role S). This instance of Needham-Schroeder symmetric key
protocol is given by ({r1, r2, r3, r4, r5, r6}, <I , KI) where:
- r1 = S1(s) :
v1 ⇒ encs(〈pi2(pi2(v1)), 〈pi1(pi2(v1)), 〈Kpi1(v1)pi1(pi2(v1)), encs(〈Kpi1(v1)pi1(pi2(v1)),
pi1(v1)〉, Kpi1(pi2(v1))s)〉〉〉, Kpi1(v1)s);
v1
?
= X1, Y1, Z1
- r2 = A1(Alice) : ∅ ⇒ 〈Alice, 〈Bob, na〉〉; ∅
- r3 = A2(Alice) : v2 ⇒ pi2(pi2(pi2(decs(v2, Kas)))); v2 ?=
encs(〈na, 〈Bob, 〈Y2, Z2〉〉〉, Kas)
- r4 = A3(Alice) : v3 ⇒ encs(decs(v3, pi1(pi2(pi2(decs(v2, Kas))))) −
1, pi1(pi2(pi2(dec
s(v2, Kas)))));
v3
?
= encs(X ′2, pi1(pi2(pi2(dec
s(v2, Kas)))))
- r5 = B1(Bob) : v4 ⇒ encs(nb, pi1(decs(v4, Kbs))); v4 ?= encs(〈X3, Y3〉, Kbs)
- r6 = B2(Bob) : v5 ⇒ ∅; v5 ?= encs(nb − 1, pi1(decs(v4, Kbs)))
- The integers in the set I = {1, . . . , 6} are partially ordered as follows: 2 < 3 < 4, and
5 < 6,
- KI = {Alice, Bob, s, I, KIs}
2.2.2 Execution of protocols
Definition 33 (Execution of protocol) Given an instance of a protocol defined by the
tuple ({vi ⇒ Si; Ui}i∈I , <I , KI), an execution of that instance is defined as follows:
Let I ′ ⊆ I such that for each i, j ∈ I , if j <I i and if i ∈ I ′ then j ∈ I ′. Let <I′ be a
total order over I ′ such that for any i, j ∈ I ′, if j <I i then j <I′ i. An execution is
defined by the couple ({vi ⇒ Si;Ui}i∈I′ , <I′).
We remark that V ar(Si) ⊆ {v1, . . . , vi} for i ∈ {1, . . . , \I ′}. Note that in an exe-
cution of protocol, not all instantiated roles need to be represented and instan-
tiated roles need not execute all their rules. Note also that in the first rule in
any execution, that is the rule vi0 ⇒ Si0 ;Ui0 where i0 is the smallest integer in I ′
with respect to the order <I′ , vi0 = Ui0 = ∅. Actually, the first rule represents the
first rule of the agent who runs the execution, and Si0 is the first message sent
and which is not a response to a received message. It is easy to see that if the
instance is given by a finite set of rules then we have a finite number of possible
executions of that instance.
Example 15 We consider the instance of protocol given in Example 14. An execution
of that instance is given by {r2, r1, r3, r5} where the integers 1, 2, 3 and 5 are totally
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ordered as follows: 2 < 1 < 3 < 5. More formally, the following sequence of rules
∅ ⇒ 〈Alice, 〈Bob, na〉〉; ∅
v1 ⇒ encs(〈pi2(pi2(v1)), 〈pi1(pi2(v1)), 〈Kpi1(v1)pi1(pi2(v1)), encs(〈Kpi1(v1)pi1(pi2(v1)), pi1(v1)〉,
Kpi1(pi2(v1))s)〉〉〉, Kpi1(v1)s);
v1
?
= X1, Y1, Z1
v2 ⇒ pi2(pi2(pi2(decs(v2, Kas)))); v2 ?= encs(〈na, 〈Bob, 〈Y2, Z2〉〉〉, Kas)
v4 ⇒ encs(nb, pi1(decs(v4, Kbs))); v4 ?= encs(〈X3, Y3〉, Kbs)
represents an execution of the instance given in Example 14.
2.3 From cryptographic protocols to constraint systems
Constraint systems are quite common in modelling security protocols for a
bounded number of sessions [156, 87, 73, 72]. Actually, many protocol security
properties can be characterised as reachability problems which are converted to
constraint solving problems. This happens for properties such as secrecy, where
the objective of protocol analysis is to search for an execution of the protocol in
which some secret data has been released publicly by the intruder. Although
the reachability is undecidable for cryptographic protocols in the general case
[110], some decidability results have been obtained for restricted cases, for in-
stance, in [178, 15, 156], the authors proved the decidability of reachability for
cryptographic protocols in the case of finite number of sessions.
We show here how constraint systems can be used to analyse cryptographic
protocols. We present in Section 2.3.1 how to built constraint system from an
execution of a protocol, and in Section 2.3.2 we show how to reduce insecurity
problem of a protocol with a bounded number of sessions to the satisfiability
problem of constraint systems. We follow the same definitions, constructions
and notations given in previous works [156, 73].
2.3.1 From an execution of a protocol to a constraint system
Given an instance of a protocol, and let exec be an execution of the given in-
stance of protocol. Assume exec = {∅ ⇒ S1, v2 ⇒ S2;U2, . . . , vn ⇒ Sn;Un} =
{∅ ⇒ S1, v2 ⇒ S2, . . . , vn ⇒ Sn;U2, . . . ,Un}. The constraint system associated
with the execution exec, denoted by Cexec, and with the initial intruder knowl-
edge KI is:
Cexec = (E1 ` v2, . . . , En−1 ` vn,U) where:
• E1 is a set of ground terms in T (F) representing the initial intruder knowl-
edge and the first sent message, E1 = KI ∪ S1,
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• for every i in the set {2, . . . , n− 1}, Ei is a set of terms included in T (F ,X )
defined as Ei = Ei−1 ∪ Si
• U = U2 ∪ . . . ∪ Un.
It is easy to see that Cexec is a constraint system in the sense of Definition 20. In
the context of cryptographic protocols, the inclusion Ei ⊆ Ei−1 for every i ∈
{1, . . . , n− 1}means that the knowledge of an intruder does not decrease as the
protocol progresses: after receiving a message a honest agent will respond to it,
this response can then be added to the knowledge of the intruder who listens to
all communications. The condition on variables, V ar(Ei) ⊆ {v1, . . . , vi−1}, stems
from the fact that a message sent at some step i must be built from previously
received messages recorded in the variables vj , j < i, and from the ground
initial knowledge of the honest agents.
An execution exec is said to be a possible execution if the correspondant con-
straint system Cexec is satisfiable, that is, there is a substitution σ satisfying Cexec
with respect to the intruder I.
Example 16 We consider the instance of Needham-Schroeder symmetric key protocol
given in Example 14, and we consider an execution of that instance given by the follow-
ing sequence of rules
∅ ⇒ 〈Alice, 〈Bob, na〉〉
v1 ⇒ encs(〈pi2(pi2(v1)), 〈pi1(pi2(v1)), 〈Kpi1(v1)pi1(pi2(v1)), encs(〈Kpi1(v1)pi1(pi2(v1)), pi1(v1)〉,
Kpi1(pi2(v1))s)〉〉〉, Kpi1(v1)s);
v1
?
= 〈X1, 〈Y1, Z1〉〉
The associated constraint system is defined as follows: C = (E1 ` v1,U) and
U =
{
v1
?
= 〈X1, 〈Y1, Z1〉〉
}
. The intruder deduction system considered here is the
Dolev-Yao intruder system with explicit destructors, IeDY . It is easy to see that
the constraint system given above has a solution which is given by the substitution
σ = {X1 7→ Alice, Y1 7→ Bob, Z1 7→ na, x1 7→ Alice, x2 7→ Bob, x3 7→ na}. Thus, the
execution given above is a possible execution.
2.3.2 From insecurity problem to satisfiability of constraint systems
We are concerned here with the secrecy property.
Secrecy. The secrecy property can be expressed by requiring that the secret
data s is not deducible from the messages sent on the network. Assume S to be
the set of messages sent on the network, the secrecy of the message (data) s is
preserved if and only if s is not deduced from S, that is s 6∈ S¯I where I is the
given intruder system. Here, we are interested by the secrecy property in the
following context:
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“given an execution exec of an instance of a protocol, does this execution
preserve secrecy?”
An execution exec preserves the secrecy of the data s if and only if the intruder,
at the end of that execution, is not able to deduce the data s. While the execution
exec = {∅ ⇒ S1, v2 ⇒ S2, . . . , vn ⇒ Sn;U2, . . . ,Un} is associated to the constraint
system Cexec = (E1 ` v2, . . . , En−1 ` vn,U) defined as in Section 2.3.1, the knowl-
edge of the intruder at the end of exec isEn = En−1∪Sn, and hence, the secrecy of
s is preserved in that execution if and only if s 6∈ EnI . We conclude that the se-
crecy property of the execution can be encoded directly by adding an additional
constraint En ` vn+1 and additional equation vn+1 ?=H s to Cexec, and asking for
the satisfiability of the new constraint system, also called extended constraint sys-
tem. We say that a protocol preserves the secrecy property if and only if each
execution of that protocol preserves the secrecy property, and to verify whether
the secrecy property is preserved by a protocol for a “bounded number of sessions”
(i.e. an instance of a protocol), it is then sufficient to check whether the secrecy
property is preserved by each execution of that instance. In [156] and [88], the
authors showed that not all executions of an instance of a protocol need to be
enumerated. But anyhow, here we are only interested whether an arbitrary exe-
cution of an instance of a protocol preserves the secrecy property, and deciding
whether an execution preserves the secrecy property is done by deciding the
satisfiability of the correspondant extended constraint system. Hence, deciding
whether a protocol under a bounded number of sessions is insecure, that is does
not preserve the secrecy property (also called deciding the secrecy problem of a
protocol under a bounded number of sessions) is reduced to deciding the satis-
fiability of constraint systems (also called decidability of reachability problem).
Example 17 We consider the execution given in the Example 16. We recall the
constraint system associated to that execution: C = (E1 ` v1,U) and U ={
v1
?
= 〈X1, 〈Y1, Z1〉〉
}
.
Let sec be a secret data. Deciding if the given execution does not preserve the secrecy of
sec under the intruder IeDY is reduced to deciding if the following constraint system
C = (E1 ` v1, E2 ` v6,U ′)
where E2 = E1 ∪ {
encs(〈pi2(pi2(v1)), 〈pi1(pi2(v1)), 〈Kpi1(v1)pi1(pi2(v1)), encs(〈Kpi1(v1)pi1(pi2(v1)), pi1(v1)〉,
Kpi1(pi2(v1))s)〉〉〉, Kpi1(v1)s)}, and U ′ = U ∪
{
v6
?
= ses
}
is IeDY -satisfiable.
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2.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have presented the basic notions that we will use in the next
chapters. Mainly, we showed how cryptographic protocols are symbolically
modeled, and how to reduce the insecurity problem of cryptographic proto-
cols with bounded number of sessions to the satisfiability problem of constraint
systems. In the next chapters, we will relax the perfect cryptography assumption
by taking into account some algebraic properties of cryptographic primitives, and,
following the symbolic approach given in this chapter, we will analyse crypto-
graphic protocols in the presence of some algebraic operators.
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Chapter 3
Analysis of protocols with collision
vulnerable hash functions
In this chapter, we consider the class of cryptographic protocols
that use collision vulnerable hash functions. Only a few years ago,
it was intractable to compute collisions on hash functions, so they
were considered to be collision resistant by cryptographers, and pro-
tocols were built upon this assumption. From the nineties on, several
authors [98, 103, 199, 201] have proved the tractability of finding colli-
sion attacks over several hash functions, and some practical methods
have been published to compute collisions on some commonly used
hash functions.
Following the symbolic method introduced in Chapter 2, we re-
duce the insecurity problem of our class of cryptographic protocols
to the ordered satisfiability problem for the intruder that uses the col-
lision vulnerability property of hash functions when attacking a pro-
tocol execution. We give an algorithm that the intruder employs to
compute collisions on hash functions. By this algorithm and roughly
following the results obtained in [74], we conjecture that the ordered
satisfiability problem for the intruder exploiting the collision vulner-
ability property of hash functions can be reduced to the ordered sat-
isfiability problem for an intruder operating on words, that is with an
associative symbol of concatenation, and we show the decidability of
the last problem. The decidability of the ordered satisfiability prob-
lem for the intruder operating on words is interesting in its own right
as it is the first decidability result that we are aware of for an intruder
system for which unification is infinitary, and that permits to consider
in other contexts an associative concatenation of messages instead of
their pairing. The results of this Chapter have been published in the
proceedings of ASIAN 2006 conference [67].
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Outline. In Section 3.1, we introduce hash functions and show some
of their properties. In Section 3.2, we introduce the collision vulnera-
bility property. In Section 3.3, we give the model that we use during
this chapter. The collision vulnerability property is symbolically for-
malised in Section 3.4, and the decidability results are given in Section
3.5.
3.1 Hash functions
3.1.1 Definition of hash functions
Cryptographic hash functions, or simply hash functions play a fundamental role in
modern cryptography. They take a message of arbitrary length as input and
output a fixed-length message referred to as a hash- code, hash-result, hash-value,
or simply hash.
Definition 34 (hash function) Let D and R be respectively a set of messages of ar-
bitrary length and a set of messages of fixed length. A hash function h is a function
h : D → R which has, as a minimum, the following two properties:
Compression
h maps an input x of arbitrary finite length, to an output h(x) of fixed length.
Ease of computation
given h and an input x, h(x) is easy to compute; actually, h is a linear function,
that is for any input x, h(x) is computable in time O(‖x‖).
For any hash function h : D → R, it is easy to see that ‖D‖ > ‖R‖.
Applications. Hash functions have many applications in information security.
A typical use of a cryptographic hash would be as follows: Alice poses a tough
math problem to Bob, and claims she has solved it. Bob would like to try it
himself, but would yet like to be sure that Alice is not bluffing. Therefore, Alice
writes down her solution, appends a random nonce, computes its hash and
tells Bob the hash value (whilst keeping the solution and nonce secret). This
way, when Bob comes up with the solution himself a few days later, Alice can
prove that she had the solution earlier by revealing the nonce to Bob. This is an
example of a simple commitment scheme.
Another important application of secure hashes is verification of message
integrity. Determining whether any change has been made to a message (or
a file) can be accomplished by comparing the hash of the message calculated
before and after transmission (or any other event). The hash of a message can
also serve as a means of reliably identifying a file.
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A related application is password verification [125]: passwords are usually
not stored in cleartext, for obvious reasons, but instead in hashed form. To
authenticate a user, the password presented by the user is hashed and compared
with the stored hash.
Hash functions are also used in digital signature schemes [175, 139]: for both
security and performance reasons, some signature schemes specify that only
the hash of the message will be “signed”, and not the entire message. Hash
functions can also be used in the generation of pseudorandom bits [153].
3.1.2 Properties of hash functions
Let h be an arbitrary hash function, h : D → R. We present here the three
potential properties (in addition to ease of computation and compression given in
Definition 34), for h [153]:
Preimage resistance
given a hash y ∈ R, if the correspondant input is not known, it is compu-
tationally infeasible, i.e. it takes too long (hundreds of years) to compute
using the fastest of super computers, to find any input x ∈ D such that
h(x) = y. This concept is related to that of one way function.
Second preimage resistance
given an input x ∈ D, it is computationally infeasible to find another input
x′ ∈ D such that x′ 6= x and h(x′) = h(x). This property is sometimes
referred to as weak collision resistance.
Collision resistance
it is computationally infeasible to find two distinct inputs x, x′ ∈ D such
that h(x′) = h(x). This property is sometimes referred to as strong collision
resistance.
We say that a hash function is vulnerable to respectively preimage attacks, second
preimage attacks, and collision attacks if it lacks respectively preimage resistance,
second preimage resistance and collision resistance property. We say also that
a hash function is respectively one-way, second-preimage resistant and collision resis-
tant hash function if it is a hash function as per definition 34 with respectively
the following properties: preimage resistance, second preimage resistance and
collision resistance property.
In [153], the authors showed the following relationships between properties
of hash functions given above:
• collision resistance implies second-preimage resistance of hash functions;
• collision resistance does not guarantee preimage resistance;
• preimage resistance does not guarantee second-preimage resistance.
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Motivations. We give now one motivation for each of the three major proper-
ties above. Consider a digital signature scheme wherein the signature is applied
to the hash h(x) rather than the message x. Here h should be a second-preimage
resistant hash function, otherwise, a intruder I may observe the signature of
some agent A on h(x), then find an x′ such that h(x′) = h(x), and claim that A
has signed x′. If I is able to actually choose the message which A signs, then
I needs only find a pair x, x′ such that h(x) = h(x′) rather than the harder task
of finding a second preimage of x; in this case, collision resistance is also nec-
essary [153]. Less obvious is the requirement of preimage resistance for some
public-key signature schemes; consider RSA [174], where agent A has public
key (e, n). I may choose a random value y, compute z = ye (mod n), and claim
that y is As signature on z. This attack is possible if I can find an input x such
that h(x) = z.
3.1.3 Examples of hash functions
Let us consider the following function: h(x) = x2 - 1 (mod p), with p a prime
number. This function h is a hash function as per Definition 34, but h is not a
one-way hash function because finding x such that h(x) = y for a given y is easy
[153].
Let us consider the following function: h(x) = x2 (mod n) with n = p ∗ q, p, q
are two randomly chosen primes. h is a one-way hash function because finding
a x such that h(x) = y for a given y is computationally equivalent to factor-
ing and thus intractable, but finding a 2nd-preimage, and, therefore, collisions,
is trivial (given x, we have that h(x) = h(−x)), and thus h is neither second-
preimage resistant hash function nor collision resistant hash function [153].
3.2 Collision vulnerability property
A hash function is a function h : D → R with ‖D‖ > ‖R‖ (Definition 34),
that is a hash function is many-to-one. This implies that the existence of pair of
inputs x, x′ with x 6= x′ and h(x) = h(x′) is unavoidable, we call such pair of
inputs a collision. However, only a few years ago, it was intractable to compute
collisions on hash functions, so they were considered to be collision resistant
by cryptographers, and protocols were built upon this assumption. From the
nineties on, several authors [98, 103, 199, 201] have proved the tractability of
finding pseudo-collision and collision attacks over several hash functions. Tak-
ing this into account, we consider in this chapter hash functions having the fol-
lowing properties: preimage resistance, second-preimage resistance, and colli-
sion vulnerability. From now on, we call a collision vulnerable hash function a hash
function having these properties. The collision vulnerability means that the hash
function is not collision resistant, i.e. it is computationally feasible to compute
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two distinct inputs x and x′ with h(x) = h(x′) provided that x and x′ are created
at the same time and independently one of the other.
To mount a collision attack, the intruder would typically begin by construct-
ing two different messages with the same hash where one message appears
legitimate or innocuous while the other serves the intruder’s purposes.
3.2.1 Hash functions having this property
MD5 Hash function [173] is one of the most widely used cryptographic hash
functions nowadays. It was designed in 1992 as an improvement on MD4 [172],
and its security was widely studied since then by several authors. The first
result was a pseudo-collision for MD5 [98]. When permitting to change the
initialisation vector, another attack (free-start collision) has been found [103].
Recently, a real collision involving two 1024-bits messages was found with the
standard value [199]. This first weakness was extended into a differential-like
attack [202] and tools were developed [129, 130] for finding the collisions which
work for any initialisation value and which are quicker than methods presented
in [199]. Finally, other methods have been developed for finding new MD5
collisions [204, 183]. The development of collision-finding algorithms is not
restricted to MD5 hash function. Several methods for MD4 [172] research attack
have been developed [200, 104]. In [200] a method to search RIPEMD [105]
collision attacks was also developed, and in [42], a collision on SHA-0 [7] has
been presented. Finally, Wang et al. have developed in [201] another method to
search for collisions for the SHA-1 [4] hash function.
3.2.2 Collision vulnerability in practice
We consider here the story of Alice and her boss [94]. Alice has been working for
some time in the office of Julius Caesar. On her last day of work, Caesar gives
her a letter of recommendation on paper. Alice decides to take advantage of this
opportunity to gain access to Caesar’s secret documents. Caesar uses MD5 hash
function which is collision vulnerable (Section 3.2.1) for his digital signature
scheme DSA [3]. When she receives her letter of recommendation on paper,
Alice prepars two postscripts files with the same MD5 hash: one is the letter
given by Caesar and the other is an order from Caesar to grant Alice some kind
of secrecy clearance. She asks Caesar to digitally sign the letter and due to the
hash collision, Caesar’s signature for the letter of recommendation is also valid
for the order. She then presents the order and the digital signature to the person
in charge of Caesar’s files, and finally gains access to Caesar’s secret documents.
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3.3 The model
To analyse cryptographic protocols, we follow in this chapter the symbolic
model described in Chapter 2. To this end, we assume an infinite set of vari-
ables X , an infinite set of constants C, a set of function symbols F . In addition
to what is already intoducted in Chapter 2, we make use here of some additional
notions that we will show next.
Given a term t, we recall that V ar(t) denotes the set of variables ap-
pearing in t, we recall also that Cons(t) denotes the set of free constants
appearing in t, that is, the set of constants from C appearing in t. Now,
we extend the definition of Cons(t) to take in consideration non-free con-
stants, i.e. the function symbols in F with arity 0, appearing in t, and we
defined all.Cons(t) to denote the set of free constants of t together with
the set of non-free constants of t. More formally, all.Cons(t) = Cons(t) ∪{
f ∈ F such that arity(f) = 0 and there is a position p ∈ Pos(t) with t|p = f
}
.
We define the set of atoms Atoms to be the union of V ar and all.Cons, if t is a
term, Atoms(t) = V ar(t) ∪ Cons(t).
In the rest of this chapter, we assume a complete simplification ordering> on
T (F ,X ), i.e. > is a simplification ordering on T (F ,X ) total over ground terms
T (F), and for which the minimal element is a free constant, i.e. a constant in C,
called cmin. We denote by Cspec the set consisting of cmin and of all symbols in
F of arity 0, i.e. Cspec = {cmin} ∪ {f ∈ F such that arity(f) = 0}.
3.3.1 Mode in an equational theory
The notion of Mode on a signature F has been initially defined in [74]. Assume
H is an equational theory over a signature F . Assume also that F is partitioned
into two disjoint sets F0 and F1, and that X is partitioned into two disjoint
sets X0 and X1. We first define a signature function Sign on F ∪ Atoms in the
following way:
Sign : F ∪ Atoms→ {0, 1, 2}
Sign(f) =
 0 if f ∈ F0 ∪ X01 if f ∈ F1 ∪ X12 otherwise, i.e. when f is a free constant (f ∈ C)
The function Sign is extended to terms by taking Sign(t) = Sign(Top(t)).
We also assume that there exists a Mode function with arity 2, Mode, such
that Mode(f, i) is defined for every symbol f ∈ F and every integer i such that
1 ≤ i ≤ arityf . For all valid f, i we have Mode(f, i) ∈ {0, 1} and Mode(f, i) ≤
Sign(f). Thus for all f ∈ F0 and for all i we have Mode(f, i) = 0.
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3.3.2 Well-moded equational theories
A position different from ε in a term t is well-moded if it can be written p · i
(where p is a position and i a non negative integer) such that Sign(t|p·i) =
Mode(Top(t|p), i). In other words the position in a term is well-moded if the
subterm at that position is of the expected type with respect to the function
symbol immediately above it. A term is well-moded if all its non root positions
are well-moded. Note in particular that a well-moded term does not contain
free constants (i.e. constants in C). If a position of t is not well-moded we say it
is ill-moded in t. The root position of a term is always ill-moded. An equational
theory H is well-moded if for all equations u ·= v ∈ H the terms u and v are
well-moded and Sign(u) = Sign(v), and similarly, a rule u→ v with u and v are
two terms is well-moded if u and v are well-moded and Sign(u) = Sign(v). In
[74], the authors proved that if an equational theory is well-moded then the ap-
plication of Unfailing Knuth-Bendix completion procedure (Chapter 2, Section
2.1.6) outputs a well-moded system.
We remark also that if H is the union of two equational theories H0 and
H1 over two disjoint signatures F0 and F1, the theory H is well-moded when
assigning Mode i to each argument of each operator f ∈ Fi, for i ∈ {0, 1}.
3.3.3 Subterm values
The notion of Mode also permits to define a new subterm relation in T (F ,X ).
This relation has been initially defined in [74].
We call a subterm value of a term t a subterm (as defined in Section 2.1.3,
Chapter 2) of t that is either atomic or occurs at an ill-moded position of t. We
denote Subv(t) the set of subterm values of t. We extend as expected the notion
of subterm value to a set of terms E, Subv(E) =
⋃
e∈E Subv(e). We denote by
factors(t), for a term t, the subset of the maximal and strict subterm values of t.
Example 18 Consider two binary function symbols f and g with Sign(f) =
Sign(g) = Mode(f, 1) = Mode(g, 1) = 1 and Mode(f, 2) = Mode(g, 2) = 0,
and t = f(f(g(a, b), f(c, c)), d). Its subterm values are a, b, f(c, c), c, d, and its factors
are a, b, f(c, c) and d.
In the rest of this chapter, the notion of subterm will refer to subterm values.
3.3.4 Intruder deduction system
As stated before, our concern in this chapter is the symbolic analysis of cryp-
tographic protocols using collision vulnerable hash functions. In chapter 2, we
show how to reduce the insecurity problem of cryptographic protocols to the
satisfiability problem of constraint solving. This reduction is done assuming
the intruder deduction rules are of the form:
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x1, . . . , xn → f(x1, . . . , xn)
with f a public function symbol in F .
Unfortunately, such intruder deduction rules are not sufficient to represent
an intruder taking advantage of the collision vulnerability property for hash
functions. To this end, we introduce next another definition of intruder de-
duction rules. This representation of intruder deduction rules have been given
initially in [72].
Definition 35 (Intruder deduction rules) An intruder deduction rule is a rule of the
form
l1, . . . , ln → l
with
• l1, . . . , ln, l ∈ T (F ,X ),
• all.Cons((lσ)↓) ⊆ ⋃ni=1 all.Cons((liσ)↓) ∪ Cspec, for any ground substitution
σ.
This second condition in the definition above is very similar to the origination
condition for well-definedness in [157]. It is easy to see that if the equation
theory H verifies the property: V ar(u) = V ar(v) for each u ·= v ∈ H, then
the second condition in the definition above is verified if and only if V ar(l) ⊆
V ar({l1, . . . , ln}).
Example 19 Let F = {., } with . denotes the concatenation, and  denotes the empty
word, and let
H =
 (x.y).z = x.(y.z)x. = x
.x = x
be the associated equational theory. The following rule
x.y → x
is an intruder deduction rule as per definition 35.
Definition 36 (Intruder deduction system) An intruder deduction system I, also
called an intruder system, is a triple I = 〈F ,LI ,H〉 where F is a signature, LI is
a set of intruder deduction rules (as per Definition 35), and H is an equational theory
over T (F ,X ).
Given two set of terms E,F ⊆ T (F ,X ), E →I F and I-derivations are defined
as in Chapter 2.
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Definition 37 (well-formed derivation) Let I = 〈F ,LI ,H〉 be an intruder deduction
system, and let E (respectively t) be a set of ground terms (respectively a ground term)
in normal form. A derivation D : E →I E, t1, →I . . . →I E, t1, . . . , tn−1, t is well-
formed if for every 1 ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}, ti ∈ Sub(E ∪ t).
Definition 38 (locality) Let I = 〈F ,LI ,H〉 be an intruder deduction system. I is
local if for every E, t with E a set of ground terms in normal form and t a ground
term in normal form, if there is a derivation starting from E of goal t then there is a
well-formed derivation starting from E of goal t.
Example 20 We present here an intruder operating on words who is able to con-
catenate messages and extract prefixes and suffixes. The intruder system is given by
〈F ,LI ,H〉 with:
• F = {., }; . denotes the concatenation, and  denotes the empty word
• LI =

x, y → x.y
x.y → x
x.y → y
∅ → 
• H =
 (x.y).z = x.(y.z)x. = x
.x = x
Combination of intruder deduction systems
We recall in Definition 39 the notion of disjoint combination (also called disjoint
union) of intruder deduction systems. This notion has been initially introduced
by Y. Chevalier and M. Rusinowitch [73] who used this notion to show that
the analysis of cryptographic protocols in presence of an intruder deduction
system I may be reduced to the analysis of cryptographic protocols in presence
of simpler intruder deduction systems I1, . . . , In provided that I is the disjoint
union of I1, . . . , In.
Definition 39 Let I1 = 〈F1,LI1,H1〉 and I2 = 〈F2,LI2,H2〉 be two intruder
deduction systems such that F1 and F2 are disjoints, H1 an equational theory on
F1 and H2 an equational theory on F2. The following intruder deduction system
I = 〈F1 ∪ F2,LI1 ∪ LI2,H1 ∪ H2〉 denotes the disjoint union of the two intruder
deduction systems I1 and I2.
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3.3.5 Symbolic derivation
Given a intruder system I = 〈F ,LI ,H〉, and a protocol P. At step i, a role in
P receives a (possibly ∅) message, checks its well-formedness by verifying that
it is as expected, and applies rules in LI to construct the response. We give in
Definition 30 (Chapter 2) a specification of role, this specification is adequate
when the intruder deduction rules are of the form x1, . . . , xn → f(x1, . . . , xn)
with f a public function symbol in F . Since, in this chapter, we consider a
different form of the intruder deduction rules (Definition 35), we represent a
role by a symbolic derivation [72].
Definition 40 (Symbolic Derivations) Let I = 〈F ,LI ,H〉 be an intruder deduction
system. A I-symbolic derivation is a tuple (V ,S,K, In,Out) where V is a finite se-
quence of variables (xi)i∈Ind, indexed by a linearly ordered set (Ind,<), K is a set of
ground terms (the initial knowledge), In, Out are two disjoint subsets of Ind, and S is
a set of equations such that, for all xi ∈ V one of the following holds:
• i ∈ In;
• There exists a ground term t ∈ K, and an equation xi ?= t in S;
• There exists a rule l1, . . . , lm → r ∈ LI such that S contains the equations xi ?= r
and xαj
?
= lj for j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} with αj < i.
A symbolic derivation is closed if In = Out = ∅, and in this case, it may be simply de-
noted (V ,S,K). A substitution σ satisfies a closed symbolic derivation C = (V ,S,K),
and we write σ |=I C, if σ |=H S.
Let (V ,S,K, In,Out) be a symbolic derivation. For simplicity, from now on,
we replace every index i in the set of indices Ind by the variable xi associated
to this index, and we do not model equations xi
?
= t ∈ S for t ∈ K, writing t
directly when xi is needed, but we keep xi in V .
Example 21 We consider the following simple protocol:
A⇒ B : encp(〈A,NA〉, PkB)
B ⇒ A : encp(NB, PkA)
The role A is represented by the following symbolic derivation:
(VA,SA,KA, InA, OutA) with:
• VA =
{
xA01, x
A
02, x
A
03, x
A
04, x
A
05, x
A
06, x
A
1 , x
A
2 , y
A
1 , y
A
2
}
, ordered as follows: xA01 <
xA02 < x
A
03 < x
A
04 < x
A
05 < x
A
06 < x
A
1 < y
A
1 < x
A
2 < y
A
2
• KA =
{
A,B,NA, KA, K
−1
A , KB
}
,
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• InA =
{
xA1 , x
A
2
}
,
• OutA =
{
yA1 , y
A
2
}
,
• SA =
{
xA1
?
= ∅, xA2 ?= encp(x, PkA), yA1 ?= encp(〈A,NA〉, PkB), yA2 ?= ∅
}
The role B is represented by the following symbolic derivation:
(VB,SB,KB, InB, OutB) with:
• VB =
{
xB01, x
B
02, x
B
03, x
B
04, x
B
05, x
B
06, x
B
1 , y
B
1
}
, ordered as follows: xB01 < xB02 < xB03 <
xB04 < x
B
05 < x
B
06 < x
B
1 < y
B
1
• KB =
{
A,B,NB, KB, K
−1
B , KA
}
,
• InB =
{
xB1
}
,
• OutA =
{
yB1
}
,
• SB =
{
xB1
?
= encp(y, PkB), y
A
1
?
= encp(NB, Pkpi1(decp(xB1 ,Pk
−1
B ))
)
}
Composition of symbolic derivations
Given two I-symbolic derivations, we show next how to compose them [72].
Definition 41 Let I = 〈F ,LI ,H〉 be an intruder deduction system, and let C1 =
(V1,S1,K1, In1, Out1) and C2 = (V2,S2,K2, In2, Out2) be two I-symbolic derivations
with two disjoint sets of variables and index sets (Ind1, <1), (Ind2, <2) respectively.
Let I1, I2, O1, O2 be subsets of In1, In2, Out1, Out2 respectively. We recall that every
index i in the set of indices Ind has been replaced by the variable xi associated to this
index. Assume that there is an order preserving bijection φ from I1∪ I2 to O1∪O2 such
that φ(I1) = O2 and φ(I2) = O1. A composition of two I-symbolic derivations along
the sets I1, I2, O1, O2 is a symbolic derivation
C = (V , φ(S1 ∪ S2),K1 ∪ K2, (In1 ∪ In2) \ (I1 ∪ I2), (Out1 ∪Out2) \ (O1 ∪O2))
V is a sequence of variables indexed by Ind = (Ind1 \ {i | xi ∈ I1}) ∪ (Ind2 \
{i | xi ∈ I2}), ordered by a linear extension of the transitive closure of the relation:
<1 ∪ <2 ∪{(u, v) | v = φ(w) and u <1 w or u <2 w}
and such that the variable of index i in V is equal to the variable of index i in V1 if
i ∈ Ind1, and to the variable of index i in V2 if i ∈ Ind2.
A composition of two I-symbolic derivations is also a I-symbolic derivation, and
we can compose an arbitrary number of I-symbolic derivations in the same way.
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Example 22 Let us consider the protocol and the two symbolic derivations of Example
21. The normal execution of that protocol corresponds to the following composition
of the two symbolic derivations of the previous example: I1 =
{
xA2
}
, O1 =
{
yA1
}
,
I2 =
{
xB1
}
, and O2 =
{
yB1
}
. This composition imposes that xA2 = yB1 which means
that the second message received by A is the first message send by B, and xB1 = yA1
which means that the first message received by B is the first message send by A. We
recall that the first message received by A is empty.
3.3.6 Ordered satisfiability problem
In chapter 2, we show how reduce the insecurity problem of cryptographic pro-
tocols to the satisfiability problem of constraint systems. Since this reduction
is based on the fact that the capacity of the intruder attacking the protocol is
represented by rules of the form x1, . . . , xn → f(x1, . . . , xn), and since, in this
chapter, the intruder deduction rules have a different form, we can not apply
this reduction. To this end, we introduce next another satisfiability problem,
called Ordered satisfiability problem, to which we reduce the insecurity problem
of cryptographic protocols using collision-vulnerable hash functions. The Or-
dered satisfiability problem has been initially defined in [72].
Definition 42 Ordered I-satisfiability problem Given an intruder deduction system
I = 〈F ,LI ,H〉, the ordered I-satisfiability problem is defined as follows:
Input: A I-symbolic derivation C, a set of ground terms Ki representing the
intruder knowledge, X = V ar(C), C = all.Cons(C) and a linear
ordering ≺ on X ∪ C.
Output: SAT if and only if there exists a I-symbolic derivation Ci =
(Vi,Si,Ki, Ini, Outi), a closed composition Ca of Ci and C, and a sub-
stitution σ such that (1) σ |=I Ca and (2) for all x ∈ X and c ∈ C,
x ≺ c implies c /∈ all.Cons(xσ).
3.4 Symbolic formalisation of collision vulnerability property
We show in this section the symbolic formalisation of collision vulnerability
property for hash functions. We recall that the collision vulnerability property
of a hash function h means that it is computationally feasible to compute two
distinct inputs x and x′ with h(x) = h(x′) provided that x and x′ are created at
the same time and independently one of the other.
In order to construct a couple of messages having the same hash value, we
introduce two new function symbols f, g, each of them with arity 4, and we
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make use of the concatenation of messages, denoted by the function symbol “.′′,
which is an associative and unary function symbol.
We define next the intruder systems IAU , If , Ig, Ifree and Ih.
We remark that our modelisation of collision vulnerability property does not
take into account the time for finding collisions, which is significantly greater
than the time necessary for other operations.
3.4.1 Intruder on words with free function symbols
We recall that the goal of this section is the symbolic specification of an intruder
system that takes into account the collision vulnerability property for hash func-
tions to mount attacks on a protocol.
We assume that the algorithm employed by the intruder to find collisions, i.e. a
couple of messages with the same hash value, is as follows:
1. Start from two messages m and m′;
2. The intruder splits both messages into two parts, m in m1,m2 and m′ in
m′1,m
′
2 such that m = m1.m2 and m′ = m′1.m′2 with “.′′ denotes the concate-
nation;
3. Then, the intruder computes two messages n and n′ such that:
(HC) : h(m1.n.m2) = h(m
′
1.n
′.m′2)
Next, we represent the collision vulnerability property of hash functions as follows:
∀m,m′, ∃ mˆ, mˆ′, such that h(mˆ) = h(mˆ′)
and more formally,
∀m1,m2,m′1,m′2, ∃ n, n′, such that h(m1.n.m2) = h(m′1.n′.m′2)
and hence, by skolemisation,
∀m1,m2,m′1,m′2, h(m1.f(m1,m2,m′1,m′2).m2) = h(m′1.g(m1,m2,m′1,m′2).m′2),
where f and g are two function symbols with arity 4.
In the remainder of this chapter, we represent collision vulnerability prop-
erty of hash functions as follows: ∀ m,m′, the intruder can compute two
messages g(m1,m2,m′1,m′2) and f(m1,m2,m′1,m′2) such that: (1) m =
m1.m2, and (2)m′ = m′1.m′2, and (3) (HC) : h(m1.g(m1,m2,m′1,m′2).m2) =
h(m′1.f(m1,m2,m
′
1,m
′
2).m
′
2).
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We remark that the function symbols f and g denote the (complex) algorithm
being used to find collisions starting from two different messages m and m′.
We first define the intruder operating on words, which we denote by IAU . This
intruder is able to concatenate messages and extract prefixes and suffixes. We
define IAU as follows:
IAU = 〈FAU ,LIAU ,HAU〉
with:
• FAU = {., }; . denotes the concatenation, and  denotes the empty word
• LIAU =

x, y → x.y
x.y → x
x.y → y
∅ → 
• HAU =
 (x.y).z = x.(y.z)x. = x.x = x
We then extend the IAU intruder with the two function symbols f and g. We
first define the intruder Ig who is an intruder able to compose messages using
the function symbol g. Ig is given as follows:
Ig = 〈{g}, {x1, x2, x3, x4 → g(x1, x2, x3, x4)}, ∅〉
and similarly If is given as follows:
If = 〈{f}, {x1, x2, x3, x4 → f(x1, x2, x3, x4)}, ∅〉
We also define the intruder system Ifree as the disjoint union of IAU , If and
Ig, and we have:
Ifree = 〈Ffree,LIfree,Hfree〉.
with:
• Ffree = {., , f, g};
• LIfree =

x, y → x.y
x.y → x
x.y → y
∅ → 
x1, x2, x3, x4 → f(x1, x2, x3, x4)
x1, x2, x3, x4 → g(x1, x2, x3, x4)
• Hfree =
 (x.y).z = x.(y.z)x. = x
.x = x
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We remark that f and g do not appear in the equational theory Hfree: they are
free in that equational theory.
3.4.2 Hash-colliding intruder
We gave in Section 3.4.1 the algorithm employed by the intruder to find colli-
sions. A consequence of our model is that in order to build collisions starting
from two messages m and m′ the intruder must know these two messages. A
side effect is that it is not possible to build three (or more) different messages
with the same hash value by iterating the research for collisions.
In a more comprehensive model we might moreover want to model that
collisions cannot always be found using attacks published in the literature, but
instead that given a deadline, the probability p of success of an attack is strictly
below 1. This would imply that the application of this rule by the intruder
would, assuming independence of collision attacks, reduce the likelihood of
the symbolic attack found. In this setting our model would account for attacks
with a non-negligible probability of success as is shown in [34].
Leaving probabilities aside, we express intruder’s application of a hash func-
tion in our setting by adding the rule x → h(x) to the deduction rules of the
Ifree intruder system. As a consequence, the previous description of the Ifree
intruder system enables us to model a collision-capable intruder. We describe
Ih as follows:
Ih = 〈Fh,LIh,Hh〉
with:
• Fh = FAU ∪ {f, g} ∪ {h}
• LIh = LIfree ∪ {x→ h(x)}
• Hh = Hfree ∪ {h(x1.g(x1, x2, x′1, x′2).x2) = h(x′1.f(x1, x2, x′1, x′2).x′2)}
The function symbols f and g are not free anymore in this equational theory.
3.4.3 Properties on Ifree and Ih intruder deduction systems
In Figure 3.1, we define the functions Mode and Sign on Fh.
It is easy to see that the equational theories Hh, Hf , Hg, HAU , and Hfree are
well-moded.
Lemma 13 Let R(Hh) be the system resulting from the application of the Unfailing
Knuth-Bendix procedure onHh, and let l = r ∈ R(Hh). If l ∈ X then l ∈ V ar(r).
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Figure 3.1 Mode and Sign on Ih
Mode:
Mode(·, 1) = Mode(·, 2) = 0
Mode(g, i) = Mode(f, i) = 0, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , 4}
Mode(h, 1) = 0
Sign:
Sign(·) = Sign() = Sign(f) = Sign(g) = 0
Sign(h) = 1
PROOF.
Let l = r ∈ R(Hh) and suppose that l ∈ X and l /∈ V ar(r). Let t1 and t2
be two different terms in T (Fh,X ) and let σ1 and σ2 be two substitutions such
that σ1(l) = t1, σ2(l) = t2 and σ1(r) = σ2(r). Then, t1 =Hh t2. We deduce that if
l ∈ X and l /∈ V ar(r) for a rule l = r ∈ R(Hh), all terms in T (Fh,X ) are equals
modulo Hh which is impossible. Then for any rule l = r ∈ R(Hh), if l ∈ X , we
have l ∈ V ar(r). 
Lemma 14 Let t ∈ T (Fh,X ), we have:
1. If t′ ∈ Sub(t) and Sign(t′) = 1 then t′ ∈ Subv(t);
2. If Sign(t) = 1 then Sign((t)↓) = 1.
PROOF.
1. Let t ∈ T (Fh,X ) and t′ ∈ Sub(t) such that Sign(t′) = 1, let us prove that
t′ ∈ Subv(t). Since t′ ∈ Sub(t), we have two cases:
• t′ = t, then t′ ∈ Subv(t).
• t′ is a strict subterm of t, then there exists an integer p ≥ 0, an integer
i ≥ 1 such that t|p.i = t′. We have Sign(t|p.i) = 1 and by definition
of Ih theory, Mode(Top(t|p), i) = 0 then Mode(Top(t|p), i) 6= Sign(t|p.i).
Thus t′ is in ill-moded position in t, which implies that t′ ∈ Subv(t).
2. Let t be a ground term in T (Fh) such that Sign(t) = 1. We have a finite
sequence of rewritings starting from t leading to (t)↓: t →R(Hh) ... →R(Hh)
ti →R(Hh) ti+1 →R(Hh) ... →R(Hh) (t)↓. Suppose that Sign(ti) = 1, and let
us prove that Sign(ti+1) = 1. Let l = r be the rule applied in the step i.
By definition of rewriting, there exists a ground substitution σ, a position
p such that ti|p = lσ, ti+1 = ti[p← rσ] and lσ > rσ. We have two cases:
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• If p 6= ε, then Top(ti+1) = Top(ti) and thus by Sign(ti) = 1. We have
Sign(ti+1) = 1.
• If p = , then ti = lσ. Since Sign(lσ) = 1 and lσ is ground, we have
Top(lσ) = h. Since lσ > rσ and by lemma 13, we have l /∈ X , and
thus l = h(l′) for some l′ ∈ T (Fh,X ). Since RHh is well-moded and
Sign(l) = 1, we have Sign(r) = 1. We have three cases:
– r is a non-free constant. Since the only non-free constant in Hh
theory is  and Sign() = 0, this case is impossible.
– r is a variable. By lemma 13, we have r ∈ V ar(l), and thus r ∈
Sub(l). Since l is well-moded in Hh theory, we haven Sign(r) = 0,
which contradicts Sign(t) = Sign(r).
– r = h(r′) for r′ ∈ T (Fh,X ). This implies that we have rσ = h(r′σ),
and therefor Sign(rσ) = 1 = Sign(ti+1).
For all i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}, we have Sign(ti) = 1 implies Sign(ti+1) = 1,
which proves the second point of the lemma.

Lemma 15 Let t be a ground term in Fh with all its factors in normal form. We have:
Subv(t) \ {, t} ⊆ Subv((t)↓).
PROOF.
Let t be a ground term in Fh. There exists a finite sequence of rewritings
starting from t leading to (t)↓: t →R(Hh) . . . →R(Hh) ti →R(Hh) ti+1 →R(Hh)
. . . →R(Hh) (t)↓. Let us prove the lemma by contradiction and assume that
u ∈ Subv(ti) \ {, ti} and u /∈ Subv(ti+1). Since u ∈ Subv(ti) \ {, ti}, there ex-
ists an integer q ≥ 1 such that ti|q = u. Let l = l′ be the rule applied on ti.
There exists an integer p ≥ 0, a ground substitution σ such that ti|p = lσ and
ti+1 = ti[p← l′σ] with lσ > l′σ.
• If u /∈ Subv(lσ) then u ∈ Subv(ti+1).
• If u ∈ Subv(lσ), by the fact that l is well-moded, u is in normal form and
u 6= , there exists x ∈ V ar(l) such that u ∈ Subv(xσ). Since V ar(l) =
V ar(l′), we have u ∈ Subv(ti+1).
In the two cases, we lead to a contradiction with u /∈ Subv(ti+1). This concludes
the proof of the lemma. 
Lemma 16 The intruder deduction system Ih satisfies the following criterion: for
any set of ground terms in normal form E, if E →LIh E, r →LIh E, r, t and
r /∈ Subv(E, t) ∪ Cspec then there is a set of ground terms in normal form F such
that E →∗LIfree F →LIh F, t.
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PROOF.
Let E be a set of ground terms in normal forms satisfying the following
derivation: E →LIh E, r →LIh E, r, t such that r /∈ Subv(E, t) ∪ Cspec. In order
to prove that there exists a set of ground terms in normal form F such that
E →∗LIfree F →LIh F, t, it suffices to prove that E →LIh E, t. We have E →LIh
E, r and the only LIh rule is x → h(x). By definition, there exists a normal
ground substitution σ such that xσ ∈ E and r = (h(xσ))↓. Since Sign(h(xσ)) = 1
by Lemma 14, we have Sign(r) = 1. SinceE, r →LIh E, r, t, there exists a normal
ground substitution σ′ such that xσ′ ∈ E, r and t = (h(xσ′))↓. If xσ′ = r, we
have t = (h(r))↓. h(r) is in normal form, since all its factors are in normal form
and r ∈ Subv(h(r)) \ {h(r), }, by Lemma 15 r ∈ Subv(t), which contradicts the
hypothesis r /∈ Subv(E, t) ∪ Cspec. By contradiction, we have xσ′ ∈ E and thus
E →LIh E, t. 
In the following lemma, t =1HC t
′ denotes that there exists a one step rewrit-
ing between t and t′ using (HC) equation.
Lemma 17 Let t0, t, t′ ∈ T (F〈,X ) such that t0 =HAU t =1HC t′ and t0 = h(t1 ·
f(t1, t2, t3, t4) · t2). We have: t′ =HAU h(t3 · g(t1, t2, t3, t4) · t4).
PROOF.
Let h(m1 · f/g(m1,m2,m3,m4) ·m2) = h(m3 · g/f(m1,m2,m3,m4) ·m4) be the
ground instance of (HC) used between t and t′. Let us prove that m1 =HAU t1. If
m1 6=HAU t1, we have eitherm1 is a prefix modulo h. of t1 or t1 is a prefix modulo
HAU of m1. Let us review these two cases:
• m1 is a prefix modulo HAU of t1: then t1 = m1 · x and x 6=HAU , then
f/g(m1,m2,m3,m4) ∈ Sub(t1), then m2 ∈ Sub(t1). And we have m2 =
y · t2 with y 6=HAU , then f(t1, t2, t3, t4) ∈ Sub(m2) then t1 ∈ Sub(m2). We
conclude that t1 is a strict subterm of m2 and m2 is a strict subterm of t1
which is impossible.
• t1 is a prefix modulo HAU of m1: by reasoning as above on t2 which is a
suffix of m2, we can also prove that this case is impossible.
Thus we have m1 =HAU t1, and thus f/g(m1,m2,m3,m4) =HAU f(t1, t2, t3, t4),
that is mi =HAU ti for i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} and t′ =HAU h(t3 · g(t1, t2, t3, t4) · t4). 
Lemma 18 Let h(m), h(m′) be two pure terms and σ be ground substitution such that
σ |=Hh h(m) ?= h(m′). Then one of the following holds:
• σ |=HAU m ?= m′
• σ |=HAU
{
m
?
= x1 · g(x1, x2, y1, y2) · x2,m′ ?= y1 · f(x1, x2, y1, y2) · y2
}
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with x1, x2, y1, y2 new variables (modulo the commutativity of
?
=).
PROOF.
Let m1,m2,m3 ∈ T (Fh,X ) such that h(m1) =1HC h(m2) =1HC h(m3). If
m1 =HAU t1 · f(t1, t2, t3, t4) · t2 then, by Lemma 17 we have{
m2 =HAU t3 · g(t1, t2, t3, t4) · t4
m3 =HAU t1 · f(t1, t2, t3, t4) · t2
Let Sm1 = {m| h(m) =Hh h(m1)} then, by Lemma 17 we have Sm1 =
{m|m =HAU m1} ∪ {m|m =HAU t3 · g(t1, t2, t3, t4) · t4}.
We have σ |=Hh h(m) ?= h(m′) that is h(mσ) =Hh h(m′σ), and thus m′σ ∈ Smσ
which implies that either mσ =HAU m
′σ and then σ |=HAU m ?= m′ or mσ =HAU
x1σ · f(x1σ, x2σ, y1σ, y2σ) · x2σ and m′σ =HAU y1σ · g(x1σ, x2σ, y1σ, y2σ) · y2σ and
then σ |=HAU
{
m
?
= x1 · g(x1, x2, y1, y2) · x2,m′ ?= y1 · f(x1, x2, y1, y2) · y2
}
. 
Lemma 19 Let E be a set of ground terms in normal form. If E →∗Ifree f(t1, t2, t′1, t′2)
and f(t1, t2, t′1, t′2) /∈ Sub(E) then E →∗Ifree t1, t2, t′1, t′2.
PROOF.
We have E →∗Ifree f(t1, t2, t′1, t′2) that is, there exists a finite sequence
of rewritings starting from E leading to f(t1, t2, t′1, t′2): E →Ifree E1 →Ifree
. . . →Ifree En−1 →IAU En−1, f(t1, t2, t′1, t′2). By hypothesis, we have
f(t1, t2, t
′
1, t
′
2) ∈ Sub(En) \ Sub(E). Let Ei be the smallest set in the derivation
such that f(t1, t2, t′1, t′2) ∈ Sub(Ei) \ Sub(Ei−1) [i ≥ 1]. By LIfree and Hfree, the
rule applied in the step i of the derivation is x1, x2, y1, y2 → f(x1, x2, y1, y2). This
implies that there exists a normal ground substitution σ such that ti = xiσ and
t′i = yiσ for i ∈ {1, 2} and t1, t2, t′1, t′2 ∈ Ei−1. We deduce that E →∗Ifree t1, t2, t′1, t′2.

Lemma 20 Let E ⊆ T (Fh) be a set of ground terms in normal form, and assume
that E does not contain terms having the form f(t1, t2, t3, t4) or g(t1, t2, t3, t4) for some
terms t1, . . . , t4. Let m1,m2 be two terms in T (Fh,X ) such that (h(m1) ?= h(m2)) is
Hh-satisfiable. Let σ be a ground substitution which satisfies (h(m1) ?=Hh h(m2)). We
have:
E →∗IAU (m1σ)↓ if and only if E →∗IAU (m2σ)↓
PROOF.
By symmetry, it suffices to prove that E →∗IAU (m1σ)↓ implies E →∗IAU
(m2σ)↓. Since σ |=Hh (h(m1) ?= h(m2)), by Lemma 18 we have two cases:
• If σ |=HAU m1 ?= m2 then the result is obvious.
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• If σ |=HAU
{
m
?
= x1 · g(x1, x2, y1, y2) · x2,m′ ?= y1 · f(x1, x2, y1, y2) · y2
}
then{
m1σ =HAU x1σ · f(x1σ, x2σ, y1σ, y2σ) · x2σ
m2σ =HAU y1σ · g(x1σ, x2σ, y1σ, y2σ) · y2σ
Since E →∗IAU (m1σ)↓, we have E →∗IAU (x1σ · f(x1σ, x2σ, y1σ, y2σ) · x2σ)↓
and thus, E →∗IAU (x1σ)↓ · f((x1σ)↓, (x2σ)↓, (y1σ)↓, (y2σ)↓) · (x2σ)↓ which
implies that E →∗IAU (x1σ)↓, (x2σ)↓, f((x1σ)↓, (x2σ)↓, (y1σ)↓, (y2σ)↓).
By hypothesis, f((x1σ)↓, (x2σ)↓, (y1σ)↓, (y2σ)↓) /∈ SubE, Lemma 19
implies E →∗IAU (x1σ)↓, (x2σ)↓, (y1σ)↓, (y2σ)↓ and thus E →∗IAU
g((x1σ)↓, (x2σ)↓, (y1σ)↓, (y2σ)↓) which implies that E →∗IAU (y1σ)↓ ·
g((x1σ)↓, (x2σ)↓, (y1σ)↓, (y2σ)↓) · (y2σ)↓. We conclude that E →∗IAU (m2σ)↓.

3.5 Decidability results
We show next the decidability of respectively ordered IAU , ordered If , ordered
Ig, ordered Ifree-satisfiability problems, and we conjecture the decidability of
the ordered Ih-satisfiability problem.
3.5.1 Decidability of ordered IAU -satisfiability problem
We state below some basic facts on IAU = 〈{.},LIAU ,HAU〉.
Lemma 21 Let E and t be respectively a set of terms and a term in normal form with
respect to the equational theoryHAU . We have:
1. all.Cons(E) ⊆ EIAU ,
2. E ⊆ all.Cons(E)IAU ,
3. EIAU = all.Cons(E)
IAU ,
4. t ∈ EIAU if and only if all.Cons(t) ⊆ all.Cons(E).
PROOF.
Let E and t be respectively a set of ground terms and a ground term in
normal form with respect to the equational theoryHAU .
1. Let c ∈ all.Cons(E) be a constant, and let e be a term in E such that c ∈
all.Cons(e). We have therefore e = e1.c.e2. By associativity of ., we have
e = e1.c.e2 = (e1.c).e2 = e1.(c.e2). Thus E →IAU E, (e1.c) →IAU E, (e1.c), c.
This implies all.Cons(E) ⊆ EIAU .
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2. By definition of IAU , it is easy to see that E ⊆ all.Cons(E)IAU .
3. (1) and (2) implies easily (3).
4. We have t ∈ EIAU is equivalent to EIAU = (E, t)IAU , which is equivalent
to all.Cons(E)
IAU
= all.Cons(E, t)
IAU by (3). By contradiction, assume
that t ∈ EIAU and there is a constant c ∈ all.Cons(t) \ all.Cons(E). c /∈
all.Cons(E) implies that c /∈ all.Cons(E)IAU , and c ∈ all.Cons(t) implies
that c ∈ all.Cons(E, t)IAU . This contradicts the equality all.Cons(E)IAU =
all.Cons(E, t)
IAU , and hence we deduce that all.Cons(t) ⊆ all.Cons(E).
Now, we prove the converse. We have all.Cons(t) ⊆ all.Cons(E), this
implies all.Cons(t) ⊆ all.Cons(E)IAU . By (2), we have t ∈ all.Cons(t)IAU ,
and hence, t ∈ all.Cons(E)IAU . By (3), we conclude that t ∈ EIAU .

The consequence of Lemma 21 is that only the set of constants appearing
or not in the initial knowledge and the goal of a supposed derivation are rel-
evant to decide its feasibility. This has the important implication, with respect
to decidability, that it is not necessary to know the exact instance of intruder’s
knowledge (his initial knowledge and the messages in the output of the sym-
bolic derivation up to this point) and the goal (the next input message of the
symbolic derivation) to decide whether a derivation exists. It suffices to know
the guessable sets of constants of the knowledge and of the goal.
We give in Figure 3.2 the algorithm that solve ordered IAU -satisfiability prob-
lem and then, show its correctness, completeness and termination.
The definition of satisfiability of symbolic derivations allows us to conclude
automatically the completeness of the algorithm:
Lemma 22 (Completeness) The algorithm described in Figure 3.2 is complete.
PROOF.
Let C = (V ,S,K, In,Out) be a IAU symbolic derivation, KI be the initial
intruder knowledge, and ≺ be a linear ordering on the variables and constants
of C. Assume that C is satisfiable, this implies, by definition, that there exists a
IAU -symbolic derivation CI = (VI ,SI ,KI , InI , OutI), a closed composition Ca of
CI and C, and a substitution σ such that (1) σ |=IAU Ca and (2) for all x variable
in C and c constant in C, x ≺ c implies c /∈ all.Cons(xσ). Hence, the intruder
I receives all messages sent by the protocol participants, and every message
they receive is send by the intruder. We have that xσ is defined for all x ∈ V ,
we let Px = all.Cons(xσ). Furthermore, we have that for all x ∈ In, (xσ)↓ ∈
K′Iσ
IAU with K′I = KI ∪ {x′ | x′ ∈ Out and x′ ≺ x}, and by Lemma 21, we have
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Figure 3.2 Ordered satisfiability for Intruder. deduction system
Input
- A IAU symbolic derivation C = (V,S,K, In,Out);
- a finite set of ground terms KI representing the initial knowledge;
- an ordering ≺ on V ar(C) ∪ all.Cons(C), ≺ is compatible with < defined on Ind,
i.e. i < j implies xi ≺ xj .
Step 1:
For each variable x ∈ V , guess the set of constants Px = {a1, . . . , ak} that may
occur in the solution, where ai ≺ x for i ∈ {1, . . . , k};
Step 2:
Check the satisfiability of S with these ordering constraints.
Step 3:
Check for each variable x ∈ In, that Px ⊆ all.Cons(KI) ∪
⋃
x′∈Out,x′<x Px′ .
Step 4:
If both checks are successful return Sat else Fail.
all.Cons(xσ) ⊆ all.Cons(K′I) = all.Cons(KI) ∪
⋃
x′∈Out , x′≺x all.Cons(x
′σ) =
all.Cons(KI) ∪
⋃
x′∈Out , x′≺x Px′ . Given σ, it is easy to see that the algorithm
of Figure 3.2 outputs sat, and hence, we conclude the proof. 
Lemma 23 (Correctness) The algorithm described in Figure 3.2 is correct.
PROOF.
Let C = (V ,S,K, In,Out) be a IAU symbolic derivation, KI be the initial
intruder knowledge, and ≺ be a linear ordering on the variable and constants
of C. Assume that the algorithm in Figure 3.2 outputs sat. By the description
of the algorithm and by Lemma 21, we deduce that there exists a IAU -symbolic
derivation CI = (VI ,SI ,KI , InI , OutI), a closed composition Ca of CI and C,
and a substitution σ such that (1) σ |=IAU Ca and (2) for all x variable in C and c
constant in C, x ≺ c implies c /∈ all.Cons(xσ). Hence, we conclude the proof. 
Lemma 24 (Termination) Let C = (V ,S,K, In,Out) be an IAU symbolic derivation,
KI be the initial intruder knowledge, and ≺ be a linear ordering on the variable and
constants of C. The algorithm described in Figure 3.2 terminates.
PROOF.
Since V is finite (by definition) and the unification moduloHAU is with con-
stant restrictions decidable [186], it is easy to conclude that the algorithm termi-
nates. 
By Lemmas 22, 23 and 24, we conclude the following theorem:
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Theorem 2 The ordered IAU satisfiability problem is decidable.
Related results. The decidability result obtained in this section is interesting
in its own right as it is the first decidability result that we are aware of for an
intruder system for which unification is infinitary, and that permits to consider
an associative concatenation of messages instead of their pairing.
A related decidability result has been obtained by Y. Chevalier et al. [72]
for an intruder on multi-set of terms, that is an intruder with an associative-
commutative-unit equational theory. In [58], S. Bursuc et al. obtain another
decidability result in presence of associative and commutative symbols under
some restrictions. This result is more recent than ours and does not cover the
case of [72].
3.5.2 Decidability of ordered If and Ig satisfiability problems
Theorem 3 The ordered If satisfiability problem is decidable.
PROOF.
We have If = 〈{f}, {x1, x2, x3, x4 → f(x1, x2, x3, x4)}, ∅〉. It is easy to see
that If is local (Definition 38). Since the equational theory in If is empty, by
[70], we deduce that given E, t with E a set of ground terms and t a ground
term, t ∈ EIf is decidable, and hence, we can see easily that the ordered If
satisfiability problem is decidable. 
Following the same reasoning as before, we can deduce the following theo-
rem.
Theorem 4 The ordered Ig satisfiability problem is decidable.
3.5.3 Decidability of ordered Ifree satisfiability problem
Theorem 5 The ordered Ifree satisfiability problem is decidable.
PROOF.
Ifree is the disjoint union of IAU , Ig and If intruder deduction systems. We
have that ordered-IAU (respectively Ig and If ) satisfiability problem, is decid-
able (respectively Theorem 2, Theorem 4, and Theorem 3). The result obtained
in [72] prove that the ordered satisfiability problem for the disjoint union of
decidable intruder deduction systems is also decidable. Thus ordered Ifree sat-
isfiability problem is decidable. 
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3.5.4 Decidability of ordered Ih-satisfiability problem
Following the results obtained in [74], and by Lemmas 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19,
and 20, we conjecture that we can reduce the ordered Ih satisfiability problem
to the ordered Ifree satisfiability problem. And hence, we conjecture that the
ordered Ih satisfiability problem is decidable.
3.6 Conclusions
We have analysed here the class of cryptographic protocols that use collision
vulnerable hash functions. In order to model such hash functions we have in-
troduced new symbols to denote the ability to create messages with the same
hash value. This introduction amounts to the skolemisation of the equational
property describing the existence of collisions. We believe that this construc-
tion can be extended to model the more complex and game-based properties
that appear when relating a symbolic and a concrete model of cryptographic
primitives. It is well-known that hash functions are widely used in the digital
signature schemes which is the topic of the next chapter.
Chapter 4
Analysis of protocols with
vulnerable digital signature schemes
The idea of digital signature schemes first appeared in W. Diffie and
M.E. Hellman’s seminal paper [101]. Digital signatures have many
applications in information security, including authentication, data
integrity, and non-repudiation. In [117], the authors showed the
different flaws of digital signature schemes. Furthermore, the au-
thors defined what is a secure digital signature scheme: a digital signa-
ture scheme is considered to be secure if it is existential unforgeable
against adaptative chosen message attacks. Unfortunately, while this
security notion is adequate to the single-user setting, it is not ade-
quate for the multi-user setting [152]. In this chapter, we are inter-
ested by the security of signature schemes in the multi-user setting, and
to this end, we consider two properties of digital signature schemes:
the constructive exclusive ownership vulnerability property and the de-
structive exclusive ownership vulnerability property. We show the de-
cidability of the insecurity problem for two classes of cryptographic
protocols where the signature schemes employed have respectively
these two properties. This result has been published in the proceed-
ings of FSTTCS 2007 conference [66].
Outline. In Section 4.1 we present the signature schemes, in Section
4.2 we define the constructive exclusive ownership vulnerability property
(also called duplicate-signature key selection property), and the destruc-
tive exclusive ownership vulnerability property is defined in Section 4.3.
In Section 4.4, we define the symbolic model of these two perperties
(Section 4.4.1 and Section 4.4.2), we prove the decidability of HDSKS
andHDEO unifiability problems (Section 4.4.3), and we prove the de-
cidability of IDSKS and IDEO reachability problems (Section 4.4.5).
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4.1 Signature schemes
4.1.1 Definition of signature schemes
The idea of digital signature first appeared in W. Diffie and M.E. Hellman’s seminal
paper [101]. A digital signature of a message is a number dependent on some
secret known only to the signer, and, additionally, on the content of the message
being signed. Signatures must be verifiable; if a dispute arises as to whether a
party signed a document (caused by either a lying signer trying to repudiate a
signature it did create, or a fraudulent claimant), an unbiased third party should
be able to resolve the matter equitably, without requiring access to the signers
secret information (secret key). To this end, each agent A possesses a pair of
keys: a public key, pkA and a secret key, skA. The agent A uses his secret key
skA to sign messages, and pkA is the key used by the other agents to verify A’s
signatures. The secret key of an agent is called signing key, and his public key is
called verifying key.
Formally, we define a key generation algorithm G to be an algorithm that takes
an agent’s name A and a random number as arguments and returns a pair of
public and secret keys, respectively denoted by Pk(A) and Sk(A), correspond-
ing to that agent. We define a digital signature generation algorithm (or signature
generation algorithm), denoted by sig, to be an algorithm that takes a secret key
(also called signing key), sk, and a message, m, as inputs, and generates a mes-
sage, sig(m, sk), representing the digital signature of m using the secret key sk.
We define a digital signature verification algorithm (or verification algorithm), de-
noted by ver, to be an algorithm testing whether a message s is a valid signature
of a message m using the public key pk (also called verifying key).
Definition 43 (digital signature scheme) A digital signature scheme (or simply a sig-
nature scheme) is defined by three algorithms: the signature generation algorithm “sig′′,
the verification algorithm “ver′′, the key generation algorithm “G′′.
Example 23 (Example of signature schemes) We give here a classical digital signature
scheme: the signature scheme proposed by W. Diffie and M. E. Hellman [101]. To
create a signature scheme, W. Diffie and M. E. Hellman proposed to use a “trap-door
function” f (informally, a “trap-door function” f is a function for which it is easy to
evaluate f(x) for any argument x but for which, given only f(x), it is computationally
infeasible to find any y with f(y) = f(x) without the secret “trap-door” information).
In their signature scheme, an agent A publishes the “trap-door function” f and anyone
can validate any A′s signature by checking that f(signature) = message. Only the
agent A possesses the “trap-door” information allowing him to invert f , and compute
a signature y such that f(y) = x where x is the message to sign.
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4.1.2 Classification of signature schemes
There exists two general classes of digital signature schemes, which can be
briefly summarised as follows:
• Digital signature schemes with appendix require the message that has been
signed (also called the original message) as input to the verification algo-
rithm.
• Digital signature schemes with message recovery do not require the original
message as input to the verification algorithm. In this case, the original
message is recovered from the signature itself.
In what follows, we make use of A to denote the set of agents, K to denote
the set of keys, R to denote a set of numbers,M to denote the message space,
that is, the set of messages to which the signature generation algorithm may
be applied, and S to denote the signature space, that is the set of messages to
which belong the signatures.
Digital signature schemes with appendix
Digital signature schemes with appendix denote the schemes which require the
original message as input to the verification algorithm. Examples of mecha-
nisms providing digital signature schemes with appendix are the DSA [3], El-
Gamal [116], and Schnorr [185] signature schemes. We describe below the three
algorithms: the signature generation, the verification, and the key generation algo-
rithms.
Key generation algorithm.
Each agentA creates a pair of keys, a secret key and a correspondant public
key. The agent A will use his secret key to sign messages, and his public
key will be used by other agents for verifying A′s signatures. The key
generation algorithm is defined as follows:
G : A×R → K ∗K
We remark that the second argument of the function G represents a ran-
domly generated number, the use of this random number allows any agent
A to have a different pair of keys for each session, and that using the same
key generation function. Furthermore, we remark that the two functions
Sk and Pk denote the two parts of the key generation algorithm G, and
we denote respectively by Sk(A) and Pk(A) the secret and public keys of
A ∈ A;
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Signature generation and verification algorithms.
An agent A produces a signature s for a message m, which can later be
verified by any agent B. The signature generation algorithm is defined as
follows:
sig : M×K → S
The verification algorithm is defined as follows:
ver : M×S ×K → {1}
such that for any m, s and pk we have: ver(m, s, pk) ={
1, if s = sig(m, sk), sk = Sk(A), and pk = Pk(A) for some agent A
We assume each time an agent generates a pair of secret and public
keys, (sk, pk), the secret key sk matches the public key pk, that is, for any
message m, we have ver(m, sig(m, sk), pk) = 1.
Digital signature schemes with message recovery
Digital signature schemes with message recovery denote the schemes for which
a priori knowledge of the message that has been signed is not required for the
verification algorithm. In this case, the original message can be recovered from
the signature itself. Examples of schemes providing digital signatures with mes-
sage recovery are RSA [174], Rabin [171], and Nyberg-Rueppel [18] public-key
signature schemes. We describe below the three algorithms: the signature gener-
ation, the verification, the public key generation, and the key generation algorithms.
Key generation algorithms.
Each agentA creates a pair of keys, a secret key and a correspondant public
key. The agent A will use his secret key to sign messages, and his public
key will be used by other agents for verifying A′s signatures. The key
generation algorithm is defined as follows:
G : A×R → K ∗K
We remark that the second argument of the function G represents a ran-
domly generated number, the use of this random number allows any agent
A to have a different pair of keys for each session, and that using the same
key generation function. Furthermore, we remark that the two functions
Sk and Pk denote the two parts of the key generation algorithm G, and
we denote respectively by Sk(A) and Pk(A) the secret and public keys of
A ∈ A;
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Signature generation and verification algorithms.
An agent A produces a signature s for a message m, which can later be
verified by any agent B. The signature generation algorithm is defined as
follows:
sig : M×K → S
The verification algorithm is defined as follows:
ver : S ×K →M
such that for any s and pk we have: ver(s, pk) ={
m, if s = sig(m, sk), sk = Sk(A), and pk = Pk(A) for some agent A
We assume each time an agent generates a pair of secret and public
keys, (sk, pk), the secret key sk matches the public key pk, that is, for any
message m, we have ver(sig(m, sk), pk) = m.
In the Handbook of Applied Cryptography, at Chapter 11 [153], it is shown
that any digital signature scheme with message recovery can be turned into a
digital signature scheme with appendix.
4.1.3 Attacks and breaks on signature schemes
Description of the attacks. There are two basic attacks against digital signature
schemes described as follows [117, 153]:
• key-only attacks: in these attacks, an intruder knows only the signers public
key.
• message attacks: here an intruder is able to examine signatures correspond-
ing either to known or chosen messages before his attempt to break the
scheme. We identify the following four kinds of message attacks, which
are characterised by how the messages whose signatures the intruder sees
are chosen.
– Known message attack: an intruder has signatures for a set of messages
which are known to the intruder but not chosen by him.
– Chosen message attack: an intruder obtains from an agent A valid sig-
natures for a chosen list of messages before attempting to break the
signature scheme. This attack is non-adaptive in the sense that mes-
sages are chosen before any signatures are seen. Furthermore, these
messages are independent of A′s public key.
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– Directed chosen message attack: this attack is similar to chosen message
attack, except that the list of messages for which the intruder obtains
A′s signatures may be created after seeing A′s public key but before
any signatures are seen.
– Adaptive chosen message attack: an intruder is allowed to use the signer
A as an oracle, that is, not only the intruder may request from the
agentA signatures of messages which depend onAs public key but he
may also request signatures of messages which depend additionally
on previously obtained signatures.
The above attacks are listed in order of increasing severity, with the adaptative
chosen message attack being the most severe natural attack an intruder can mount.
Description of the breaks. The different notions of break a signature scheme we
give below were initially introduced in [117, 153].
We say that an intruder forges a signature if he is able to produce a new signa-
ture which will be accepted as one of some other agent.
One might say that the intruder has broken a signature scheme if his attack
allows him to do one of the following with a non-negligible probability:
• Total break: an intruder is able to compute the secret key information of an
agent.
• Universal forgery: an intruder is able to find an efficient signing algorithm
functionally equivalent to an agent’s signing algorithm.
• Selective forgery: an intruder is able to forge a signature for a particular
message or class of messages chosen a priori. Creating the signature does
not directly involve the legitimate signer.
• Existential forgery: an intruder is able to forge a signature for at least one
message. The intruder has little or no control over the message whose
signature is obtained, and the legitimate signer may be involved in the
deception.
The kinds of “breaks” are listed above in order of decreasing severity, the least
the intruder might hope for is to succeed with an existential forgery. We say that
a signature scheme is respectively totally breakable, universally forgeable, selectively
forgeable, or existentially forgeable if it is breakable in one of the above senses.
From now on, we are interested only by signature schemes with appendix,
and for simplicity, we write “signature schemes” instead of “signature schemes
with appendix”.
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4.2 Duplicate-signature key selection (DSKS) property
4.2.1 Description of DSKS property
Digital signature schemes are primarily employed to authenticate documents,
i.e. if a public key is known to be associated with an agent A, then a valid signa-
ture of some data according to A′s public key proves that the agent A endorses
the content of the signed message, and approves the association between the
message that has been signed and his public key. This assumes that no other
agent has access to the secret key. But digital signature schemes can also be em-
ployed to authenticate the origin of a message, i.e. ensure that only one person
could have signed it, or more formally, given a signed message s and A′s public
key pk, if s is a valid signature of m according to pk then s has been produced
using A′s secret key.
The analysis of digital signature algorithms has however focused on the for-
mer authentication property. Formally speaking, the yardstick security notion
for assessing the robustness of a digital signature scheme is the existential un-
forgeability against adaptative chosen-message attacks [117, 93]. This notion
states that, given a pair of signing and verifying keys, it is infeasible for some-
one ignorant of the signing key to forge a signature for at least one message, and
this even when messages devised by the attacker are signed beforehand. The
security goal provided by this property is the impossibility (within given com-
puting bounds) to impersonate a legitimate user (i.e. one that does not reveal
its signature key) when signing a message.
We note that this robustness does not address the issue of the identifica-
tion of the origin of a message. However, this latter concept is also pertaining
to digital signatures when they are employed in a non-repudiation protocol.
While one would not differentiate the two properties (message authentication
and origin authentication) at first glance, they are different since the first au-
thentication property requires the existence of the participation of the signer in
the creation of the message, while the latter mandates the unicity of a possible
creator of a message.
The two notions of message authentication and origin authentication col-
lapse in the single-user setting when there exists only one pair of signing and
verifying keys (or only one legitimate agent who can sign data, authenticate
data). They may however be different in the multi-user setting.
There has been some works defining and proving security of some of the
cryptographic primitives in the multi-user setting. M. Bellare and P. Rogaway [37],
S. Black-Wilson et al. [43], R. Canetti and H. Krawczyk [59] and V. Shoup [189]
gave security definitions for symmetric key entity authentication schemes and
key transport schemes in the multi-user setting, M. Bellare et al. [36] presented
security definitions for public key encryption in the multi-user setting, and more
88 CHAPTER 4. PROTOCOLS WITH VULNERABLE SIGNATURE SCHEMES
recently, A. Menezes and N. Smart [152] gave security definitions for signature
schemes in the multi-user setting.
In this chapter, we are interested by the origin authentication goal of the
signature schemes with appendix in the multi-user setting, and we consider in
this section the property called duplicate-signature key selection property while the
destructive exclusive ownership property is considered in Section 4.3. Duplicate-
signature key selection property (also called key substitution property) can be infor-
mally described as follow:
Definition 44 (Duplicate-signature key selection property) Let S = (G, sig, ver) be
a digital signature scheme. S possesses the duplicate-signature key selection property
(or key substitution property) if, knowing A′s public key, where A is an agent, and A′s
signature sA on a message m, the intruder is able to construct with a non-negligible
probability a new pair of keys (SkI , PkI) such that SkI matches PkI , and sA is also
I ′s signature on the message m, that is ver(m, sA, PkI) = 1.
This property was first introduced by S. Blake-Wilson and A. Menezes [45]. In
[45], S. Blake-Wilson and A. Menezes showed the existence of a flaw on a variant
of the Station-to-Station protocol [102] and which is due to the fact that the used
signature scheme has the duplicate-signature key selection property. That flaw is
given by the possibility to confuse a participant into thinking he shares a key
with another person than the actual one. This duplicate-signature key selection
property was also discussed in [152], and in [170].
In [45], the authors showed that, in certain circumstances, RSA [174], DSA
[3], ECDSA [5] and ElGamal [116] signature schemes have duplicate-key substi-
tution property. And in [170], the authors showed that DSS [6] also has this
property, an in [27] the authors showed that Schnorr signature scheme has this
property.
4.2.2 DSKS property in practice
We present here the unknown-key share attack, given by J. Baek et al. [27], on
the Key Agreement protocol proposed by Hirose and Yoshida (also called KAP-HY
protocol) in [119]. This attack exploits the duplicate-signature key selection prop-
erty of signature schemes.
An unknown key share (UKS) attack on a key agreement protocol is an attack
whereby an agent A finishes believing she shares the key with B, and although
this is in fact the case, B mistakenly believes that he shares the key with an
agent E 6= A [27, 45, 44, 102].
Presentation of the KAP-HY protocol. The signature scheme used in this proto-
col is the Redundant signature scheme, which is a variant of Schnorr signature
scheme. In what follows and for simplicity, we denote by sigA(m) the signature
4.2. DUPLICATE-SIGNATURE KEY SELECTION (DSKS) PROPERTY 89
of a message m by an agent A. Abstracting the details of the Diffie-Hellman
key construction with messages uA and uB, and of the signature scheme, the
protocol reads as follows: 1 A⇒ B : uA, idA2 B ⇒ A : uB, sigB(uA), idB3 A⇒ B : sigA(uB)
In the description given above, idA (respectively idB) denotes the identification
of the agent A (respectively B) which contains A′s (respectively B′s) public key,
uA = g
−kA(modp), and uB = g−kB(modp), where kA (respectively kB) is a secret
value known only byA (respectively byB), p and g are public values. At the end
of the protocol, A computesKA = u−kAB mod p andB computesKB = u
−kB
A mod p.
KA and KB verify the property KA = KB. Actually, KA = u−kAB (mod p) =
g−kB−kA(mod p) = g(−kB)∗(−kA)(mod p) = g−kA−kB(mod p) = u−kBA (mod p) = KB.
And hence, KA becomes the session key between A and B.
Description of the UKS attack on the KAP-HY protocol. In [27], J. Baek et al.
showed that the redundant signature scheme employed in the KAP-HY pro-
tocol possesses the duplicate-signature key selection property, and elaborate on
this to show that the KAP-HY is vulnerable to a UKS attack. In this attack, we
have two honest agents: Alice playing the role A, Bob playing the role B, and
the intruder I. In this attack, the intruder I waits that Alice initiates a session
with him: The attack is described as follows:
1 Alice⇒ I : ua, ida
2 I ⇒ Bob : ua, ida
3 Bob⇒ I(Alice) : ub, sigb(ua), idb
4 I ⇒ Alice : ub, sigb(ua), idI
5 Alice⇒ I : siga(ub)
6 I(Alice)⇒ Bob : siga(ub)
In this attack, the intruder I records, but passes unchanged, the first mes-
sage, and initiates a session as Alice with Bob. It then intercepts the message
sent by Bob to Alice, and, exploiting the duplicate-signature key selection prop-
erty of the redundant signature scheme, builds from the public key of Bob and
from the message sigb(ua) a pair of signing and verifying keys, and registers
this key pair. I then sends the signature to Alice, but this time accompanied
by his identity (4). The main point is that when Alice checks the signature of
the incoming message, she accepts it on the ground that it seems to originate
from I. At the end of this execution, Alice believes that the key is shared with
I whereas it is actually shared with Bob.
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4.3 Destructive exclusive ownership property
4.3.1 Description of DEO property
In [170], T. Pornin and J. P. Stern studied the duplicate-signature key selection
property. They introduced the notion of conservative exclusive ownership defined
as follows: a signature scheme with appendix is said to provide conservative
exclusive ownership if it does not have duplicate-signature key selection prop-
erty.
T. Pornin and J.P. Stern [170] also introduced the notion of destructive exclu-
sive ownership defined as follows: a signature scheme with appendix is said to
provide destructive exclusive ownership if it is computationally infeasible for
the intruder, given an agent public key PkA, a message m and A′s signature s of
m, to produce a new pair of secret and public keys (SkI , PkI), a new message
m′ 6= m, such that SkI matches PkI , and ver(m′, s, PkI) = 1.
Example 24 In [170], the authors showed that, in certain circumstances, RSA [174]
and DSS [6] do not provide destructive exclusive ownership.
In what follows, we make use of “signature schemes vulnerable to construc-
tive exclusive ownership property”, and “signature schemes vulnerable to de-
structive exclusive ownership property”. We say that a signature scheme is vul-
nerable to conservative exclusive ownership property if it does not provide that prop-
erty, that is if it has duplicate-signature key selection property, and similarly, we
say that a signature scheme is vulnerable to destructive exclusive ownership property
if it does not provide that property.
4.4 Decidability results
In this section, we show that the insecurity problem for the class of crypto-
graphic protocols using signature schemes vulnerable to conservative exclusive
ownership property (respectively for the class of cryptographic protocols us-
ing signature schemes vulnerable to destructive exclusive ownership property)
is decidable. To get this decidability result, we follow the symbolic approach
described in Chapter 2, that is, we reduce the insecurity problem for our two
classes of cryptographic protocols to the satisfiability problem of respectively
two classes of constraint systems, and we give a procedure to decide the satisfi-
ability problem for these two classes of constraint systems.
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4.4.1 Symbolic model for constructive exclusive ownership vulnerability
property
In order to symbolically analyse the class of cryptographic protocols using
digital signature schemes vulnerable to the constructive exclusive owner-
ship property (also called digital signature schemes having duplicate signa-
ture key selection property), we consider the following signature FDSKS =
{Sk, Pk, sig, ver, Sk′, Pk′, 1}where
• Sk, denoting the secret key generation function which is a part of the key
generation algorithm G, is a function with arity 1,
• Pk, denoting the public key generation function which is a part of the key
generation algorithm G, is a function with arity 1,
• sig, denoting the signature generation algorithm, is a function with arity
2,
• ver, denoting the verification algorithm, is a function with arity 3,
• Sk′, denoting the “special” intruder secret key generation function, is a
function with arity 2,
• Pk′, denoting the “special” intruder public key generation function, is a
function with arity 2,
• 1, denoting a possible output of ver, is a function with arity 0,
The functions Sk, Pk (respectively sig and ver) given above abstract the two
parts of the key generation algorithm G (respectively the signature generation
algorithm, and the verification algorithm) in a signature scheme. The key gen-
eration algorithm employs randomly generated number to perform its compu-
tation. We assume that this number is kept secret and that it is destroyed at the
end of the computation. We abstract this situation by assuming the functions
modelling this algorithm are private. The special functions Sk′, Pk′ abstract
the ability of the intruder, knowing an agent’s public key (pk), and the agent’s
signature s on a message m, to construct a new pair of secret and public keys
(Pk′(pk, s), Sk′(pk, s)) such that the verification of s with respect to m and the
new public key succeeds. We assume that FDSKS = FDSKSpub ∪FDSKSpri where
FDSKSpub = {sig, ver, Sk′, Pk′, 1} and FDSKSpri = {Sk, Pk}.
The constructive exclusive ownership vulnerability property is represented
by the following equational theory, denoted byHDSKS :
HDSKS =
 ver(x, sig(x, Sk(y)), Pk(y)) = 1ver(x, sig(x, Sk′(y1, y2)), Pk′(y1, y2)) = 1
sig(x, Sk′(Pk(y), sig(x, Sk(y)))) = sig(x, Sk(y))
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The intruder system we consider to analyse our class of cryptographic protocols
is given as follows:
IDSKS = 〈FDSKS , TDSKS ,HDSKS〉
with: 
FDSKS = FDSKSpub ∪ FDSKSpri
FDSKSpub = {sig, ver, Sk′, Pk′, 1}
FDSKSpri = {Sk, Pk}
TDSKS = {sig(x, y), ver(x, y, z), Sk′(x, y), Pk′(x, y), 1}
The associated set of intruder deduction rules, denoted by LDSKS is given as
follows:
LDSKS =

x, y → sig(x, y)
x, y, z → ver(x, y, z)
x, y → Sk′(x, y)
x, y → Pk′(x, y)
∅ → 1
In what follows, we introduce the rewrite system,RDSKS , generating the equa-
tional theory HDSKS , and we prove that RDSKS is convergent. The rewrite sys-
temRDSKS is obtained by applying Knuth-Bendix completion procedure [131]
onHDSKS . This completion procedure is described in Chapter 2, at Section 2.1.6.
Lemma 25 HDSKS is generated by the convergent rewriting system:
RDSKS =

ver(x, sig(x, Sk(y)), Pk(y))→ 1
ver(x, sig(x, Sk′(y1, y2)), Pk′(y1, y2))→ 1
ver(x, sig(x, Sk(y)), Pk′(Pk(y), sig(x, Sk(y))))→ 1
sig(x, Sk′(Pk(y), sig(x, Sk(y))))→ sig(x, Sk(y))
PROOF.
The application of the Knuth-Bendix completion procedure [131] on HDSKS
terminates successfully and outputs the rewrite system RDSKS , which is a con-
vergent rewrite system generatingHDSKS (Chapter 2, Section 2.1.6). 
Lemma 26 AnyRDSKS-narrowing derivation starting from any term t terminates.
PROOF.
In Lemma 25, we proved that RDSKS is a convergent rewrite system. Fol-
lowing the definition of basic narrowing (Definition 13, Chapter 2), it is easy to
see that any right member of any RDSKS rule is not RDSKS-basic narrowable,
and hence, by Theorem 1 (Chapter 2) , we conclude that anyRDSKS-narrowing
derivation starting from any term terminates.
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Lemma 27 HDSKS has the finite variant property.
PROOF.
In Lemma 25, we proved that HDSKS is generated by a convergent rewrite
systemRDSKS , and in lemma 26, we proved that anyRDSKS-narrowing deriva-
tion starting from any term terminates. In [86], the authors showed that each
convergent rewrite systemR such that anyR-basic narrowing derivation start-
ing from any term terminates has the finite variant property. This allows us to
conclude thatRDSKS and henceHDSKS has the finite variant property. 
4.4.2 Symbolic model for destructive exclusive ownership vulnerability
property
In order to symbolically analyse the class of cryptographic protocols
using digital signature schemes vulnerable to the destructive exclu-
sive ownership property, we consider the following signature FDEO =
{Sk, Pk, sig, ver, Sk”, Pk”, f, 1}where
• Sk, denoting the secret key generation function which is a part of the key
generation algorithm G, is a function with arity 1,
• Pk, denoting the public key generation function which is a part of the key
generation algorithm G, is a function with arity 1,
• sig, denoting the signature generation algorithm, is a function with arity
2,
• ver, denoting the verification algorithm, is a function with arity 3,
• Sk”, denoting the “special” intruder secret key generation function, is a
function with arity 2,
• Pk”, denoting the “special” intruder public key generation function, is a
function with arity 2,
• f , denoting the “special” algorithm applied by the intruder to generate a
“special” message, is a function with arity 2,
• 1, denoting a possible output of ver, is a function with arity 0.
The functions Sk, Pk (respectively sig and ver) given above abstract the two
parts of the key generation algorithm G(respectively the signature generation
algorithm, and the verification algorithm) in a signature scheme. Following the
same reasons as in Section 4.4.1, Sk and Pk are private function symbols. The
special functions Sk”, Pk”, f abstract the ability of the intruder, knowing an
agent’s public key (pk), and the agent’s signature s on a message m, to construct
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a new pair of secret and public keys (Sk”(pk, s), Pk”(pk, s)), a new message m′
(m′ = f(pk, s)) such that the verification of swith respect to the new messagem′
and the new public key succeeds. We assume that FDEO = FDEOpub ∪ FDEOpri
where FDEOpub = {sig, ver, Sk”, Pk”, f, 1} and FDEOpri = {Sk, Pk}.
In addition to the signature FDEO, and as described in Chapter 2, we make
use of an infinite set of variables X and an infinite set of constants C.
The destructive exclusive ownership vulnerability property is represented
by the following equational theory, denoted byHDEO:
HDEO =
 ver(x, sig(x, Sk(y)), Pk(y)) = 1ver(x, sig(x, Sk”(y1, y2)), Pk”(y1, y2)) = 1
sig(f(Pk(y), sig(x, Sk(y))), Sk”(Pk(y), sig(x, Sk(y))) = sig(x, Sk(y))
The intruder system we consider to analyse our class of cryptographic protocols
is given as follows:
IDEO = 〈FDEO, TDEO,HDEO〉
with:
FDEO = FDEOpub ∪ FDEOpri
FDEOpub = {sig, ver, Sk”, Pk”, f, 1}
FDEOpri = {Sk, Pk}
TDEO = {sig(x, y), ver(x, y, z), Sk”(x, y), Pk”(x, y), f(x, y), 1}
The associated set of intruder deduction rules, denoted by LDEO is given as
follows:
LDEO =

x, y → sig(x, y)
x, y, z → ver(x, y, z)
x, y → Sk”(x, y)
x, y → Pk”(x, y)
x, y → f(x, y)
∅ → 1
In what follows, we introduce the rewrite system, RDEO, generating the equa-
tional theoryHDEO, and we prove thatRDEO is convergent. The rewrite system
RDEO is obtained by applying Knuth-Bendix completion procedure [131] on
HDEO. This completion procedure is described in Chapter 2, at Section 2.1.6.
Lemma 28 HDEO is generated by the convergent rewriting system:
RDEO =

ver(x, sig(x, Sk(y)), Pk(y))→ 1
ver(x, sig(x, Sk”(y1, y2)), Pk”(y1, y2))→ 1
ver(f(Pk(y), sig(x, Sk(y))), sig(x, Sk(y)), Pk”(Pk(y), sig(x, Sk(y))))→ 1
sig(f(Pk(y), sig(x, Sk(y))), Sk”(Pk(y), sig(x, Sk(y))))→ sig(x, Sk(y))
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PROOF.
The application of the Knuth-Bendix completion procedure [131] on HDEO
terminates successfully and outputs the rewrite system RDEO, which is a con-
vergent rewrite system generatingHDEO (Chapter 2, Section 2.1.6). 
Lemma 29 AnyRDEO-narrowing derivation starting from any term t terminates.
PROOF.
In Lemma 28, we proved that RDEO is a convergent rewrite system. Fol-
lowing the definition of basic narrowing (Definition 13, Chapter 2), it is easy
to see that any right member of any RDEO rule is not RDEO-basic narrowable,
and hence, by Theorem 1 (Chapter 2) , we conclude that anyRDSKS-narrowing
derivation starting from any term terminates.
Lemma 30 HDEO has the finite variant property.
PROOF.
In Lemma 28, we proved that HDEO is generated by a convergent rewrite
system RDEO, and in lemma 29, we proved that any RDEO-narrowing deriva-
tion starting from any term terminates. In [86], the authors showed that each
convergent rewrite systemR such that anyR-basic narrowing derivation start-
ing from any term terminates has the finite variant property. This allows us to
conclude thatRDEO and henceHDEO has the finite variant property. 
4.4.3 Decidability ofHDSKS- andHDEO-unifiability problems
In this section, we prove the decidability ofHDSKS- andHDEO-unifiability prob-
lems. Given an arbitrary equational theory H, we recall the definition of H-
unifiability problem (Chapter 2, Definition 3).
TheH-unifiability problem is defined as follows:
Input: AH-unification system U .
Output: SAT if and only if there exists a substitution σ such that σ |=H U .
In Chapter 2 (Section 2.1.8), we present a complete, sound and finite H-
unification algorithm where H is an equational theory having the finite variant
property.
Since RDSKS and RDEO have the finite variant property (Lemma 27 and
Lemma 30 respectively), we conclude the following theorem.
Theorem 6 TheHDSKS- andHDEO-unifiability problems are decidable.
We prove below thatHDSKS- (respectivelyHDEO-) unifiability problem is in fact
in NPtime.
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Complexity ofHDSKS- andHDEO-unification
Theorem 7 The HDSKS-unifiability problem (respectively. HDEO-unifiability prob-
lem) can be decided in NPtime.
PROOF.
Let us prove the theorem for HDSKS-unifiability problem. We have HDSKS
is an equational theory generated by a convergent rewrite system RDSKS such
that the right hand side of every rule inRDSKS is notRDSKS-narrowable.
We proved in Theorem 6 the decidability ofHDSKS-unifiability problem, and
the unification algorithm that solves that problem is the algorithm proposed in
Chapter 2, at Section 2.1.8. Let us prove that this algorithm runs in NPtime. Let
s and t be two terms, and let M = g(s, t), (g is a new function symbol represent-
ing the cartesian product), andm = ‖M‖dag = ‖s‖dag+‖t‖dag+1 be the length of
M . Following the unification algorithm we use to solve this problem, if there is
a HDSKS-unifier of s and t, then there is a variant substitution θ of M such that
(sθ)↓ and (tθ)↓ are syntactically unifiable. Given any variant θ′ of M , lemma 5
(Chapter 2) proved that we can guess in NPtime another variant substitution
θ of M such that θ is more general modulo H than θ′. Assuming that we al-
ways guess the right variant substitution θ′ for which there is another variant
substitution θ, computable in NPtime, that makes (sθ)↓ and (tθ)↓ syntactically
unifiable, and since the unification algorithm modulo ∅-theory runs in Ptime,
we conclude thatHDSKS-unifiability can be decided in NPtime.
By the same reasoning, we prove that HDEO-unifiability can be decided in
NPtime. 
Remark. Given a HDSKS (respectively HDEO)-unification system U such that U
is HDSKS (respectively HDEO)-unifiable. There is a non deterministic algorithm
that compute a HDSKS (respectively HDEO)-unifier of U .
4.4.4 Saturation of IDSKS and IDEO deduction rules
Construction of the saturation Let I = 〈F , TI ,H〉 be an intruder deduction sys-
tem (Definition 16) and H be the considered equational theory. Assume that H
is generated by a convergent rewrite system R and has the finite variant prop-
erty. Let LI be the intruder deduction rules associated with I. We recall that
rules in LI are of the form x1, . . . , xn → f(x1, . . . , xn) and f is a public function
symbol in F .
In what follows, we make use of the notation l˜ to mean a set of terms l1, . . . , ln
for n ≥ 1.
The saturation of the set of deduction rules LI modulo the equational theory
H is given in Figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.1 System of saturation rules
Input:
The intruder deduction rules LI .
Initialisation:
Let I ′ = 〈F ,LI′ , ∅〉 be the variant of the intruder deduction system I (Definition
19, Chapter 2). We recall that
LI′ =
⋃
x1, . . . , xn → f(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ LI
θ variant substitution of f(x1, . . . , xn)
x1θ, . . . , xnθ → (f(x1, . . . , xn)θ)↓
Step 1. Start with LI” = LI′ . Apply on LI” the rules below until any added rule is
subsumed by a rule already present in LI”.
Subsumption :
l˜1 → r ∈ LI” l˜2 → r ∈ LI”
LI”← LI” \
{
l˜2 → r
} l˜1 ⊆ l˜2
Closure :
l˜1 → r1 ∈ LI”, t, l˜2 → r2 ∈ LI”
LI”← LI” ∪
{
(l˜1, l˜2 → r2)σ
} t /∈ X
σ = mgu∅(r1, t)
Output:
Output LI”.
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We define two new deduction systems I ′ = 〈F ,LI′ , ∅〉 and I” = 〈F ,LI”, ∅〉.
We remark that I satisfies the definition of intruder deduction system as given
in Definition 16 (Chapter 2) and in [73], and the intruder deduction systems
I ′, I” satisfy the definition of intruder deduction system as given in [72].
Saturation of IDSKS and IDEO The application of the saturation given in Figure
4.1 on LDSKS terminates, and yields the following two sets of rules, each corre-
sponding to a step of the saturation algorithm (respectively the Initialisation and
the first step):
L′DSKS = LDSKS ∪

x, Sk′(Pk(y), sig(x, Sk(y)))→ sig(x, Sk(y))
x, sig(x, Sk(y)), Pk(y)→ 1
x, sig(x, Sk′(y1, y2)), Pk′(y1, y2)→ 1
x, sig(x, Sk(y)), Pk′(Pk(y), sig(x, Sk(y)))→ 1
L”DSKS = LDSKS ∪
{
x, Sk(y)→ sig(x, Sk(y))
x, Sk′(Pk(y), sig(x, Sk(y)))→ sig(x, Sk(y))
and, the application of the saturation given in Figure 4.1 on LDEO terminates,
and yields the following two sets of rules, each corresponding to a step of the
saturation algorithm (respectively the Initialisation and the first step):
L′DEO = LDEO∪

x, sig(x, Sk(y)), Pk(y)→ 1
x, sig(x, Sk”(y1, y2)), Pk”(y1, y2)→ 1
f(Pk(y), sig(x, Sk(y))), sig(x, Sk(y)), Pk”(Pk(y), sig(x, Sk(y)))→ 1
f(Pk(y), sig(x, Sk(y))), Sk”(Pk(y), sig(x, Sk(y)))→ sig(x, Sk(y))
L”DEO = LDEO∪{f(Pk(y), sig(x, Sk(y))), Sk”(Pk(y), sig(x, Sk(y)))→ sig(x, Sk(y))}
From the intruder systems IDSKS and IDEO, we define four new intruder
systems:
I ′DSKS = 〈FDSKS ,L′DSKS , ∅〉,
I”DSKS = 〈FDSKS ,L”DSKS , ∅〉,
I ′DEO = 〈FDEO,L′DEO, ∅〉 and,
I”DEO = 〈FDEO,L”DEO, ∅〉.
We remark that IDSKS and IDEO satisfy the definition of intruder deduc-
tion system as given in Definition 16 (Chapter 2) and in [73], and the intruder
deduction systems I ′DSKS, I ′DEO, I”DSKS, I”DEO satisfy the definition of
intruder deduction system as given in [72].
In the rest of this chapter, we assume that H, R, L, L′, L”, I, I ′, and I”
to be either respectively HDSKS , RDSKS , LDSKS , L′DSKS , L”DSKS , IDSKS , I ′DSKS ,
I”DSKS or respectivelyHDEO,RDEO, LDEO, L′DEO, L”DEO, IDEO, I ′DEO, I”DEO.
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Properties of the saturation Let us first prove that the intruder deduction sys-
tem obtained after the saturation gives exactly the same deductive power to the
initial intruder deduction system.
Given a set of terms E and a term t, from now on, we make use of the nota-
tion E →∗I t to means that there exists a I-derivation starting from E of goal t,
that is t ∈ EI .
Lemma 31 For any set of normal ground terms E and any normal ground term t we
have: t ∈ EIt if and only if t ∈ EI”.
PROOF.
Lemma 8 (Chapter 2) showed that for any two sets of ground terms in nor-
mal form E and F , we have E →I F if and only if E →I′ F . This implies that
t ∈ EI if and only if t ∈ EI′ for any set of ground terms E in normal form and
any ground term t in normal form. Now, we prove that t ∈ EI′ if and only if
t ∈ EI”. First, let us assume that t ∈ EI′ , that is, there exists a I ′-derivation D
starting from E of goal t, and let us prove that there exists a I”-derivation start-
ing from E of goal t. If there exists a step in the derivation D which uses a rule
l˜ → r ∈ LI′ but not in LI”, then, by construction of LI”, there exists another
rule l˜1 → r in LI” such that l˜1 ⊆ l˜ and thus that can be applied instead of l˜ → r.
We conclude that t ∈ EI”.
For the reciprocal, let us assume that there exists a I”-derivation starting
from E of goal t, and let us prove that there exists a I ′-derivation starting from
E of goal t. We begin by defining an arbitrary order on the rules of LI′ , and we
extend this order to the rules of LI” \ LI′ as follows: the rules of LI′ are smaller
than the rules of LI” \ LI′ and the rules of LI” \ LI′ are ordered according to
the order of their construction during the saturation. Let M(D) be the multiset
of deduction rules applied in D. Let Ω(E, t) = {D | D : E(→∗I′ ∪ →I”)∗t}. Since
t ∈ EI”, Ω(E, t) 6= ∅. Let D be a derivation in Ω(E, t) having the minimal
M(D), and let us prove that D does not use rules in LI” \ LI′ . By contradiction,
suppose that D uses a rule l˜ → r ∈ LI” \ LI′ . Since l˜ → r /∈ LI′ , it has been
constructed according to the closure rule given in Figure ??. This implies that
there exists two rules l˜1 → r1 and s, l˜2 → r2 in LI” such that µ = mgu(r1, s),
s /∈ X , l˜ = (l˜1, l˜2)µ and r = r2µ. suppose that l˜→ r is applied on the set of terms
F , F →el→r F, g. Since l˜σ ⊆ F and rσ = g for a substitution σ, we have l˜1µσ ⊆ F
and (s, l˜2)µσ ⊆ F ∪ r1µσ, this implies that F →el1→r1 F, r1µσ →el2,s→r2 F, r1µσ, g.
Let D′ be the derivation where l˜1 → r1 and s, l˜2 → r2 replace l˜ → r. D′ is in
Ω(E, t). Since l˜1 → r1 and s, l˜2 → r2 have an order smaller than the order of
l˜→ r, we have M(D′) < M(D) which contradicts the minimality of M(D).
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We conclude that D does not use rules in LI”\LI′ . This yields the reciprocal
of the lemma. 
The next lemma proves that, for any set of terms E in normal form and any
term t in normal form, if t ∈ EI” then there is a I”-derivation starting from E of
goal t such that for any rule l˜→ r applied in the derivation with the substitution
σ, the instances, with respect to σ, of the non variable terms in l˜ belong toE, and
hence are not the result of another deduction rules.
We make use of Cons(D) to denote the set of terms constructed during the
derivation D, more formally, let E and t be respectively a set of terms and a
term in normal form and let D be a derivation starting from E of goal t, D : E =
E0 → E0, t1 → . . .→ En−2, tn−1 → En−1, t, Cons(D) = E0 ∪ {t1, . . . , tn−1}.
Lemma 32 LetE (respectively t) be a set of terms (respectively a term) in normal form.
If t ∈ EI”, then for every I”-derivation D starting from E of goal t, we have either D
satisfies the following property
prop : for all I” rules l˜→ r applied with substitution σ, for all s ∈ l˜ \ X , we have
sσ ∈ E
or there exists another I”-derivationD′ starting from E of goal t such that Cons(D) =
Cons(D′) and D′ satisfies the property prop.
PROOF.
We have t ∈ EI” implies that the set Ω(E, t) of I”-derivations starting from
E of goal t is not empty. Let D ∈ Ω(E, t), D : E = E0 → E1 → . . . → En−1, t,
and suppose that D does not satisfy the property prop. we denote l˜i → ri the
rule applied at step i with the substitution σ. Let us (pre-)order derivations
in Ω(E, t) with a measure M such that M(D′) for a derivation D′ is a multiset
of integers constructed as follows: starting with M(D′) = ∅, for all steps k,
1 ≤ k ≤ n, for every term u ∈ lkσ obtained by former rule, add k to M(D′).
Since this pre-order is well-founded, there exists a derivation d ∈ Ω(E, t) such
that M(d) is minimum, and Cons(d) = Cons(D). Let us prove that d satisfies
the property prop. By contradiction, assume that d does not satisfy prop and let
j be the first step in d such that l˜j → rj is the rule applied with substitution σ
and there is a term u ∈ l˜j \ X obtained by a former rule, let l˜h → rh be this rule.
Since u /∈ X , Closure can be applied on l˜h → rh and l˜j → rj and the resulting
rule can be applied at step j instead of l˜j → rj yielding also Ej . Let d′ be the
derivation obtained after this replacement, d′ ∈ Ω(E, t) andCons(d′) = Cons(d).
Since h < j and by definition of M , we have M(d′) < M(d) which contradicts
the minimality of M(d). We deduce that d satisfies prop and then we have the
lemma. 
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4.4.5 Decidability of IDSKS and IDEO reachability problems
In what follows, we prove the decidability of IDSKS and IDEO reachability prob-
lems.
Theorem 8 The IDSKS-reachability (respectively IDEO-reachability) problem is decid-
able.
The rest of this section is devoted to the presentation of an algorithm for
solving IDSKS-reachability (respectively IDEO-reachability) problems and to a
proof scheme of its completeness, correctness and termination. This decision
procedure comprises three different steps.
We recall that we make use of H, R, L, L′, L”, I, I ′, and I” to denote ei-
ther HDSKS , RDSKS , LDSKS , L′DSKS , L”DSKS , IDSKS , I ′DSKS , I”DSKS respectively
orHDEO,RDEO, LDEO, L′DEO, L”DEO, IDEO, I ′DEO, I”DEO respectively.
Let C be an I-constraint system, C = (E1 ` v1, . . . , En ` vn,U).
First step: Guess of a variant constraint system Guess a variant C ′ = (E ′1 B
t′1, . . . , E
′
n B t′n) I-constraint system associated to C. C ′ is constructed from
C as given in Definition 28 (Chapter 2).
Lemma 33 Let C be a I-constraint system. If σ is a substitution in normal form
such that σ |=I C, then there exists a choice of C ′ obtained at the end of Step 1 and
a substitution σ′ in normal form such that σ′ |=I” C ′.
PROOF.
Let C = (E1 ` v1, . . . , En ` vn,U) be a I-constraint system, and let σ
be a substitution in normal form such that σ |=I C. This implies that
there exists a substitution θ in normal form and a substitution τ in nor-
mal form such that τ |=I ((E1θ)↓ B (v1θ)↓, . . . , (Enθ)↓ B (vnθ)↓) , and
((E1θ)↓ B (v1θ)↓, . . . , (Enθ)↓ B (vnθ)↓) is a variant I-constraint system as-
sociated to C (Lemma 12 at Chapter 2). By Lemma 31, we deduce that
τ |=I ”((E1θ)↓B (v1θ)↓, . . . , (Enθ)↓B (vnθ)↓), which concludes the proof. 
Lemma 34 Let C (respectively C ′) be a I- (respectively I”-) constraint system.
Assume that C ′ is obtained from C at the end of Step 1. If C ′ is I”-satisfiable then
C is I-satisfiable.
PROOF.
Let C (respectively C ′) be a I- (respectively I”-) constraint system and
assume that C ′ is obtained from C at then end of Step 1. This implies that
C = (E1 ` v1, . . . , En ` vn,U) and C = ((E1θ)↓B (v1θ)↓, . . . , (Enθ)↓B (vnθ)↓)
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while θ is a substitution in normal form (the construction of θ is shown in
Definition 28). Since C ′ is I”-satisfiable there exists a normal substitution
σ′ such that (viθ)↓σ′ ∈ (Eiθ)↓σ′I” and thus (viθσ′)↓ ∈ (Eiθσ′)↓I”, which
implies that (viθσ′)↓ ∈ (Eiθσ′)↓I (Lemma 31). Let σ = (θσ′)↓, we have that
(viσ)↓ ∈ (Eiσ)↓I , and by construction of θ, we have that θ |=H U , and hence
σ |=H U which concludes the proof. 
Figure 4.2 System of transformation rules.
Apply :
Cα, E B t, Cβ
(Cα, (E B y)y∈lx , Cβ)σ
lx, l1, . . . , ln → r ∈ LI” and lx ⊆ X , t /∈ X
e1, . . . , en ∈ E and σ = mgu(
{
(ei
?=∅ li)i, r
?=∅ t
}
)
Unif :
Cα, E B t, Cβ
(Cα, Cβ)σ
u, t /∈ X
u ∈ E, σ = mgu(u ?=∅ t)
Second step: Transformation in solved form. We give now the rules that sim-
plify a modified constraint system. These rules are given in Figure 4.2. Our
goal is to transform C ′, the modified constraint system obtained from C at
the end of Step 1, into a modified constraint system in solved form.
The next Lemma shows that the application of a rule from Figure 4.2 on a
modified constraint system outputs a modified constraint system.
Lemma 35 Let C ′ be a modified constraint system. The application of Apply and Unif
rules on C ′ outputs a modified constraint system.
PROOF.
Let C ′ = (E1 B t1, . . . , En B tn) be a modified constraint system. Definition
22 (Chapter 2) implies that Ei ⊆ Ei+1 and V ar(Ei) ⊆ V ar({t1, . . . , ti−1}) for i ∈
{1, . . . , n}. Assume C ′ = (E1Bx1, . . . , Ei−1Bxi−1, EiB ti, Ei+1B ti+1, . . . , EnB tn)
with ti /∈ X , and let us prove that the application of Apply and Unif rules on C ′
outputs a modified constraint system.
Unif rule. The application of Unif on C ′ outputs C” = (E1σ B x1σ, . . . , Ei−1σ B
xi−1σ,Ei+1σ B ti+1σ, . . . , Enσ B tnσ) with σ = mgu(u ?=∅ ti), u ∈
Ei \ X . Ej ⊆ Ej+1 implies Ejσ ⊆ Ej+1σ. We prove next that
V ar(Ejσ) ⊆ V ar(x1σ, . . . , xi−1σ, ti+1σ, . . . , tj−1σ). Actually, we have
V ar(Ej) ⊆ V ar(x1, . . . , xi−1, ti, . . . , tj−1). This implies that V ar(Ejσ) ⊆
V ar(x1σ, . . . , xi−1σ, tiσ, ti+1σ, . . . , tj−1σ). We have that tiσ = uσ and u ∈ Ei,
thus V ar(tiσ) = V ar(uσ) ⊆ V ar(Eiσ) ⊆ V ar({x1σ, . . . , xi−1σ}). This im-
plies that V ar(Ejσ) ⊆ V ar(x1σ, . . . , xi−1σ, ti+1σ, . . . , tj−1σ), and hence, the
application of Unif rule on C ′ outputs a modified constraint system.
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Apply rule. The application of Apply on C ′ outputs C” = (E1σBx1σ, . . . , Ei−1σB
xi−1σ, (Eiσ B yσ)y∈lx , Ei+1σ B ti+1σ, . . . , Enσ B tnσ) with σ = mgu(r
?
=∅
ti, (uk
?
=∅ lk)1≤k≤m), uk ∈ Ei \ X , and lx, l1, . . . , lm → r ∈ LI”. Ej ⊆ Ej+1 im-
plies Ejσ ⊆ Ej+1σ. Let j ≤ i, we have that V ar(Ej) ⊆ V ar({x1, . . . , xj−1})
and hence, V ar(Ejσ) ⊆ V ar({x1σ, . . . , xj−1σ}). Let j > i, and let us
prove that V ar(Ejσ) ⊆ V ar({x1σ, . . . , xi−1σ}∪{yσ}y∈lx∪{ti+1σ, . . . , tj−1σ}).
We have that V ar(Ejσ) ⊆ V ar({x1σ, . . . , xi−1σ, tiσ, ti+1σ, . . . , tj−1σ}), and
V ar(tiσ) = V ar(rσ) ⊆ V ar(lxσ) ∪ V ar({l1σ, . . . , lmσ}) ⊆ V ar(lxσ) ∪
V ar(Eiσ) ⊆ V ar(lxσ) ∪ V ar({x1σ, . . . , xi−1σ}). We conclude that
V ar(Ejσ) ⊆ V ar({x1σ, . . . , xi−1σ} ∪ {yσ}y∈lx ∪ {ti+1σ, . . . , tj−1σ}), and
hence, the application of Apply rule on C ′ outputs a modified constraint
system.

We prove below (Lemma 36 and Lemma 37) that the simplification of the
modified constraint system C ′ using rules from Figure 4.2 terminates in the case
of I”DSKS and I”DEO.
Lemma 36 Let C = (E1 B t1, . . . , En B tn) be a modified I-constraint system. The
application of transformation rules of the algorithm on C using L”DSKS rules termi-
nates.
PROOF.
Let nbv(C) be the number of variables in C, and M(C) denotes the multi-
set of the right-hand side of deduction constraints in C. Let us prove that af-
ter any application of a transformation rule on a modified I-constraint system
C = (Cα, E B t) (where Cα is in solved form), either nbv(C) decreases strictly, or
the identity substitution is applied on C during the transformation and M(C)
strictly decreases.
The first point will ensure that after some point in a sequence of transforma-
tions the number of variables will be stable, and thus from this point onM(C)
will strictly decrease. The fact that no more unification will be applied and that
the extension of the subterm ordering on multisets is well-founded will then
imply that there is only a finite sequence of different modified I-constraint sys-
tems, and thereby the termination of the constraint solving algorithm.
This fact is obvious if the Unif rule is applied, since it amounts to the uni-
fication of two subterms of C. It is then well-known that if the two subterms
are not syntactically equal, the number of variables in their most general unifier
is strictly less than the union of their variables, which is included in V ar(C).
If they are syntactically equal, then no substitution is applied, and thus denot-
ing C ′ the result of the transformation, we haveM(C) = M(C ′) ∪ {t}, and thus
M(C ′) <M(C).
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Let us now consider the case of the Apply rule, and let C ′ be the obtained
modified I-constraint system. If the underlying intruder deduction rule is in
LDSKS , the fact that t is not a variable implies that the variables of the right-hand
side of the rule will be instantiated by the strict maximal subterms t1, . . . , tk of
t. We will thus have:
M(C ′) =M(C) ∪ {t1, . . . , tn} \ {t}
and thusM(C ′) <M(C).
It now suffices to prove the Lemma for the two rules in L”DSKS \ LDSKS :
rule x, Sk(y)→ sig(x, Sk(y)): The substitution σ applied is the most general
unifier of the unification system
{
sig(x, Sk(y))
?
=∅ t, Sk(y)
?
=∅ u
}
for some
u ∈ E. Since this is syntactic unification and since we can assume neither u
(by Lemma 9) nor t (by definition of the Apply rule) are variables, we must
have u = Sk(u′) and t = sig(t1, t2). The second equation thus yields y = u′,
with u′ ∈ Sub(C). Replacing in the first equation, σ is the most general
unifier of the equation sig(x, Sk(u′)) ?=∅ sig(t1, t2), which reduces into the
set of equations
{
x
?
=∅ t1, Sk(u′)
?
=∅ t2
}
. The first equation implies that x
is instantiated by a strict subterm t1 of t. If the second equation is trivial
we haveM(C ′) =M(C) ∪ {t1} \ {t}, and thusM(C ′) <M(C). Otherwise,
since V ar(Sk(u′)) ∪ V ar(t2) ⊆ V ar(C) we have nbv(C ′) < nbv(C).
rule x, Sk′(Pk(y), sig(x, Sk(y)))→ sig(x, Sk(y)): The substitution σ ap-
plied is the most general unifier of the unification system{
sig(x, Sk(y))
?
=∅ t, Sk′(Pk(y), sig(x, Sk(y)))
?
=∅ u
}
for some u ∈ E.
Since this is syntactic unification and since we can assume neither u (by
Lemma 9) nor t (by definition of the Apply rule) are variables, we must
have u = Sk′(u′1, u′2) and t = sig(t1, t2). If σ is the identity on C, we are
done, since in this case we have M(C ′) = M(C) ∪ {t1} \ {t} and thus
M(C ′) < M(C). Otherwise let us examine how the unification system is
solved. It is first transformed into:{
x
?
=∅ t1, Sk(y)
?
=∅ t2, Pk(y)
?
=∅ u′1, sig(x, Sk(y))
?
=∅ u′2
}
Resolving the first equation yields (note that x /∈ V ar(C)):{
Sk(y)
?
=∅ t2, Pk(y)
?
=∅ u′1, sig(t1, Sk(y))
?
=∅ u′2
}
Let us consider two cases, depending on whether both u′1 and t2 are vari-
ables:
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• If they are both variables, then solving the first equation removes t2
from V ar(C) but adds a variable y. The second equation will also
remove u′1, but since the variable y is already present, it will not add
another variable. Since Pk(y) and Sk(y) are not unifiable, we note that
we must have t2 6= u′1, and thus we have removed two variables and
added one by solving the two first equations. The remaining equation
contains only variables of the “intermediate” modified I-constraint
system, and thus will not add any new variable. In conclusion, in this
case, the number of variables of C decreases by at least 1.
• If t2 is not a variable, and thus t2 = Sk(t′2), with t′2 ∈ sub(C). Resolving
the first equation and injecting the solution in the remaining equations
yields the unification system:{
Pk(t′2)
?
=∅ u′1, sig(t1, Sk(t
′
2))
?
=∅ u′2
}
Note that up to this point the substitution σ that we built does not
affect any variable of C. If this remaining unification system is trivial,
then the substitution applied on C is the identity, we are done (see
above). Otherwise, since all the variables in this system are in V ar(C),
it strictly reduces nbv(C). This terminates the proof of this case.
Thus, if this rule is applied, either no substitution is applied on C andM(C)
strictly decreases, or the number of variables in the resulting modified I-
constraint system C ′ is strictly smaller than the number of variables in C.

Lemma 37 Let C = (E1B t1, . . . , EnB tn) be a modified I-constraint system. The ap-
plication of transformation rules of the algorithm on C using L”DEO rules terminates.
PROOF.
Let C = (E1Bt1, . . . , EnBtn) be a modified I-constraint system not in solved
form and let the complexity of C be a couple ordered lexicographically with the
following components:
• nbv(C), the number of distinct variables in C,
• M(C) the multiset of the right-hand side of deduction constraints in C.
We have to show that each rule reduces the complexity. The fact is obvious if the
Unif rule is applied, since it amounts to the unification of two subterms of C.
If is then well-known that if two subterms are not syntactically equal, then the
number of variables in their most general unifier is strictly less than the union of
their variables, which is included in V ar(C). If their are syntactically equal, then
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no substitution is applied, and thus denoting C ′ the result of transformation, we
haveM(C ′) <M(C).
Let us now consider the case of Apply rule, and let C ′ be the obtained modi-
fied I-constraint system. If the underlying intruder deduction rule is in LDEO,
the fact that t is not a variable implies that the right-hand side of the rule will
be instantiated by the strict maximal subterms t1, . . . , tk of t. we will thus have
M(C ′) =M(C) ∪ {t1, . . . , tk} \ {t} and thusM(C ′) <M(C).
It is now suffices to prove the Lemma for the rule in L”DEO \ LDEO:
the applied rule is: f(Pk(y), sig(x, Sk(y))), Sk”(Pk(y), sig(x, Sk(y))) →
sig(x, Sk(y)).
The substitution σ is the most general unifier of the unification system{
t
?
=∅ sig(x, Sk(y)), e1
?
=∅ f(Pk(y), sig(x, Sk(y))), e2
?
=∅ Sk”(Pk(y), sig(x, Sk(y)))
}
for some e1, e2 ∈ E. since it is syntactic unification and since we can assume
neither e1, neither e2 (by Lemma 9) nor t (by definition of the Apply rule) are
variables, we must have t = sig(t1, t2), e1 = f(v1, v2), and e2 = Sk”(v3, v4).
• If t2 ∈ X , we have σ(x) = t1, σ(t2) = Sk(y) and the unification system is
then transformed into:{
v1
?
=∅ Pk(y), v2
?
=∅ sig(t1, Sk(y)), v3
?
=∅ Pk(y), v4
?
=∅ sig(t1, Sk(y))
}
.
By the fact that t3 is replaced by y, x, y /∈ V ar(C), and the number of vari-
ables in σ is strictly less than the union of variables of the unification sys-
tem, we deduce that nbv(C ′) < nbv(C).
• If t2 /∈ X then t2 = Sk(t3). We have σ(x) = t1, σy = t3 and the unification
system is then transformed into:{
v1
?
=∅ Pk(t3), v2
?
=∅ sig(t1, Sk(t3)), v3
?
=∅ Pk(t3), v4
?
=∅ sig(t1, Sk(t3))
}
.
If the unification system is obvious, that is σ is the identity substitution,
we have C ′ = C \ (E B t), and thenM(C ′) = M(C) \ t which implies that
M(C ′) <M(C). Else, we have nbv(C ′) < nbv(C).
This concludes the proof. 
Lemma 38 If C = (E1 B t1, . . . , En B tn) is a modified I-constraint system satisfied
by a substitution σ with respect to I” (σ |=I” C), then it can be transformed into a
constraint system in solved form by the rules of Figure 4.2.
PROOF.
Let C = (E1Bt1, . . . , EnBtn) be a modified I-constraint system not in solved
form and let i be the smallest integer such that ti /∈ X , then C = (Cα, Ei B ti, Cβ)
where Cα is in solved form, and t /∈ X . Let σ be a substitution such that
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σ |=I” C, and let us prove that C can be reduced to another satisfiable modi-
fied I-constraint system C ′ by applying the transformation rules given in the
algorithm. σ |=I” C, then σ |=I” (Cα, Ei \ X B ti, Cβ) (Lemma 9) and then,
(Ei \ X )σ →∗I∅ tiσ. We have two cases:
• If tiσ ∈ (Ei \ X )σ, there exists a term u ∈ (Ei \ X ) such that uσ = tiσ. Let
µ be the most general unifier of u and ti, then σ = θµ, and we can simplify
C by applying the first transformation rule Unif, C =⇒ C ′ = (Cαµ, Cβµ). We
have σ |=I” Cα and σ |=I” Cβ , then θ |=I” {Cαµ, Cβµ}.
• If tiσ /∈ (Ei \ X )σ there exists a derivation starting from (Ei \ X )σ of goal
tiσ, and then from Eiσ of goal tiσ. By lemma 32, there exists a derivation
starting from Eiσ of goal tiσ such that for all steps in the derivation such
that l→ r is the applied rule with the substitution σ, for all s ∈ l and s /∈ X ,
we have sσ ⊆ Eiσ. This implies that we can reduce C to C ′ by applying the
Apply rule of transformation and θ |=I” C ′.
We deduce that for all satisfiable modified I-constraint systems C such that C is
not in solved form, C can be reduced to another satisfiable modified I-constraint
system C ′ by applying the transformation rules. When applying the transforma-
tion rules to a modified I-constraint system, we reduce its complexity (Lemmas
36 and 37), this implies that when we reduce C, we will obtain at some step a sat-
isfiable modified I-constraint system which can not be reducible, this modified
I-constraint system is in solved form. This concludes the proof. 
Lemma 39 Let C and C ′ be two modified I”-constraint systems such that C ′ is obtained
from C by applying a transformation rule from figure 4.2. If C ′ is I”-satisfiable then so
is C.
PROOF.
Let C and C ′ be two modified I”-constraint systems such that C ′ is obtained
from C by applying a transformation rule and suppose that C ′ is I”-satisfiable.
Let σ′ be a solution of C ′ and let us prove that C is I”-satisfiable. Since a trans-
formation rule can be applied on C, C can’t be in solved form. Suppose that
C = (Cα, E B t, Cβ) where Cα is in solved form and t /∈ X .
• If C ′ is obtained from C by applying Unif rule then, there exists a term u ∈
E\X such that u and t are syntactically unifiable. Let µ be the most general
∅-unifier then C ′ = (Cαµ, Cβµ). Since σ′ |=I” C ′, we have σ′µ |=I” (Cα, Cβ)
and by the fact that µ is the most general ∅-unifier of t and a term in E we
have σ′µ |=I” E B t. We deduce that σ′µ |=I” C.
• If C ′ is obtained from C by applying Apply then there exists a rule
lx, l1, . . . , ln → r ∈ L′′, a set of terms e1, . . . , en in E \ X such that
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r
?
=∅ t, (li
?
=∅ ei)1≤i≤n
}
has solution. Let µ be the most general ∅-unifier.
C ′ = (Cα, (E B x)x∈lx , Cβ)µ. Since σ′ |=I” C ′ and by definition of µ, we have
σ′µ |=I” C.

From Lemmas 33, 34, 35, 38, 39 and Lemma 36 (respectively Lemma 37), we
deduce respectively the following two corollaries:
Corollary 1 The IDSKS-reachability problem is decidable.
Corollary 2 The IDEO-reachability problem is decidable.
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we study the constructive exclusive ownership vulnerability
and the destructive exclusive ownership vulnerability properties for digital sig-
nature schemes, and we show the decidability of the insecurity problem for
the two classes of cryptographic protocols using signature schemes vulnera-
ble respectively to constructive exclusive ownership and destructive exclusive
ownership properties: we give an algorithm that solves IDSKS- and IDEO-
reachability problems. This algorithm can be summarised as follows: first, we
saturate IDSKS and IDEO intruder deduction rules, this saturation terminates,
and yields two new intruder deduction systems I”DSKS and I”DEO. Second, we
simplify IDSKS and IDEO constraint systems, using two steps, in order to get
respectively a modified I”DSKS and I”DEO constraint system in solved form.
This simplification is sound and complete. We proved also the termination of
this simplification, which is obtained due to the termination of saturation, and
to the fact that each simplification step reduces the complexity of the constraint
system on which the simplification is applied.
Unfortunately, the termination of such procedure is specific to our cases of
cryptographic protocols.
In [95], S. Delaune and F. Jacquemard showed that the I-reachability prob-
lem is decidable in non-deterministic polynomial time providing that the equa-
tional theory is generated by a convergent public-collapsing rewrite system.
We remark that both hDSKS and hDEO are generated by convergent public-
collapsing rewrite systems, and hence, the result of [95] can be applied on our
classes of cryptographic protocols. We also remark that in [31], M. Baudet ob-
tained a decidability result to the reachability problem for the class of subterm
convergent equational theory. Since both hDSKS and hDEO are subterm conver-
gent equational thoeries, we can apply the result of [31] to our classes of cryp-
tographic protocols. The method we used in this chapter is different than the
methods used in [95, 31], and can be generalised to other classes of deduction
systems than can not be considered by [95, 31].
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In the next chapter, we generalise this decidability result to the class of
cryptographic protocols that use cryptographic primitives represented by equa-
tional theories generated by convergent rewrite systems having the finite vari-
ant property. That decidability result is obtained by generalising the proofs of
this chapter: we show that the termination of the saturation is sufficient to ob-
tain the decidability of the ground reachability problems, and we add another
condition to obtain the decidability of the non ground reachability problems.
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Chapter 5
Decidability results for saturated
deduction systems
In this chapter, we consider the class of cryptographic protocols
where the cryptographic primitives are represented by equational
theories generated by convergent rewrite systems satisfying the fi-
nite variant property, which symbolically has been introduced in [86].
The finite variant property allows one to compute all possible normal
forms of the instances of a term t. Such a property is claimed to be a
key property for decidability results in cryptographic protocols ver-
ification in presence of algebraic properties [80], and many common
equational theories have been proved to have this property, for exam-
ple, the Dolev-Yao theory with explicit destructors, the Abelian group
theory and others. A first contribution on this chapter is the decid-
ability of the ground reachability problems for our class of deduction
systems. Following the description given in Chapter 2, we employ
the finite variant property to reduce reachability problems modulo
an equational theory to reachability problems modulo the empty the-
ory. We then partially compute a transitive closure of the possible de-
ductions. We prove that the termination of this computation implies
the decidability of the ground reachability problems. We conjecture
that the overall construction amounts to proving that the deduction
system is F -local [40]. We then give a new criterion that permits us
to reduce general reachability problems to ground reachability prob-
lems. This criterion is based on counting the number of variables in a
reachability problem before and after a deduction is guessed, and is a
generalisation of the one employed for the specific case of the DSKS
intruder model. The intuition behind this criterion is that a deduc-
tion rule has to provide more relations between existing fact than it
introduces new unknown. We give an example showing that such an
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additional criterion is needed, in the sense that there exists deduction
systems on which the saturation algorithm terminates, but for which
the general reachability problems are undecidable. Another contribu-
tion of this chapter is a decidability result of the ground reachability
problems for the theory of blind signature [136] using the initial def-
inition of subterm introduced in [10, 31], a similar result was given
in [9] using an extended definition of subterm. In [91], another de-
cidability result has been obtained for the class of cryptographic pro-
tocols with blind signature schemes. This result has been obtained
using a different technique than the one followed in this chapter: in
[91], the authors showed the decidability of a fragment of first order
logic and used this result to obtain the decidability for the class of
cryptographic protocols using blind signature schemes. In addition
we give a decidability result to the general reachability problems for
a class of subterm convergent equational theories, while a more gen-
eral result was given in [31], the proof given in this chapter for our
special case is much shorter.
Outline. In section 5.1, we introduce the basic notions we use in this
chapter. We introduce the finite variant property in section 5.2.1, and
in section 5.2.2 we give some examples of equational theories hav-
ing finite variant property. We introduce the saturation algorithm in
Section 5.3.1 and show its properties in section 5.3.2. We give in sec-
tion 5.4 an algorithm to solve reachability problems. We show the
decidability of the ground reachability problem in section 5.5.1, and
the decidability of the general reachability problem in section 5.5.3.
Some application of our results are shown in section 5.6. We show
in section 5.7 the decidability of the ground reachability problems for
the blind signature theory, and in section 5.8, we show the decidabil-
ity of the ground reachability problems for the subterm convergent
theories.
5.1 The model
To analyse cryptographic protocols, we follow in this chapter the symbolic
model described in Chapter 2. To this end, we assume an infinite set of vari-
ables X , an infinite set of constants C, a set of function symbols F . In addition
to what is already intoducted in Chapter 2, we make use here of some additional
notions that we will show next. Given an equational theoryH′, and rewrite sys-
temR, rewriting moduloH′, also called equational rewriting, is the relation→H′\R
defined as follows: given two terms s, t, we have s →H′\R t if and only if there
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exists a position p ∈ Pos(s) such that s|p =H′ lσ and t = s[rσ]p for some substi-
tution σ and rule l→ r ∈ R.
A rewrite system R is H′-confluent if and only if for any terms t, u, v such
that t →∗H\R u and t →∗H\R v, there exists a term w verifying u →∗H\R w and
v →∗H\R w. it said to be H′-convergent if, in addition, =H′ ◦ →R ◦ =H′ is well-
founded. The notion of R-normal form defined in Chapter 2 is extended to
H′\R-normal form as expected. These notions are initially given in [100].
We assume in the following two equational theories H and H′, and an H′-
convergent rewrite system R generating H. Furthermore, we assume a com-
plete simplification order  over T (F ,X ), that is  is well-founded, monotone,
stable, subterm, and total over ground terms (T (F)). We extend the strict order
 over T (F ,X ) to the order  over T (F ,X ) as follows: we have t1  t2 if and
only if t1  t2 or t1 = t2 for any terms t1, t2 ∈ T (F ,X ).
5.2 Finite variant property
In what follows, we make use of “AC ′′ to means the associativity and commu-
tativity axioms.
5.2.1 Definition of finite variant property
In [84, 87], the authors came twice through the following problem:
Given an AC-convergent rewrite systemR, is it possible (and how) to compute
from any term t a finite set of instances tσ1, . . . , tσn such that
{(tσ)↓ | σ ∈ Σ} =
n⋃
i=1
{(tσi)↓θ | θ ∈ Σ}
where Σ is the set of normalised substitutions and (s)↓ is the AC-normal form
of s with respect toR.
In other words, the reductions in tσ only depend on reductions in finitely many
(fixed) instances of t. This is typically what it is called in [86] the finite vari-
ant property: compute in advance all possible normal forms of an instance of t,
independently of that instance.
Definition 45 (H-variants modulo H′) Given two terms t, t′ ∈ T (F ,X ), t′ is an H-
variant of t if there is a substitution θ such that tθ =H t′. A complete set ofH-variants
modulo H′ of t is a set V of H-variants of t such that, for every substitution σ, there is
a term t′ ∈ V and a substitution θ such that (tσ)↓R =H′ t′θ.
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Definition 46 (finite variant property) The pair of equational theories (H,H′) has the
finite variant property if for every term t, we can effectively compute a finite complete
set ofH-variants moduloH′. Sometimes and for simplicity, we will simply say variants
and complete set of variants whenH andH′ are clear from the context.
When R is a H′-convergent rewrite system generating H, we have that (R,H′)
satisfies the finite variant property if and only if (H,H′) satisfies the finite variant
property.
Definition 47 (R,H′) satisfies the finite variant property if for any term t, there is a
finite set of variants t1, . . . , tn, effectively computable, such that, for every substitution
σ, there is an index i and a substitution θ such that (tσ)↓H′\R =H′ tiθ.
In [86], the authors showed that if (R,H′) has the finite variant property, we
may not only compute in advance some instances ti of t such that (tσ)↓ is always
an instance modulo H′ of some ti , but actually compute in advance substitu-
tions θi such that ti = (tθi)↓ is a complete set of variants and every normalised
substitution can be factorised through θi. This result is summarised by the fol-
lowing lemma.
Lemma 40 (R,H′) has the finite variant property if and only if for any term t, there is
a finite set of substitutions Σ(t) such that for any substitution σ, there exists a substi-
tution θ ∈ Σ(t), and a substitution τ verifying (σ)↓ =H′ θτ and (tσ)↓ =H′ (tθ)↓τ
In [86], S. Delaune and H. Comon-Lundh define the boundness property as fol-
lows:
Definition 48 (boundedness property) (R,H′) satisfies the boundedness property if
for every term t, there exists an integer n such that for every normalised substitution σ,
the normal form of tσ is reachable by a derivation whose length can be bounded by n:
∀t, ∃n, ∀σ, t((σ)↓) ≤n→H′\R (tσ)↓
and then, S. Delaune and H. Comon-Lundh showed the relationships between
the boundness property and the finite variant property by proving the following
theorem.
Theorem 9 (R,H′) satisfies the boundedness property if and only if (R,H′) satisfies
the finite variant property.
5.2.2 Equational theories having finite variant property
In [86], S. Delaune and H. Comon-Lundh showed that for any equational theory
H generated by a (∅-) convergent rewrite system R, if any R-basic narrowing
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starting from any term t terminates then (R, ∅) satisfies the boundness property
and hence, by theorem 9, (R, ∅) satisfies the finite variant property.
Since the termination of basic narrowing derivations starting from right
hand sides of rules of any convergent rewrite system R implies the termina-
tion of basic narrowing derivations starting from any term t with respect to R
[123] (Chapter 2, theorem 1), the result obtained in [86] allows us to conclude
that finite variant property holds for any equational theory H generated by a
convergent rewriting system R such that any basic narrowing derivation start-
ing from right hand sides of rules ofR terminates.
Furthermore, it is shown in [86] that the finite variant property holds for
any equational theory H generated by a convergent optimally reducing [162]
rewriting systemR.
In practice, many equational theories, which are relevant to cryptographic
protocols, have the finite variant property. We give in the follow some of them:
Dolev-Yao theory with explicit destructors The Dolev-Yao theory with ex-
plicit destructors is given by the following equational theory:
HDY :

pi1(< x, y >) = x
pi2(< x, y >) = ydec
s(encs(x, y), y) = x
decp(encp(x, y), y−1) = x
decp(encp(x, y−1), y) = x
The application of Knuth-Bendix completion procedure [131] on HDY ter-
minates successfully and outputs the rewrite systemRDY
RDY :

pi1(< x, y >)→ x
pi2(< x, y >)→ y
decs(encs(x, y), y)→ x
decp(encp(x, y), y−1)→ x
decp(encp(x, y−1), y)→ x
Following the results obtained in [21],RDY is a convergent rewrite system
generating HDY . Furthermore, the right hand sides in all rules in RDY
are not basic narrowable and hence, we conclude that the finite variant
property holds forHDY .
Exclusive Or theory The Exclusive Or theoryHEO given by the equations
x+ x = 0
x+ 0 = x
x+ x+ y = y
and the associativity and commutativity axioms for +. It is proven that
REO = {x+ x→ 0, x+ 0→ x, x+ x+ y → y} is a AC-convergent rewrite
116 CHAPTER 5. SATURATED DEDUCTION SYSTEMS
system generating the exclusive or theory, and such that (R, AC) satisfies
the finite variant property [86].
Abelian group theory The Abelian group theoryHAG is defined by the follow-
ing set of equations:
RAG :

x ∗ (y ∗ z) = (x ∗ y) ∗ z
x ∗ y = y ∗ x
x ∗ x−1 = 1
x ∗ 1 = x
The following rewrite system
RAG :

x ∗ 1→ x
1−1 → 1
x ∗ x−1 → 1
x−1 ∗ y−1 → (x ∗ y)−1
(x ∗ y)−1 ∗ y → x−1
(x−1)−1 → x
(x−1 ∗ y)−1 → x ∗ y−1
x ∗ (x−1 ∗ y)→ y
x−1 ∗ (y−1 ∗ z)→ (x ∗ y)−1 ∗ z
(x ∗ y)−1 ∗ (y ∗ z)→ x−1 ∗ z
is anAC-convergent system for abelian group theory [124], and (RAG, AC)
satisfies the finite variant property [86].
In this chapter, we consider only equational theoriesH generated by convergent
rewrite systemR, or more formally, we consider only equational theoriesH for
which there exists a rewrite system R such that R is an ∅-convergent rewrite
system generatingH.
From now on, and for the aim of simplicity, we call an equational theory H
has the finite variant property if H is generated by a convergent rewrite system
R such that (R, ∅) has the finite variant property, that is for any term t, one
can compute a finite set of substitutions Σ(t) = {θ1, . . . , θn} such that, for any
substitution σ there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and a substitution τ such that (σ)↓ = θiτ
and (tσ)↓ = (tθi)↓τ . We call the substitutions θi variant substitutions of t and the
terms (tθi)↓ variants of t. It is easy to see that the variant substitutions of any
term t are in normal form.
The finite variant property ensures that it is possible to compute a com-
plete set of most general unifiers between two terms t and t′. Indeed, it suf-
fices to compute for these two terms the respective sets of variant substitutions
{θi}i∈{1,...,m},
{
θ′j
}
j∈{1,...,n}, and to (try to) unify in the empty theory every pair of
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terms (tθi)↓ = (t′θ′j)↓. Based on this technique, a complete, sound and terminat-
ing H-unification algorithm has been given in Section 2.1.8 (Chapter 2) when
H is an equational theory generated by a convergent rewrite system having the
finite variant property.
5.3 Saturation of intruder deduction rules
In the rest of this chapter we assume that F is a signature, H represents
an equational theory generated by a convergent rewriting system R, and
such that (R, ∅) satisfies the finite variant property. Furthermore, we assume
I0 = 〈F , TI0 ,H〉 to be an intruder deduction system (Definition 16, Chapter 2),
L0 = LI0 to be intruder deduction rules associated to I0, that is, rules in LI0 are
of the form x1, . . . , xn → f(x1, . . . , xn) where f is a public function symbol in F
with arity n.
Definition 49 (Increasing and decreasing deduction rule) Let l˜ → r be a deduction
rule with l˜ is a set of terms and r is a term. l˜ → r is said to be decreasing rule if there
is a term s ∈ l˜ such that s  r and l˜→ r is said to be increasing otherwise.
From now on, if L is a set of deduction rules, we denote by Linc the set of in-
creasing rules in L and by Ldec the set of decreasing rules in L. By definition of
increasing and decreasing rules, we have L = Linc ∪ Ldec.
Definition 50 Let E (respectively t) be a set of terms (respectively a term) in normal
form and let D be a derivation starting from E of goal t, D : E = E0 → E0, t1 →
. . . → En−2, tn−1 → En−1, t. We let Cons(D) be the sequence of terms constructed
during the derivation D, Cons(D) = E0 ∪ {t1, . . . , tn−1}.
Definition 51 (well-formed derivation) Let E (respectively t) be a set of terms (respec-
tively a term) and let D be a derivation starting from E of goal t, D : E = E0 →
E0, t1 → . . . → En−2, tn−1 → En−1, t. The derivation D is said to well-formed if for
all rules l˜ → r applied with substitution σ, for all u ∈ l˜ \ X we have either uσ ∈ E or
uσ was deduced by a former decreasing rule.
Definition 52 (Strongly order locality) Let I1 = 〈F , TI1 ,H〉 be
an intruder deduction system (Definition 16), we recall that TI1 =
{f(x1, . . . , xn) such that xi is variable for every i, and f ∈ Fpub with arity n }. Let
I2 = 〈F ,LI2 , ∅〉 be another intruder deduction system with LI2 a set of intruder
deduction rules of the form l1, . . . , ln → r and li, r are terms in T (F ,X ). I2 follows
the definition of intruder deduction systems of [72]. I2 is said to be I1-strongly order
local if the following three conditions are satisfied:
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Figure 5.1 Saturation algorithm moduloH
Input:
The intruder deduction rules L0.
Initialisation:
Let I = 〈F ,L, ∅〉 be the variant of the intruder deduction system I0 (Definition
19, Chapter 2). We recall that
L =
⋃
x1, . . . , xn → f(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ L0
θ variant substitution of f(x1, . . . , xn)
x1θ, . . . , xnθ → (f(x1, . . . , xn)θ)↓
Step 1.
Start with L′ = L.
Repeat the closure rule given below until no more new rule can be added on L′.
l˜1 → r1 ∈ L′inc ; l˜2, s→ r2 ∈ L′
L′ ← L′ ∪
{
(l˜1, l˜2 → r2)σ
} s /∈ X
σ = mgu(r1, s)
Output:
Output L′.
V ariant
Let I ′1 = 〈F ,LI′1 , ∅〉 be the variant intruder deduction system of I1, LI′1 ⊆ LI2 .
SOL1
For any set of ground terms E in normal form and any ground term t in normal
form we have: t ∈ EI1 if and only if t ∈ EI2 .
SOL2
For any set of terms E in normal form and any terms t in normal form such that
t ∈ EI2 . For all I2-derivations D starting from E of goal t we have either D is
well-formed or there is another I2-derivation D′ starting from E of goal t such
that Cons(D) ⊆ Cons(D′) and D′ is well-formed.
5.3.1 Saturation algorithm
We define in Figure 5.1 the saturation algorithm modulo H which takes as input
the set of deduction rules L0 and outputs another set of deduction rules called
a saturated set of deduction rules.
We define two new deduction systems I = 〈F ,L, ∅〉 and I ′ = 〈F ,L′, ∅〉. We
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remark that I0 satisfies the definition of intruder deduction system as given in
Definition 16 (Chapter 2) and in [73], and the intruder deduction systems I, I ′
satisfy the definition of intruder deduction system as given in [72].
5.3.2 Properties of the saturation
We prove in Lemmas 41 and 42 that I ′ is I0-strongly order local: in fact, the
saturation algorithm given in Figure 5.1 implies easily that I ′ satisfies V ariant,
Lemma 41 shows that SOL1 is satisfied and Lemma 42 shows that SOL2 is sat-
isfied.
Lemma 41 For any set of ground terms E in normal form and any ground term t in
normal form we have: t ∈ EI0 if and only if t ∈ EI′ .
PROOF.
The direct implication is trivial since L ⊆ L′. Let us prove the converse
implication. In Section 2.1.11 (Chapter 2), we proved that: E →I F implies
E →I0 F for any two sets of ground terms E and F in normal form, an hence
t ∈ EI implies t ∈ EI0 for any set of ground terms in normal form E and any
ground term in normal form t. We prove now that t ∈ EI′ implies t ∈ EI for
any set of ground terms in normal form E and any ground term in normal form
t.
Assume that there exists a I ′-derivation starting from E of goal t. Let us
define an arbitrary total order on the rules of L, and we extend this order
to rules of L′ \ L as follows: rules of L are smaller than the rules of L′ \ L
and rules of L′ \ L are ordered according to the order of their construction
during the saturation. Let M(D) be the multiset of rules applied in D. Let
Ω(E, t) = {D | D : E →∗I′ F 3 t}. By construction, the ordering on rules is total
and well-founded, and thus the pre-ordering on derivations in Ω(E, t) is also
total and well-founded. Since t ∈ EI′ , we have Ω(E, t) 6= ∅, and thus M(Ω(E, t))
has a minimum element which is reached. Let D be a derivation in Ω(E, t) hav-
ing the minimum M(D), and let us prove that D employs only rules in L. By
contradiction, assume that D uses a rule l˜ → r ∈ L′ \ L applied with a ground
substitution σ on a set F . Since l → r /∈ L, it has been constructed by closure
rule. Thus, there exists two rules l˜1 → r1 ∈ L′inc and l˜2 → r2 ∈ L′, a term
s ∈ l˜2 \ X such that s and r1 are unifiable, α = mgu(s, r1), l˜ = (l˜1, l˜2 \ s)α and
r = r2α. Replacing the application of the rule l˜ → r by two steps applying first
the rule l˜1 → r1 and then l˜2 → r2 yields another derivation D′. Since l˜→ r must
have an order bigger than the order of l˜1 → r1 and l˜2 → r2 and the last two rules
are in L′, we deduce that D′ ∈ Ω(E, t) and M(D′) < M(D) which contradicts the
minimality of M(D). 
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The following Corollary is an obvious consequence of Lemma 41.
Corollary 3 The saturation algorithm given in Figure 5.1 is correct and complete.
The following lemma is a consequence of the computation of the closure
(Figure 5.1). Notice that we do not assume here, nor afterward unless stated,
that the saturation terminates.
Lemma 42 Let E (respectively t) be a set of terms (respectively a term) in normal form
such that t ∈ EI′ . For all I ′-derivations D starting from E of goal t we have either D
is well-formed or there is another I ′-derivation D′ starting from E of goal t such that
Cons(D) = Cons(D′) and D′ is well-formed.
PROOF.
We have t ∈ EI′ implies that the set Ω(E, t) of I ′-derivations starting from
E of goal t is not empty. Let D ∈ Ω(E, t), D : E = E0 → E1 → . . .→ En−1, t, we
denote l˜i → ri the rule applied at step iwith the substitution σi and suppose that
D is not well-formed. Let us (pre-)order derivations in Ω(E, t) with a measure
M such that M(D′) for a derivation D′ is a multiset of integers constructed as
follows: starting withM(D′) = ∅, for all steps k, 1 ≤ k ≤ n, for all terms u ∈ lkσk
obtained by former increasing rule, add k toM(D′). Since this pre-order is well-
founded, there exists a derivation d ∈ Ω(E, t) such that M(d) is minimum and
Cons(d) = Cons(D). Let us prove that d is well-formed. By contradiction,
assume that d is not well-formed and let j be the first step in d such that l˜j → rj
is the rule applied with substitution σj and there is a term u ∈ l˜j \ X obtained
by a former increasing rule, let l˜h → rh be this rule. Since l˜h → rh ∈ L′inc and
u /∈ X , Closure can be applied on l˜h → rh and l˜j → rj and the resulting rule can
be applied at step j instead of l˜j → rj yielding also Ej . Let d′ be the derivation
obtained after this replacement, d′ ∈ Ω(E, t) and Cons(d′) = Cons(d). Since
h < j and by definition of M, we have M(d′) < M(d) which contradicts the
minimality of M(d). We deduce that d is well-formed and then we have the
lemma. 
From the definition of the saturation (Figure 5.1), and from Lemma 41 and
Lemma 42, we deduce the following corollary.
Corollary 4 The saturated intruder deduction system I ′ is I0-strongly order local.
5.4 Algorithm for solving reachability problems
Presentation of the algorithm This section is devoted to the presentation of an
algorithm for solving reachability problems and to a proof scheme of its com-
pleteness and correctness. In this section, we consider that I1 = 〈F , TI1 ,H〉 is
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an intruder deduction system (Definition 16) and I2 = 〈F ,LI2 , ∅〉 is another
intruder deduction system with LI2 a set of intruder deduction rules of the
form l1, . . . , ln → r and li, r are terms in T (F ,X ). We also consider that I2 is
I1-strongly order local. We recall that LI2 is partitioned into two disjoint sets
of deduction rules LI2 inc and LI2dec (by definition of increasing and decreasing
rules). The algorithm comprises two steps, and is described in Fig. 5.2
Figure 5.2 Algorithm for solving constraint systems.
Resolution(C0)
We let C0 = ((E0i ` v0i )i∈{1,...,n},U0) be an I1-constraint system.
Step 1: guess of a variant constraint system
Guess a variant I1-constraint system associated to C0. Let C = (E′1 B
t′1, . . . , E′n B t′n) be the variant I1-constraint system associated to C0. C is
constructed from C0 as given in Definition 28 (Chapter 2).
Step 2.
Apply non-deterministically the transformation rules of Fig. 5.3
Step 3.
If a solved form is reached, return SAT, else return FAIL.
We prove below that there exists a solution to the original I1-constraint sys-
tem C0 if and only if there exists a solution to one of the possible modified con-
straint systems computed in the first step for the I2 deduction system.
Lemma 43 Let C0 be a I1-constraint system. If σ is a substitution in normal form such
that σ |=I1 C0, then there exists a modified constraint system C in the output of Step 1
and a substitution σ′ in normal form such that σ′ |=I2 C.
PROOF.
Let C0 = (E1 ` v1, . . . , En ` vn,U) be a I1-constraint system, and let σ
be a substitution in normal form such that σ |=I1 C0. This implies that there
exists a substitution θ in normal form and a substitution τ in normal form such
that τ |=I1′ ((E1θ)↓ B (v1θ)↓, . . . , (Enθ)↓ B (vnθ)↓), with I ′1 is a variant intruder
deduction system of I1, and ((E1θ)↓ B (v1θ)↓, . . . , (Enθ)↓ B (vnθ)↓) is a variant
I1-constraint system associated to C (Lemma 12 at Chapter 2). Since L′I1 ⊆ LI2 ,
we have that τ |=I2 ((E1θ)↓ B (v1θ)↓, . . . , (Enθ)↓ B (vnθ)↓), which concludes the
proof. 
Lemma 44 Let C0 (respectively C) be a I1- (respectively I2-) constraint system. As-
sume that C is obtained from C0 at the end of Step 1. If C is I2-satisfiable then C0 is
I1-satisfiable.
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PROOF.
Let C0 (respectively C) be a I1- (respectively I2-) constraint system and
assume that C is obtained from C0 at then end of Step 1. This implies that
C0 = (E1 ` v1, . . . , En ` vn,U) and C = ((E1θ)↓ B (v1θ)↓, . . . , (Enθ)↓ B (vnθ)↓)
while θ is a substitution in normal form (the construction of θ is shown in Def-
inition 28). Since C is I2-satisfiable there exists a normal substitution σ′ such
that (viθ)↓σ′ ∈ (Eiθ)↓σ′I2 and thus (viθσ′)↓ ∈ (Eiθσ′)↓I2 , which implies that
(viθσ
′)↓ ∈ (Eiθσ′)↓I1 (Lemma 41). Let σ = (θσ′)↓, we have that (viσ)↓ ∈ (Eiσ)↓I0 ,
and by construction of θ, we have that θ |=I1 U , and hence σ |=I1 U which con-
cludes the proof. 
Transformation in solved form
In the rest of this chapter, we denote by lx, l1, . . . , ln → r a LI2-rule such that
lx is a finite set of variables and {l1, . . . , ln} is a finite set of non-variable terms.
Unless otherwise specified, I2 is the intruder deduction system implicit in all
notations.
In the rest of this section, we prove a progress property: If a satisfiable modi-
fied constraint system is not in solved form, then a rule of Fig. 5.3 can be applied
on it to yield another satisfiable modified constraint system.
Figure 5.3 System of transformation rules.
Unif :
Cα, E B t, Cβ
(Cα, Cβ)σ
u ∈ E \ X , t /∈ X ,
σ = mgu(u, t)
Reduce 1 :
Cα, E B t, Cβ
(Cα, (E B y)y∈lx , Cβ)σ
lx, l1, . . . , ln → r ∈ LI2 inc and t /∈ X
e1, . . . , en ∈ E \ X and σ = mgu(
{
ei
?=∅ li
}
1≤i≤n
, r
?=∅ t)
Reduce 2 :
Cα, E B t, Cβ
(Cα, (E B y)y∈lx , E ∪ r B t, C′β)σ
lx, l1, . . . , ln → r ∈ LI2dec and t /∈ X
e1, . . . , en ∈ E \ X and σ = mgu(
{
ei
?=∅ li
}
1≤i≤n
)
C′β is obtained from Cβ by
adding r to left hand side of constraints
Simplification step. Let C = (Cα, E B t, Cβ) be a modified constraint system
such that Cα in solved form and t /∈ X . If we apply Reduce 1 (respectively
Reduce 2) on C using a rule lx, l1, . . . , ln → r such that there is a variable x ∈
lx \V ar({l1, . . . , ln, r}) then the constraint EBx will be in the obtained modified
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constraint system C ′ and x does not appear twice in C ′. By lemma 10, this con-
straint can be deleted from C ′. As a consequence, we apply a simplification step
on the deduction system LI2 that eliminates variables x ∈ lx\V ar({l1, . . . , ln, r})
for all rules lx, l1, . . . , ln → r ∈ LI2 .
The next Lemma shows that the application of a rule from Figure 5.3 on a
modified constraint system outputs a modified constraint system.
Lemma 45 Let C ′ be a modified constraint system. The application of Unif , Reduce 1
and Reduce 2 rules on C ′ outputs a modified constraint system.
PROOF.
Let C ′ = (E1 B t1, . . . , En B tn) be a modified constraint system. Definition
22 (Chapter 2) implies that Ei ⊆ Ei+1 and V ar(Ei) ⊆ V ar({t1, . . . , ti−1}) for i ∈
{1, . . . , n}. Assume C ′ = (E1Bx1, . . . , Ei−1Bxi−1, EiB ti, Ei+1B ti+1, . . . , EnB tn)
with ti /∈ X , and let us prove that the application ofUnif ,Reduce 1 andReduce 2
rules on C ′ outputs a modified constraint system.
Unif. The application of Unif on C ′ outputs C” = (E1σ B x1σ, . . . , Ei−1σ B
xi−1σ,Ei+1σ B ti+1σ, . . . , Enσ B tnσ) with σ = mgu(u ?=∅ ti), u ∈
Ei \ X . Ej ⊆ Ej+1 implies Ejσ ⊆ Ej+1σ. We prove next that
V ar(Ejσ) ⊆ V ar(x1σ, . . . , xi−1σ, ti+1σ, . . . , tj−1σ). Actually, we have
V ar(Ej) ⊆ V ar(x1, . . . , xi−1, ti, . . . , tj−1). This implies that V ar(Ejσ) ⊆
V ar(x1σ, . . . , xi−1σ, tiσ, ti+1σ, . . . , tj−1σ). We have that tiσ = uσ and u ∈ Ei,
thus V ar(tiσ) = V ar(uσ) ⊆ V ar(Eiσ) ⊆ V ar({x1σ, . . . , xi−1σ}). This im-
plies that V ar(Ejσ) ⊆ V ar(x1σ, . . . , xi−1σ, ti+1σ, . . . , tj−1σ), and hence, the
application of Unif rule on C ′ outputs a modified constraint system.
Reduce 1. The application of Reduce 1 on C ′ outputs C” = (E1σ B
x1σ, . . . , Ei−1σ B xi−1σ, (Eiσ B yσ)y∈lx , Ei+1σ B ti+1σ, . . . , Enσ B tnσ) with
σ = mgu(r
?
=∅ ti, (uk
?
=∅ lk)1≤k≤m), uk ∈ Ei \ X , and lx, l1, . . . , lm →
r ∈ LI2 inc. Ej ⊆ Ej+1 implies Ejσ ⊆ Ej+1σ. Let j ≤ i,
we have that V ar(Ej) ⊆ V ar({x1, . . . , xj−1}) and hence, V ar(Ejσ) ⊆
V ar({x1σ, . . . , xj−1σ}). Let j > i, and let us prove that V ar(Ejσ) ⊆
V ar({x1σ, . . . , xi−1σ} ∪ {yσ}y∈lx ∪ {ti+1σ, . . . , tj−1σ}). We have that
V ar(Ejσ) ⊆ V ar({x1σ, . . . , xi−1σ, tiσ, ti+1σ, . . . , tj−1σ}), and V ar(tiσ) =
V ar(rσ) ⊆ V ar(lxσ) ∪ V ar({l1σ, . . . , lmσ}) ⊆ V ar(lxσ) ∪ V ar(Eiσ) ⊆
V ar(lxσ) ∪ V ar({x1σ, . . . , xi−1σ}). We conclude that V ar(Ejσ) ⊆
V ar({x1σ, . . . , xi−1σ} ∪ {yσ}y∈lx ∪ {ti+1σ, . . . , tj−1σ}), and hence, the appli-
cation of Reduce 1 rule on C ′ outputs a modified constraint system.
Reduce 2 . The application of Reduce 2 on C ′ outputs C” = (E1σ B
x1σ, . . . , Ei−1σ B xi−1σ, (Eiσ B yσ)y∈lx , Eiσ ∪ rσ B tiσ,Ei+1σ ∪ rσ B
ti+1σ, . . . , Enσ ∪ rσ B tnσ) with σ = mgu((uk ?=∅ lk)1≤k≤m), uk ∈ Ei \ X ,
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and lx, l1, . . . , lm → r ∈ LI2dec. Ej ⊆ Ej+1 implies Ejσ ⊆ Ej+1σ. Let
j ≤ i, we have that V ar(Ej) ⊆ V ar({x1, . . . , xj−1}) and hence, V ar(Ejσ) ⊆
V ar({x1σ, . . . , xj−1σ}). By definition of decreasing rule (Definition 49), we
have that li  r for 1 ≤ i ≤ m or x  r with x ∈ lx.
• If li  r, then liσ  rσ, and thus V ar(rσ) ⊆ V ar(liσ) = V ar(uiσ). We
conclude that V ar(rσ) ⊆ V ar(Eiσ).
• If x  r for x ∈ lx then V ar(rσ) ⊆ V ar(xσ).
If both cases, we deduce that V ar(Ejσ ∪ rσ) ⊆ V ar({x1σ, . . . , xi−1σ}) ∪⋃
y∈lx V ar(yσ) ∪ V ar({tiσ, . . . , tj−1σ}) for j ≥ i. We conclude that the ap-
plication of Reduce 2 rule on C ′ outputs a modified constraint system.

We prove below that the correctness and completeness of the rules in Fig. 5.3
with respect to the satisfiability of modified constraint systems.
Lemma 46 A satisfiable modified constraint system not in solved form can be reduced
into another satisfiable modified constraint system by applying a rule of figure 5.3.
PROOF.
Let C = (Ej B tj)1≤j≤n be a satisfiable modified constraint system not in
solved form and let i be the smallest integer such that ti /∈ X . Let C = (Cα, Ei B
ti, Cβ) where Cα is in solved form. Since C is satisfiable there exists a substitution
σ such that σ |=I2 C. Let us prove that C can be reduced into another satisfiable
modified constraint system C ′ by applying transformation rules given in figure
5.3. By lemma 9 (Chapter 2), σ |=I2 C implies σ |=I2 (Cα, Ei \X B ti, Cβ) and that,
since I2 is I1-strongly order local, there is a well-formed derivation D starting
from (Ei \ X )σ of goal tiσ. We have two cases:
• If tiσ ∈ (Ei \ X )σ then there exists a term u ∈ Ei \ X such that uσ = tiσ.
Let µ = mgu(ti, u), we have σ = µθ for some substitution θ. C can then be
reduced to C ′ by applying Unif rule, C ′ = (Cαµ, Cβµ) and θ |=I2 C ′.
• If tiσ /∈ (Ei \X )σ, let D : (Ei \X )σ → . . .→ Fσ, tiσ and for every step in D
where l˜→ r is the rule applied with the substitution γ, for every s ∈ l˜ \ X ,
we have either sγ ∈ (Ei\X )σ or sγ was constructed by a former decreasing
rule.
– Suppose that all applied rules in D are increasing and let l˜ → r be the
last applied rule with the substitution γ, this implies that rγ = tiσ and
for every s ∈ l˜ \ X , sγ ∈ (Ei \ X )σ and then for every s ∈ l˜ \ X there
exists a term u ∈ Ei \ X such that sγ = uσ. Let µ be the most general
unifier of
{
r
?
=∅ ti, (s
?
=∅ u)∀s∈el\X ,u∈Ei\X and sγ=uσ
}
, we have σ = µθ and
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γ = µθ for some θ. This implies that C can be reduced to C ′ = (Cα, (EiB
x)x∈el, Cβ)µ by applying Reduce 1 and θ |=I2 C ′.
– Suppose that D contains decreasing rules and let j be the first step
where the applied rule is decreasing. Let l˜ → r be this rule applied
with substitution γ. D : (Ei\X )σ = F0σ → F0σ, t1σ → . . .→ Fj−1σ →
Fj−1σ, tjσ → . . .→ Fn−1σ, tiσ. Since D is well-formed, we deduce that
for every s ∈ l˜ \ X , sγ ∈ (Ei \ X )σ and then, for every s ∈ l \ X there
exists a term u ∈ Ei \ X such that sγ = uσ. Let µ be the most general
unifier, we have γ = µθ and γ = µθ for some substitution θ. This
implies that C can be reduced to C ′ = (Cα, (EiBx)x∈el, (Ei∪ r)B ti, C ′β)µ
by applying Reduce 2 and θ |=I2 C ′.

Lemma 47 Let C and C ′ be two modified constraint systems such that C ′ is obtained
from C by applying a transformation rule. If C ′ is satisfiable then so is C.
PROOF.
Let C and C ′ be two modified constraint systems such that C ′ is obtained from
C by applying a transformation rule and suppose that C ′ is satisfiable. Let σ′ be
a solution of C ′ and let us prove that C is satisfiable. Since a transformation rule
can be applied on C, C can’t be in solved form. Suppose that C = (Cα, E B t, Cβ)
where Cα is in solved form and t /∈ X .
• If C ′ is obtained from C by applying Unif rule then, there exists a term
u ∈ E \ X such that u and t are unifiable. Let µ be the most general unifier
then C ′ = (Cαµ, Cβµ). Since σ′ |=I2 C ′, we have σ′µ |=I2 (Cα, Cβ) and by
the fact that µ is the most general unifier of t and a term in E we have
σ′µ |=I2 E B t. We deduce that σ′µ |=I2 C.
• If C ′ is obtained from C by applying Reduce 1 then there exists an increas-
ing rule lx, l1, . . . , ln → r, a set of terms e1, . . . , en in E \ X such that{
r
?
=∅ t, (li
?
=∅ ei)1≤i≤n
}
has solution. Let µ be the most general unifier.
C ′ = (Cα, (E B x)x∈lx , Cβ)µ. Since σ′ |=I2 C ′ and by definition of µ, we have
σ′µ |=I2 C.
• If C ′ is obtained from C by applying Reduce 2 then there exists a decreas-
ing rule lx, l1, . . . , ln → r and a set of terms e1, . . . , en in E \ X such
that
{
(li
?
=∅ ei)1≤i≤n
}
has solution. Let µ be the most general unifier.
C ′ = (Cα, (E B x)x∈lx , (E ∪ r)B t, C ′β)µ. Since σ′ |=I2 C ′ and by definition of
µ and modified constraint systems, we have σ′µ |=I2 C.

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5.5 Decidability results
5.5.1 Decidability of the ground reachability problems
We recall that I1 = 〈F , TI1 ,H〉 is the initial deduction system, L1 = LI1 is the
associated intruder deduction rules, and I2 = 〈F ,L2, ∅〉 is a deduction system
which is I1-strongly order local.
A core result of this chapter is the following lemma.
Lemma 48 Let I2 be a deduction system such that I2 is I1-strongly order local, and
L2 is finite. Applying the transformation algorithm of Fig. 5.3 on a modified constraint
system C without instantiating the variables of C yields only a finite number of different
modified constraint systems.
PROOF.
Assume the application of rules of Fig. 5.3 yields an infinite sequence of
modified constraint systems C1, . . . , Cn, . . .. Let us prove there is only a finite
number of different Ci when identical constraints within a modified constraint
system are identified.
Let us first prove that there is only a finite number of different left-hand side
of deduction constraints. The number of different left-hand sides in a modified
constraint system does not change (or decrease) when a UNIF or REDUCE1 rule
is applied. Assume now that a decreasing rule lx, l1, . . . , ln → r ∈ L2 is applied
with a substitution σ on a constraint with left-hand side E. If rσ ∈ E, the
number of different left-hand side does not change. Thus let us assume rσ /∈ E,
and thus rσ /∈ {l1σ, . . . , lnσ}. Since r is smaller or equal to a term of the left-hand
side of there rule, we have two case:
• Either there exists i with liσ  rσ, and thus there exists e ∈ E such that
e  rσ.
• Or r ∈ lx \ V ar(l1, . . . , ln). Then the obtained modified constraint system
contains the deduction constraints EBr and E∪{r}B t and not other con-
straint contains r. By Lemma 9 the obtained modified constraint system is
equivalent to the one in which E ∪ {r}B t is replaced by E B t.
Let us now consider the set T which is the union of all left-hand side of deduc-
tion constraints reachable from E by employing a decreasing rule.
• the root is labelled by ∅;
• the sons of the root are labelled by the terms in a left-hand side E;
• The sons of the non-root node are defined as follows: assume there exists
two left-hand sides E ′ and E ′′ where E ′ is reachable from E, and there is
a decreasing rule whose application leads to the addition of a deduction
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constraint with left-hand side E ′′ = E ′′, t1. Let t2 ∈ E ′ be the term strictly
greater than t1. We then set t1 as a son of t2.
Since t2  t1 there is no cycle, and since we consider sets reachable from E,
the “is son of” relation is connected. It thus defines a tree. We note that t2 is
the instance of a non-variable term l in the left-hand side of a decreasing rule.
There is only a finite number of such terms. Since we consider deductions in the
empty theory, for each l there is a unique substitution σ such that lσ = t2. Given
the properties of ordering we have V ar(r) ⊆ V ar(l) and thus t1 = rσ is uniquely
determined by the rule applied. Thus, each term t2 has a finite number of sons
t1. Along each branch of the tree a node t is strictly smaller than its parent. Since
 is a well-founded ordering, this implies that each branch is finite. Thus, by
Ko¨nig’s Lemma, this tree is finite. We conclude that T itself is finite. Each left-
hand side of a deduction constraint is a subset of T , thus there is only a finite
number of different left-hand sides.
When applying REDUCE 1 or REDUCE 2 on a constraint E B t, the newly
introduced constraints E B t′ are such that t′ is a strict subterm of a term in E
or t. Let E ′ B t′ be a deduction constraint reached from E B t. Either t′ is a
subterm of t or there exists E ′′ reachable from E such that t′ is a strict subterm
of E ′′. Since there is only a finite number of different E ′′, there is thus only a
finite number of possible right-hand side of constraints.
In conclusion only a finite number of deduction constraints E ′ B t′ can be
reached from a deduction constraint E B t. Thus only a finite number of modi-
fied constraint systems can be reached from a given one by applying rules that
do not instantiate the variables in the modified constraint system. 
Let E and t be respectively a set of ground terms in normal form and a
ground term in normal form. We recall that t ∈ EI1 if and only if t ∈ EI2
(I2 is I1-strongly order local). This implies that solving I1-ground reachability
problem is reduced to solving I2-ground reachability problem. It is then routine
to see that a ground constraint system is satisfiable if, and only if, it reduces to
an empty sequence of deduction constraints. Thus by Lemma 48 we have:
Theorem 10 If L2 is finite, the I1-ground reachability problem is decidable.
We recall that I0 = 〈F , TI0 ,H〉 and that I ′ = 〈F ,LI′ , ∅〉 is the output of
the saturation algorithm given in Figure 5.1. Since I ′ is I0-strongly order local
(Corollary 4), and by Lemmas 46, 47, and 48, we conclude that the following
theorem.
Theorem 11 If the saturation algorithm terminates on L0, the I0-ground reachability
problem is decidable.
While the termination of the saturation on L0 implies the decidability of its
ground reachability problem, we prove next that this condition is not sufficient
to decide I0 general reachability problem.
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5.5.2 Termination of Saturation does not imply decidability of general
reachability problems
It is well-known how to encode 2-stack automata into deduction systems. How-
ever the saturation will typically not terminate on standard encodings as it will
amount in this case to the pre-computation of all possible executions of the au-
tomaton. We can however adapt the construction so that saturation terminates.
We consider a signature F such that, for all symbol f ∈ F0 of arity n, there is a
deduction rule x1, . . . , xn → f(x1, . . . , xn), and the signature F = F ∪{g}with g
a symbol of arity 1. Let (Q,QI , QF ,Σ,Π,∆) be a finite 2-stack automaton, where
Q is the finite set of states of the automaton,QI andQF its initial and final states,
Σ denotes the alphabet of the words read by the automaton, and Π denotes the
elements in the stacks of the automaton. We shall encode the emptiness of the
language recognised by this automaton into a general reachability problem. Let
us assume there exists:
• ⊥ ∈ F0 be a constant denoting the empty stack or the empty word;
• one unary symbol uα for each letter α ∈ Σ ∪ Π;
• one constant q ∈ F for each state in Q;
• one symbol s ∈ F of arity 4 where we intend that:
– the first argument represents the word that remains to be read by the
automaton;
– the second argument represents the current state of the automaton;
– the third and fourth arguments represent the two stacks of the au-
tomaton.
• one symbol f of arity 2.
We represent a transition from a state σ1 to a state σ2 with a symbol τ of arity 1
unique to the transition and a rewriting rule τ(g(f(σ1, f(σ2, x)))) → g(f(σ2, x)).
Given the unicity of τ , the rewriting system has no critical pairs, and thus is
convergent. Since every narrowing step decreases strictly the number of “τ”
symbols in a term, narrowing terminates, and thus the equational theory has
the finite variant property. At the end of the first step of the saturation the sys-
tem will contain the rules enabling the attacker to build sequences of states, and
additional rules g(f(σ1, f(σ2, x))) → g(f(σ2, x)) that are decreasing for any re-
cursive path ordering. Since there is no increasing rule with the symbol g in the
right-hand side, the saturation terminates, and hence that ground reachability
problems are decidable.
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However, the instance of x in the following reachability problem encodes a
word recognised by the automaton after a run encoded by the instance of y:
∅B f(s(x, q0,⊥,⊥), y), g(f(s(x, q0,⊥,⊥), y))B g(s(⊥, qf ,⊥,⊥))
This example proves (with q0 ∈ QI and qf ∈ QF ) that the saturation can termi-
nate and yield a deduction system for which general reachability problems are
not decidable.
The undecidability comes from the fact that one can apply an unbounded
number of decreasing rules on a non-ground terms, and from the “lack of regu-
larity” on the terms obtained.
5.5.3 Decidability of the general reachability problems
We recall that the initial intruder system is given by I0 = 〈F , T0,H〉 while H is
generated by a convergent equational theory and has the finite variant property,
L0 = LI0 is the intruder deduction rules associated to I0. We recall also that
I ′ = 〈F ,L′, ∅〉 is the saturated intruder system.
We give here a simple criterion that permits to ensure the termination of the
resolution of a constraint problem with a saturated deduction system. Let T
be a set of terms, T = {t1, . . . , tm}, we let ∆(T ) to be the set of strict maximal
subterms of T and we define:
δ(T ) =
{
+∞ if T ⊆ X
|T \ X | − |V ar(T \ X ) \ (T ∩ X )| otherwise.
Now let us define µ(T ). We consider the image of the set of terms T by the
rewriting system U containing rules f(x1, . . . , xn)→ x1, . . . , xn for every symbol
f in the signature of the deduction system. We define:
µ(T ) = min
Tσ →∗U T ′
σ mgu of subterms of T
δ(T ′)
We extend µ to rules as follows. Let L′ be the set of deduction rules. We
recall that L′ is partitioned into two disjoint sets of deduction rules, the set of
increasing rules L′inc and the set of decreasing rules L′dec. For every rule l˜ → r ∈
L′,
µ(l˜→ r) =
{
µ(∆(l˜ \ X ∪ {r})) if l˜→ r is increasing,
µ(∆(l˜ \ X )) otherwise.
Definition 53 (Contracting deduction systems) A saturated deduction system I ′ =
〈F ,L′, ∅〉 is contracting if for all rules l˜→ r in L′ we have µ(l˜→ r) > 0.
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Figure 5.4 Martelli-Montanari ∅-unification algorithm
Given an ∅-unification system U , repeatedly perform any of the following transforma-
tions. If no transformation applies, stop with success.
• Select any equation of the form t ?=∅ x where t is not a variable and x is a variable,
and rewrite it as x ?=∅ t.
• Select any equation of the form x ?=∅ x where x is variable, and erase it.
• Select any equation of the form t′ ?=∅ t” where t′ and t” are not variables. If
the two root function symbols are different, stop with failure; otherwise, assume
t′ = f(t1, . . . , tn) and t” = f(s1, . . . , sn) with f a function symbol with arity n and
apply the following:
If n = 0, then f is a constant symbol, and the equation is simply erased;
otherwise, replace f(t1, . . . , tn)
?=∅ f(s1, . . . , sn) with the following equations:
t1
?=∅ s1, . . . , tn
?=∅ sn.
• Select any equation of the form x ?=∅ t where x is a variable which occurs some-
where else in the unification system and where t 6= x. If x occurs in t, then stop
with failure; otherwise, apply the substitution σ = {x 7→ t} to both terms of all
other equations in the unification system (without erasing x ?=∅ t).
Martelli-Montanari unification algorithm. In this paragraph, we recall the uni-
fication algorithm due to Martelli-Montanari [147], which is used in the proof
of the next lemma. In [147], A. Martelli and U. Montanari gave a ∅-unification
algorithm based on the transformation of a given ∅-unification system U into an
equivalent and simpler unification system. An unification system U is said to
be in solved form if and only if it satisfies the following conditions:
• every equation in U is of the form x ?=∅ t;
• every variable which is the left member of some equation occurs only
there.
An ∅-unification system U =
{
x1
?
=∅ t1, . . . , xn
?
=∅ tn
}
in solved form has the
obvious unifier σ = {x1 7→ t1, . . . , xn 7→ tn}, which is its most general ∅-unifier.
We give in Figure 5.4 Martelli-Montanari ∅-unification algorithm. In [147],
A. Martelli and U. Montanari proved that for any ∅-unification system U
• their algorithm always terminates, no matter which choices are made,
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• if the algorithm terminates with failure, U has no unifier, and if the algo-
rithm terminates with success, U has been transformed into an equivalent
∅-unification system in solved form.
We remark that Martelli-Montanari ∅-unification algorithm provides a widely
general version from which most unification algorithms [35, 55, 148, 167, 177,
176, 197, 198] can be derived.
Lemma 49 Let S = {s1, . . . , sn} and T = {t1, . . . , tn} be two sets of terms and
let σ be the most general unifier of V =
{
s1
?
=∅ t1, . . . , sn
?
=∅ tn
}
. If µ(T ) > 0
then either nbv(s1, . . . , sn) > nbv((s1, . . . , sn, t1, . . . , tn)σ) or nbv(s1, . . . , sn) =
nbv((s1, . . . , sn, t1, . . . , tn)σ), S = Sσ and for all x ∈ V ar(T ) there is i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
such that σ(x)  si.
PROOF.
Let V =
{
s1
?
=∅ t1, . . . , sn
?
=∅ tn
}
. In order to solve V , we apply the first
step of the unification algorithm of Martelli-Montanari [147] (Figure 5.4). We
reduce V to V ′ =
{
x1
?
=∅ u1, . . . , xk
?
=∅ uk, xk+1
?
=∅ uk+1, . . . , xm
?
=∅ um
}
such that
for every equation x ?=∅ u ∈ V ′, we have either x ∈ V ar(S) and u ∈ Sub(T ) or
x ∈ V ar(T ) and u ∈ Sub(S). We suppose that xj ∈ V ar(T ) for j ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
• If k = m then we have xj ∈ V ar(T ) for j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. We sup-
pose that xi 6= xj for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and i 6= j. This implies that
Sσ = S and V ar(T ) are instantiated by subterms of S, that is V ar(T )σ are
smaller or equal than terms in S. We conclude also that nbv(s1, . . . , sn) =
nbv((s1, . . . , sn, t1, . . . , tn)σ).
• If k 6= m assume {uk+1, . . . , um} /∈ V ar(T ), we have different cases:
– If for all different i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}we have xi 6= xj thenm−k variables
of S, xk+1, . . . , xm, are instantiated by subterms of T , uk+1, . . . , um. This
implies that when we apply σ to U , new variables, V ar(uk+1, . . . , um)\
{x1, . . . , xk} will appear in Sσ. There exists a set T ′ 6⊆ X such that
T →∗U T ′ and T ′ = {x1, . . . , xk, uk+1, . . . , um}. Since µ(T ) > 0, we have
|T ′\X | > |V ar(T ′\X )\(x1, . . . , xk)|. This implies that nbv(s1, . . . , sn) >
nbv((s1, . . . , sn, t1, . . . , tn)σ).
– If there is different i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} such that xi = xj :
∗ If i, j ≤ k then we have to unify two subterms of S. Let ui and uj
be these two subterms and α be their most general unifier.
Let us apply α on V and to solve V we have to solve V α ={
s1α
?
=∅ t1, . . . , snα
?
=∅ tn
}
. To solve V α we reduce it to another
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system V ” where equations have the same form as in V ′. We note
that nbv(T ) in V α is the same as in V and nbv(S) is reduced.
By the same reasoning as above, we deduce that nbv(S) >
nbv(Sσ, Tσ).
∗ If i, j > k then we have to unify two subterms of T . Let ui
and uj be these two subterms and α be their most general uni-
fier. Let us apply α on V and to solve V we have to solve V α ={
s1
?
=∅ t1α, . . . , sn
?
=∅ tnα
}
and to solve V α, we have to reduce it
to another system V ” where equations have the same form as in
V ′. V ” =
{
x1
?
=∅ u1, . . . , xm
?
=∅ um
}
where x1 . . . , xk ∈ V ar(Tα)
and xk+1, . . . , xm ∈ V ar(S). By definition of µ and by following
the same reasoning as above, we deduce that:
· If k = m and for all different i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} we have xi 6= xj ,
we deduce that S = Sσ, V ar(T )σ are smaller or equals than
terms in S and then nbv(S) = nbv(Sσ, Tσ).
· If k = m and there is different i, j such that xi = xj then we
have to unify two subterms of S and then we conclude that
nbv(S) > nbv(Sσ, Tσ).
· If k 6= m we deduce that nbv(S) > nbv(Sσ, Tσ).

It is easy to see that the following corollary immediately follows from
Martelli-Montanari ∅-unification algorithm [147] (Figure 5.4) and from Lemma
49.
Corollary 5 For any arbitrary terms s and t, if σ = mgu∅(s, t) then
• nbv(sσ) ≤ nbv(s, t),
• and if nbv(sσ) = nbv(s, t) then s = t.
The definition of µ is tailored to the proof of the following Lemma.
Remark. Let T be a set of terms and let Σ(T ) be the set of substitutions σ such
that σ is the most general unifier of some subterms of T . We remark that µ(T )
is defined with respect to Tσ for every σ ∈ Σ. It will be more natural if µ(T ) is
defined with respect to T instead of some instances of T . The simpler definition
would be as follow:
µ(T ) = min
T →∗U T ′
δ(T ′)
Using this simpler definition of µ, we remark that µ(T ) > 0 does not im-
ply µ(Tσ) > 0 for a set of terms T and a substitution σ ∈ Σ(T ). Let T =
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{f(x, x), f(x, y), f(y, x)} and let σ be such that σ(x) = y. Using the general
definition of µ, we remark that µ(T ) > 0 and µ(Tσ) = 0.
Lemma 50 Let I ′ be a saturated contracting deduction system, C be a modified I ′-
constraint system not in solved form. If a transformation is applied on C to yield a
modified constraint system C ′, then either the substitution applied does not instantiate
the variables of C and V ar(C ′) ⊆ V ar(C) or nbv(C ′) < nbv(C).
PROOF.
Let C be a modified constraint system such that a transformation rule can be
applied on it. This implies that C is not in solved form. Let C = (Cα, E B t, Cβ)
such that Cα is in solved form and t /∈ X . We have three cases:
• If we apply Unif rule on C then there exists a term e ∈ E \ X such that
e and t are unifiable and σ is the most general unifier. C is then reduced
to C ′ = (Cα, Cβ)σ. Since we unify two subterms of C in the empty theory,
either σ does not instantiate the variables of C and then C ′ = (Cα, Cβ) (which
implies that V ar(C ′) ⊆ V ar(C)) or σ instantiates the variables of C (and
then nbv(C ′) < nbv(C)) (Corollary 5).
• Assume we apply REDUCE 1 on C. By definition of REDUCE 1 there exists
an increasing rule lx, l1, . . . , ln → r ∈ L′, a set of terms e1, . . . , en ∈ E \ X
such that U =
{
r
?
=∅ t, (ei
?
=∅ li)1≤i≤n
}
has a solution. Let σ be its most
general unifier. Either σ|V ar(C) = Id or not. Let us examine the two cases.
σ|V ar(C) = Id. In this case, C is reduced to C ′ = (Cα, (E B xσ)x∈lx , Cβ). For
each li ∈ {l1, . . . , ln} we have, by definition of σ, liσ = ei. Also, we
have rσ = t. Thus for each x ∈ V ar(l1, . . . , ln, r) we have V ar(xσ) ⊆
V ar(C). Since lx ⊆ V ar(l1, . . . , ln, r) we deduce that V ar(C ′) ⊆ V ar(C).
σ|V ar(C) 6= Id. In this case C is reduced to C ′ = (Cα, (E B x)x∈lx , Cβ)σ. Since
the ei and r are not variables, we can decompose all equations in U
to obtain a set of equations in which each equation has a member in
∆(l1, . . . , ln, r). Since the deduction system is contracting Lemma 49
implies nbv(e1, . . . , en, t) > nbv(e1σ, . . . , enσ, tσ, l1σ, . . . , lnσ, rσ). Since
lx ⊆ V ar(l1, . . . , ln, r) we deduce that nbv(C) > nbv(C ′).
• Let us finally assume REDUCE 2 is applied. First let us prove we can as-
sume lx ∪ V ar(r) ⊆ V ar({l1, . . . , ln}). Since the rule is decreasing there
exists a term l ∈ lx ∪ {l1, . . . , ln} such that V ar(r) ⊆ V ar(l). Thus it suffices
to prove lx ⊆ V ar({l1, . . . , ln}). By definition of the REDUCE 2 rule, the
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modified constraint system C is transformed into
(Cα, (E B y)y∈lx\{x}, E B x,E ∪ {x}B t, C ′β)σ
= Cασ, (Eσ B yσ)y∈lx\{x}, Eσ B x,Eσ ∪ {x}B tσ, C ′βσ
≡ Cασ, (Eσ B yσ)y∈lx\{x}, Eσ B x,Eσ B tσ, Cβσ
≡ Cασ, (Eσ B yσ)y∈lx\{x}, Eσ B tσ, Cβσ
where the first ≡ is by Lemma 9, and the second one by Lemma 10.
Thus the resulting system is equivalent for solutions to one in which
lx ⊆ V ar(l1, . . . , ln). We can then apply the same reasoning as above.

We may now conclude by applying the previous results and again Ko¨nig’s
Lemma.
Theorem 12 Let I0 = 〈F ,L0,H〉 be a deduction system such that the saturation of L0
terminates , and the resulting deduction system is contracting. Then the I0-reachability
problem is decidable.
PROOF.
It suffices to prove that the application of rules of Fig. 5.3 terminates. As-
sume there exists a modified I ′-constraint system C and an infinite sequence of
transformations starting from C. Let C1, . . . , Cn, . . . be the resulting sequence of
modified constraint systems. By Lemma 50, at each step nbv(Ci) ≥ nbv(Ci+1) and
if there is equality, then the substitution applied on Ci is the identity (does not in-
stantiate the variables of C). Since we must have a positive number of variables,
there is only a finite number of steps where the substitution is not the identity.
Let Cn be the last obtained modified constraint system with nbv(Cn−1) > nbv(Cn).
Since all subsequent transformation do not instantiate the variables of Cn and its
successor, the sequence has only a finite number of different modified constraint
systems.
Since L′ is finite, each modified constraint system has only a finite number
of successors. Thus by Ko¨nig Lemma there is only a finite number of different
modified constraint systems. 
5.6 Applications: some relevant equational theories
We give here some examples of well-known equational theories where the sat-
uration applied on the corresponding initial set of deduction rules terminates.
5.6.1 Dolev-Yao theory with explicit destructors
The Dolev-Yao theory with explicit destructors is the classical Dolev-Yao model
with explicit destructors such as decryption and projections. This theory is
given by the following set of equations:
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HDV =

decs(encs(x, y), y) = x,
encs(decs(x, y), y) = x,
decp(encp(x, Pk(y)), Sk(y)) = x,
encp(decp(x, Sk(y)), Pk(y)) = x,
pi1(〈x, y〉) = x,
pi2(〈x, y〉) = y.
By orienting equations ofHDV from left to right, we obtain a rewrite system
RDV generating HDV . We remark that RDV is convergent and HDV has finite
variant property.
The initial set of deduction rules is given by the following set of rules:
L0 =

x, y → 〈x, y〉,
x→ pi1(x),
x→ pi2(x),
x, y → encp(x, y),
x, y → decp(x, y),
x, y → encs(x, y),
x, y → decs(x, y).
The saturation (modulo the simplification introduced after the lemma 10)
outputs the following set of deduction rules:
L′ = L0 ∪

〈x, y〉 → x,
〈x, y〉 → y,
decp(x, Sk(y)), Pk(y)→ x,
encp(x, Pk(y)), Sk(y)→ x,
decs(x, y), y → x,
encs(x, y), y → x,
x, Pk(y), Sk(y)→ x.
5.6.2 Digital signature theory with duplicate signature key selection prop-
erty
The theory of digital signature with duplicate signature key selection property
is defined in [66] and is given by the following set of equations:
HDSKS =
 ver(x, sig(x, Sk(y)), Pk(y)) = 1,ver(x, sig(x, Sk′(y1, y2)), Pk′(y1, y2)) = 1,
sig(x, Sk′(Pk(y), sig(x, Sk(y)))) = sig(x, Sk(y)).
The equational theoryHDSKS is generated by:
RDSKS =

ver(x, sig(x, Sk(y)), Pk(y))→ 1,
ver(x, sig(x, Sk′(y1, y2)), Pk′(y1, y2))→ 1,
ver(x, sig(x, Sk(y)), Pk′(Pk(y), sig(x, Sk(y))))→ 1,
sig(x, Sk′(Pk(y), sig(x, Sk(y))))→ sig(x, Sk(y)).
We remark thatRDSKS is convergent andHDSKS has the finite variant prop-
erty.
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The initial set of deduction rules is given by the following set of rules:
L0 =

x, y → sig(x, y),
x, y, z → ver(x, y, z),
x, y → Sk′(x, y),
x, y → Pk′(x, y),
∅ → 1.
The saturation (modulo the simplification introduced in Section 5.4) outputs
the following set of deduction rules:
L′ = L0 ∪

x, sig(x, Sk(y)), Pk(y)→ 1,
x, sig(x, Sk′(y1, y2)), Pk′(y1, y2)→ 1,
x, sig(x, Sk(y)), Pk′(Pk(y), sig(x, Sk(y)))→ 1,
x, Sk′(Pk(y), sig(x, Sk(y)))→ sig(x, Sk(y)),
Sk(y), Pk(y)→ 1,
Sk′(y1, y2), Pk′(y1, y2)→ 1,
x, Sk(y), Pk′(Pk(y), sig(x, Sk(y)))→ 1,
x, Pk(y), sig(x, Sk(y))→ sig(x, Sk(y)),
x, Pk(y), Sk(y)→ sig(x, Sk(y)),
y1, y2, Pk
′(y1, y2)→ 1,
x, y1, y2, sig(x, Sk
′(y1, y2))→ 1,
y1, y2, Sk
′(y1, y2)→ 1,
x, Pk(y), sig(x, Sk(y))→ 1,
x, Pk(y), Sk(y), sig(x, Sk(y))→ 1,
x, Sk(y), Pk(y), Pk′(Pk(y), sig(x, Sk(y)))→ 1,
x, Sk(y), Pk(y)→ sig(x, Sk(y)).
5.7 Decidability of ground reachability problems for the blind
signature theory
Blind signature was introduced in [136], it is defined by the signature FBS =
{sig, ver, Bl, Ubl, Pk, Sk}which satisfies the following set of equations:
HBS =
 ver(sig(x, Sk(y)), Pk(y)) = x,Ubl(Bl(x, y), y) = x,
Ubl(sig(Bl(x, y), Sk(z)), y) = sig(x, Sk(z)).
Let RBS be the set of rules obtained by orienting equations of HBS from left
to right,RBS is convergent and it is obvious that any basic narrowing derivation
(Definition 13) issuing from any of the right hand side term of the rules of RBS
terminates. This implies that any narrowing derivation (and in particular basic
narrowing derivation) issuing from any term terminates (Theorem 1) and thus
HBS has finite variant property [86].
The initial deduction system is given by the tuple I0 = 〈FBS,L0,HBS〉 and
we have:
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L0 =

1 : x, y → sig(x, y),
2 : x, y → ver(x, y),
3 : x, y → Bl(x, y),
4 : x, y → Ubl(x, y).
The initialisation step of saturation (Figure 5.1) outputs the following set of
deduction rules:
L = L0 ∪
 5 : sig(x, Sk(y)), Pk(y)→ x,6 : Bl(x, y), y → x,7 : sig(Bl(x, y), Sk(z)), y → sig(x, Sk(z)).
We define a new deduction system I = 〈FBS,L, ∅〉 and by lemma 31, we
have: t ∈ EI0 if and only if t ∈ EI for every set of ground terms E (respectively
a ground term t) in normal form. From now we remark that the equational
theory employed is the empty one.
Now, let us apply the first step of saturation. The closure applied on rules 1
and 5 outputs the rule 8 : x, Sk(y), Pk(y) → x, the closure applied on rules 3
and 6 outputs the rule 9 : x, y → x which will be deleted by the simplification
step introduced in Section 5.4. The closure applied on rules 1 and 7 outputs the
rule 10 : y,Bl(x, y), Sk(z)→ sig(x, Sk(z)).
We prove in the next lemma that the last rule is redundant when the em-
ployed equational theory is the empty one.
Lemma 51 Let L′1 = L ∪ {x, Sk(y), Pk(y)→ x} ∪
{y,Bl(x, y), Sk(z)→ sig(x, Sk(z))} and let L′2 = L′1 \
{y,Bl(x, y), Sk(z)→ sig(x, Sk(z))}. Suppose that the employed equational the-
ory is the empty one. For any two sets of ground terms in normal form E and F we
have: E →∗L′2 F if and only if E →
∗
L′1 F .
PROOF.
Let E and F be two sets of normal ground terms. The direct implication is
obvious, let us prove the second one. Suppose that E →∗L′1 F and let us prove
that E →∗L′2 F . Suppose that in the L
′
1-derivation D starting from E to F there
is some steps where the applied rule is in L′1 \ L′2 that is, by definition of L′1 and
L′2, the applied rule is y,Bl(x, y), Sk(z)→ sig(x, Sk(z)).
Let i be the first step in the derivation where the applied rule is
y,Bl(x, y), Sk(z) → sig(x, Sk(z)), we prove that this step can be replaced by
other steps where the respectives applied rules are in L′2. D : E = E0 →
. . . → Ei →y,Bl(x,y),Sk(z)→Sig(x,Sk(z)) Ei+1 . . . → F . There is a ground substi-
tution σ in normal form such that {yσ,Bl(x, y)σ, Sk(z)σ} ⊆ Ei and Ei+1 =
Ei ∪ sig(xσ, Sk(z)σ). Thus, the rule Bl(x, y), y → x ∈ L′2 with the substitu-
tion σ can be applied first on Ei and outputs Ei1 = Ei ∪ xσ, then the rule
x, y → sig(x, y) ∈ L′2 also with the substitution σ can be applied on Ei1 and
outputs Ei1 ∪ sig(xσ, Sk(zσ)) = Ei+1. We deduce that each application of the
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rule y,Bl(x, y), Sk(z)→ sig(x, Sk(z)) in D can be replaced by the application of
two rules in L′2. We conclude that E →∗L′1 F implies E →
∗
L′2 F . 
Remarks.
Enforcing the termination of the Saturation. The application of the Satura-
tion algorithm as is described in section 5.3.1 does not terminate. In
fact, the rule 10 is an increasing one and closure rule can be applied
on rules 10 and 7. The application of the closure outputs the rule
11 : y, y′, Bl(Bl(x, y), y′), Sk(z) → sig(x, Sk(z)) which is increasing. We
remark that closure rule can be applied on the rules 11 and 7 and this ap-
plication outputs a new increasing rule. In addition, closure rule can be
applied again on the new obtained rule and the rule 7. We remark also
that each such application of closure rule outputs a new increasing rule
where the size of the terms in the left hand side is increased and closure
rule can be applied again on this new obtained rule and the rule 7. This
implies that we have an infinite sequence of application of closure rule. We
remark that this infinite sequence is due to the presence of the rule 10.
As a consequence from the previous lemma (where we prove that the rule
y,Bl(x, y), Sk(z) → sig(x, Sk(z)) is redundant), we can delete this rule
from the system immediately after its creation. This deletion enforces the
termination of the Saturation.
Saturated deduction system. Let I ′ = 〈FBS,L′, ∅〉 be the saturated deduction
system (obtained after enforcing the termination of the saturation), we
have:
L′ = L0 ∪

sig(x, Sk(y)), Pk(y)→ x,
Bl(x, y), y → x,
sig(Bl(x, y), Sk(z)), y → sig(x, Sk(z)),
x, Sk(y), Pk(y)→ x.
In L′, we note that only L0-rules are increasing and the others are decreas-
ing (by definition of increasing and decreasing rules).
Following Lemma 41, it is easy to see that for any set of ground terms E in
normal form and any ground term t in normal form, we have: t ∈ EI0 if and
only if t ∈ EI′ .
We recall that a derivation D starting from E of goal t is well-formed if for all
rules l → r applied with substitution σ, for all u ∈ l \ X we have either uσ ∈ E
or uσ was constructed by a former decreasing rule.
Lemma 52 Let E (respectively t) be a set of terms (respectively a term) in normal form
such that t ∈ EI′ . For all I ′-derivations D starting from E of goal t we have either D
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is well-formed or there is another I ′-derivation D′ starting from E of goal t such that
Cons(D) ⊆ Cons(D′) and D′ is well-formed.
PROOF.
We have t ∈ EI′ implies that the set Ω(E, t) of I ′-derivations starting from
E of goal t is not empty. Let D ∈ Ω(E, t), D : E = E0 → E1 → . . . → En−1, t,
we denote l˜i → ri the rule applied at step i with the substitution σi: this rule is
well-applied if for all u ∈ l˜i \ X , we have either uσ ∈ E or uσ was obtained by a
former decreasing rule, otherwise it is bad-applied.
Suppose that D is not well-formed then there is at least one step in the
derivation D where the applied rule is bad-applied. At each such step, one
the following rule is applied: sig(x, Sk(y)), Pk(y)→ x,Bl(x, y), y → x,
sig(Bl(x, y), Sk(z)), y → sig(x, Sk(z)),
We note that the rule x, Sk(y), Pk(y) → x can not be applied at such step
because the rules y → Sk(y) and y → Pk(y) are not in L′.
Let us prove that each application of the first (respectively the second) rule
inD such that there is a non variable term in left hand side of the rule where the
instance is obtained by a former increasing rule can be deleted from D without
altering Cons(D). Let i be the first step where the first (respectively the second)
rule is bad applied, that is there is a non variable term in left hand side where the
instance is obtained by a former increasing rule. There is only one non variable
term in the left hand side of the first (respectively the second) rule which can
be obtained by a former increasing rule, this term is sig(x, Sk(y)) (respectively
Bl(x, y)). Since the instance of this term, sig(x, Sk(y))σ (respectively Bl(x, y)σ),
is obtained by a former increasing rule this last rule will be x, y → sig(x, y)
(respectively x, y → Bl(x, y)) and let h (h < i) be the step where this rule is
applied. We deduce that {xσ, Sk(yσ)} (respectively {xσ, yσ}) ⊆ Eh and then the
rule applied at step i (which adds xσ) does not add a new term and the step i
can be deleted without modifying in Cons(D). Let D′ be the obtained deriva-
tion, we have Cons(D′) = Cons(D). We deduce that every step in D′ where the
rule sig(x, Sk(y)), Pk(y) → x (respectively the rule Bl(x, y), y → x) is bad ap-
plied can be deleted without altering in the trace of D′ and let d be the obtained
derivation. We note that every application of the rule sig(x, Sk(y)), Pk(y) → x
(respectively the rule Bl(x, y), y → x) in d is a well-application.
Suppose that d is not well-formed then there is at least one step where the
rule applied is bad-applied. Let i be the first such step and let the applied rule
be sig(Bl(x, y), Sk(z)), y → sig(x, Sk(z)) and Sig(Bl(x, y), SK(z))σ is obtained
by a former increasing rule, x, y → sig(x, y). Let h < i be the step at which
this increasing rule is applied. We deduce that {Bl(x, y)σ, Sk(z)σ} ⊆ Eh. If
xσ /∈ Ei then the rule applied at step i in d can be replaced first by the ap-
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plication of Bl(x, y), y → x then the application of x, y → sig(x, y). Let d′ be
the obtained derivation, d′ : E → . . . → Ei →Bl(x,y),y→x Ei, xσ →x,y→sig(x,y)
Ei, xσ, sig(x, Sk(z))σ → . . . → En−1, t. By above and since xσ /∈ Ei we have
either Bl(x, y)σ ∈ E or Bl(x, y)σ is obtained by a former decreasing rule.
If xσ ∈ Ei then the rule applied at step i in d can be replaced by the appli-
cation of x, y → sig(x, y). Let d′′ be the obtained derivation, d′′ : E → . . . →
Ei →x,y→sig(x,y) Ei, sig(x, Sk(z))σ → . . .→ En−1, t.
This implies that each bad application of the rule sig(Bl(x, y), Sk(z)), y →
sig(x, Sk(z)) can be replaced by one (or two) well-applied rules. We deduce that
if the derivation D is not well-formed there is another well-formed derivation
D′′ starting from E of goal t such that Cons(D) ⊆ Cons(D′′). 
We recall that I0 = 〈FBS, TI0 ,HBS〉 and I ′ = 〈FBS,LI′ , ∅〉. We recall also
that HBS has the finite variant property. The construction of I ′ and Lemma
52 implies that the conditions V ariant, SOL1 and SOL2 from Definition 52 are
satisfied, and hence we conclude that I ′ is I0-strongly order local.
In order to solve I0-ground reachability problems, we apply the algorithm
defined in section 5.4. Since L′I is finite and I ′ is I0-strongly order local, by
lemmas (43, 44, 46, 47 and 48) we deduce the following theorem:
Theorem 13 The I0-ground reachability problem is decidable.
5.8 Decidability of reachability problems for subterm conver-
gent theories
In this section, we give a decidability result for the reachability problems for
a class of subterm convergent equational theories. We recall that subterm con-
vergent equational theories have finite variant property [86]. The result of this
section is entailed by a more general result by Baudet [31], but the proof here in
this specific case is much shorter.
We recall that F is a set of functions symbols and we denote byH a subterm
convergent equational theory and by I0 = 〈F ,L0,H〉 the initial deduction sys-
tem such that L0 is the union of functions x1, . . . , xn → f(x1, . . . , xn) for some
function symbols f ∈ F .
Definition 54 (Subterm convergent theories.) An equational theory H is subterm
convergent if it is generated by a convergent rewriting system R and for each rule
l→ r ∈ R, r is a strict subterm of l.
In the rest of this section, we give an algorithm to decide the following reacha-
bility problem, “I0-Reachability Problem”:
Input: An I0-constraint system C.
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Output: SAT if and only if there exists a substitution σ such that σ |=I0 C.
We let I ′ = 〈F ,L′, ∅〉 to be the saturated deduction system, we recall that I ′
is I0-strongly order local. We suppose that r /∈ l˜ for all rules l˜ → r ∈ L′ that is
rules not satisfying this property will be deleted.
In the following lemma we prove that, in the case of subterm convergent
equational theories and under our assumption on the form of initial deduction
rules L0, Saturation terminates and the obtained new rules are decreasing.
Lemma 53 The saturation of L0 terminates and for every rule l˜ → r ∈ L′ \ L0 there
exists a term s ∈ l˜ such that r is a strict subterm of s.
PROOF.
Let l˜ → r ∈ L′ \ L0 and let us prove that this rule satisfies the following
property: there is a term s ∈ l˜ such that r ∈ SSub(s). By induction on the
number of saturations needed to obtain a rule l˜→ r.
Let us first prove this property is true for rules obtained by the step 1 of
the saturation. By definition of H, by the fact that variants of term are in nor-
mal form and given the assumption that all original rules are x1, . . . , xn →
f(x1, . . . , xn), this implies:
(f(x1, . . . , xn)θ)↓ ∈ SSub(f(x1, . . . , xn)θ)
Thus, there exists i such that: (f(x1, . . . , xn)θ)↓ ∈ Sub(xiθ)
If there is equality, the rule is removed (since r /∈ l˜ for all rules l˜ → r). This
implies that all rules obtained from step 1 of saturation satisfies the property.
Since L0 is finite and since subterm convergent equational theories have finite
variant property [86], first step of saturation terminates. Since u ∈ SSub(v)
implies u ≺ v, rules obtained by step 1 are decreasing. Let L be the set of rules
obtained by step 1 and let us prove that rules obtained by closure satisfy the
property. Let us prove it for the first rule obtained by closure. By definition
of closure rule and since rules in L \ L0 are decreasing, the first closure will
be applied on rules x1 . . . , xn → f(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ L0 and f(s1, . . . , sn), l˜ → r ∈
L \ L0. Again by definition of closure, the obtained rule is s1, . . . , sn, l˜ → r. By
definition of decreasing rule, there is a term u ∈
{
f(s1, . . . , sn), l˜
}
such that r ∈
SSub(u), if u = l˜ then the new rule satisfies the property and if u = f(s1, . . . , sn)
then there is an integer i such that r ∈ Subsi. If r ∈ SSubsi the obtained rule
satisfies the property else the rule can not be in L′ (since rules l → r with r ∈ l
are deleted). We conclude that the first rule obtained by closure is decreasing
and if we apply again closure, it will be applied on a rule in L0 and a rule not
in L0. We conclude that rules obtained by step 2 satisfy the property and are
decreasing . We conclude also that step 2 terminates. 
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We recall that increasing rules are of form x1, . . . , xn → f(x1, . . . , xn) for a
function symbol f ∈ F (Lemma 53).
5.8.1 Decidability result
We recall that our goal is to solve I0-reachability problem.
Algorithm. Let C0 = ((E0i ` v0i )i∈{1,...,n},U0).
Step 1: Guess a variant I0-constraint system associated to C0. Let
C = (E ′1 B t′1, . . . , E ′n B t′n) be the variant I0-constraint system associ-
ated to C0. C is constructed from C0 as given in Definition 28 (Chapter
2).
We remark that this step terminates and it is also correct (Lemma 44) and
complete (Lemma 43). Unless otherwise specified, I ′ is the deduction system
implicit in all notations in the rest of this section.
We now introduce the notation Binc to denote a deduction constraint that
has to be solved using only increasing rules. We say a constraint E Binc t is in
solved form if t is a variable. The constraint system is in solved form if all the
deduction constraints are in solved form. The application of a decreasing rule
l˜→ r on a constraint EB t is defined as follows, and in accordance with the fact
that I ′ is I0-strongly order local.
• let σ be the mgu of the terms in l˜ \ X with a subset F of E \ X
• if {x1, . . . , xk} = l˜ ∩ X , replace Cα, E B t, Cβ with:
(Cα, E Binc x1, . . . , E Binc xk, E ∪ {r}B t, C ′β)σ
Where C ′β is constructed from Cβ by adding r to each left-hand side. This
last construction aims at preserving the inclusion of knowledge sets.
Step 2. Iterate until the constraint system is in solved form or un-
solvable:
1. Put all tagged deduction constraints E Binc t in solved form;
2. If all constraints preceding an untagged EB t are in solved form,
Apply non-deterministically |Sub(E) \ V ar(E)| decreasing rules
on E. Replace E B t by the obtained deduction constraints, all
tagged with inc.
Let us prove the completeness and termination of Step 2.
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Completeness. The proof of the following lemma is trivial by the form of in-
creasing rules.
Lemma 54 If σ |= E Binc f(t1, . . . , tn) then either f(t1, . . . , tn)σ ∈ Eσ or
x1, . . . , xn → f(x1, . . . , xn) will be in L0 and for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} we have
σ |= E Binc ti.
The first part of the iteration consists either in transforming a deduction con-
straint EBinc f(t1, . . . , tn) into EBinc t1, . . . , EBinc tn, or in unifying f(t1, . . . , tn)
with e ∈ E. By Lemma 54, given a ground substitution σ such that σ |=
EBinc f(t1, . . . , tn) there exists a sequence of choices reducing EBinc f(t1, . . . , tn)
to a (possibly empty) set of deduction constraintsEτBincu1, . . . EτBincuk where
the u1, . . . , uk are variables or constants. If there is a constant which is not in Eτ
the constraint is not satisfiable (by definition of increasing rules), and the se-
quence of choices fails.
Let us now consider the second part of the iteration.
Lemma 55 Assume σ |= EBincx with x the first variable in the sequence of deduction
constraints such that t ∈ Sub(xσ) for some ground term t. Then either there exists
u ∈ Sub(E) such that uσ = t or t ∈ EσL′inc .
PROOF.
Let us assume there does not exist u ∈ Sub(E) such that uσ = t. By minimal-
ity of x and the determinacy of constraint systems we have t /∈ Sub(V ar(E)σ).
Since Sub(Eσ) = Sub(E)σ ∪ Sub(V ar(E)σ) we have t /∈ Sub(Eσ) and, by hy-
pothesis on x and t, t ∈ Sub(xσ). Since σ |= E Binc x consider a derivation
E1 = Eσ → . . . → En−1 ∪ xσ, and let i be minimal such that t ∈ Sub(Ei). The
index i exists since t ∈ Sub(xσ), and is different from 1 since t /∈ Sub(Eσ). By
definition of the increasing rules we then must have Ei = Ei−1, t. 
Consider a I ′-constraint system C = (Cα, EB t, Cβ) satisfied by a substitution
σ and all deduction constraints in Cα are in solved form. By Lemma 53 and
by the facts that I ′ is I0-strongly order local and r /∈ l˜ for all rules l˜ → r ∈ L′,
all decreasing rules applied on Eσ yield a term in Sub(Eσ). Thus there are
at most |Sub(E) \ V ar(E)| different terms that can be obtained by decreasing
rule starting from Eσ and which are not in Sub(V ar(E)σ). Assume a term t
is in Sub(V ar(E)σ) \ Sub(E)σ, and let x be the first variable (in the ordering
of deduction constraints) such that t ∈ Sub(xσ). By definition of constraint
systems there exists a deduction constraint Ex Binc x in Cα. Since Ex ⊆ E, by
Lemma 55, we have t ∈ ExσL
′
inc . Again, since Exσ ⊆ Eσ, this implies t ∈
Eσ
L′inc : the decreasing rule was not useful, and can be replaced by a sequence
of derivation ending with an increasing rule. Thus in Eσ at most |Sub(E) \
V ar(E)| terms are deducible using decreasing rules that can not be deduced
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with increasing rules. Thus, after a right choice of at most |Sub(E) \ V ar(E)|
decreasing rules, all terms deducible from the obtained knowledge set can be
deduced using only increasing rules, hence the tagging with inc of the final
deduction constraint E ∪ {r1, . . . , rk}Binc t, k = |Sub(E) \ V ar(E)|.
Termination of Step 2. First let us notice that if a unification is chosen, it uni-
fies two subterms of the constraint system in the empty theory, and thus either
the two terms were already equal or it reduces strictly the number of variables
in the constraint system. Thus the number of unification choices is bounded by
the number of variables in the constraint system. Once all unification have been
performed, the termination of the first part of the iteration can easily be proved
by considering the multiset of the right-hand side of the deduction constraints,
ordered by the extension to multisets of the (well-founded) subterm ordering.
The second part of the iteration obviously terminates. Thus each iteration ter-
minates. Since each iteration decreases strictly the number of non-labelled de-
duction constraints, Step 2. terminates.
5.9 Related works
Several decidability results have been obtained for cryptographic protocols in
a similar setting [15, 156, 16, 178]. These results have been extended to handle
algebraic properties of cryptographic primitives [68, 70, 66, 9]. In [10], a de-
cidability result was given to the ground reachability problems in the case of
subterm convergent equational theories. This result was extended in [9] and
a decidability result to the ground reachability problems in the case of locally
stable AC-convergent equational theories was given. Moreover, again in [9], a
decidability result was given to the ground reachability problems for the theory
of blind signature [136] while this theory was not included in [10]. To obtain
a decidability result for the theory of blind signature, M. Abadi and V. Cortier
[9] use a new extended definition of subterm. The result obtained in [10] was
extended in [31] in different way than in [9] and a decidability result was ob-
tained to the general reachability problem for the class of subterm convergent
equational theory. The first result of our chapter is a decidability result to the
ground reachability problems for a class of equational theories which includes
the class studied in [10]. We note that the class studied in [9] is incomparable
to ours and we note also that the proof used in [9] to decide the ground reach-
ability problems for the theory of blind signature is different from the ours.
Another result of this chapter is a decidability result to the general reachability
problem for a class of equational theories under some conditions on the deduc-
tion systems and the class studied in [31] is incomparable with ours. In [40], a
decidability result was given to the general reachability problems under some
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syntactic conditions on the intruder deduction rules, this result is incomparable
with ours.
5.10 Conclusion
In [80], H. Comon-Lundh proposes a two-steps strategy for solving general
reachability problems: first, decide ground reachability problems and, second,
reduce general reachability problems to ground reachability ones, e.g. by pro-
viding a bound on the size of a minimal solution of a problem. Our results
are in this line: for contracting deduction systems, general reachability can be
reduced to ground reachability. We strongly conjecture that it permits one to
provide a bound on the size of minimal solutions. Thus, this chapter adds a
new criterion to the one already known for deciding reachability problems. In
future works, we will investigate how the construction presented here can be
extended to equational theories having the finite variant property w.r.t. a non-
empty equational theory. We will also try to weaken the definition of µ(T ) for
a set of terms T . In the next chapter, we employ similar techniques to solve
ground entailment problems for saturated first-order theories.
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Chapter 6
Decidability of ground entailment
problems for saturated sets of
clauses
In this chapter, we study the ground entailment problems in the
first order logic, and more precisely the ground entailment problems
for a set of first order clauses. For clauses and Horn clauses sets,
the satisfiability and ground entailment problems are undecidable.
Many decidability results have been obtained for several fragments
of first order logic [150, 28, 84, 180, 205]. In this chapter, we introduce
a new fragment of first order logic and we prove the decidability of
its ground entailment problem using the selected resolution, and a
special ordering over atoms and terms. We then show how to use this
result in order to decide the insecurity problem for cryptographic
protocols in the case of bounded number of sessions.
Outline of the chapter We introduce in Section 6.1 the basic
notions of this chapter including clauses, ground entailment prob-
lems, and resolution methods. In Section 6.2, we mention some
obtained decidability results for the ground entailment problem,
and in Section 6.3 we show that the ground entailment problem
and satisfiability problem in first order logic can be used to analyse
cryptographic protocols and we mention some obtained results in
that field. In Section 6.4, we introduce our modelisation of cryp-
tographic protocols using first order clauses and we show how to
reduce insecurity problem for cryptographic protocols to ground
entailment problem in the first order logic. In Section 6.5, we present
selected resolution for which we show soundness and completeness,
we introduce a new fragment of first order logic and we show the
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decidability of its ground entailment problem. The conclusion is
given in Section 6.6.
6.1 Preliminaries
6.1.1 Basic notions
We assume that we have an infinite set of variables X , an infinite set of con-
stant symbols C, a set of predicate symbols P and a set of function symbols
F . We associate the function arity to function symbols and predicate symbols,
arity : F ∪ P → N. The arity of a function symbol (respectively predicate sym-
bol) indicates the number of arguments that the function symbol (respectively
the predicate symbol) expects. We define the set of terms T (F ,X ) as follows:
X , C ⊆ T (F ,X ), and for each function symbol f ∈ F with arity n ≥ 0, for each
terms t1, . . . , tn ∈ T (F ,X ), we have f(t1, . . . , tn) ∈ T (F ,X ). We define atoms as
follows: if I is a predicate symbol in P with arity n ≥ 0, and t1, . . . , tn are terms
in T (F ,X ), then I(t1, . . . , tn) is an atom. A literal L is either positive literal A or
negative literal¬AwhereA is an atom, and¬ denotes the negation. A (full) clause
is a formula of the form Γ→ ∆, where Γ and ∆ are sets of atoms; Γ represents the
antecedent of the clause and ∆ its succedent. A clause {A1, . . . , Am} → {B1, . . . , Bn}
may also be viewed as a set of literals {¬A1, . . . ,¬Am, B1, . . . , Bn}. The an-
tecedent of the clause represents its the negative literals, and the succedent of
the clause represents its positive literals. A clause Γ→ ∆ is Horn when ∆ is a sin-
gleton or empty. A clause Γ → ∆ is unit when it has only one literal, i.e. either
Γ is a singleton and ∆ = ∅, or Γ = ∅ and ∆ is a singleton. A clause Γ→ ∆ is pos-
itive when it has only a succedent, i.e. Γ = ∅ and a clause is negative when it has
only an antecedent, i.e. ∆ = ∅. We will write Γ1,Γ2 to indicate the union of sets
and usually omit braces, for example, writing Γ, A or A,Γ for the union of {A}
and Γ or writing A1, . . . , Am → B1, . . . , Bn for {A1, . . . , Am} → {B1, . . . , Bn}.
We also make more simplifications, by writing A for the positive unit clause
∅ → A, and ¬A for the negative unit clause A → ∅. If C is a clause, by ¬C
we denote the set of unit Horn clauses ¬L, with L a literal in C, for example,
¬C = {A1, . . . , Am,¬B1, . . . ,¬Bn} for C = A1, . . . , Am → B1, . . . , Bn. We say
that a term t occurs in an atom A if A is of the form I(. . . , t, . . .) and t occurs in
a clause if it occurs in an atom of the clause. If M is an expression (i.e. a term,
an atom, clause, or a set of such objects), and σ is a substitution, then Mσ is
obtained by applying σ to M as usually defined. We also extend as usual the
notation of unifiers from terms to atoms, for example, the atoms I(a), I ′(b, x)
are not unifiable while the atoms I(x), I(a) are unifiable and their most gen-
eral unifier is σ = {x 7→ a}. An expression is ground if it does not contain any
variables.
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Herbrand interpretations. A (Herbrand) interpretation is a set of ground atoms.
A ground atom A is true in the interpretation Int if A ∈ Int, and it is false oth-
erwise. A ground clause Γ → ∆ is satisfied by Int if either Γ 6⊆ Int or else
∆ ∩ Int 6= ∅. We also say that a ground clause C is true in Int, if C is satisfied
by Int, and that C is false in Int otherwise. An interpretation Int satisfies a
non-ground clause if it satisfies all ground instances of that clause. For any in-
terpretation Int, we never have Int satisfies C and ¬C in the same time, where
C is a clause. An interpretation Int is an (Herbrand) model of a clause C if it satis-
fies the clause, and Int is a model of a set of clauses S if it satisfies all clauses in
S. A clause (or a set of clauses) is satisfiable if it has a model, and unsatisfiable
otherwise. We say that the set of clauses S entails the clause C (or C is logical
consequence of S), and write S |= C, if C is true in every model of S. It is easy to
see that S |= C if and only if S ∪ ¬C is unsatisfiable.
Ground entailment problem. Given a set of clauses S, the (ground) entailment
problem for S is defined as follows:
Input : a ground clause C
Output : entailed if and only if S |= C
The goal of this chapter is to provide conditions on S which make its
ground entailment problem decidable.
Inference rules. An inference rule is described as follows:
C1 C2 . . . Cn
C
where C1 . . . , Cn (the premises) and C (the conclusion) are clauses.
We call an inference system any set of inference rules.
Refutational and direct proofs. Let J be an inference system, and let S be a set
of clauses and C be a ground clause. A refutational proof of S |= C is a tree whose
root is labelled by the empty clause, and whose internal nodes are labelled by
results of the applications of inference rules in J on their direct descendents and
whose leaves are ground instances of clauses in S or unit clauses ¬L, with L a
literal in C. We call the inference rule applied on the direct descendent of the
root the end inference rule of the proof. We say that the ∅ clause is derived from
S ∪ ¬C if there exists a refutational proof of S |= C.
When S is a set of Horn clauses, a direct proof of a ground atom A is an un-
ordered tree, labelled by atoms, whose root is A and whose subtrees are direct
proof of atoms that constitute the antecedent of a ground instance of a clause in
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S with succedent A. Leaves are ground instances of positive unit clauses in S.
A direct proof of a ground clause A1, . . . , An → B from S is a direct proof of B
from S ∪ {A1, . . . , An}.
A term t occurs in either kind of proof if t occurs in a clause or in an atom
labelling the proof tree and an atom A occurs in either kind of proof if A occurs
in a clause labelling the proof tree. If pi is a proof, by Terms(pi) (respectively
µ(pi)) we denote the set of terms (respectively set of atoms) occurring in pi.
An inference system J is said to be complete if the empty clause can be de-
rived from any unsatisfiable set of clauses. An inference system J is said to be
sound if the empty clause can not derived from any satisfiable set of clauses. It
is easy to see that S |= C if and only if the ∅ clause is derived from S ∪ ¬C for
any complete and sound inference system J.
In the rest of this chapter, we will be interested only by the refutational
proofs, and for simplicity, we will write proofs instead of refutational
proofs. In addition, when the inference system is complete and sound,
we will abuse the notation and use the notation S |= C to mean that there
is a proof of S |= C.
6.1.2 Resolution
The resolution is one of the most successful methods for automated proof
search. It was developed in [176]. We introduce in this section some of the
well-known resolution inference strategies. Some of these strategies use order-
ings, transitive and irreflexive binary relations, on atoms and terms. We denote
by a the ordering on atoms and by t the ordering on terms.
(Binary) Resolution
The (binary) resolution is described by the following two inference rules:
Resolution
Γ→ ∆, A A′,Γ′ → ∆′
(Γ,Γ′ → ∆,∆′)α
where α is the most general unifier of A and A′.
The clause (Γ,Γ′ → ∆,∆′)α is called a resolvent of the premises or a conclusion
of the inference, and the atom Aα is called the resolved atom.
Factoring
Γ→ ∆, A,A′
(Γ→ ∆, A)α
where α is the most general unifier of A and A′.
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The clause (Γ → ∆, A)α is called a factor of the premise or a conclusion of the
inference, and the atom Aα is called the factored atom.
(Binary) resolution is a refutationally complete theorem proving method: the empty
clause (i.e., a contradiction) can be derived from any unsatisfiable set of clauses.
The search of a contradiction proceeds by saturating the given set of clauses,
that is, systematically applying all inferences rules until no more new clauses
can be added [176].
Ordered Resolution
Ordered resolution is described by the following two inference rules:
Ordered resolution
Γ→ ∆, A A′,Γ′ → ∆′
(Γ,Γ′ → ∆,∆′)α
where α is the most general unifier of A and A′,
Aα is strictly maximal with respect to Γα, ∆α,
and Aα is maximal with respect to Γ′α, ∆′α.
Ordered factoring
Γ→ ∆, A,A′
(Γ→ ∆, A)α
where α is the most general unifier of A and A′,
Aα is strictly maximal with respect to Γα,
and maximal with respect to ∆α.
Ordered resolution (respectively ordered factoring) inference rule requires that
there is no atom in the conclusion greater than the resolved (respectively fac-
tored) atom. Ordered resolution, i.e. ordered resolution inference rule together
with ordered factoring rule, is refutationally complete and sound, and hence,
for any set S of clauses, S is unsatisfiable if and only if empty clause can be
derived from S [24].
We remark that not every ground instance of an inference by ordered resolu-
tion is an inference by ordered resolution. For example, let Inf be the following
inference by ordered resolution
I(y)→ I ′(x) I ′(x′), I(y′)→ I ′′(y′)
I(y), I(y′)→ I ′′(y′)
The most general unifier of I ′(x), I ′(x′) is α = {x′ 7→ x}. By definition of
ordered resolution inference, we have that I(yα) 6≥ I ′(xα), I(y′α) 6> I ′(xα),
and I ′′(y′α) 6> I ′(xα). Let the ground substitution σ be such that σ = αα′,
I(yσ) > I(y′σ) > I ′′(y′σ) > I ′(xσ) and I ′(xσ) = I ′(x′σ). Infσ is a ground
instance of Inf , and it is easy to see that Infσ is not an inference by ordered
resolution.
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Remarks. All these resolution inference rules have two premises. We implicitly
suppose here that these premises do not share variables, which can be obtained
by renaming the variables of one of the premises. Note that, by the defini-
tion of clauses, the same literal can not appear twice in a clause, for example
the clause A1, A1, A2 → B1, B2 is not permitted. Indeed, we suppose that the
resolution inference rules contain an implicit factorisation which immediately
replaces A,A,Γ → ∆ (respectively Γ → B,B,∆) by A,Γ → ∆ (respectively
Γ→ B,∆).
6.1.3 Orderings
We shall make use of various ordering relations on expressions. A (strict) order-
ing  on a set of elements E is a transitive and irreflexive binary relation on E.
The ordering  is said to be:
• well-founded if there is no infinite descending chain e  e1  . . . for any
element e in E
• monotone if e  e′ then eσ  e′σ for any elements e, e′ in E and any substi-
tution σ
• stable if e  e′ then u[e]  u[e′] for any elements u, e and e′ in E
• subterm if e[e′]  e′ for any elements e, e′ in E
• complete if it is total over ground elements of E
Any ordering  on a set E can be extended to an ordering set on finite sets
over E as follows: if η1 and η2 are two finite sets over E, we have η1 set η2 if
(i) η1 6= η2 and (ii) whenever for every e ∈ η2 \ η1 then there is e′ ∈ η1 \ η2 such
that e′  e. Given a set, any smaller set is obtained by replacing an element
by a (possibly empty) set of strictly smaller elements. We will call an element e
maximal (respectively strictly maximal) with respect to a set η of elements, if for
any element e′ in η we have e′ 6 e (respectively e′ 6 e). Similarly, any ordering
 on a set E can be extended to an ordering mul on finite multisets over E
as follows: if ξ1 and ξ2 are two finite multisets over E, we have ξ1 mul ξ2
if (i) ξ1 6= ξ2 and (ii) whenever ξ2(e) > ξ1(e) then ξ1(e′) > ξ2(e′), for some e′
such that e′  e; ξ(e) denotes the number of occurrences of e in the multiset
ξ, and > denotes the standard “greater-than” relation on the natural numbers.
Given a multiset, any smaller multiset is obtained by replacing an element by
occurrences of smaller elements. We will call an element emaximal (respectively
strictly maximal) with respect to a multiset ξ of elements, if for any element e′ in
ξ we have e′ 6 e (respectively e′ 6 e).
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If the ordering  is total (respectively, well-founded), so is its multiset ex-
tension [1]. It is easy to see that if the ordering  is total (respectively, well-
founded), so is its set extension: actually, by definition of multisets, a set is a
multiset; since the multiset extensionmul of a total (respectively well-founded)
order  is also total (respectively well-founded) [1], we deduce that the set ex-
tension set of a total (respectively well-founded) order  is also total (respec-
tively well-founded).
Clause and proof orderings. By an atom ordering (respectively term ordering) we
mean an arbitrary ordering on atoms (respectively on terms). To extend an atom
orderinga to an ordering on clauses, we identify a (positive or negative) literal
A with a set {A}, and a clause with the union of its literals, or more precisely
with the union of sets of atoms identifying its literals. For example, the clause
A1, A2 → B is identified with the following union of literals ¬A1∪¬A2∪B, that
is with the following union of sets of atoms {A1}∪{A2}∪{B}which is equal to
the set of atoms {A1, A2, B}. From now on, we denote by µ(C) the set of atoms
representing the clause C, that is the set of atoms equal to the union of the set of
atoms identifying its literals. For example µ(A1, A2 → B) = {A1, A2, B}. Then,
for clausesC andC ′, we defineCcC ′ if and only if the set of atoms representing
C is strictly bigger than the set of atoms representing C ′ for the set extension of
a, that is µ(C)asetµ(C ′). Clearly, if the ordering a is well-founded and total
on ground atoms, so is its extension to ground clauses. We extend the definition
of µ from a clause to a set of clauses, let S be a set of clauses, S = {C1, . . . , Cn},
µ(S) = µ(C1) ∪ . . . ∪ µ(Cn) = ∪ni=1µ(Ci). By definition of proofs, each atom that
appears in a proof belongs to a clause labelling one of its leaves. We extend next
the atom ordering to an ordering on proofs. If pi is a proof, the set leaves(pi)
denotes the set of clauses labelling its leaves, and µ(pi) = µ(leaves(pi)). More
precisely µ(pi) is the union of set of atoms identifying clauses labelling its leaves.
For example, let the proof pi given as below:
∅→C C→A,B B→∅
C→A
∅→A
A→B B→∅
A→∅
∅
leaves(pi) is equal to the following set of clauses {∅ → C;C → A,B;A→ B;B →
∅}, and µ(pi) = {A,B,C}. Let pi, pi′ be two proofs, we define pippi′ if and only if
µ(pi)asetµ(pi′).
6.2 Decidable fragments of first order logic
It is known that the ground entailment problem for Horn clauses and full
clauses sets is undecidable. Here, we mention some obtained decidability re-
sults under some restrictions.
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6.2.1 McAllester’s work
McAllester’s work [150] is based on Horn clauses. He defined a set of Horn
clauses S to be subterm local if for every ground Horn clause C, we have S |= C
if and only ifC is entailed from a set of ground instances of clauses in S in which
all terms are subterms of ground terms in S and C. He proved that if a set S of
Horn clauses is finite and subterm local then its ground entailment problem is
decidable.
6.2.2 Basin and Ganzinger work
In their work, D. Basin and H. Ganzinger [28] generalised McAllester’s work
by allowing arbitrary term ordering, any strict well-founded order over terms,
and full (not Horn) clauses. We recall some definitions used by D. Basin and
H. Ganzinger. A set of clauses S is said to be order local with respect to a term
ordering  if for every ground clause C, we have S |= C if and only if C is
entailed from a set of ground instances of clauses in S in which each term is
smaller than or equal (under the ) to some term in C. A term ordering  is
said to be of complexity f, g, whenever for each clause of size n (the size of a
term is the number of nodes in its tree representation, and the size of a clause is
the sum of sizes of its terms) there exists O(f(n)) terms that are smaller or equal
(under ) to a term in the clause, and that may be enumerated in time g(n). It
is easy to see that if  is of complexity f, g, each ground term has finitely many
smaller terms that may be enumerated in finite time. D. Basin and H. Ganzinger
obtained the following results:
1. If S is a set of Horn clauses that is order local with respect to a term or-
dering  of complexity f, g then the ground entailment problem for S is
decidable.
2. If S is a set of (full) clauses that is order local with respect to a term order-
ing  of complexity f, g then the disentailment ground problem for S is
decidable.
In [28], D. Basin and H. Ganzinger showed that the saturation of a set S of Horn
clauses and hence (full) clauses is not sufficient to obtain the decidability of the
ground entailment problem for S. To show this, they considered the following
example. We recall that for arbitrary Horn clause sets, the satisfiability and
ground entailment problems are undecidable.
Example 25 Let S be an arbitrary set of Horn clauses, and let S ′ consist of the set
of Horn clauses q(a),Γ → A such that Γ → A is in S. Choose an ordering ≺ such
that a is the maximal term. For any compatible atom ordering, there is no ordered
inferences from S ′, and hence S ′ is saturated under ordered resolution. It is undecidable
if S ′ |= ¬q(a) since this is equivalent to the inconsistency of S.
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In [28], D. Basin and H. Ganzinger showed that restrictions on occurrences of
variables can lead to decidability for full and hence also Horn clauses. This
result is given as follows:
If S is a set of (full) clauses saturated up to redundancy under ordered res-
olution with respect to a complete well-founded ordering over atoms, and
if, for each clause in S, each of its maximal atoms contains all the variables
of the clause, then the ground entailment problem for S is decidable.
6.3 From cryptographic protocols to logic of clauses
Lots of researchers [84, 82, 180, 187, 205] have been interested by clauses and
Horn clauses in order to analyse cryptographic protocols. In this line of re-
search, many models have been given. In the most common models, intruder
behaviour, protocol description and security properties are encoded as clauses
and in particular as Horn clauses; and, the insecurity problem of the crypto-
graphic protocol is reduced to the satisfiability problem for a class of Horn
clauses. While the satisfiability problem for first order logic is undecidable in
general, several classes have been proved to be decidable [60], and in Section
6.2, we mentioned some of them. In this section, we focus on the fragments of
first order logic which are well-suited to modelling security protocols. In sec-
tions 6.3.1, 6.3.2 and 6.3.3, we present some of such fragments that are shown to
be decidable, and in Section 6.4 we introduce our result. In what follows, a class
of clauses means a set of sets of clauses. In Sections 6.3.1 and 6.3.2, we assume
a unique unary predicate symbol I .
6.3.1 Comon-Lundh and Cortier work
H. Comon-Lundh and V. Cortier [84] were focused on the secrecy property. In
[82], they have showed that, for the secrecy property, it is sufficient to verify the
correctness of the protocol for only k honest agents and one dishonest agent,
k being the number of roles in the protocol. In [84], they represented the ca-
pacities of the intruder (respectively the description of the protocol and the
intruder knowledge) by a set of Horn clauses, and the secrecy property by a
negative unit Horn clause. They reduced the insecurity problem to the satisfi-
ability problem of the set of clauses constructed from the intruder clauses and
the clauses modelising the protocol, intruder knowledge and security goal (se-
crecy property). Assuming CI to be a class of Horn clauses containing at most
one function symbol, and CP to be a class of Horn clauses containing at most
one variable, CI represents the class of intruder clauses, and CP represents the
modelisation of the protocol. As noticed in [84], the protocols with single blind
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copying, i.e. protocols for which, at each step of the protocol, at most one mes-
sage is blindly copied, fall into the class CP. While not all intruder clauses fall
into the class CI , for example the intruder clause I({x}py), I(y−1) → I(x) repre-
senting the asymmetric decryption does not fall in CI , H. Comon-Lundh and V.
Cortier proposed a solution. As showed in [82], one needs to consider only a
finite number of agents. H. Comon-Lundh and V. Cortier proposed to replace
each problematic intruder clause, that is each intruder clause that does not fall
in CI , by a finite set of Horn clauses where the terms dependent from the agents
(for example, a secret key of an agent) are replaced by constants (agents param-
eters). The finiteness of this set is guaranteed by the fact that we need only a
finite number of agents. For example, the Horn clause I({x}py), I(y−1) → I(x)
can be replaced by the Horn clause I({x}ppk(a)), I(sk(a)) → I(x) if we consider
a unique agent, a. In many cases, for example in the case of Dolev-Yao rules,
the set of Horn clauses replacing a problematic Horn clause fall in CP. Further-
more, CP contains all ground Horn clauses, hence clauses modelling the initial
intruder knowledge and the secrecy property fall in the class. H. Comon-Lundh
and V. Cortier showed that the satisfiability problem of a set of clauses of CI∪CP
is decidable in 3-EXPTIME, and H. Seidl and K. Verma [187] have shown that
satisfiability is in fact DEXPTIME-complete.
6.3.2 Zalinescu’s work
In [205], E. Zalinescu extended the result obtained in [84] to a larger class of
clauses. Indeed, the prefix property, that is the ability of the intruder to get
from any encrypted message the encryption of any of its prefixes, which is
represented by the Horn clause Cpre = I({< x, y >}z) → I({x}z) does not
fall in neither CI nor CP, and can not be replaced by a set of clauses falling
in CP. The same problem arises with the Horn clause representing blind sig-
nature Cbsig = I(sig(blind(x, y), z), I(y) → I(sig(x, z)). In order to extend in-
truder power to clauses likeCpre andCbsig, E. Zalinescu defined a class of special
clauses, CS , defined as follows. Given a strict and total ordering over function
symbols, he considered a special function symbol f0 which is the smaller over
the function symbols, and CS is the class of Horn clauses of the form
I(f0(u(g(y1, . . . , yk)), v)),
p∧
i=1
I(wi(g(y1, . . . , yk))),
q∧
l=1
I(yil)→ I(f0(yj, z))
where {j, i1, . . . , iq} ⊆ {1, . . . , k}, p, q ≤ 0, u, wi are ground contexts, v is a
term with var(v) = {z}, g 6= f0 and I(f0(u(g(y1, . . . , yk)), v)) is greater than any
other atom in the clause. He introduced also the notion of well-behaved term and
well-behaved clause. A term is well-behaved if for any of its subterms of the form
f0(u, v), the following two implications hold:
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if var(u) 6= ∅ then v is a constant;
if var(v) 6= ∅ then u is a ground term.
A clause in CS is well-behaved if the terms u, v and wi, for all i, are well-behaved.
A clause not in CS is well-behaved if for any atom I(w) in the clause, w is well-
behaved. E. Zalinescu showed that if I, P, S are finite set of clauses included
respectively in the classes CI , CP and CS , and if I ∪ S is saturated by a variant of
ordered resolution with respect to a monotone atom ordering and P ∪ S is well-
behaved then the satisfiability of I ∪P ∪ S is decidable.
6.3.3 Delaune, Lin and Lynch work
In [180], S. Delaune, H. Lin and Ch. Lynch introduced flexible and rigid clauses.
A rigid clause is a clause where variables are only allowed to have one instan-
tiation, and a flexible clause is a clause where variables are allowed as many
instantiations as desired. S. Delaune, H. Lin and Ch. Lynch assume a finite set of
unary predicate symbols P , and a well-founded and total ordering > over P .
Furthermore, they considered an embedding ordering  over term which is then
extended to an atom ordering. They defined intruder clauses as defined in [84],
that is with a unique function symbol, and then they extended this definition.
To this end, they introduced a special flexible Horn clause of the form
I0(f0(g(x1, . . . , xp), y2, . . . , yq), I1(xi1), . . . , Im(xim)→ Im+1(f0(xi0 , y2, . . . , yq))
where f0 6= g, xij ∈ {x1, . . . , xp} for every j ∈ {0, . . . ,m}, and Ij ∈ P for all
j.They defined a protocol clause to be a rigid Horn clause of the form
I1(u1), . . . , In(un)→ I0(u0)
where var(u0) ⊆ var({u1, . . . , un}), and I0 ≥ Ii for all i. Note also that intruder
knowledge and the secrecy goal, represented as before, are considered as proto-
col clauses. They defined intruder theory as follows. Assuming CI to be a finite
set of intruder clauses, CS a special clause such that CI ∪ CS is saturated by or-
dered resolution, and the unique predicate symbol in CI ∪CS is I . The intruder
theory ICI∪CS is the set of clauses which contains I1(u1), . . . , In(un) → I0(u0) if
and only if
I0, . . . , In ∈ P and I0 ≥ Ii for all i, and
I(u1), . . . , I(un)→ I(u0) ∈ CI ∪ {CS, I(x)→ I(x)}
S. Delaune, H. Lin and Ch. Lynch reduced the insecurity problem to a satis-
fiability problem defined as follows. The insecurity problem takes as input a
finite set CP of protocol clauses, a finite set CI of intruder clauses and a special
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clause CS where I is the unique predicate symbols used in CI∪CS and such that
CI ∪CS is saturated by ordered resolution. This insecurity problem outputs un-
sat if and only if CPθ∪ICI∪CS is unsatisfiable, for a substitution θ grounding for
CP. S. Delaune, H. Lin and Ch. Lynch showed the decidability of this problem.
While in the above sections (Section 6.3.1, 6.3.2 and 6.3.3), the secrecy prop-
erty is the unique studied security property, other security properties can also
be encoded as Horn Clauses. B. Blanchet has encoded authentication [47], and
strong secrecy [51].
6.4 Our contribution
In Section 6.3, we have presented some decidable fragments of first order logic,
and showed their use in the analysis of security protocols. To this end, in-
truder rules, protocol description and security property are represented by
Horn clauses and the insecurity problem is reduced to the satisfiability prob-
lem of a fragment of first order logic.
In this section, we present our model to analyse security protocols using
Horn clauses. As opposite to the models represented in Section 6.3, we do
not represent protocol description by Horn clauses. As showed in Chapter
2, one line of research reduces the insecurity problem of cryptographic pro-
tocols to an intruder reachability problem, also called I-reachability problem,
and in this chapter we reduce the I-reachability problem to the entailment
problem (or satisfiability problem) in first order logic. We remark that Horn
clauses and a unique unary predicate symbol I are sufficient to analyse security
protocols. The predicate symbol I represents the knowledge of the intruder:
I(m) means that the intruder knows the term (or message) m. Thus a clause
I(u1), . . . , I(un) → I(v) should be read as “if the intruder knows some mes-
sages of the form u1, . . . , un, then he knows a message of the form v”. For ex-
ample, let us consider the clause I(x), I(y) → I(< x, y >), and assume that
the intruder knows the messages a, b, then, due to the clause given above, the
intruder knows also the message < a, b >. There is thus a natural correspon-
dence between constraint systems (respectively solving of constraint systems)
and Horn clauses (respectively entailment problems).
6.4.1 Model for cryptographic protocols
Intruder clauses
Let I be an intruder and let LI be its deduction system (LI represents the
intruder capacities). LI is a set of rules of the form u1, . . . , un → v where
u1, . . . , vn, v are terms in the given algebra. The set of clauses associated with
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I is
CI
def
= {I(u1), . . . , I(un)→ I(v) such that u1, . . . , un → v ∈ LI}
Example 26 The Dolev-Yao rules presented in Chapter 2, in Example 11, more ex-
actly the rules without explicit destructors are represented by the following set of Horn
clauses:
CDY =

I(x), I(y)→ I(< x, y >)
I(x), I(y)→ I({x}sy)
I(x), I(y)→ I({x}py)
I(< x, y >)→ x
I(< x, y >)→ I(y)
I({x}sy), I(y)→ I(x)
I({x}py), I(y−1)→ I(x)
I({x}py−1), I(y)→ I(x)
Given a set of terms E, we define CE
def
= {I(u) such that u ∈ E}.
Lemma 56 LetCI be the set of clauses associated with the intruder I,E a set of ground
terms and m a ground term. If m ∈ E¯I then CE ∪ CI |= I(m).
PROOF.
Let E and m be respectively a set of ground terms and a ground term, and
assume that m ∈ E¯I . This implies that there is a derivation d starting from E of
goal m, d = E →I E1 →I . . . →I En−1,m, where Ei = Ei−1 ∪mi, E0 = E and
mn = m. We reason by induction on the lenghth of the derivation d.
• lenghth(d) = 0: then m ∈ E and thus I(m) ∈ CE which implies that
CE |= I(m) and then CE ∪ CI |= I(m).
• lenghth(d) = 1: let u1, . . . , un → v be the intruder deduction rule applied
on E in the derivation d, we have {uiσ}1≤i≤n ⊆ E and m = vσ for a ground
substitution σ. Hence, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, I(ui)σ ∈ CE which implies that
CE |= I(ui)σ. Consider an arbitrary model Int of CE ∪ CI , Int satisfies all
I(ui)σ. Let us prove that I(m) which is equal to I(v)σ is true in Int by con-
tradiction. If I(v)σ is false in Int then the clause I(u1)σ, . . . , I(un)σ → I(v)σ
is not satisfied by Int, and hence neither the clause I(u1), . . . , I(un)→ I(v)
which belong to CI . But this contradicts Int being a model of CE ∪ CI .
Thus, I(m) = I(v)σ is true in Int. We conclude that CE ∪ CI |= I(m).
• Assume that CE ∪ CI |= I(m) for any length k of the derivation d, k ≤
n and n ≥ 0, and let us prove it for lenghth(d) = n + 1. Assume that
u1, . . . , un → v be the last applied rule in the derivation d. Then all uiσ
are in En and vσ = m for a ground substitution σ. By induction we have
CE ∪CI |= I(ui)σ for all i. By the same reasoning as above, we deduce that
CE ∪ CI |= I(v)σ, and thus CE ∪ CI |= I(m).
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Again, by induction, we conclude that CE ∪ CI |= I(m) for any length of the
derivation d, and then, we conclude the proof. 
Insecurity problem of cryptographic protocols
We are concerned here with secrecy property of cryptographic protocols. We
show in this Section how secrecy property of cryptographic protocols can be
encoded as Horn clauses. As we see in the Section 6.4.1, the behaviour of the
intruder represented in Chapter 2 by a set of deduction rules can be modeled by
a set of Horn clauses. The initial knowledge of the intruder IK usually given
by a set of ground terms can be modeled by a set of clauses CIK . We show in
Chapter 2 that the insecurity problem of a protocol is reduced to a reachabil-
ity problem, and thus by constructing a constraint system for each execution of
the protocol and reducing the insecurity problem of the execution to the satis-
fiability problem of its correspondant constraint system, and hence to a reach-
ability problem. Now, we will show how to reduce the satisfiability problem
of a ground constraint system to a ground entailment problem in the first or-
der logic. Let the ground constraint system C = (E1 B t1, . . . , En B tn), for each
constraint Ei B ti ∈ C, we associate the following Horn clause CEi → I(ti).
For example, the clause I(a), I(b) → I(< a, b >) corresponds to the constraint
{a, b} B < a, b >. The constraint system C will then be associated to the set of
ground Horn clauses CC = {CE1 → I(t1), . . . , CEn → I(tn)}, and we have that C
is satisfiable if and only if CC is entailed from CI . Thus, an execution exec does
not preserve the secrecy of a message s if and only if the set of Horn clauses
CC′exec is entailed from the set of Horn clauses CI , where C
′
exec is the extended
ground constraint system representing the execution exec. The construction of
the extended constraint system C′exec from an execution exec is given in Chapter
2.
A set S1 of Horn clauses is entailed from a set S2 of Horn clauses if each clauseC
is S1 is entailed from S2. For example, S |= {C1, C2} if S |= C1 and S |= C2, S is a
set of clauses and C1, C2 are two clauses. Thus, assuming that the protocol runs
correctly (i.e. runs in presence of a passive intruder), each protocol execution is
associated to a ground constraint system, and then, the insecurity problem of
a protocol execution and hence of a cryptographic protocol under a bounded
number of sessions is reduced to the ground entailment problem for CI .
Example 27 Needham-Schroeder public key protocol.
Presentation of the protocol We consider the Needham-Schroeder symmetric key pro-
tocol [163] as an example. This protocol intends to permit Alice to establish a shared
key (session key) with Bob and to obtain mutual conviction of the possession of the key
by each other. The session key is created by a trusted server which shares a secret key
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with each partie. The protocol can be described as follows:
PNS :

1 A⇒ S : A,B,NA
2 S ⇒ A : {NA, B,KAB, {KAB, A}sKBS}sKAS
3 A⇒ B : {KAB, A}sKBS
4 B ⇒ A : {NB}sKAB
5 A⇒ B : {NB − 1}sKAB
NA (respectively NB) represents the nonce freshly created by A (respectively B), KAS
(respectively KBS) represents the secret key shared between A (respectively B) and the
trusted server, and KAB the session key shared between A and B.
The functions symbols {−}s−, {−}−1s− used in the specification of protocol given above
denotes respectively the symmetric encryption and symmetric decryption. While sym-
metric encryption has been denoted before by the symbol encs and symmetric decryption
by decs, we use here the notation {−}s−, {−}−1s− with the aim of being more readable.
In this protocol, we have three roles, the trusted server, Alice and Bob. The role
server is given by the following rule:
S1 :
v1 ⇒ {pi2(pi2(v1)), pi1(pi2(v1)), Kpi1(v1)pi1(pi2(v1)), {Kpi1(v1)pi1(pi2(v1)), pi1(v1)}sKpi1(pi2(v1))S}
s
Kpi1(v1)S
;
v1
?
= X1, Y1, Z1
The role Alice is given by the following set of rules:
A1 : ∅ ⇒ A,X2, NA; ∅
A2 : v2 ⇒ pi2(pi2(pi2({v2}−1sKAS))); v2
?
= {NA, X2, Y2, Z2}sKAS
A3 : v3 ⇒ {{v3}−1spi1(pi2(pi2({v2}−1sKAS ))) − 1}
s
pi1(pi2(pi2({v2}−1sKAS )))
;
v3
?
= {X ′2}spi1(pi2(pi2({v2}−1sKAS )))
And the role Bob is given by the following set of rules:
B1 : v4 ⇒ {NB}spi1({v4}−1sKBS ); v4
?
= {X3, Y3}sKBS
B2 : v5 ⇒ ∅; v5 ?= {NB − 1}spi1({v4}−1sKBS )
Attack on the protocol Many attacks have been discovered on this protocol, D. Den-
ning and G. Sacco [99] considered that communication keys may be compromised, and
showed that the protocol is vulnerable to reply attack. Here we concentrate on the key
exchange goal rather than on the authentication of the two parties. The key exchange
goal can be expressed by the secrecy of the nonce NB. Intuitively, if NB remains se-
cret than the key KAB has also been kept secret. We will present the attack discovered
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Figure 6.1 Attack on the Needham-Schroeder protocol
(1).1 A⇒ S : A,B,NA
(1).2 S ⇒ A : {NA, B,KAB, {KAB, A}sKBS}KAS
(2).3 I(B)⇒ A : {NA, B}KAS
(2).4 A⇒ I(B) : {N ′A}NA
by O. Pereira and J.-J. Quisquater [169], this attack described in Figure 6.1 allows, as
we will see below, the intruder to break the secrecy of NB. This attack is possible if
the encryption scheme used in the implementation of the protocol is used in the cipher-
block-chaining (CBC) mode. In the case of CBC encryption, the intruder may be able to
get from any encrypted message the encryption of any of its prefixes, and that without
knowing the encryption key: from the message {< x, y >}sz, the intruder can deduce
the message {x}sz. This property, called prefix property, is encoded by the deduction rule
{< x, y >}sz → {x}sz
and hence by the clause
Cpre = I({< x, y >}sz)→ I({x}sz)
In a first session (1), the intruder can listen to the message
{NA, B,KAB, {KAB, A}sKBS}KAS and then, using the prefix property, computes
the message {NA, B}KAS . This message is of the form Alice might expect to receive
as third message of a latter session of the protocol where Bob is considered to play
initiator’s role. Then once the message {NA, B}sKAS computed, the intruder starts a
another session of the protocol by sending to Alice the message {NA, B}KAS . Alice
thinks that Bob has started a session (2) with her and thus, Alice can be fooled into
accepting the publicly known NA as a secret key shared with Bob. Let us consider an
instance of the protocol PNS where Alice instantiates once the role A and once the role
B, Bob instantiates only once the role B and the agent s instantiates only once the role
S, Kbs denotes the secret key shared between Bob and s, and Kas denotes the secret key
shared between Alice and s.
The attack described above is a possible execution of this instance of PNS . This
execution is given by the set of rules {A1(Alice), S1(s), B1(Alice)}. At the end of this
execution, the intruder breaks the secrecy of the nonce n′a. This execution is then given
by the following set of rules:
∅ ⇒ Alice, Bob, na
v1 ⇒ {na, Bob,Kab, {Kab, Alice}sKbs}Kas ; v1
?
= Alice, Bob, na
v2 ⇒ {n′a}na ; v2 ?= {na, Bob}Kas
We associate to this execution the ground constraint system C, C = (E1 B
Alice, E1BBob,E1Bna, E1∪{na, Bob,Kab, {Kab, Alice}sKbs}sKasB{na, Bob}sKas , E1∪
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{na, Bob,Kab, {Kab, Alice}sKbs}sKas ∪ {n′a}sna B n′a) and E1 is the initial knowledge of
the intruder, E1 = {Alice, Bob, s,Kis, na}.
We associate to this ground constraint system the following set of clauses CC:
CE1 → I(Alice)
CE1 → I(Bob)
CE1 → I(na)
CE1 ∪ I({na, Bob,Kab, {Kab, Alice}Kbs}sKas)→ I({na, Bob}sKas)CE1 ∪ I({na, Bob,Kab, {Kab, Alice}sKbs}sKas) ∪ I({n′a}sna)→ I(n′a)
where CE1 = {I(Alice), I(Bob), I(s), I(Kis), I(na)}. It is easy to see that CC is en-
tailed from CI where CI = CDV ∪ Cpre.
6.5 A decidability result
In this section, we show the decidability of the ground entailment problem for a
new fragment of first order logic. To get this result, we consider a refinement of
resolution, the selected resolution, that we present in Section 6.5.1, and for which
we show the completeness and soundness. We prove our decidability result in
Section 6.5.2.
6.5.1 Selected resolution
In Section 6.1.2, we have presented the resolution and the standard ordering
refinement of resolution (the ordered resolution). In this section, we present an-
other refinement of resolution, the selected resolution (or resolution with selection)
and then show its completeness and soundness.The selected resolution is the
resolution considered in the remainder of this chapter.
A selection function is a function that will be applied to each clause and selects
(or marks) a possibly empty set of its atoms. A selection function is said to be
valid if for each clause, either all maximal atoms are selected or, at least one atom
appearing in the antecedent of the clause is selected [146].
The selection resolution has been widely studied in the literature [134, 133,
137, 146, 164]. In [134], R. Kowalski and D. Kuehner introduced the linear res-
olution with selection function, also called SL-resolution. This resolution is
closely related to D. W. Loveland’s model elimination system [143]. In [133],
R. Kowalski introduced another variation of linear resolution with selection,
which considers only Horn clauses and not general clauses as in [134]. In [146],
Ch. Lynch introduced the resolution with selection as we employ it. He as-
sumed a selection function which, for each clause, selects all maximal atoms or,
at least one atom appearing in the antecedent of the clause. He assumed also
that the resolution includes the following deletion rules: tautology deletion and
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subsumption; tautology deletion deletes any clause of the form Γ, A → ∆, A, and
subsumption deletes any clause C ′ such that there exists another clause C with
Cσ ⊆ C ′ for a substitution σ. In [164], H. De Nivelle defined another variation
of the resolution with selection, called L-ordered resolution. He assumed a selec-
tion function that, for each clause, selects the maximal atoms with respect to an
atom ordering ≺ that verifies the following property: for every atoms A,B, if
A  B then Aθ  Bθ for every substitution θ.
In this chapter, we make use of the resolution with selection introduced in
[146], and from now on, we consider only a subset of the valid selection func-
tions, namely the functions that select maximal atoms in clauses with respect
to an atom ordering. We remark that the selection functions we consider are
less general than in [146], and more general than in [164] since we consider an
arbitrary atom ordering.
Selected resolution is described by the following two inference rules:
Selected resolution
Γ→ ∆, A A′,Γ′ → ∆′
(Γ,Γ′ → ∆,∆′)α
where α is the most general unifier of A and A′,
and A,A′ are selected in their respective premises.
Selected factoring
Γ→ ∆, A,A′
(Γ→ ∆, A)α
where α is the most general unifier of A and A′,
and A or A′ is selected in the premise.
Selected resolution (respectively selected factoring) inference rule requires that
all atoms in the resolvent of two ground premises (respectively in the factor of
a ground premise) are strictly smaller than the resolved (respectively factored)
atom. We define a notion of redundancy that identifies clauses and inferences
that are not needed for establishing refutational completeness of selected reso-
lution. To this end, we define next the relations→RS and→RgS over atoms, and
the notation A ↓S where A is a set of atoms and S a set of clauses.
Definition 55 Let S be a set of clauses. We define the relation→RS as follows: we have
A →RS B if there exists a clause C in S and A,B two atoms in C such that AaB;
and we define the relation→RgS as follows: we have A→RgS B if there exists two atoms
As, Bs such that As →RS Bs, Asσ = A and Bsσ = B for a substitution σ grounding
As, Bs.
Let the rewriting system RS (respectively RgS) be the set of rewriting rules
→RS (respectively →RgS ). By definition, it is easy to see that rules in R
g
S are
ground, and thatRgS is set of ground instances of rewriting rules inRS . We also
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remark that if S ⊆ S ′, thenRS ⊆ RS andRgS ⊆ RgS . We denote by→∗RS (respec-
tively→∗RgS ) the transitive cloture of→RS (respectively→RgS ), more formally, ifA
and B are two ground atoms, we have A→∗RS B (respectively A→∗RgS B) if and
only if A→RS A1 →RS . . .→RS B (respectively A→RgS A1 →RgS . . .→RgS B).
Definition 56 Let S be a set of clauses, andA be a set of atoms. We define the setA ↓S
as follows: A ↓S=
{
A | ∃B ∈ A with B →∗RS A
}
.
Definition 57 (redundancy)
• A ground clause C is redundant in a set of clauses S with respect to a if it can
be derived, by binary resolution, from a finite set S ′ of ground clauses instances of
clauses in S such that µ(S ′) ⊆ µ(C) ↓S .
• We call an inference by selected resolution from ground clauses C ′, C ′′ redundant
in the set of clauses S if the conclusion, C, can be derived, by binary resolution,
from a finite set S ′ of ground clauses instances of clauses in S such that µ(S ′) ⊆
µ({C1, C2}) ↓S \{A} where A is the resolved atom.
• We call an inference by selected factoring from a ground clause C ′ redundant in
the set of clauses S if the conclusion, C, can be deduced, by binary resolution,
from a finite set S ′ of ground clauses instances of clauses in S such that µ(S ′) ⊆
µ(C ′) ↓S \{A} with A the factored atom.
• A non-ground inference is called redundant in S if all its ground instances are
redundant.
• Finally, we call a set of clauses S saturated up to redundancy under selected reso-
lution with respect to a, if any inference by selected resolution or factoring from
premises in S is redundant in S.
We remark that another notion of redundancy has been introduced in [28], that
notion is based on the multiset ordering over clauses.
Remark Let us consider the set S = {q(x)→ q(f(x))} of clauses, and the clause
C = q(x) → q(f(f(x))). Following our definition of redundancy, C is redun-
dant in S. But, C is not redundant in S following the definition of redundancy
given in [28].
We also remark that our definition of saturation is different that the definition
of saturation given in [146]: while we define the saturation with respect to a
notion of redundancy, Ch. Lynch [146] defined the saturation with respect to
the tautology deletion and subsumption rules.
We conjecture that under a slight modifications, our definition of saturation
may include the forward subsumption rule: in fact, if (1) we order the clauses in a
set S of clauses as follows:
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we associate an index to each clause in S, then during the saturation of
S under selected resolution, to each obtained new clause we associate an
index which is bigger (with respect to the classical “greater than” order in
the natural numbers) than the previous indexes
and if (2) we associate to each proof the multiset of indexes of the clauses la-
belling its leaves, then for any set of clauses S and any ground clause C, if there
is a proof of S |= C which uses a clause C2 in S that can be subsumed by an-
other clause C1 in S with the index of C1 is smaller than the index of C2, then
there is another proof of S |= C which does not use the clause C2 and which is
smaller than the first proof with respect to the multiset of indexes associated to
the proofs. Thus, we conjecture that under the modifications given above, we
can introduce the forward subsumption in the saturation procedure.
We remark that if C is the conclusion of an inference by selected factoring
from a ground clause C ′, this inference should be given as follows:
Γ→∆,A,A
Γ→∆,A
where C ′ = Γ → ∆, A,A and C = Γ → ∆, A. As the definition of clauses
prohibits the existence of the clause Γ→ ∆, A,A, this clause is replaced directly
by the clause Γ → ∆, A and hence, the inference by selected factoring from a
ground clause C ′ will be given as follows:
C′
C′
We conclude that such inferences can be ignored in the construction of (ground)
proofs.
As for ordered resolution, we do not have that every ground instance of an
inference by selected resolution is an inference by selected resolution. Let us
consider the same example considered for ordered resolution, let Inf be the
following inference by selected resolution
I(y)→ I ′(x) I ′(x′), I(y′)→ I ′′(y′)
I(y), I(y′)→ I ′′(y′)
The most general unifier of I ′(x), I ′(x′) is α = {x′ 7→ x}. By definition of selected
resolution inference, we have that I(y) 6≥ I ′(x), I(y′) 6> I ′(x′), and I ′′(y′) 6> I ′(x).
Let the ground substitution σ be such that σ = αα′, I(yσ) > I(y′σ) > I ′′(y′σ) >
I ′(xσ) and I ′(xσ) = I ′(x′σ). Infσ is a ground instance of Inf , and it is easy to
see that Infσ is not an inference by selected resolution.
Soundness and Completeness. We show that selected resolution is sound and
complete. We recall the definitions of soundness and completeness. The sound-
ness means that if a set S of clauses is satisfiable then the empty clause can not
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be derived from S, and the completeness means that if a set S of clauses is un-
satisfiable then the empty clause can be derived from S. Furthermore, if a set
S of clauses is saturated, we have: ∅ ∈ S if and only if S is unsatisfiable. We
remark that the soundness and completeness of the selected resolution are also
given in [146]. We prove these results in the following lemmas.
Lemma 57 Each ordered resolution inference is a selected resolution inference which
is, in its turn, a resolution inference.
PROOF.
Let C and C ′ be two clauses, C = Γ → A,∆ and C ′ = A′,Γ′ → ∆′. Assume
that ordered resolution can be applied on C and C ′, this implies that A,A′ are
unifiable and let σ be their most general unifier. In addition, Aσ is strictly maxi-
mal with respect to Γσ,∆σ and A′σ are maximal with respect to Γ′σ,∆′σ for the
ordering a.This implies that A,A′ are maximals for the ordering a in their
respectives clauses and then, selected resolution can be applied on C and C ′. In
fact, if A is not maximal in C, there is an atom B ∈ C such that BaA and then,
by monotonicity of a, BσaAσ which contradicts the maximality of Aσ with
respect to Γσ,∆σ. Now, let us prove the other part of the lemma. Assume that
selected resolution can be applied on the clauses C and C ′, this implies, among
other, that A and A′ are unifiable, and hence, the resolution can be applied on C
and C ′. 
Lemma 58 Each ordered factoring inference is a selected factoring inference which is,
in its turn, a factoring inference.
PROOF.
Let C = Γ→ ∆, A,A′ be a clause, and assume that ordered factoring can be
applied on it. This implies thatA,A′ are unifiable and let σ be their most general
unifier. In addition, Aσ is strictly maximal with respect to Γσ and maximal with
respect to ∆σ for the ordering a.This implies that A, A′ are maximals for the
ordering a in the C and then, selected factoring can be applied on C.In fact,
if A is not maximal in C, there is an atom B ∈ C such that BaA and then
BσaAσ which contradicts the maximality of Aσ with respect to Γσ,∆σ. Now,
let us prove the other part of the lemma. Assume that selected factoring can be
applied on the clause C, this implies, among other, that A and A′ are unifiable,
and hence, the factoring can be applied on C and C ′. 
Lemma 59 If a set S of clauses is unsatisfiable then the empty clause can be deduced
from S by applying selected resolution and selected factoring inferences.
PROOF.
Let S be a set of unsatisfiable clauses. By the completeness of the ordered
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resolution, we deduce that the empty clause can be derived from S by apply-
ing ordered resolution and ordered factoring inferences, and as each ordered
resolution (respectively ordered factoring) inference is a selected resolution (re-
spectively selected factoring) inference, by lemma 57, we conclude the proof.

Lemma 60 If a set S of clauses is satisfiable then the empty clause can not be derived
from S by applying selected resolution and selected factoring inferences.
PROOF.
Let S be a set of satisfiable clauses and let us prove the lemma by contra-
diction. Assume that the empty clause can be derived from S by applying se-
lected resolution and selected factoring inferences. This implies that the empty
clause can be derived from S by applying resolution and factoring inferences,
by lemma 57 which is impossible due to the soundness of resolution and the
unsatisfiability of S. 
6.5.2 A decidability result
In the rest of this chapter, we consider a complete simplification ordering t
over terms and a complete ordering a over atoms compatible with t. We re-
call the definition of a complete ordering. An ordering over a set of elements is
said to be complete if it is total over ground elements of this set. A complete sim-
plification ordering over terms is any ordering over terms which is well-founded,
monotone, stable, subterm, and total over ground terms. We call an atom order-
inga compatible with the term orderingt if it satisfies the following condition:
p(t1, . . . , tk)aq(s1, . . . , sn) if and only if for any j with 1 ≤ j ≤ n there exists an
i with 1 ≤ i ≤ k such that titsj .
In the following lemma, we show some properties of the atom ordering a.
Lemma 61 The ordering a is:
(1) well-founded,
(2) monotone,
(3) and B ≺a A implies V ar(B) ⊆ V ar(A).
PROOF.
We recall that the orderinga is compatible with the complete simplification
ordering t and a is total on ground atoms.
1. Let us prove that a is well-founded by contradiction. Assume that a is
not well-founded. By definition, there is an infinite descending chain of
atoms A0aA1a . . .. By the compatibility of a with t, we deduce that
there is an infinite descending chain of terms t0tt1t . . . where ti is a term
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of the atom Ai. That implies t is not well-founded which contradicts the
fact that t is a complete simplification ordering.
2. Let A, B be two atoms such that B ≺a A. Suppose that A = I(t1, . . . , tn)
and B = I ′(s1, . . . , sm). By the compatibility of a with t, for all
i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, there is j ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that si ≺t tj , and then, by
monotonicity of t, siσ ≺t tjσ for any substitution σ. Again by the com-
patibility of a with t, we deduce that Bσ ≺a Aσ for any σ and then the
monotonicity of a.
3. Let A, B be two atoms such that B ≺a A. By the compatibility of a with
t, each term in B is smaller than a term in A for the ordering t and as
V ar(t) ⊆ V ar(t′) for all terms t, t′ and t ≺t t′ (Lemma 6), we deduce that
V ar(B) ⊆ V ar(A).

Lemma 62 If C is a ground atom there is no infinite chain of atoms C →RgS C1 →RgS
. . ..
PROOF.
Let us prove the lemma by contradiction. Let C be a ground atom and
suppose that there is an infinite chain of atoms C = C0 →RgS C1 →RgS . . .. For
every i ≥ 0, we have Ci →RgS Ci+1 ∈ R
g
S and then, by definition of→RgS and by
lemma 61, CiaCi+1. From the infinite chain starting from C using the relation
→RgS , we deduce that there is an infinite chain CaC1a . . . starting from C and
using the ordering a which contradicts the well-foundness of a and thus, we
conclude the proof. 
Given a ground atom A, the set Succ(A) of ground atoms is defined as fol-
lows: B ∈ Succ(A) if and only if A→RgS B.
Lemma 63 If S is a finite and saturated set of clauses then for every ground atom C,
Succ(C) is finite.
PROOF.
Let S be a finite and saturated set of clauses and let RS and RgS be the sets
of rewriting rules constructed as defined before (Section 6.5.1). Let As → Bs
is a rewriting rule in RS and let σ be a substitution grounding As and Bs. We
recall thatRgS is the set of ground instances of rewriting rules inRS , and hence,
Asσ → Bsσ ∈ RgS . Assume that Asσ → Bsσ be a rewriting rule in RgS that can
be applied on C. As C and Asσ are ground, we have C = Asσ. This implies that
C and As are unifiable. As C is ground and by the unification, σ is the unique
unifier of C and As. We deduce that, for each rule in RS , at most one ground
instance will be applied on C and by the finiteness of RS , obtained due to the
finiteness of S, we conclude the proof. 
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Lemma 64 If S is a finite and saturated set of clauses then for every ground atom C,
C ↓S is finite.
PROOF.
Let C be a ground atom and let T be the tree constructed as follows: the
root of T is labelled by the atom C, if n is a node in T labelled by the atom
D, each atom D′ verifying D →RgS D′ will be added as direct successor of the
node labelled by D. We remark that the set of atoms labelling the nodes of T
is equal to the set C ↓S . Let us prove the lemma by contradiction. Suppose
that C ↓S is infinite, this implies that the tree T is infinite. As, by lemma 63,
each node in T has a finite number of direct successors, we deduce, by Ko¨nig′s
lemma, that there is an infinite chain of atoms C →RgS C1 →RgS . . . in the treeT which contradicts the non existence of infinite chain starting from a ground
atom using the relation→RgS (lemma 62). We conclude that T is finite and hence
the set C ↓S is finite also. 
Let S be a set of saturated clauses, C be a ground clause, and assume that
C is entailed from S. Let pi be a proof of S |= C. We define a partial order pi
over atoms in the proof pi as follows: for each clause C ′ in S, for each ground
instance C ′σ of C ′ labelling a leave of the proof pi, we have Bsσ  Asσ if As, Bs
are atoms in C ′ such that BsaAs. We define pi to be the transitive closure of
.
Lemma 65 Let S be a set of clauses, C be a ground clause and pi be a ground proof of
S |= C. If A,B are two atoms in the proof pi and A pi B then A→∗RgS B.
PROOF.
Let M = {B ∈ µ(pi) such that ∃A ∈ µ(pi), A pi B and B 6∈ A ↓S} and let
us prove that M = ∅ by contradiction. Suppose that M 6= ∅ and let B be a
maximal atom in M for the ordering pi. B can not be maximal in µ(pi) for pi
otherwise there would exist no atom A ∈ µ(pi) such that A pi B which would
imply B 6∈ M . Thus there exists an atom A ∈ µ(pi) such that A pi B. Let
MB = {A such that A ∈ µ(pi) and A pi B}. The argument above proves that
MB 6= ∅.
Case 1. Let A be a minimal atom in MB for the ordering pi. By minimality of
A in MB and maximality of B in M there is no atom D ∈ µ(pi) such that
A pi D pi B. There is a ground clause Cσ instance of a clause C in S such
that Cσ is labelling a leave in the proof pi, and there are two atoms A,B in
Cσ, and two atoms As, Bs in C such that Asσ = A, Bsσ = B and AsaBs.
By definition of the relationRgS , we thus have A→RgS B.
Case 2. If A is not minimal in MB for pi, there exists a minimal atom A′ ∈ MB
such that A pi A′ pi B. By the maximality of B in M , A′ 6∈ M and thus
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A →∗RgS A
′ and by minimality of A′ in MB the first case implies A′ →RgS B.
By transitivity we thus have A→∗RgS B.
Thus for every atom A ∈MB we have A→∗RgS B, which contradicts the assump-
tion B is maximal in M , and therefore M = ∅. 
Lemma 66 Let S be a set of clauses and C be a ground clause, C = A1, . . . , An → B.
Let pi be a ground proof of S |= C and let A be an atom in pi maximal with respect to
atoms of pi for the ordering pi. There exists a clause C ′ ∈ S ∪
⋃n
i=1 Ai ∪ ¬B and an
atom A′ ∈ µ(C ′) such that A′ in maximal with respect to atoms of C ′ for the ordering
a and A′σ = A.
PROOF.
Let pi be a ground proof of S |= C. By definition, leaves of pi are labelled
by ground instances of clauses in S, positive unit clauses ∅ → Ai for 1 ≤ i ≤
n and negative unit clause B → ∅. Let A ∈ µ(pi) be such that A is maximal
with respect to atoms of pi for the ordering pi. As atoms in pi are ground, we
have either A ∈ {A1, . . . , An, B} or there is a ground instance C1 of a clause
in S, such that A ∈ µ(C1). If A ∈ {A1, . . . , An, B} and as each atom in the
set {A1, . . . , An, B} is a unit clause then we conclude the lemma directly. Now,
suppose that A 6∈ {A1, . . . , An, B}. Then there exists a ground instance of a
clause in S, C1 such that A ∈ µ(C1). As C1 is a ground instance of a clause in
S, let Cs1 be that clause in S and let As be an atom in Cs1 such that A is a ground
instance of As. We have σ is the applied ground substition. Now, let us prove
that As is maximal with respect to atoms in Cs1 for the ordering a. Let the set
of atoms M = {D such that D is an atom in Cs1 and D is maximal in Cs1 for a}
and let us prove that As ∈ M . By contradiction, suppose that As 6∈ M , then
there is an atom Es ∈ M such that EsaAs and then Esσ pi Asσ, by definition
of the ordering pi. We have that Esσ ∈ C1 and then Esσ pi Asσ is an atom
of the proof pi and that contradicts the maximality of A = Asσ with respect to
atoms of pi for the ordering pi. We conclude that As is maximal with respect to
atoms of Cs1 for the ordering a which concludes the proof. 
Let pi be a proof of S |= C where S is a set of clauses andC is a ground clause.
By definition of (refutational) proof, we remark that every atom appearing in pi
appears in a clause labelling a leave of pi.
Lemma 67 Let S be a finite saturated set of clauses, C be a ground clause and Π be the
non-empty set of refutational ground proofs of S |= C. Given pi ∈ Π let:
δS(pi,C) = (µ(pi) ↓S) \ (µ(C) ↓S)
If pi ∈ Π is such that δS(pi,C) is minimal then δS(pi,C) = ∅.
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PROOF.
Let S be a finite saturated set of clauses and C be a ground clause such
that Π is not empty. Let finally pi ∈ Π be such that δS(pi,C) is minimal. Such
pi exists as atoms in pi are ground and the ordering ≺seta is well-founded. Since
δS(pi,C) depends only on the atoms of pi we can assume w.l.o.g. that pi is a proof
by selected resolution. By contradiction assume δS(pi,C) 6= ∅, and let A be the
maximal atom in δS(pi,C) for the atom ordering <a.
Claim. The atom A must be maximal for ≺pi.
Proof of the claim. Otherwise there would exist an atomB ∈ µ(pi)
such that B →S A by definition of ≺pi. If B ∈ µ(C) ↓S then we could
not have A ∈ δS(pi,C). If B /∈ µ(C) ↓S then B ∈ δS(pi,C), and hence
A would not be maximal.
Let TA be the set of subtrees of pi where the end resolution inference elim-
inates the atom A and let piA be a minimal subtree in TA. By minimality of
piA, its end inference is its unique inference that eliminates the atom A. Let
Γ1→A,∆1 A,Γ2→∆2
Γ1,Γ2→∆1,∆2 be that inference. We remark that pi is ground and that each
atom appearing in the proof pi is an atom appearing in a clause labelling a leave
of pi. Furthermore, by definition of refutational proof and selected resolution,
there is a leave in piA labelled by a clause containing the atom A in its succedent,
and there is another leave in piA labelled by a clause containing the atom A in
its antecedent. By the maximality of A with respect to atoms of pi for the order-
ing pi, and by the previous lemma (Lemma 66), we have either A ∈ µ(C) or
there exists a clause C ′ in S and an atom D in C ′ such that D is maximal with
respect to atoms of C ′ for the ordering a and Dσ = A for a ground substi-
tution σ. We prove that A ∈ µ(C) by contradiction. Suppose that A 6∈ µ(C),
and let C1 and C2 be two ground instances of clauses in S, Cs1 and Cs2 , such that
C1, C2 label leaves in pi8A, A appears as positive literal in C1 and negative lit-
eral in C2, C1 = Cs1σ and C2 = Cs2σ for a ground substitution σ. Let As1 and As2
be two atoms respectively in Cs1 and Cs2 such that A is a ground instance of As1
and As2. We have C1 = Γ → A,∆, C2 = A,Γ′ → ∆′, Cs1 = Γs → As1,∆s and
Cs2 = A
s
2,Γ
′s → ∆′s. Furthermore, As1, As2 are maximals in Cs1 and Cs2 respec-
tively for the ordering a (by maximality of A for pi), and As1σ = As2σ = A.
This implies that As1 and As2 are unifiable and let θ be their most general unifier,
σ = θθ′ for a ground substitution θ′. By definition, selected resolution can be
applied on Cs1 and Cs2 and outputs the clause Cs3 , Cs3 = Γsθ,Γ′sθ → ∆sθ,∆′sθ. Let
C3 = C
s
3θ
′ = Γ,Γ′ → ∆,∆′.
For each possible C1, C2 and for each C3 obtained, since the resolution is an
instance of a resolution by selection between two clauses of S, there are two
possibilities:
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• If C3 is a ground instance of a clause in S (i.e. Cs3 ∈ S). Then we have
µ(C3) = µ(C1, C2) \ {A} and thus:
µ(C3) ⊆ µ(pi) \ {A}
⊆ µ(pi) ↓S \{A}
The second inclusion is correct since A is maximal in δS(pi,C), and thus in
µ(pi).
• Otherwise, by definition of the saturation algorithm the selected resolu-
tion inference applied on Cs1 and Cs2 is redundant and, by definition of re-
dundancy, all its ground instances are redundant and hence the inference
Γ→A,∆ A,Γ′→∆′
Γ,Γ′→∆,∆′ is redundant. This implies that the clause C3 = Γ,Γ
′ →
∆,∆′ can be deduced from a finite set S ′ of ground clauses instances of
clauses in S such that
µ(S ′) ⊆ µ(C1, C2) ↓S \{A}
⊆ µ(pi) ↓S \{A}
Again, the second inclusion holds because A is maximal in δS(pi,C), and
thus in µ(pi).
By iterating the construction on pi we find another proof pi′ such that
µ(pi′) ⊆ µ(pi) ↓S \{A}
Thus:
µ(pi′) ↓S⊆ (µ(pi) ↓S \{A}) ↓S
Since A is a maximal in pi for ≺a this implies:
µ(pi′) ↓S⊆ ((µ(pi)\{A}) ↓S ∪({A} ↓S \{A})) ↓S = (µ(pi) ↓S ∪{A} ↓S) ↓S \{A} =
Since A ∈ δS(pi,C) we have A /∈ µ(C) ↓S , and thus we have:
δS(pi
′, C) = µ(pi′) ↓S \µ(C) ↓S
⊆ ((µ(pi) ↓S ∪{A} ↓S) \ {A}) \ µ(C) ↓S
⊆ ((µ(pi) ↓S ∪{A} ↓S) \ µ(C) ↓S) \ {A}
< {A}
< δS(pi,C)
Thus pi is not such that δS(pi,C) is minimal. 
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Lemma 68 Let S be a saturated set of clauses, C be a ground clause and Π be a non-
empty set of proofs of S |= C. Let pi ∈ Π be such that δS(pi,C) is minimal. If A is an
atom in the proof pi then there is an atom B ∈ µ(C) such that B →∗RgS A.
PROOF.
By Lemma 67, the minimality of δS(pi,C) implies that δS(pi,C) = ∅. This
implies that if A is an atom in pi (A ∈ µ(pi)) then A ∈ µ(C) ↓S , and hence, by
definition, there is an atom B ∈ µ(C) such that B →∗RgS A. 
Theorem 14 If the set of clauses S is saturated by selected resolution up to redundancy
with respect to a then ground entailment problem for S is decidable.
PROOF.
Let S be a saturated set of clauses. Given a ground clause C, we prove that
we can decide if S |= C.We make use of the fact that S |= C if and only if S∪¬C
is unsatisfiable. By Lemma 59 and Lemma 60, S∪¬C is unsatisfiable if and only
if the set of T of ground refutational proofs of S ∪ ¬C |= ∅ is not empty. Let pi
be a proof in T having the minimal δS(pi,C). By lemma 68, the atoms appearing
in the proof pi belongs to the set µ(C) ↓S and since the clause C is ground,
Lemma 64 implies that the set µ(C) ↓S is finite.Now, the strategy for deciding
the problem S |= C is to construct first the set µ(C) ↓S , then to construct the set
S ′ of ground instances of clauses of S such that for every ground clause C ′ ∈ S ′,
and for every atom A ∈ µ(C ′), A ∈ µ(C) ↓S . By finiteness of the set µ(C) ↓S ,
the set S ′ is finite. We construct now the set of trees Π such that for each tree,
the leaves are labelled by ¬L with L is a literal in C and by clauses in S ′, and
internal nodes are labelled by the result of selected resolution from their direct
descendents. Since S ′ is finite, the set Π is finite. Moreover, by definition of
selected resolution and since S ′ and S are ground, we have that each tree in
Π is finite. Finally, we have S |= Cl if and only if there is a tree in the set Π
whose root is labelled by the empty clause, and as the existence of such tree
is decidable then, the problem S |= C for a ground clause C is decidable, and
hence the ground entailment problem for S is decidable. 
Example 28 We consider the Needham-Schroeder symmetric key protocol described in
Example 27. We analyse the security of this protocol in the presence of an intruder
I to which we associate the following set of clauses, CI = CDY ∪ Cpre. The set of
clauses CDY is given in Example 26 and the clause Cpre is given in Example 27. As
shown in Section 6.4.1, the insecurity problem for this protocol is reduced to the ground
entailment problem for CI . We show that the decidability of insecurity problem for this
protocol can be deduced from Theorem 14. In fact, CI is saturated by selected resolution
up to redundancy with respect to a complete atom ordering compatible with a complete
simplification term ordering. Theorem 14 implies that the ground entailment problem
for CI is decidable, and hence the insecurity problem of Needham-Schroeder symmetric
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key protocol is decidable under a bounded number of sessions and under the hypothesis
that the protocol runs correctly.
6.6 Discussions and conclusions
The main contribution of this chapter is a decidability result of the ground en-
tailment problem for a set S of clauses under the hypothesis that S is saturated
by selected resolution up to redundancy with respect to a complete atom order-
ing compatible with a complete simplification ordering over terms.
Many decidability results have been obtained for this problem, and we dis-
cuss some of them in Section 6.5. Among the works cited above, the closest to
ours is [28]. In [28], D. Basin and H. Ganzinger proved the decidability of the
ground entailment problem for a set S of clauses under the assumptions that
(i) S is saturated up to redundancy under ordered resolution with respect to a
complete well-founded ordering over atoms and that (ii) each maximal atom
in each clause in S contains all variables appearing in the other atoms in the
clause. In this chapter, we relax the condition (ii), and in order to get the de-
cidability, we use an order more restrictive than the one used in [28]. Another
contribution of this chapter is the reduction of insecurity problem of crypto-
graphic protocols to a ground entailment problem in the first order logic. In
this line of research, many results have been obtained, and some of them have
been discussed in Section 6.3. We remark that our result is different than the
results discussed in that section. In fact, we define a new model to analyse
cryptographic protocols using Horn clauses, which is different that the mod-
els given in [84, 180, 205]. Moreover, in [84, 180, 205], the decidability results
are obtained for Horn clauses and not full clauses as in this chapter. while in
[84, 205], they can deal with an unbounded number of sessions, we consider
only a bounded number of sessions but our result allows us to deal with a class
of cryptographic protocols less restrictive than [84, 205].
In future works, we plan implement the decision procedure with respect to
the result of D. Basin and H. Ganzinger [28], we remark that for ground entail-
ment problems, it suffices to consider inferences by selected resolution in which
one of the atoms is ground. Thus we do not need to construct the set of ground
atoms before solving an entailment problem. Furthermore, we plan to extend
the result to the case where the clauses are considered modulo an equational
theory.
We thanks Michae¨l Rusinowitch for all the discussions we had concerning
the results of this chapter
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Chapter 7
Formalising voter verifiability
properties for electronic voting
protocols
The multiple benefits of electronic-voting push many governments
to change their traditional methods and to move toward the elec-
tronic democracy. In fact, electronic voting allows, amongst others,
to reduce the cost of the vote, to get the results faster and more ac-
curately, and to reduce the risk of human errors. Over the last years,
several electronic-voting systems have been proposed and studied.
In this chapter, we study and formally define the voter verifiabil-
ity property for electronic voting protocols using the applied pi calcu-
lus [11], which is well suited for modelling security protocols and in
particular electronic voting protocols [97, 25]. The concept of voter
verifiability has emerged as an important property for electronic vot-
ing. It means that voters and observers can verify that the declared
outcome corresponds to the votes cast. Voter verifiability property
includes the individual verifiability and universal verifiability properties.
Intuitively, a protocol satisfies voter verifiability if there is a test that
a voter or observer can perform on the output of the election pro-
cess; the test succeeds if and only if the output corresponds to the
votes cast, and the declared outcome corresponds to the output. The
test is in two parts, corresponding to the two aspects of voter verifi-
ability mentioned above. The definition is a sufficient condition for
voter verifiability, but it may not be necessary; there could be some
protocols which offer voter verifiability but are not captured by our
definition.
Our definition may be applied across a range of voting protocols.
We give examples of protocols that are voter verifiable, and others
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which are not: we show that the protocols due to Fujioka, Okamoto
& Ohta [115] and Lee et al. [141] are voter verifiable.
Intuitively, voter verifiability may appear to contradict another
important property of voting systems, namely coercion-resistance. If a
voter is capable of verifying that her vote has been included in the
tally, she may be able to use that capability to convince a coercer
that she voted as he ordered. However, there are systems that sat-
isfy both, such as the system by Lee et al. [141] which we consider
in Section 7.5.4. This is achieved by ensuring that what constitutes a
proof for the voter will not be a proof for the coercer. Therefore, it is
important to ensure that voter verifiability is not defined so strongly
that it is incompatible with coercion-resistance.
This work has been done in collaboration with Mark Ryan, Ben
Smyth, and Steve Kremer during my internship at the School of Com-
puter Science (University of Birmingham) from October, 2008 until
January, 2009. A more recent version will be presented in the 4th
Benelux Workshop on Information and System Security (WISSec 2009)
[191].
Outline. We introduce in Section 7.1 the electronic voting protocols.
In Section 7.2, we introduce the applied pi calculus. The formalisa-
tion of electronic voting protocols and voter verifiability properties
are given in Section 7.3 and Section 7.4. We give in Section some ex-
amples, and the related works are given in Section 7.6.
7.1 Electronic voting protocols
Electronic voting, also known as e-voting, is a term encompassing several dif-
ferent types of voting, embracing both electronic means of casting a vote and
electronic means of counting votes. Electronic voting systems can include
punch cards, optical scan voting systems and specialised voting kiosks, including self-
contained Direct-recording electronic (DRE) voting systems. It can also involve
transmission of ballots and votes via telephones, private computer networks,
or the Internet. Electronic voting may offer advantages compared to other vot-
ing techniques. It promises the possibility of a convenient, efficient and secure
facility for recording and tallying votes. It can be used for a variety of types of
elections, from small committees or on-line communities through to full-scale
national elections. Electronic voting for electorates have been in use since the
1960. However, the electronic voting machines used in recent US elections have
been fraught with problems. In [132], the authors have analysed the source code
of the machines sold by the second largest and fastest-growing vendor, which
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are in use in 37 US states. This analysis has produced a catalogue of vulnerabil-
ities and possible attacks.
A potentially much more secure system could be implemented, based on
cryptographic protocols that specify the messages sent between the voters and
administrators. Such systems are called electronic voting protocols.
Abstractly, electronic voting protocols are cryptographic protocols that spec-
ify the messages sent between the voters and administrators, they can be writ-
ten as a sequence of messages sent between voters and administrators. Such
protocols have been studied for several decades [97, 136, 30, 39, 62, 63, 65], and
a various types of electronic voting protocols have been proposed in the liter-
ature [61, 64, 39, 92, 62, 115, 141, 181]. These protocols aim to provide security
properties which go beyond those that can be achieved by paper-based voting
systems. Some of these properties are given next.
7.1.1 Properties of electronic voting protocols
Some properties commonly sought for electronic voting protocols are the fol-
lowing:
• Fairness: no early results can be obtained which could influence the re-
maining voters.
• Vote-privacy: the fact that a particular voter voted in a particular way is
not revealed to anyone.
• Receipt-freeness: a voter does not gain any information which can be used
to prove to a coercer that she voted in a certain way.
• Coercion-resistance: a voter can not cooperate with a coercer to prove to
him that she voted in a certain way.
• Inalterability: no one can change a voter’s vote.
• Declared tally: the published outcome is a correct sum of the votes cast.
• Eligibility: only legitimate voters can vote, and only once.
• Individual verifiability: a voter can check that her ballot was included in
the tally.
• Universal verifiability: anybody can check the correctness of the pub-
lished outcome.
• Eligibility verifiability: anybody can check that each vote cast was created
by a unique legitimate voter.
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The properties vote-privacy, receipt-freeness, coercion-resistance are called
privacy-type properties [97] since they guarantee that the link between the voter
and her vote is not revealed by the protocol. They are considered by S. De-
laune, S. Kremer and M. Ryan [97]. The properties fairness, inalterability, eligi-
bility are called correctness properties, and some of them have been considered
by M. Backes, C. Hritcu and M. Maffei [25]. The properties individual verifiabil-
ity, universal verifiability are called voter verifiability and some of them have been
considered by B. Chevallier-Mames et al. [76], Baskar et al. [30], Talbi et al.
[193].
We remark that verifiability properties are related to the correctness proper-
ties, but verifiability properties are intuitively stronger than correctness prop-
erties. They allow voters and observers to check that the outcome is correct
without having to trust the protocol, the administrators or the implementation.
In contrast, correctness properties merely assert good behaviour in case the ex-
pected protocol was indeed executed by all the participants, i.e. one has to trust
the software and the administrators.
7.2 Applied pi calculus
The applied pi calculus [11] is a language for describing concurrent systems
and their interactions. It is based on the pi calculus [158, 159] which is a process
calculus originally developed by R. Millen as a continuation of work on the pro-
cess calculus CCS (Calculus of Communicating Systems). Th applied pi calculus
is intended to be less pure than the pi calculus and therefore more convenient
to use. The applied pi calculus is, in some sense, similar to the spi calculus [12].
The key difference between the two formalisms concerns the way the crypto-
graphic primitives are handled. The spi calculus has a fixed set of primitives
built-in (symmetric and public-key encryption), while the applied pi calculus
allows one to define less usual primitives often used in electronic voting proto-
cols, like zero knowledge proofs, by means of equational theory. The applied pi
calculus has been used to study a variety of security protocols, such as a private
authentication protocols [114], or a key establishment protocols [8], or electronic
voting protocols [97].
In order to represent our properties, we slightly modify the applied pi cal-
culus introduced in [11]. We assume an infinite set of names (which are used
to name communication channels or other atomic data), an infinite set of vari-
ables and a finite signature Σ which consists of a finite set of function symbols
each with an associated arity. A function symbol with arity 0 is a constant sym-
bol. In the case of security protocols, typical function symbols will include enc
for encryption, and dec for decryption. Terms are defined as names, variables,
and function symbols applied to other terms. A terms is ground if it does not
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contain variables. Although names, variables, and constant symbols haves sim-
ilarities, they are kept separate. We let a, b, c,m, n, r, s, t, v . . . range over names
and x, y, z, . . . over variables. We use metavariables u,w to range over both
names and variables. F,L,M,N,R, T range over arbitrary terms. Terms and
function symbols are sorted, and of course function symbol application must
respect sorts and arities. We suppose that terms can be of sort Channel or Base
type. Function symbols can only be applied to and return terms of base type.
As a slight convenient extension, also introduced in [83], we suppose a set of
predicates P over terms, each with an arity.
In the applied pi calculus, one has plain processes and extended processes. Plain
processes are built up in a similar way to processes in the pi calculus, except
that messages can contain terms (rather than only names). The grammar for
plain processes is shown below where c is supposed to be of channel sort:
ψ ::= tests
p(M1, . . . ,Mn) predicate
ψ1 ∧ ψ2 conjunction
P,Q, V ::= processes
0 null process
P |Q parallel composition
ν n.P name restriction
c(x).P message input
c〈N〉.P message output
if ψ then P else Q conditional
The null process 0 does nothing; P |Q is the parallel composition of P and Q.
the process ν n.P makes a new, private name n then behaves as P . The process
c(x).P is ready to input from channel c, then to run P with the actual message
replaced for the formal parameter x, while the process c〈N〉.P is ready to output
N on channel c, then to run P . In all cases, we omit P when it is 0. Finally,
if ψ then P else Q behaves in the standard way.
Extended processes add active substitutions and restriction on variables, their
grammar is shown below:
A,B,C ::= extended processes
P plain process
A |B parallel composition
ν n.A name restriction
ν x.A variable restriction
{M/x} active substitution
We write {M/x} for the substitution that replaces the variable x with the
term M . Active substitutions generalise ′let′ and the process ν x.({M/x} | P )
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corresponds exactly to the process let x = M in P . As usual, names and vari-
ables have scopes which are delimited by restrictions ν u and by inputs c(x). We
write fv(A), bv(A), fn(A), bn(A) for the sets of free and bound variables, respec-
tively names, in A. An extended process A is closed if it has no free variables.
We suppose that bn(A) ∩ fn(A) = ∅ for any extended process A and names are
at most bound once. A frame is an extended process built from 0, active sub-
stitutions and restriction. We write φ(A) for the frame obtained by replacing
every plain process in A with 0. The domain dom(ϕ) of a frame ϕ is the set of
variables that ϕ exports, i.e., the variables x in active substitutions {M/x}where
x is not bound. It represents the static knowledge output by a process to its en-
vironment. A context C[ ] is an extended process with a hole. We obtain C[A] as
the result of filling C[ ]’s hole with A. An evaluation context is a context whose
hole is not under a replication, a conditional, an input, or an output.
The signature Σ is equipped with an equational theory H, and we define
the relation =H as usual (Chapter 2). Predicates are interpreted as relations
over closed terms modulo the equational theory H. Conjunction of predicates
are interpreted as expected. We always suppose that we have at least a binary
predicate eq which holds on terms M1,M2 when M1 =H M2. For convenience
we sometimes write M = N for eq(M,N).
We define structural equivalence (≡) to be the smallest equivalence relation
closed under α-conversion of bound variables, (the α-conversion of bound vari-
ables is obtained by renaming one or more bound variables), and application of
evaluation contexts such that
PAR-0 A ≡ A | 0
PAR-A A | (B | C) ≡ (A | B) | C
PAR-C A | B ≡ B | A
NEW-0 ν n.0 ≡ 0
NEW-C ν u.ν w.A ≡ ν w.ν u.A
NEW-PAR A | ν u.B ≡ ν u.(A | B)
where u 6∈ fv(A)
ALIAS ν x.{M/x} ≡ 0
SUBST {M/x} | A ≡ {M/x} | A{M/x}
REWRITE {M/x} ≡ {N/x}
where M =H N
A slightly unusual detail is that we consider structural equivalence to be closed
under α-conversion of variables but not names. This will be convenient in what
follows to uniquely identify secrets, i.e., bound names, of a given voter.
Internal reduction (−→) is the smallest relation closed under structural equiv-
alence and application of evaluation contexts and such that
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COMM c〈x〉.P | c(x).Q −→ P | Q
THEN if ψ then P else Q −→ P if ψ
ELSE if ψ then P else Q −→ Q if ¬ψ
Example 29 Consider the process ν a.(ν k.a〈k〉 | a(x).P ) which models the distribu-
tion of key k using private channel a. We have ν a.(ν k.a〈k〉 | a(x).P ) ≡ ν x.({k/x} |
ν a.ν k.(a〈x〉 | a(x).P )). We can now model the communication using the COMM rule
ν x.({k/x} | ν a.ν k.(a〈x〉 | a(x).P )) −→ ν x.({k/x} | ν a.ν k.(0 | P )) ≡ ν k.P{k/x}
(where a 6∈ fn(P )).
The labelled semantics ( α−→) extends internal reduction by the following rules.
We suppose that u is either a channel name or a variable of base type.
IN c(x).P
c(M)−−−→ P{M/x}
OUT-ATOM c〈u〉.P c〈u〉−−→ P
OPEN-ATOM
A
c〈u〉−−→ A′ u 6= c
ν u.A
ν u.c〈u〉−−−−→ A′
SCOPE
A
α−→ A′ u does not occur in α
ν u.A
α−→ ν u.A′
PAR
A
α−→ A′ bv(α) ∩ fv(B) = bn(α) ∩ fn(B) = ∅
A | B α−→ A′ | B
STRUCT
A ≡ B B α−→ B′ B′ ≡ A′
A
α−→ A′
Example 30 Continuing example 29, and let us consider the process ν a.(ν k.a〈k〉 |
a(x).c〈sign(m, k)〉) i.e. we have added the output of a signed message using the key
distributed. Since internal reduction is closed by structural equivalence and by our
previous reasoning we have ν a.(ν k.a〈k〉 | a(x).c〈sign(m, k)〉) −→ ν k.c〈sign(m, k)〉.
We model the output of sign(m, k) to the environment using labelled semantics:
ν k.c〈sign(m, k)〉 ν x.c〈x〉−−−−→ ν k.{sign(m, k)/x}.
An extended process A is said to be irreducible if there does not exist B,α
such that A −→ B or A α−→ B.
Remark. We will abbreviate (M1, . . . ,Mn) as M˜ and occasionally we write
x˜f for (xf(1), . . . , xf(n)) where f : {1, . . . , n} → {1, . . . ,m}. We abbreviate
{M1/x1}| . . . |{Mk/xk} as {M˜/x˜} or σ. We also write σ, {M/x}, {M˜/x˜} for substitions
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and Nσ for the result of applying σ to N . We write m˜i for the tuple of names ob-
tained from m˜ by annotating with subscript i. For example given m˜ = (n, n′) we
write m˜1 for (n1, n′1). Finally, we write a(x1, ..., xn).P as a convenient shorthand
for a(x).let x1 = nthn1 (x) in . . . let xn = nth
n
n(x) in P .
7.3 Formalising electronic voting protocols
We refine our sort system with the new base type Candidate. A voting process
is characterised with respect to a voter process V and administrators processes.
We capture administrators who are assumed to be honest by the process P .
Dishonest administrators do not need to be modelled as they are directly part
of the adversarial environment in which the protocol is executed. Processes
V, P will each be instantiated n times where n is the number of voters. We
assume secrets s˜ only occur in process V ; similarly t˜ only occur in process P ;
additionally, shared secrets m˜ appear in both V, P . Definition 58 formalises a
voting process specification accordingly.
Definition 58 (Voting process specification) A voting process specification is a tu-
ple 〈V, P, s˜, t˜, m˜〉 where plain processes V, P do not contain any name restrictions,
the tuples of names s˜, t˜, m˜ are disjoint and (fn(V ) ∪ fn(P )) ∩ ⋃j∈N(s˜j ∪ t˜j ∪ m˜j) =
fn(V ) ∩ t˜ = fn(P ) ∩ s˜ = ∅. We write V P ({v¯1/u}, . . . , {v¯n/u}) for:
ν m˜1, . . . , m˜n, s˜1, . . . , s˜n, t˜1, . . . , t˜n(
V {s˜1/s˜, m˜1/m˜, v¯1/u} | P{t˜1/t˜, m˜1/m˜} | . . . |
V {s˜n/s˜, m˜n/m˜, v¯n/u} | P{t˜n/t˜, m˜n/m˜}
)
where v¯i of type Candidate is the ith voter’s vote.
As an example consider the simple “postal ballot” voting protocol (Fig-
ure 7.1). A voter V receives her private signing key skV from a keying authority
P , and then sends her signed vote to the bulletin board. The keying authority
also sends the voter’s public verification key Pk(skV ) to the bulletin board. By
convention we use the channel bb (referring to the bulletin board). We consider
the equational theory H defined by getmsg(sign(x, y)) = x and the predicate
checksign defined as checksign(M1,M2) if and only ifM1 =H sign(N1, N2)∧M2 =H
Pk(N2).
To analyse verifiability, we consider a modified version of the voting pro-
cess, in which all inputs that a voter receives are stored on the frame (perhaps
in encoded form). To achieve this we extend the equational theory to include
functions senc/2, sdec/2, the associated equation sdec(senc(x, y), y) = x and de-
fine the process modification (Definition 59).
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Definition 59 (Input-storing process) Given channel c and process ν n˜.P where P
has no restrictions, the input-storing process is defined as ν k, n˜.P c,n˜,k where:
• 0c,n˜,k =̂ 0
• (P | Q)c,n˜,k =̂ P c,n˜,k | Qc,n˜,k
• (ν m.P )c,n˜,k =̂ ν m.P c,n˜,k
• (a(x).P )c,n˜,k =̂ a(x).c〈senc(x, k)〉.P c,n˜,k if a ∈ n˜
• (a(x).P )c,n˜,k =̂ a(x).c〈x〉.P c,n˜,k otherwise
• (a〈M〉.P )c,n˜,k =̂ a〈M〉.P c,n˜,k
• (if ψ then P else Q)c,n˜,k=̂if ψ then P c,n˜,k else Qc,n˜,k
Given a voting process specification 〈V, P, s˜, t˜, m˜〉 and votes v¯1, . . . , v¯n we write
V˜ P ({v¯1/u}, . . . , {v¯n/u}) for the special input-storing process defined as follows:
ν n˜.(V {s˜1/s˜, m˜1/m˜, v¯1/u}bb,n˜,kpc1 | P{t˜1/t˜, m˜1/m˜} |
. . . | V {s˜n/s˜, m˜n/m˜, v¯n/u}bb,n˜,kpcn | P{t˜n/t˜, m˜n/m˜})
where n˜ =
⋃n
j=1(m˜
j ∪ s˜j ∪ t˜j ∪ {kpcj}).
The definition is illustrated on the postal ballot example in Figure 7.1.
7.4 Formalising voter verifiability property
Now we introduce voter verifiability. As mentioned, there are two parts, corre-
sponding to individual verifiability and universal verifiability. A voting process
satisfies voter verifiability if there are two tests it can apply to check these two
items. Each test is a predicate which, after substitutions from the bulletin board
and elsewhere, evaluates to true or false.
Individual verifiability: The test RIV is performed by a voter, and has param-
eters u (the vote cast by the voter), x1, . . . , xk (the items on the bulletin
board corresponding to that vote), and z˜ (the secrets of the voter). The
test is required to return true if and only if the correct items are given. In
the definition below, the functions f1, . . . , fk pick out the k bulletin board
items corresponding to the voter.
Universal verifiability: The test RUV is performed by an observer, and has pa-
rameters u˜ (the declared outcome), x˜1, . . . , x˜k (the items on the bulletin
board corresponding to all the voters), and y˜ (the items on the bulletin
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board from the administrators). To model the possibility of dishonest ad-
ministrators, we allow the attacker to supply y˜ by means of the substitu-
tion τ . The test is required to return true if and only if the declaration
corresponds to the votes actually cast.
Definition 60 (Voter verifiability) A voting process specification 〈V, P, s˜, t˜, m˜〉 sat-
isfies voter verifiability if and only if for all n and votes v¯1, . . . , v¯n of type Candidate,
there exist tests RIV , RUV , such that (fv(RIV )∪ fv(RUV ))∩ {x′1, x′2, . . .} = fn(RIV )∪
fn(RUV ) = ∅ and for all irreducible extended processes B where φ(B) = ν n˜.σ,
if
a) V˜ P ({v¯1/u}, . . . , {v¯n/u})(−→∗ α−→−→∗)∗B; and
b) dom(σ) = {x′1, . . . , x′k·n};
where k is defined such that k · n is the number of occurrences of c〈M〉 in
V˜ P ({v¯1/u}, . . . , {v¯n/u}) for c 6∈ n˜,
then there exists injective maps f1, . . . , fk : {1, . . . , n} → {1, . . . , k · n} where the
ranges of f1, . . . , fk are pairwise disjoint and the conditions below are satisfied.
Moreover, we require the existence of B satisfying Conditions a) & b).
1. Individual verifiability. For all i1, . . . , ik, j, v′ we have:
RIV {v′/u, x′f1(i1)/x1, . . . , x′fk(ik)/xk, s˜′j/z˜}σ
⇔ i1 = i2 = . . . = ik = j ∧ v′ = v¯j
where s˜′j = (s1,j, . . . , s|s˜|,j, kpcj).
2. Universal verifiability. For all v˜′ we have:
∃τ.(dom(σ) ∩ dom(τ) = ∅ ∧
RUV {v˜′/u˜, x˜′f1/x˜1, . . . , x˜′fk/x˜k}τ ◦ σ)
⇔ v˜′ = (v¯1, . . . , v¯n)
We recall that V˜ P is a modification of V P which stores all inputs the voter re-
ceives on the frame. Public channel inputs a(x) are stored without modifica-
tions, whereas private channel inputs a′(y) are stored in the form senc(y, k). The
RIV test for the original protocol V P can be extracted by replacing such inputs
x and y into the test.
For convenience we use the shorthand RIV Φ for
RIV {v′/u, x′f1(i1)/x1, . . . , x′fk(ik)/xk, s˜j/z˜}σ.
Similarly we write RUV Φ for RUV {v˜′/u˜, x˜′f1/x˜1, . . . , x˜′fk/x˜k}τ ◦ σ.
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7.5 Cases studies
7.5.1 Postal ballot voting protocol
Consider again the simple “postal ballot” voting protocol (Figure 7.1). Such a
protocol should be voter verifiable.
Analysis Let tests RIV , RUV be given as follows:
RIV = eq(sign(u, sdec(x2, z1)), x3)
∧ eq(x1, Pk(sdec(x2, z1)))
RUV =
∧n
i=1 eq(getmsg(x3,i), ui)
and hence the variable x1 is expected to correspond to the voter’s public key
published by the key distribution process; x2 is the voter’s private key dis-
tributed on a private channel; and x3 should correspond to the voter’s signed
vote.
Suppose V˜ P (1, . . . , n)(−→∗ α−→−→∗)∗B = ν n˜.(σ | Q) such that B is irreducible
and dom(σ) = {x′1, . . . , x′3·n}. Without loss of generality we have:
σ = {Pk(skV1)/x′l1 , . . . , Pk(skVn)/x′ln ,
senc(skV1 , kpc1)/x′ln+1 , . . . ,
senc(skVn , kpcn)/x′l2n ,
sign(v¯1, skV1)/x′l2n+1 , . . . ,
sign(v¯n, skVn)/x′l3n}
Let f1, f2, f3 be given by f1(j) = lj, f2(j) = ln+j, f3(j) = l2n+j . It follows that:
1. Individual verifiability. We observe RIV Φ is defined as
sign(v′, sdec(senc(skVi2 , kpci2), kpcj)) = sign(v¯i3 , skVi3 ) ∧ Pk(skVi1 ) =
Pk(sdec(senc(skVi2 , kpci2), kpcj)). For the ⇒ implication suppose RIV Φ
holds. It must be the case that i1 = i2 = i3 = j and v′ = v¯j . For the ⇐
implication suppose i1 = i2 = i3 = j and v′ = v¯j . The result follows
immediately.
2. Universal verifiability. For the ⇒ implication suppose RUV Φ holds. We
observe RUV Φ =
∧n
i=1 eq(getmsg(sign(v¯i, skVi)), v
′
i) =E
∧n
i=1 eq(v¯i, v
′
i) and
hence it must be the case that v¯1 = v′1∧ . . .∧ v¯n = v′n. It follows immediately
that v˜′ = (v¯1, . . . , v¯n). For the⇐ implication suppose v˜′ = (v¯1, . . . , v¯n). We
have RUV Φ =
∧n
i=1 eq(getmsg(sign(v¯i, skVi)), v
′
i) =E
∧n
i=1 eq(v¯i, v
′
i), which
holds by our hypothesis.
Moreover, by inspection of the voting protocol specification we have
V˜ P ({v¯1/u}, . . . , {v¯n/u})(−→∗ α−→−→∗)∗ϕ and dom(ϕ) = {x′1, . . . , x′3·n}.
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7.5.2 Traditional ballot box voting example
Our second protocol is similar to the traditional ballot box voting system. A
voter selects her vote and completes the ballot paper accordingly; she then
places the ballot paper anonymously in the ballot box, without recording her
name or any other identification information. This system can be transformed
into an electronic system by publishing a vote v¯i on the bulletin board. The spec-
ification of this protocol is defined by 〈V, 0, (), (), ()〉where V , bb〈u〉. Hence we
have that
V˜ P ({v¯1/u}, . . . , {v¯n/u}) = bb〈v¯1〉 | . . . | bb〈v¯n〉
Such a protocol should obviously not be individually verifiable. We will show
that our definition is indeed violated. The set of irreducible processes {B |
V P (−→∗ α−→−→∗)∗B} consists of the set of frames
{σp = {v¯p(1)/x′1, . . . , v¯p(n)/x′n} |
p is a permutation on {1, . . . , n}}
We suppose that there exist a, b such that a 6= b and v¯a = v¯b, i.e. two voters
cast the same vote. Let k · n be the number of c〈M〉 in V˜ P ({v¯1/u}, . . . , {v¯n/u}).
It follows that k = 1 and we simply write f instead of f1. By contradiction,
suppose for all σp that there exists f and RIV such that for all i, j and v′ we have
RIV {v′/u, x′f(i)/x}σp iff i = j ∧ v′ = v¯j . However as v¯a = v¯b there exist i, j such
that x′f(i)σp = x
′
f(j)σp. Hence, we obtain R
IV {v′/u, x′f(i)/x}σp and i 6= j ∧ v′ = v¯j
which contradicts the hypothesis.
7.5.3 Protocol due to Fujioka, Okamoto & Ohta
Description The protocol [115] involves voters, an administrator and a collec-
tor. The voter computes her ballot b = commit(v¯, r) and sends the signature
sign(blind(b, r′), skV ) with her blind ballot blind(b, r′) to the administrator. The
administrator verifies the signature, signs this blind ballot sign(blind(b, r′), skA)
and returns it. The voter verifies the administrator’s signature and unblinds
the received message to recover the signature of her ballot by the administra-
tor sign(b, skA). The voter then posts her ballot b and the administrator’s sig-
nature of her ballot sign(b, skA) to the bulletin board. The collector receives
(b, sign(b, skA)) from the bulletin board, verifies the signature and if the verifica-
tion succeeds, places (l, b, sign(b, skA)) on the bulletin board. The voter checks
the bulletin board for her entry, discovers l and posts on the bulletin board l
and r. Finally, the collector opens all of ballots on the bulletin board using the
corresponding r’s. To capture the protocol we consider the equational theory E
defined by:
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sdec(senc(x, y), y) = x
open(commit(x, y), y) = x
checksign(sign(x, y), x, Pk(y)) = true
unblind(blind(x, y), y) = x
unblind(sign(blind(x, y), z), y) = sign(x, z)
nthji ((x1, . . . , xj)) = xi if i ≤ j.
Applied pi formalism The voting specification of this protocol is represented
by 〈voter, keying, s˜, t˜, m˜〉 where s˜ = (r, r′), t˜ = (skV ), m˜ = (a). The voter and
keying processes are defined below.
voter , a(skV , pkA)
let b = commit(u, r) in
c〈Pk(skV ), blind(b, r′), sign(blind(b, r′), skV )〉
c(x)
if checksign(x, blind(b, r′), pkA) = true then
let sb = unblind(x, r′) in
bb〈b, sb〉
bb(l, y, z)
if y = b ∧ z = sb then
bb〈l, r〉
keying , a〈skV , Pk(skA)〉 | bb〈Pk(skV ), Pk(skA)〉
Analysis Let tests RIV and RUV be given in Figure 7.2. RIV expects that x1 cor-
responds to the public keys published by the keying authority; x2 corresponds
to the private/public keys sent to the voter by the keying authority using a pri-
vate channel; and x3 is the voter’s signed blinded ballot. The variable x4 should
correspond to the voter’s blinded ballot signed by the administrator; and x5 is
the unblinded signed ballot. Finally, x7 is expected to refer to the commitment
factor used during the protocol. The test RIV ensures that all values are pro-
vided as expected and RUV checks that opening the ballots reveals the votes
corresponding to the published outcome.
Suppose V˜ P (1, . . . , n)(−→∗ α−→−→∗)∗B such that B is irreducible, φ(B) = ν n˜.σ,
dom(σ) = {x′1, . . . , x′7·n} and σ is as defined in Figure 7.2. Let f1, . . . , f7 be given
by fi(j) = l(i−1)·n+j . It follows that:
1. Individual verifiability. The result follows immediately since RIV Φ has a
single solution for i1, . . . , i7, j, v′ namely i1 = . . . = i7 = j and v′ = v¯j . The
result of RIV Φ is provided in Figure 7.2.
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2. Universal verifiability. We observe that RUV Φ =∧n
i=1 eq(open(nth
3
2(〈li, commit(v¯i, ri), sign(commit(v¯i, ri), skA)〉), ri), v′i) =E∧n
i=1 eq(open(commit(v¯i, ri), ri), v
′
i) =E eq(v¯i, v
′
i) and hence has a single
solution for v′1, . . . , v′n and namely v˜′ = (v¯1, . . . , v¯n), concluding our proof.
Moreover, by inspection of the voting process specification, we have
V˜ P ({v¯1/u}, . . . , {v¯n/u})(−→∗ α−→−→∗)∗B and dom(σ) = {x′1, . . . , x′7·n}.
7.5.4 Protocol due to Lee et al.
Description The protocol [141] involves an administrator, voters, mixers, tal-
liers and a trusted randomisation service (in practice the randomisation service
is implemented as a secure smart card called a tamper resistant randomiser).
The voter encrypts her ballot and sends it to the randomisation service using a
private channel. The randomisation service re-encrypts the ballot and returns
the signed re-encrypted ballot along with a designated verifier proof which
demonstrates the re-encrypted ballot is indeed a re-encryption of the voter’s
encrypted ballot. The additional randomisation ensures the voter cannot recon-
struct her ballot and hence is unable to create a receipt for a potential coercer.
The voter signs her ballot and posts it on the bulletin board. The administra-
tor verifies the double signed ballots and publishes valid ballots on the bulletin
board. The mixers then perform a secret shuffle. Finally the talliers use signa-
ture proofs of knowledge to reveal an (t, n)-threshold decryption key for each
ballot.
Applied pi formalism The voting specification of this protocol is defined as
〈voter, registrar, s˜, t˜, m˜〉where s˜ = (r), t˜ = (skV , skR), m˜ = (aV) and processes
voter,registrar are defined below.
voter , aV(skV , pkR, pkT )
let b = penc(u, r, pkT ) in
aVR〈b〉.aVR(sb′, dvp)
if checkdvp(dvp, b, getmsg(sb′), Pk(skV )) then
if checksign(sb′, pkR) then
bb〈sign(sb′, skV )〉
registrar , aV〈skV , Pk(skR), Pk(skT )〉 | aR〈skR〉 |
bb〈〈Pk(skV ), Pk(skR), Pk(skT )〉〉
For simplicity we consider (1, n)-threshold decryption. In addition we assume
the existence of a secure mixer and hence do not verify the shuffle.
In [141] it is suggested that the protocol makes use of the ElGamal encryp-
tion scheme which we model by the following equations for decryption and
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re-encryption.
dec(penc(x, y, Pk(z)), z) = x
renc(penc(x, y, z), w) = penc(x, f(y, w), z)
The ElGamal encryption scheme exhibits the feature expressed by the equation
dec(penc(x, y, Pk(z)), commit(penc(x, y, Pk(z)), z)) = x
which is used by the protocol. We also add functions dvp, checkdvp to model
designated verifier proofs of the fact that a message is a re-encryption of another
one; we adopt the equations
checkdvp(dvp(x, renc(x, y), y, pk(z)),
x, renc(x, y), pk(z)) = true
checkdvp(dvp(x, y, z, w), x, y, pk(w)) = true
The second equation models that checkdvp also succeeds for a fake proof con-
structed using the designated verifier’s private key. By a slight abuse of nota-
tion we also interpret checkdvp(t1, t2, t3, t4) as a predicate which evaluates to true
whenever checkdvp(t1, t2, t3, t4) =E true.
We adopt the formalism for signature proofs of knowledge due to Backes et
al. [25]. A signature proof of knowledge is a term SPKi,j(M˜, N˜ , F ) where M˜ =
(M1, . . . ,Mi) denotes the witness (or private component), N˜ = (N1, . . . , Nj)
defines the public parameters and F is a formula over those terms. More
precisely F is a term without names or variables, but includes distinguished
constants αk, βl where k, l ∈ N. The constants αk, βl in F denote placehold-
ers for the terms Mk ∈ M˜ , Nl ∈ N˜ used within a signature of knowl-
edge SPKi,j(M˜, N˜ , F ). For example the signature proof of knowledge used
by the Lee et al. voting protocol [141] demonstrates possession of a se-
cret key skT such that Pk(skT ) = pkT and d = commit(b′, skT ) i.e. the
proof shows the public key pkT is correctly formed and d is a decryption
key for the voter’s ballot b′. This can be captured as SPK1,3((skT ), (pkT ,
commit(b′, skT ), b′), FL) where FL = eq(β1, Pk(α1)) ∧ eq(β2, commit(β3, α1)). A
term SPKi,j(M˜, N˜ , F ) represents a valid signature if the term obtained by substi-
tuting Mk, Nl for the corresponding αk, βl evaluates to true. Verification of such
a statement is modelled by the function Veri,j . The equational theory includes
the following equations defined over all tuples x˜ = (x1, . . . , xi), y˜ = (y1, . . . , yj)
and formula F ∈ TΣ∪{αk,βl|k≤i, l≤j} without names or variables:
Publicp(SPKi,j(x˜, y˜, F )) = nth
j
p(y˜) where p ∈ [i, j]
Formula(SPKi,j(x˜, y˜, F )) = F
We also make use of the predicate Veri,j defined as Veri,j(F, SPKi,j(M˜, N˜ , F ′))
if and only if F =E F ′ and F{M1/α1, . . . ,Mi/αi,N1/β1, . . . ,Nj/βj} holds where
i = |M˜ |, j = |N˜ | and F, F ′ ∈ TΣ∪{αk,βl|k≤i, l≤j} without names or variables.
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Analysis Let tests RIV , RUV be given as in Figure 7.3. The tests make the fol-
lowing assumptions. The variable x1 corresponds to the public/secret keys sent
to the voter by the key distribution process; x2 is the voter’s randomised ballot;
and x3 is the signed ballot produced by the randomisation service along with
a designated verifier proof demonstrating the correctness of the re-encryption.
The value x4 is the voter’s double signed ballot and finally x5 corresponds to the
public keys published by the keying process. AdditionallyRUV assumes that for
all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} we have y1,i corresponds to the ballot recovered from the dou-
ble signed ballot produced by the voter; y2,i is a signature proof of knowledge
revealing the ballot’s decryption key; and finally y3,i is the decryted ballot (i.e.
the ith voter’s vote).
Suppose V˜ P (1, . . . , n)(−→∗ α−→−→∗)∗ν n˜.(σ | Q) such that Q is irreducible and
dom(σ) = {x′1, . . . , x′6·n}. Without loss of generality we have σ as specified in
Figure 7.3. Let f˜ be given by fi(j) = l(i−1)·n+j . It follows that:
1. Individual verifiability. The expansion of RIV Φ is provided in Figure 7.3.
The result follows immediately since RIV Φ has a single solution for
i1, . . . , i6, j namely i1 = i2 = . . . = i6 = j and v′ = v¯j .
2. Universal verifiability. We observe RUV {v˜′/u˜, x˜′f1/x˜1, . . . , x˜′fk/x˜k}σ evaluates
to the following for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}:
y1,i = b
′
i ∧ Ver1,3(FL, y2,i)∧
y1,i = Public3(y2,i) ∧ Pk(skT ) = Public1(y2,i)∧
y3,i = dec(y1,i,Public2(y2,i)) ∧ v′i = y3,i
where b′i = penc(v¯i, f(ri, r′i), Pk(skT )). It follows that RUV Φ holds when
v˜′ = (v¯1, . . . , v¯n) and
τ =E {b′1/y1,1, . . . , b′n/y1,n, s1/y2,1, . . . , sn/y2,nsv¯1/y3,1, . . . , v¯n/y3,n}
with si = SPK1,3((skT ), (pkT , commit(b′i, skT ), b′i), FL), concluding our proof.
Moreover, we have V˜ P ({v¯1/u}, . . . , {v¯n/u})(−→∗ α−→−→∗)∗ϕ such that dom(ϕ) =
{x′1, . . . , x′6·n}.
7.6 Relates works
The literature is rich in works dealing with formal verification of security proto-
cols. However, there are only few formal works [30, 77, 97, 196, 136, 149] related
to electronic voting protocols. This is mainly due to their lack of maturity com-
pared to other ones such as key distribution or authentication protocols, and to
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the complexity of the involved techniques. Indeed, they involve advanced cryp-
tographic primitives, for example bit commitment, blind signature, zero knowl-
edge proofs, and rely on complex channels, for example anonymous channels.
Eligibility, fairness, receipt-freeness, coercion-resistance, vote-privacy, inalter-
ability and declared tally have been studied in [97, 136, 30, 25].
In this chapter, we analyse the individual and universal verifiability prop-
erties. Juels , Catalano and Jacobson [126, 127] presented the first definition
of universal verifiability in terms of game semantics in the provable security
model. Their definition assumes voting protocols produce signature proofs of
knowledge demonstrating the correctness of tallying. Automated analysis is
not discussed.
In the context of formal methods, Chevallier-Mames et al. [76] provide the
first formalisation of universal verifiability. However, their definition is incom-
patible with vote-privacy, and hence with coercion-resistance. To see this, note
that they require functions f and f ′ such that, for any bulletin board bb and list
of eligible voters L, f(bb, L) returns the list of actual voters, and f ′(bb, L) returns
the tally (see Definition 1 of [76]). From these functions, one could consider any
single bulletin board entry b and compute f({b}, L) and f ′({b}, L) to reveal a
voter and her vote.
Baskar, Ramanujan & Suresh [30] and subsequently Talbi et al. [193] have
formalised verifiability with respect to the FOO [115] electronic voting protocol.
Their definitions are tightly coupled to that particular protocol and cannot eas-
ily be generalised to other protocols. Moreover, their definitions characterise in-
dividual executions as verifiable or not; whereas verifiability properties should
be considered with respect to every execution (i.e. the entire protocol).
7.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have formally defined the properties of individual and univer-
sal verifiability for electronic voting protocols, and show that they are satisfied
by the protocols due to Fujioka, Okamoto & Ohta [115] and Lee et al. [141].
Since the second of these protocols also satisfies vote-privacy, receipt-freeness
and coercion-resistance [97], our definition is compatible with those properties,
in contrast with the definition of [76]. Our definition represents a sufficient con-
dition, but not a necessary one.
A more recent version of this work, in which, in addition to the formalisation
of individual and universal verifiability, we formalise the eligibility verifiability will
be presented at WISSec 2009 workshop [191].
Since the voter verifiability properties can be seen as equivalence properties, we
plan, in future works, to extend the decidability results obtained on the satu-
rated systems in order to prove such equivalence properties.
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Figure 7.1 Postal ballot voting protocol
The voting specification of our “postal ballot” voting protocol is defined as
〈V, P, (), (skV ), (a)〉 for processes:
V , a(skV ).bb〈sign(u, skV )〉
P , a〈skV 〉 | bb〈Pk(skV )〉
The process V˜ P ({v¯1/u}, {v¯2/u}) is defined as:
V˜ P ({v¯1/u}, {v¯2/u}) , ν a1, skV1 , kpc1, a2, skV2 , kpc2.
(a1〈skV1〉 | bb〈Pk(skV1)〉 | a2〈skV2〉 | bb〈Pk(skV1)〉 |
a1(skV ).bb〈senc(skV , kpc1)〉.bb〈sign(v¯1, skV )〉 |
a2(skV ).bb〈senc(skV , kpc1)〉.bb〈sign(v¯2, skV )〉)
Figure 7.2 Fujioka et al. protocol verification artifacts
RIV = eq(Pk(nth21(sdec(x2, z3))), nth
2
1(x1)) ∧ eq(nth32(x3), blind(commit(v, z1), z2))∧
eq(checksign(x4, blind(commit(v, z1), z2), nth22(x1)), true)∧
eq(nth21(x5), nth
3
2(x6)) ∧ eq(nth21(x5), commit(v, z1)) ∧ eq(nth22(x7), z1)
RUV =
∧n
i=1 eq(open(nth
3
2(x6,i), nth
2
2(x7,i)), vi)
σ = {(Pk(skV1), Pk(skA))/x′l1 , . . . , (Pk(skVn), Pk(skA))/x′ln ,
senc((skV1 , Pk(skA)),Kpc1)/x′ln+1 , . . . ,
senc((skVn , Pk(skA)),Kpcn)/x′l2n ,
(Pk(skV1), blind(b1, r
′
1), sign(blind(b1, r
′
1), skV1))/x′l2n+1 , . . . ,
(Pk(skVn), blind(bn, r
′
n), sign(blind(bn, r
′
n), skVn))/x′l3n ,
sign(blind(b1, r
′
1), skA)/x′l3n+1 , . . . ,
sign(blind(bn, r
′
n), skA)/x′l4n ,
(b1, sign(b1, skA))/x′l4n+1 , . . . ,
(bn, sign(bn, skA))/x′l5n ,
(l1, b1, sign(b1, skA))/x′l5n+1 , . . . ,
(ln, bn, sign(bn, skA))/x′l6n ,
(l1, r1)/x′l6n+1 , . . . ,
(ln, rn)/x′l7n}
where bi = commit(v¯i, ri)
RIV Φ = eq(Pk(nth21(sdec(senc((skVi2 , Pk(skA)),Kpci2),Kpcj))), Pk(skVi1 ))∧
eq(blind(commit(v¯i3 , ri3), r
′
i3
), blind(commit(u, rj), r′j))∧
eq(checksign(sign(blind(commit(v¯i4 , ri4), r
′
i4
), skA),
blind(commit(u, rj), r′j), Pk(skA)), true)∧
eq(commit(v¯i5 , ri5), commit(v¯i6 , ri6))∧
eq(commit(v¯i5 , ri5), commit(u, rj)) ∧ eq(ri7 , rj).
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Figure 7.3 Lee et al. protocol verification artifacts
RIV = eq(x2, penc(u, z1, nth33(sdec(x1, z2)))) ∧ eq(x4, sign(nth21(sdec(x3, z2)),
nth31(sdec(x1, z2))))∧
checkdvp(nth22(sdec(x3, z2)), x2, getmsg(nth
2
1(sdec(x3, z2))), Pk(nth
3
1(sdec(x1, z2))))∧
eq(nth31(x6), Pk(nth
3
1(sdec(x1, z2)))) ∧ eq(Pk(x5), nth32(sdec(x1, z2)))
RUV =
∧n
i=1
(
y1,i = getmsg(getmsg(x4,i)) ∧ nth33(x6,i) = Public1(y2,i) ∧ y1,i = Public3(y2,i)∧
Ver1,3(FL, y2,i) ∧ y3,i = dec(y1,i,Public2(y2,i)) ∧ ui = y3,i
)
σ =E {senc(〈skV1 , Pk(skR1), Pk(skT )〉, kpc1)/x′l1 , . . . , senc(〈skVn , Pk(skRn), Pk(skT )〉, kpcn)/x′ln ,
b1/x′ln+1 , . . . ,
bn/x′l2n
senc(〈sign(b′1, skR1), dvp(b1, b′1, r′1, Pk(skV1))〉, kpc1)/x′l2n+1 , . . . ,
senc(〈sign(b′n, skRn), dvp(bn, b′n, r′n, Pk(skVn))〉, kpcn)/x′l3n ,
sign(sign(b′1, skR1), skV1)/x′l3n+1 , . . . ,
sign(sign(b′n, skRn), skVn)/x′l4n ,
skR1/x′l4n+1 , . . . ,
skRn/x′l5n ,
〈Pk(skV1), Pk(skR1), Pk(skT )〉/x′l5n+1 , . . . , 〈Pk(skVn), Pk(skRn), Pk(skT )〉/x′l6n}
where bi = penc(v¯i, ri, Pk(skT )) and b′i = penc(v¯i, f(ri, r
′
i), Pk(skT ))
RIV Φ = eq(bi2 , penc(v
′, rj , nth33(sdec(senc(〈skVi1 , Pk(skRi1 ), Pk(skT )〉, kpci1), kpcj))))
∧eq(sign(sign(b′i4 , skRi4 ), skVi4 ), sign(nth21(sdec(senc(〈sign(b′i3 , skRi3 ),
dvp(bi3 , b
′
i3
, r′i3 , Pk(skVi3 ))〉, kpci3), kpcj)),
nth31(sdec(senc(〈skVi1 , Pk(skRi1 ), Pk(skT )〉, kpci1), kpcj))))
∧checkdvp(nth22(sdec(senc(〈sign(b′i3 , skRi3 ),
dvp(bi3 , b
′
i3
, r′i3 , Pk(skVi3 ))〉, kpci3), kpcj)), bi2 ,
getmsg(nth21(sdec(senc(〈sign(b′i3 , skRi3 ), dvp(bi3 , b′i3 , r′i3 , Pk(skVi3 ))〉, kpci3), kpcj))),
Pk(nth31(sdec(senc(〈skVi1 , Pk(skRi1 ),
Pk(skT )〉, kpci1), kpcj))))
∧eq(nth31(〈Pk(skVi6 ), Pk(skRi6 ), Pk(skT )〉), Pk(nth31(sdec(senc(〈skVi1 , Pk(skRi1 ),
Pk(skT )〉, kpci1), kpcj))))
∧eq(Pk(skRi5 ), nth32(sdec(senc(〈skVi1 , Pk(skRi1 ), Pk(skT )〉, kpci1), kpcj)))
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Chapter 8
Conclusion and Perspectives
In our society, the use of electronic applications such as e-communication, e-
voting, e-banking, e-commerce, etc is increasing. Among several important re-
quirements, security figures as one crucial aspect. To guarantee security, such
applications use cryptographic protocols. It is well-known that design of cryp-
tographic protocols is not sufficient to their deployment, they need to be for-
mally analysed. While the insecurity problem of cryptographic protocols has
been shown to be undecidable in the general case [111], several restrictions led
to decidable results with perfect and unperfect cryptography hypotheses.
In this thesis, we have relaxed the perfect cryptography hypothesis by taking
into account several algebraic properties of cryptographic primitives. Follow-
ing the symbolic approach (in particular the method based on the resolution
of constraint solving) to analyse cryptographic protocols, we provided deci-
sion procedures for the insecurity problem of cryptographic protocols with a
bounded number of sessions.
In Chapter 3, we considered the collision vulnerability property of hash func-
tions, and we analysed the class of cryptographic protocols employing hash
functions having this property. We reduced the insecurity problem of our class
of cryptographic protocols to the ordered satisfiability problem for the intruder
exploiting the collision vulnerability property of hash functions. We provided
sufficient arguments that allowed us to conjecture that, following [74], the or-
dered satisfiability problem for the intruder exploiting the collision vulnerabil-
ity property of hash functions can be reduced to the ordered satisfiability prob-
lem for an intruder operating on words. We then proved the decidability of the
last problem. A natural extension of this work would be to prove the above
conjecture.
In Chapter 4, we considered the destructive exclusive ownership vulnerability
and the constructive exclusive ownership vulnerability properties for digital signature
schemes, and we showed the decidability of the insecurity problem for the two
classes of cryptographic protocols using signature schemes having respectively
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these two properties. We first reduced the insecurity problem of our two classes
of protocols to the reachability problem for our respective intruder deduction
systems. We then provided a decision procedure, based on the saturation of
intruder deduction systems, for the reachability problem.
This decision procedure was then extended in Chapter 5 in order to capture a
general class of cryptographic protocols: the class of protocols using cryptographic
primitives represented by convergent equational theories with finite variant property.
A simple generalisation of the decision procedure given in Chapter 4 allowed
us to prove the decidability of the ground reachability problem for our class
of deduction systems. Actually, we slightly modified the saturation algorithm
introduced in Chapter 4, and showed that the termination of its application on
our class of intruder deduction systems implies the decidability of the ground
reachability problem. We also showed that this termination is not sufficient to
prove the decidability of the general reachability problem. We then gave an ad-
ditional syntactic condition on the deduction systems that allowed us to prove
the decidability of the general reachability problem. As an application of our
result, we gave an alternative proof for the decidability of the ground reacha-
bility problem for the blind signature theory. This decidability result has been
initially proved in [9]. We also gave an alternative proof for the decidability of
the general reachability problem for the subterm convergent theory, which is
already proved in [31].
We note that in Chapter 5, we have only considered the class of convergent
equational theories with finite variant property. We plan to extend the results of
Chapter 5 to the class of AC-convergent equational theories with finite variant
property. As showed in [86], such extention may include several theories such
as the theory of exclusive or and the theory of abelian groups. We also plan to
weaken the syntactic condition we assume on the deduction systems in order
to prove the decidability of the general reachability problem.
In Chapter 6, we showed the decidability of the ground entailment problem
for a new class of clauses. This decidability result is obtained by generalising
the saturation procedure given in Chapter 5, and it relies on the use of selected
resolution and on some syntactic conditions on the atom and term orderings.
We also showed how to use this result in order to decide the insecurity problem
of cryptographic protocols in the case of bounded number of sessions. In future
works, we plan to:
1. implement the decision procedure: with respect to the result of D. Basin
and H. Ganzinger [28], we remark that for ground entailment problem,
it suffices to consider inferences by selected resolution in which one of the
atoms is ground. Thus we do not need to construct the set of ground atoms
before solving an entailment problem.
2. extend this result to the case where the clauses are considered modulo an
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equational theory, i.e. we reason modulo an equational theory on atoms
and terms.
3. extend the application on cryptographic protocols from search of proofs
to proof of correctness, and that by including the clauses describing the
protocol to the set of clauses.
4. extend the application on cryptographic protocols to the unperfect cryp-
tography hypothesis, and that by including the clauses describing the alge-
braic properties of primitives and the clauses representing the congruence
relation to the set of clauses.
In Chapter 7, we studied a new class of cryptographic protocols: the
electronic-voting protocols, and in particular the voter verifiability property, which
includes the individual verifiability and the universal verifiability properties. We
formally defined these two properties using the applied pi calculus, and we ap-
plied our definition to the e-voting protocol due to Fujioka, Okamoto & Ohta [115]
and the e-voting protocol due to Lee et al. [141]. In future works, we plan to:
1. extend the scope of e-voting protocols on which we apply our definition in
order to capture more relevant protocols such as the protocol due to Okamoto
[165], and the protocol due to D. Sandler et al. [182].
2. extend the decidability results obtained on the saturated systems in order
to prove the voter verifiability property.
3. analyse the e-voting protocols by taking into consideration algebraic prop-
erties of cryptographic primitives.
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